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The thesis explores trade union resistance to neo-liberal globalisation through a 
case-study of the strategic development of Sintraemcali (the trade union of the 
Municipal Enterprises of Cali) in Colombia. Sintraemcali, since the mid 1990's, has 
fought off a series of attempts by the Colombian government to privatise the 
public utilities of water, electricity and telecommunications. Drawing on Burawoy's 
(1998) Extended Case Method the research is based on 16 months of participatory 
ethnographic fieldwork and develops a critical theory approach to researching 
`globalisation from below' through drawing on the work of the Neo-Gramscian 
School and that of Boaventura de Sousa Santos. 
The thesis focuses on one particular episode of protest - the 36 day CAM Tower 
Occupation that began on December 25th, 2001 - in order to understand the 
conditions that enabled this event to come about. This episode of protest linked 
workers and local communities in mass protest and operated on a range of scales 
from the local to the global. The thesis explores how this multi-scalar strategy 
developed. The thesis traces the historical development of these strategies and 
explores Sintraemcali's transformation during the 1990's from a corporate trade 
union fighting for the particular interests of its affiliates to a social movement 
union defending the broader interests of the local community. The transformation 
of the trade union took place under the difficult conditions of Colombia where 
trade unions and human rights activists are regularly subject to assassination by 
state and para-state forces. 
Through a reconceptualisation of `trade union education' the thesis argues that 
Sintraemcali's transformation can be understood as a pedagogical process. The 
main argument put forward is that the emergence of a strategic pedagogy within 
the union facilitated the development of a broad multi-scalar strategy that included: 
(1) an alternative economic strategy for the management of Emcali; (2) a trade 
union/ community alliance within the city of Cali in defence of public services; (3) a 
mobilisation strategy which included a series of militant occupations of high profile 
buildings; and, (4) a human rights strategy that provided access to local, national 
and international legal and advocacy mechanisms that facilitated Sintraemcali's 
ability to globalise its struggle against privatisation. 
The research isolates two key pedagogical processes at work that serve to modify 
the context within which Sintraemcali operated: transborderisation and 
horiiontalisation. The first challenges the view that labour organisations can only 
operate at the local scale and highlights how, through a multi-scalar pedagogy, 
Sintraemcali members and allies developed new skills, knowledge and strategies 
that enabled them to operate on a range of scales from the local to the global. The 
second pedagogical process, horiiontalisation, highlights the rearticulation of trade 
union objectives towards an ethic of citizenship and human rights. This allowed 
for the development of a more reciprocal relationship between the trade union, 
social movements, and marginalised communities at a range of geographical scales. 
Keywords: Social movement unionism, globalisation, neoliberalism, privatisation, 
Colombia, critical pedagogy, social movement learning 
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I began this research project in September 2000 after having returned from 
a two-year teaching contract with the British Council in Cali, Colombia. In my own 
mind the idea of studying for a PhD served two purposes, one to facilitate a career 
change, and the other to engage with the Colombian popular' movement and 
attempt to assist where possible in the international solidarity movement created to 
challenge the appalling human rights situation prevalent in the country. 
My initial proposal, funded by the Economic and Social Research Council, 
was based around exploring the impacts of globalisation on the education system 
in Colombia, but early on I began to focus on the assassination of teachers and 
education workers and the relationship between these human rights violations and 
neo-liberal restructuring taking place across the country. In the UK during my first 
months of undertaking the PhD I made contact with a range of Colombian 
political exiles and UK international solidarity activists who were working on 
raising the profile of the situation in Colombia. 
By December 2000 1 had met with Alexander Lopez, President of 
Sintraemcali (Sindicato De Los Trabajadores de Las Empresas Municipales de 
Cali3). Alexander Lopez was temporarily in exile in the UK after surviving an 
assassination attempt on his life. He had been told by the Colombian Ministry of 
the Interior that they could no longer guarantee his security if he remained in 
Colombia. At our first meeting I also met with Andy Higginbottom, then a 
member of the Latin American Solidarity Collective Against US Intervention in 
Colombia (LASOC), and I was struck by the political clarity and commitment that 
both of them had, and their belief in the importance of building up international 
solidarity for the Colombian. popular movement. That meeting would lead to a 
2 The word `popular' in Spanish has the connotation of including the poor and the working classes. A 
`barrio popular' (popular neighborhood) signifies a poor or working class neighborhood. Trade unions, 
community groups, indigenous organisations would all be understood as examples of `popular' 
movements, and collectively would be known as `the popular movement'. See Kane (2001, pp. 8-9) 
for a 
discussion of this. Subaltern would be a suitably inclusive English synonym, but in this thesis I will use 
the Spanish `popular'. 
Prologue 2 
change in research direction, and facilitate my involvement in a range of advocacy 
work on the human rights situation in Colombia. It would also lead to my eventual 
job as a volunteer in the headquarters of Sintraemcali whilst I carried out my 
fieldwork. 
I arrived in Cali on my first field trip in June 2001 and would stay there and 
work in the human rights department until late November 2001. My fluency in 
Spanish and English meant that I could assist Sintraemcali in a variety of tasks. 
During that time my work with the union involved translating documents, 
contacting a range of international trade union and political organizations, and 
carrying out simultaneous translation work when international delegates arrived 
from English speaking countries. During that first field trip I became deeply 
impressed with the work that Sintraemcali was carrying out in the city's poorest 
communities, its joint management of Emcali that had been undertaken through 
the Plan PARE (Emcali Assistance and Recuperation Plan), and its militant style of 
trade unionism that linked up workers and communities in mass mobilisations and 
direct actions in defence of public services. 
It was an intensive period of work for me, and of personal transformation, 
whereby I became trained, under the supervision of Berenice Celeyta (head of 
Sintraemcali's human rights department), in being a human rights activist. I had 
entered into the difficult and dangerous world of the Colombian popular 
movement. Under Alexander Lopez's leadership there was a vibrancy and clear 
political direction that I had probably been seeking for many a year and I felt 
deeply committed to the objectives of the trade union organisation. 
When I returned to the UK that November I still planned to continue my 
research on teachers' unions. However, that was all to change on December 25th, 
2001, when Sintraemcali took over the CAM Tower (see Picture 2), their central 
administration building, after the Colombian government had sacked the Managing 
Director of the company and were intent on once again trying to privatise the 
3 Literally translated this would be the Trade Union of the Municipal Enterprises of Cali. From this point 
on I will refer to it as Sintraemcali. Emcali stands for the Empresas Muncipales de Cali, the official name 
of the public service providing company. 
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company. I returned on January 8th and would remain there until shortly after its 
successful conclusion on January 28th. Within a few days the trade union secured 
special permission from the local mayor and the military to allow me to enter and 
leave the occupation as a `human rights observer', and I spent the whole period 
working night and day inside and outside the CAM Tower occupation facilitating 
the international solidarity work. The uniqueness of the experience, and the 
privileged access that I had gained to a successful protest episode against 
privatisation, led me to completely re-orientate my research and focus instead on 
the CAM Tower Occupation. 
That task led me into a range of fascinating directions. I sought out the 
literatures on anti-globalisation and transnational solidarity networks, research on 
theories of trade union renewal and particularly `social movement unionism', and 
to theories of human rights defence, social capital and the construction of 
solidarity links. I became particularly interested in literatures on popular education 
and its role in constructing alternatives to the neo-liberal status quo that dominates 
the contemporary era and became involved in the popular education work that 
Sintraemcali was carrying out in local communities. Most importantly, the research 
allowed me to interview and discuss these issues with a broad cross section of 
leaders, workers and community activists involved in the occupation. From my 
own perspective the research process, the solidarity work developed through it, the 
friendships formed, and the knowledge gained is as important, if not more so, than 
this final product. But I believe that this thesis also serves an important role. As 
Santos (1999b) notes, it is the powerful that tend to write history and thus little is 
documented of alternative globalisations and counter-hegemonic struggles and 
victories. 
Thus the thesis represents a modest contribution, a grain of sand (as they 
say in Colombia), to redress the balance and place on the text the historical 
memory of one interpretation of the process of Sintraemcali's successful defence 
of public services in Cali. It is a story of ordinary people doing extra-ordinary 
things in different parts of the world, but united in a common vision that the 
contemporary neo-liberal state of affairs is unjust and unfair and that alternative 
Prologue 4 
futures can only be constructed through struggle, commitment and solidarity. This 
process has meant great personal sacrifices for many people, in time, in family 
relationships, in forced exile, in imprisonment, in physical injuries, and for 16 
members and supporters of Sintraemcali since 1998 it has led to the ultimate price 
- their assassination by paramilitary organisations linked to the Colombian state. 
This work is a tribute to their dignity, courage and sacrifice, and will hopefully 
serve as a useful reference and a source of inspiration for those committed to 
challenging the status quo in Colombia and in the wider world. 
Introduction 
Introduction 
On December 25th, 2001, hundreds of public service workers affiliated to 
Sintraemcali occupied the CAM Tower, their company's 17-floor central 
administration building in Colombia's second city of Cali4. As they entered the 
building they put on masks and kept their identities hidden from the cameras 
outside. When they left the occupation victoriously 36 days later a communique 
was released entitled 'We covered our faces so that we could be seen", and they 
dedicated their victory to the "7,900 of our comrades who were murdered by 
political assassinations last year, 155 of them trade union leaders"(see Appendix 1). 
This was no ordinary struggle against privatisation, but then Colombia is no 
ordinary place. 
The occupation was triggered by the national government's decision to try 
once again to privatise the company which provides electricity, water and 
telecommunications to the cities two million inhabitants, and abandon the 
worker/management `Plan PARE' which had been drawn up by the trade union 
and jointly administered with Emcali management since May 2001. Upon entering 
the CAM Tower Sintraemcali presented three main demands: that plans for the 
privatisation and/or liquidation of Emcali be stopped, that price increases for 
consumers for 2002 be frozen, and finally that a high level anti-corruption 
commission be set up to investigate and prosecute those who had embezzled 
money out of the company over recent years, which the trade union argued was 
the main cause of the financial crisis that the company then faced. 
During the course of the 36 day occupation, tens of thousands of people in 
Cali went to meetings, joined marches, blocked off roads, and engaged in political 
protest in the defence of Emcali as a state-owned public utilities provider, with the 
vast majority drawn from the poorest neighbourhoods in the city. The geography 
of the surrounds of the CAM Tower became transformed as a makeshift kitchen 
4 As the second biggest city in Colombia, with a two million population, this was no small provincial event and was well 
covered by the national Colombian media. In terms of comparative scale to the UK an equivalent event might be 
workers taking control of Birmingham City Council headquarters. 
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was constructed to feed the workers inside, as police and military troops 
surrounded the building, and as a stage was constructed across the road from the 
CAM Tower for local music bands to play and political speeches to be made. 
Colombian flags and trade union and community banners adorned the CAM 
Tower and surrounding buildings and the police perimeter was mirrored by a 
perimeter made up of Emcali workers and supporters who had their own notions 
of defence and security to counter those of the state. 
This local activity was complemented by solidarity actions both in Bogota, 
the capital, and in London, UK. In Bogota, Sintraemcali workers and supporters 
occupied the headquarters of the Superintendent of Public Services' for 14 hours 
while local public service trade unionists formed a protective cordon around the 
building. During that day the elite anti-terrorist section of the Colombian military 
surrounded the building and placed snipers on adjacent roofs. In the United 
Kingdom pickets outside the Colombian embassy were organised on several 
occasions in solidarity with Sintraemcali workers, and two live video link ups were 
made between leaders of the British Trade Union Congress (TUC) and workers 
inside the Cali occupation. During key moments of the dispute interventions were 
made either via letters to the Colombian government and/or face to face meetings 
with Colombian diplomats by the TUC, Amnesty International, Public Services 
International (PSI), the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 
(ICFTU), UNISON, the FBU, ASLEF, War on Want, the UK based Colombia 
Solidarity Campaign and a range of other trade union and social organisations. 
Furthermore, messages of support and solidarity for the occupation were received 
by email from as far a field as Papua New Guinea, Indonesia and the Philippines. 
Given the considerable rhetoric around `hegemonic globalisation' as both 
juggernaut and ideology that shapes all in its path, it is important to see these 
events as offering a different way of understanding the complex, contested and 
considerably more contingent nature of global-local dynamics. The Sintraemcali 
case offers a concrete example of the possibilities of alternative forms of 
5A Colombian government ministry that is responsible for the regulation and control of public services 
in Colombia. 
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`globalisation' emerging, that operate on a range of spatial terrains from the local to 
the global in a process that in the abstract is often referred to as `counter- 
hegemonic globalisation' or `globalisation from below'. 
The question that I ask in this thesis is how did a small trade union with 
only 3,000 members spark off such a broad range of local, national and 
transnational support, and how did it manage to overturn a process of privatisation 
that had the full backing of local elites, the national government, the World Bank, 
the IMF (International Monetary Fund), and several key multinational corporations 
(MNCs) with all the structural, political and military power that this entails? The 
second question I ask is what were the major pedagogical interventions that 
contributed to the trade union's strategic development? 
What I will argue is that rather than being understood as a spontaneous 
uprising against privatisation, the CAM Tower Occupation can be seen as an 
`educational outcome' produced through several years of strategic pedagogical 
action on the part of Sintraemcali in its attempt to defend public utility provision in 
the city of Cali from privatisation. This process began internally within the trade 
union and spread out linking local communities left out of the benefits of neo- 
liberal globalisation, and transnationally through a range of solidarity and human 
rights networks. This pedagogical process emerged in the complex and harsh 
conditions of a violent internal civil war underpinned by a socio-economic crisis 
that had worsened since the beginning of the imposition of a neo-liberal economic 
model in the early 1990's. 
What the thesis argues is that Sintraemcali during the early 1990's went 
through a process of transformation triggered by the structural changes brought 
about by the effects of neo-liberal globalisation on the economy, polity and society. 
This transformation took the form of a shift from a `corporate trade union' 
fighting for the `particular' rights of its members, to a `social movement union' 
engaged in a process seeking to defend the broader citizenship rights of the local 
community through a range of strategies that included the development of an 
alternative economic plan for the management of Emcali as a state public service 
provider, a mobilisation strategy that included the militant occupation of key 
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buildings, a trade union/ community alliance that linked organised workers with 
sections of the poorest communities in Cali, and finally a human rights strategy 
that operated on a range of scales from the local to the national and international. 
Underpinning this strategic transformation were two key pedagogical processes 
transborderisation and horkontalisation. The former challenges the view that labour 
organisations can be successful only when operating at the local scale and 
highlights how labour just like capital can operate on a range of scales from the 
local to the global. The latter highlights the benefits of a shift in the culture of trade 
unionism away from the narrow defence of `particular' member conditions towards 
a conceptualisation of trade unionism committed to the defence of local 
communities and citizen rights that not only seeks to mediate between capital and 
labour but challenge the labour/capital relationship itself and point towards 
alternative means of organising social life. Throughout this process of 
transformation, education and learning played a key role as new skills were 
developed and new subjectivities formed. Through a reconceptualisation of 
educational processes I highlight how a critical strategic pedagogy emerged within 
Sintraemcali that operated along these two dimensions and drove the process of 
transformation forward. 
While the thesis is firmly located in the particularities of Colombia it is 
driven by an ongoing dialogue that knows no geographical boundaries and is being 
addressed at present on all of the world's continents in different ways: Can the 
forward march of neo-liberal globalisation be halted? What can we learn from 
those social movements who have successfully or unsuccessfully sought to 
challenge this hegemonic form of globalisation? What role can the labour 
movement, broadly defined, play in this process? It is my belief that the case of 
Sintraemcali contributes to these debates and that this thesis represents an attempt 
to locate this struggle within those more wide-ranging theoretical and practical 
dialogues. 
Layout of Thesis 
The thesis is structured into three main sections. In Section One I develop a 
theoretical framework for understanding globalisation(s) from above and below, 
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locate this firmly within the trajectory of Latin American development and provide 
a critical case study methodology which guided my exploration of the case 
(Chapters One to Three). In Section Two the case of Sintraemcali is explored over 
four chapters. In Chapter Four I provide a contextual chapter on Colombia 
highlighting the particularities of neo-liberal globalisation and its implementation. 
In Chapter Five, I chart the transformation of Sintraemcali during the 1990's from 
`corporate' to `social movement union' and explore how this strategic development 
occurred. In Chapter Six I return to the CAM Tower Occupation and highlight 
how the process of Sintraemcali's transformation came together in one episode of 
protest - the 36-day occupation that began on December 25th, 2001. In Chapter 
Seven I analyse the findings of the case study bringing together the insights 
developed in the earlier chapters and explore how the critical strategic pedagogy of 
Sintraemcali operated. 
In Section three I provide a conclusion to the thesis by returning to the 
theoretical questions outlined in chapter one and two and highlight the dynamics 
of Sintraemcali's construction of a form of bottom-up globalisation that took on 
the structural and discursive power of those agents driving the process of neo- 
liberal globalisation forward. I assess the contribution that the case study can make 
to labour strategy in the contemporary era, highlight the key findings and locate 
these within the broader debates on neo-liberal globalisation, particularly in the 
wake of September 11th, 2001. Finally, in the epilogue I bring the reader up to date 
with events in Sintraemcali from 2002 to the present day and the ongoing struggle 
for the defence of public services in Cali that is taking place. 
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SECTION ONE: 
Globalisation, labour and education: 
Theory and Method 
I 
Chapter One 
1 Chapter One 
UNDERSTANDING 
GLOBALISATION(S) FROM 
ABOVE: POWER AND THE NEO- 
LIBERAL GLOBAL (DIS) ORDER. 
1.1 Introduction 
11 
The rise of neo-liberalism as ideology and dominant economic model has 
defined the trajectory of global capitalist development over the last three decades. 
Facilitated by the leverage of the debt crisis, the iconic institutions of globalisation 
the World Bank and the IMF became increasingly influential over the 1980's and 
1990's, spreading their `free market' policy recipes throughout the world, but 
particularly in the South. From a local policy initiative in the UK, privatisation 
became a `globalised localism' that oversaw the shift from public to private 
ownership of a vast swathe of the world's natural resources and productive assets. 
Tariffs and legislation protecting national industries and products were abolished 
or severely curtailed facilitating equal access for foreign corporations and products 
to internal markets, and once protected national currencies were floated on 
international markets thus becoming subject to the market discipline of currency 
speculators. The `market' became the new `engine' of development and the `state' 
increasingly seen as an obstacle whose `power', `role' and `budget' had to be 
reduced and curtailed. All of these changes had a profound effect on the 
relationship between citizens, markets and states producing winners and losers. 
Reductions in state budgets and the removal of subsidies on basic goods all 
produced widespread opposition from poor population groups. The privatisation 
of national industries threw up movements in defence of national sovereignty and 
state employment. Removal of tariffs on foreign food imports produced 
6 Throughout the thesis I will use the `South' to refer to those countries previously categorised as the 
`Third World', or more recently labelled as `low or middle income countries' or `Postcolonial societies'. 
Drawing on Santos (1995, p. 506) the word `South' also serves as a metaphor to express all of those 
population groups left out of the benefits of this contemporary phase of capitalism wherever they are 
located. 
A 
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widespread opposition from local peasants and farmers unable to compete with 
cheap imports. By the end of the 1990's neo-liberalism for many people across the 
world became synonymous with attacking the rights of the poor and provoked 
widespread anger and opposition. 
On December 251", 2001 when several hundred Emcali workers occupied 
the headquarters of their company the building was quickly surrounded by heavily 
armed riot police. Each of the workers inside pledged to give up their life if 
necessary in defence of their company and in opposition to `el modelo neo-liberal'. 
On August 26th, 2003, Kun Hai Lee, a South Korean farmer committed ritual 
suicide in Cancun, Mexico outside a meeting of the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO). According to eyewitnesses, his last words were "... the WTO kills 
farmers" before slashing himself to death with a blade (AlterNet, 2003). These two 
events are not unrelated and news of suicides, riots, demonstrations, self- 
crucifixions, hunger strikes, occupations, and protests against neo-liberal economic 
policy have become widely reported in the media. 
What, then, is this thing called neo-liberalism? Why does it provoke such 
fury and spark such drastic forms of resistance? How has neo-liberalism affected 
these and other people and what are the means through which it has inserted itself 
as the only viable political project? Further, how has neo-liberalism managed to 
spread so rapidly across the planet? These are some of the questions that this initial 
chapter will begin to unravel and in doing so provide a theoretical framework for 
understanding neo-liberal globalisation. Central to this chapter is the argument that 
there has been a shift from a world economy based on inter-state relations towards 
a more global economy. Neo-liberalism has been the key catalyst in this process, 
serving to reorganise and restructure nation state development to the demands of 
global capitalist accumulation processes. In particular I will be arguing that this has 
been fundamentally a class project that strengthened the power of capital vis-a-vis 
labour through a range of coercive and consensual means. In Latin America this 
has had a profoundly negative impact on the working class and the poor. Poverty 
and many forms of social inequality have drastically increased, while the 
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casualisation of labour has simultaneously facilitated the penetration and influence 
of transnational capital throughout the region. 
The chapter draws upon a `critical theory' approach to social science to 
examine the relationship between globalisation and neo-liberalism. Developing the 
work of the eminent sociologist Boaventura de Sousa Santos and the critical 
theorists from the Neo-Gramscian School I lay out a framework for understanding 
the dynamics of neo-liberal globalisation and resistance which will inform the 
analysis of the case of Colombia and organised trade union and worker resistance 
to neo-liberalism. This focus leads to an exploration of the question of `power' and 
of the various forms of power at the heart of the neo-liberal globalisation project. 
Finally I explore the empirical evidence of social transformation in Latin America 
to highlight key structural changes to economic and political ownership and 
control and to the changing composition of the working class. 
1.2 Towards `knowledge as emancipation' and a `critical theory' of control vs. 
rebellion 
Robert Cox (1996, p. 87) argues that "theory is always for someone and for 
some purpose" and is located in both time and space. Because it is both space and 
time bound, theory emerges out of a `problematic' thrown up by particular 
historical conjunctures. Cox argues that at a meta-level, there are two major ways 
of categorising theory. The first, `problem solving theory', takes the prevailing 
order as given and seeks to delineate and mark off the problem from its broader 
social relations. Because it takes the present as given, it does not seek to challenge 
the existing social order; rather its aim is to make this order run more smoothly 
and efficiently. For that reason problem-solving theory has a built in system bias in 
that it tries to generate solutions that make the system work better rather than 
challenging the system itself. The second approach, `critical theory', unlike 
`problem solving theory', begins by problematising the problem itself, seeking to 
understand and locate it within larger wholes as a component within a far bigger 
and intimately connected picture. 
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Cox (1996, p. 85) criticised `academic conventions' for dividing the totality 
of the social world into separate spheres in order to understand particular 
phenomena or events. For Cox, the danger is that knowledge of particular events 
is only a fragment of the social totality, and that it is necessary to seek to reintegrate 
that knowledge into the bigger picture so that "... it becomes the basis for 
constructing a structured and dynamic view of larger wholes" (ibid, p. 85). He 
offers the example of his own field, international relations, that has focused its 
energy on looking at inter-state relations, leaving out many other actors on the 
international stage. A `critical theory' approach allows us to transcend the 
parameters of the problematic itself and provides the possibility of imaging 
alternatives to the status quo. While this does not mean that `critical theory' ignores 
`problems' and their possible solutions, what it does imply is that it allows space for 
a normative approach that can seek out other possibilities. In that sense `critical 
theory' contains within it a utopian element, but this is grounded in an analysis of 
the possible. Cox argues that `critical theory' "must reject improbable alternatives 
just as it rejects the permanency of the existing order", and in that manner it can 
act as a "guide to strategic action for bringing about an alternative order" (ibid, 
p. 87). 
The binary between `problem solving theory' and `critical theory' is also 
addressed by Santos (1999a)7 but in different terminology. He talks of the need to 
move from `knowledge as regulation' to `knowledge as emancipation' - ideas that 
correspond broadly to Cox's terminology. However, unlike Cox, Santos questions 
whether `critical theory' is able to fulfil its task of producing `knowledge as 
emancipation'. He raises the question as to why, in a world so full of things to 
criticize, has it become so difficult to produce a `critical theory' within the social 
sciences. His tentative response begins from an assertion that the key `analytical 
icons' (Santos, 1999a, pp. 29-36) of `critical theory' such as class, conflict, 
domination, exploitation, imperialism, sexism, dependency and so on have lost 
their centrality within `critical theory', and where they remain they are often so 
nuanced and re-elaborated that they have lost their critical edge. Secondly, as a 
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response to the more general crisis of the social sciences, conventional sociology in 
both its positivist and post-positivist forms was able to secure its own survival by 
justifying a critique of critical sociology. From the positivists this came in the form 
of an attack on critical sociology, arguing for a focus on methodological rigour and 
research on what `exists' rather than on `alternatives' as a justification for the 
usefulness of sociology itself. From the post positivists, the attack on critical 
sociology came from the perspective that social scientists cannot impose their 
"... normative preferences because they lack the privileged viewpoint that would 
allow them to do so" (Santos, 1999a, p. 32). As a result of this, the building block of 
`critical theory' - the question of whose side you are on - "became for some 
illegitimate, for others irrelevant, for others still an unanswerable question" (ibid). 
Yet Santos argues that this crisis of `critical theory' stems not only from the 
attacks on it by positivists and post-positivists. `Critical theory' as `knowledge as 
emancipation' emerged during modernity as an alternative `totalising theory', with 
Marxism being its clearest and dominant strand. Marxism developed the notion of 
an inevitable social transformation based on the historic development of the 
productive forces and the class struggles that would ensue. In this perspective, 
capitalism would be replaced by socialism and the agent of that transformation was 
the working class. This paradigm fitted neatly within the `duality of structure and 
agency' that underpins conventional sociology. In that sense the difference 
between Functional and Marxist sociology is not one between order and chaos, but 
between the order of social regulation and the order of social emancipation 
(Santos, 1999a, p. 33). What Marxism lacked was a notion of the alternative forms 
of domination and oppression, based on race, gender, sexuality and culture, and 
thus of alternative subjects of resistance which weakened the emancipatory 
potential of the paradigm. The second major weakness of Marxism, and its 
similarity to more conventional social science, was its implicit faith in 
industrialisation as the harbinger of `progress'. Increasingly, this position has 
become untenable both because of the environmental degradation that this has 
brought with it, and the fact that industrialisation has not brought `development' 
7 For those interested in easy access to more translated works see http: //www. eurozine. com and search 
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for two thirds of the world's population (in whichever manner this problematic 
term is defined). These two similarities with conventional social science, coupled 
with the knowledge of what happened to the proposals advocated by critical social 
theory under the project of `actually existing socialism' (in the USSR, Eastern 
Europe and China), necessitates that "we cannot rest content with merely thinking 
alternatives. We need an alternative thinking of alternatives" (Santos, 1999a, p. 37). 
This does not imply the abandonment of Marxism, but it does require a thorough 
and more reflexive critique that recognizes its limitations particularly in the 
domains of economic determinism and cultural homogeneity. 
According to Santos, what we are faced with in the contemporary world is a 
decline in both the paradigm of `social regulation' that has failed to bring progress 
to the majority of the world's population, and a decline in the `paradigm of social 
emancipation' that now fails to offer a viable emancipatory alternative. Thus the 
general crisis of the social sciences becomes mixed up with the crisis of `critical 
theory' as both were built on similar terrains. For this reason Santos argues we are 
in a `transition period' where we are "facing modern problems to which there are 
no modern solutions" (Santos, 1999a, p. 36). This state of affairs can lead either to a 
`celebratory postmodernism' that rejoices in the lack of alternatives, or what Santos 
calls "disquieting or oppositional postmodernity" that addresses the problems of 
the collapse of both emancipatory and regulatory paradigms and seeks to begin the 
process and face the challenges of constructing a new emancipatory paradigm 
drawing on the strengths of `critical theory' while at the same time addressing its 
weaknesses. 
In order to begin the process of constructing `knowledge as emancipation' 
Santos (1999a, pp. 39-43) argues that there is a need to overcome the unitary focus 
on `order' in the hegemonic paradigm of `knowledge as regulation' and, instead, 
move to a focus on `solidarity' as well. In the onset of capitalism, the study of both 
solidarity and order existed and could be conceptualised as one focused upon 
controlling `rebellious subjects' with the other seeking to build `solidarity' amongst 
those engaged in unequal structural relations with those who owned and controlled 
Santos. 
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the land and the factories. As the social sciences became institutionalised, so order 
became prioritised and solidarity downgraded, hence the reification of capital and 
the focus on power from above. Santos argues that `knowledge as emancipation' 
needs to redress the balance and return once again to a focus on `conformism' and 
`order' on the one hand and `rebellion' and `solidarity' on the other. In this chapter 
I will be exploring some of the research on `order' in the contemporary era while in 
Chapter Two I focus our attention on solidarity, rebellion and dissent in order to 
provide a theoretically informed picture of the nature of contestation in the 
contemporary neo-liberal global order. This dialectical relationship between `order' 
and `rebellion' will provide the theoretical framework for the research that will be 
presented in the rest of the thesis. 
1.3 What is Globalisation? 
Globalisation has in many ways become the catchphrase of the 
contemporary era and is utilised by academics, politicians and journalists to explain 
phenomena across a whole range of social and political domains. This is reflected 
in shifts in its usage in the social sciences as researchers grapple with the reality that 
something fundamental has changed in the contemporary world, and that those 
changes are affecting all areas of our social, political and material world. New 
phrases have appeared which reflect this shift, such as `globality', `globalism', 
`glocalisation', though there remains a tendency to use 'globalisation' as a synonym 
for such things as 'liberalism', 'universalism', 'westernisation' which, while perhaps 
reflecting some aspects of globalisation, does not do justice to its complexity and 
indeed can be highly misleading (Scholte, 2000). 
Despite the different range of `time-frames' $ that authors use to chart the 
rise of globalisation, the word itself has emerged over the last 20 years and appears 
to be an attempt to make sense of the changes that have taken place in the world 
with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the global recession of the late 1960's early 
8 Some authors see globalisation as beginning in the mid-1970's (e. g. Amin, 1997) while others (e. g. 
Held 1999) use the term to describe processes beginning 500 years ago. 
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1970's, the end of the Cold War, the rise in information technologies, the collapse 
of Keynesian economics, and the ascendancy of neo-liberalism, which is facilitating 
the emergence of a truly global economy (Shaw, 2000). While some authors see 
globalisation as the inevitable spread of free market economics (Ohmae, 1995; 
Gray, 1998; Reich, 1991), others reject this `juggernaut theses'. Some suggest that 
little has changed and that interconnectedness between nations was greater at the 
turn of the last century (Hirst & Thompson, 1996), and that the present period 
merely represents a heightening of imperialism (Callinicos, 2003; Petras, 2003). 
Increasingly, however, globalisation is recognised as neither inevitable nor 
just a simple extension of past tendencies. Instead it is understood as a set of highly 
complex and contested processes rather than one single phenomenon producing 
indeterminate and unexpected outcomes (see Shaw, 2000; Gills, 2000; Gill, 2003; 
Waterman, 2001; Mittelman, 2000; Othman & Kessler, 2000; Hay, 2002; Santos, 
2002). In part the realisation that globalisation is a set of processes that are highly 
contested has emerged in response to the gathering pace of global opposition to 
certain processes of globalisation, particularly to the dominant ideological project 
that has paralleled broader processes of globalisation, neo-liberalism. This is 
evidenced in many parts of the globe in protest episodes such as the `anti- 
globalisation' demonstrations in Seattle, and elsewhere since 1999, strikes and civil 
unrest in Argentina, South Africa, Mexico, Ecuador, Brazil, Venezuela, South 
Korea, Ecuador, and Bolivia (e. g. Kiely, 2000; Gills, 2000; Gill, 2003; Mittelman, 
2000). Furthermore, even in purely economic terms, the Asian crisis and its 
knock-on effect in Russia and Latin America in the late 1990's, and the near 
collapse of Argentina in 2001 have all jolted the confidence of those who had 
heralded, following Fukuyama (1992), the `end of history' and a never ending neo- 
liberal future. 
The recent rise of Christian and Islamic fundamentalism, the events of 
September 11th, 2001, and the subsequent `war on terror' have all disrupted the 
`globalisation as juggernaut theses' and raised the spectre of a variety of potential 
outcomes and futures. The invasion and occupation of Iraq and the fierce national 
popular resistance that US led forces are facing likewise reflect the instability, 
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contestation, and indeterminate future direction of world history. In that respect 
there appears an emerging consensus that globalisation can no longer be defined as 
an `ether' descending over the planet, a `juggernaut' (Ohmae, 1995) or as Hay 
(2002) calls `a process without a subject'. Rather increasingly we see globalisation as 
a highly contested set of processes driven by concrete agents with contingent and 
indeterminate outcomes: 
In reality, the politics of globalisation is all around us, and like all politics, it is a 
fairly fluid and open situation, the outcomes of which will be determined by 
'struggle' or contest, and by the balance of forces on each question... Above 
all, no account of globalisation should 'write out' the response to these 
processes by popular forces and social movements, including traditional 
labour movements and 'opposition' political parties (Gills, 1997 quoted in 
Lazarus, 1998/9, p. 97). 
Globalisation, thus, can be understood as a `meta' concept for a whole 
range of processes taking place which collectively reflect a feeling that we are in a 
period of transition the outcomes of which will be `determined by `struggle' and 
`contest'. This conceptualisation perhaps explains the re-emergence of interest in 
Polanyi's classic work `The Great Transformation' (1957) which described an earlier 
period of profound change - the Industrial Revolution. Indeed, Munck (2002) 
talks of the `Globalisation Revolution' in precisely those terms. Polanyi described 
the miraculous development of the tools of production that were however 
accompanied by a profound and catastrophic dislocation of ordinary people's lives. 
His focus was on the relationship between market and society as he explored the 
destructive nature of the notion of a `self-regulated market' and talked of this as a 
`market dystopia' that would destroy both man and nature if it were not countered 
by the self-defence mechanisms of society (Polanyi, 1957, p. 3). This process of 
societal defence to the destructive nature of the market was known as the `double- 
movement' whereby the market was tamed and placed firmly under the control of 
societal institutions. 
Neo-liberalism is the contemporary variant of that same neo-classical 
economic theory which so troubled Polanyi. The theory argues that societies 
function best when the market is left alone to determine distribution, production 
and consumption patterns. Derived from the neo-classical economic thought of 
Adam Smith and developed by Hayek and Milton Friedman, neo-liberalism in its 
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contemporary form emerged onto the international scene in the late 1970's with 
the election of Margaret Thatcher and later Ronald Reagan. In Latin America it 
appeared several years earlier and far more brutally in the wake of the military coup 
in Chile carried out by General Pinochet and backed by the United States. At its 
heart, neo-liberalism represents a commitment to the primacy of markets and a 
belief that competition, both amongst business and in the provision of public 
services, best fosters growth and is the basis of social distribution. 
Certainly over the last twenty years we have seen profound advances in 
technological and communication processes and an equally worrying set of social 
consequences and catastrophes for many peoples across the world (c. f. 
Chossudowsky, 1997; Fröbel, 1979; Hoogveldt, 1997; Amin, 1997; Harvey, 2002; 
Amin, 1994; Dicken, 1998; Wade, 2001) which lends credence to Munck's (2002) 
claim that we are entering an era of epochal change. A critical study of globalisation 
would thus need to address this by exploring the mechanisms through which 
agents discursively and materially are embedding neo-liberalism and seeking to 
consolidate and extend their rule (a sociology of order), while also searching for the 
emergence of alternative `counter-measures' that are seeking to rein in the 
destructive forces that threaten `society' (a sociology of rebellion). 
The initial task for an informed analysis of those social processes and power 
relations that make up `globalisation' would be to identify the agents both driving 
and resisting these social forces and sets of social relations, and explore and 
uncover alternative possibilities that have already or might in the future emerge. In 
order to facilitate this, I want to return again to Santos's work to explore a way of 
conceptualising processes of globalisation that facilitate the breaking down of this 
`meta' concept into different sets of processes and relationships. 
7.3.7 Boaventura de Sousa Santos: Globalising Localisms and Localised Globalisms 
Central to Santos's concept of globalisation is that we are entering a period 
of profound transformation (Santos, 1999b). Here globalisation is defined as being 
more than the rise over the last 30 years of transnational processes of the 
Chapter One 21 
production of goods and services and an increase in the power of Transnational 
Corporations (TNCs) and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) as 
international actors. Instead, Santos offers a definition that incorporates the social, 
political and cultural dimensions of globalisation as well as the economic, arguing 
that what we term 'globalisation' is actually 'a set of social relations' and should be 
treated in the plural (Santos, 1999b; pp. 188-193). This complex set of social 
relations involves power and conflict, winners and losers. Historically, definitions 
are normally written by the winners, and thus provide a distorted view of events, 
hence globalisation is often depicted as the synonym for the victorious spread of 
neo-liberal economics while obscuring less successful alternative globalisations. 
Santos (1999b, p. 216) sees globalisation as "the process by which a given 
local condition or entity succeeds in extending its reach over the globe and, by 
doing so, develops the capacity to designate a rival social condition or entity as 
local. " This definition has several important implications. Firstly, what we 
generally call globalisation is inevitably the successful globalisation of a given 
localism. The process of globalising a given localism ensures that competing 
localisms are confined to their particular geographic area, or even removed. The 
example of the spread of English is illustrative here. This local language (English) 
globalises, and in doing so prevents the spread of other potential globalising 
localisms, such as French, while re-localising or distorting local languages. Here we 
can think of the way English words have penetrated many local languages, and 
how many localised languages are being systematically eliminated (c. f. Phillipson, 
1992; Skutnabb-Kangas, 20009). A further example is the way Coca Cola and 
McDonalds and other fast food products have broken down local cultural eating 
habits (Schlosser, 2002) as these MNCs have extended production and distribution 
across the world. When we examine a process of globalisation, we need to 
simultaneously explore processes of re-localisation as their inevitable counterpart: 
neo-liberalism spreads and Keynesianism shrinks. The global and the local are not, 
9 Linguistic Imperialism is Phillipson's (1992) classic critique of the role of the British Council and its 
promotion of the English language. Skutnabb-Kangas (2000) provides a fascinating empirical critique of 
the destruction of indigenous languages and the role of national educational policies in this process. 
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therefore, binary opposites but two sides of the same globalisation coin (Gibson- 
Graham, 2002). 
The second key point concerns power differentials involved in processes of 
globalisation. Time-space compression, which is often presented as a key aspect of 
globalisation, contains key power differentials within it. Time-space compression 
refers to the annihilation of space through time, whereby technological advances 
and new organisational practices reduce spatial and temporal distances and allow 
for radical change in the parameters under which capitalism operates (Harvey, 
1989). One striking example of this has been the phenomenon of Call Centres 
located in countries such as India where labour costs are far cheaper than in the 
core developed nations. The distance between Western consumers and Indian 
service providers are made less relevant by virtue of advanced information 
technology. Distance and time which would have previously prevented this activity 
have thus been removed as an obstacle through improved technological advances 
thus allowing for the outsourcing of labour which would previously have taken 
place within the confines of the nation-state. 
Santos (1999b) calls for an exploration of the relations of power within 
`time space compression', arguing that it is not a neutral process, and while some 
population groups are in control of these processes, others are less so. Financial 
elites are better able to take charge of `time-space compression' and turn it to their 
advantage, while refugees and migrant workers, though moving, are much less in 
control of that movement. Another example of this differential power relation that 
is implicit in `globalisations' is that key contributors to processes of globalisation 
may be confined to certain locales. Santos (ibid) offers two examples from Latin 
America to illuminate this: The drug growers of Colombia and Bolivia (who 
contribute to the globalisation of a drug culture, but are bounded in local 
circumstances), and the urban poor in Brazil (who are trapped in poverty but see 
their musical culture exported globally). Examining the basis of unequal social 
relations characterised by asymmetries in power is thus crucial to an understanding 
of the uneven nature of globalisation processes. 
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These unequal global power relations mean that 'core' developed countries 
specialise in 'globalised localisms', while 'localised globalisms' are generally imposed 
on the peripheral 'less developed nations'. This definition of globalisation assists in 
understanding how the local/global relationship is mutually constituted and riven 
with differences in power. It also begins the process of pinpointing `power' and its 
unequal distribution within the contemporary world. What is less clear, however, in 
Santos's exposition, are the differential power relations within and between 
`globalised localisms' such as neo-liberalism, human rights, democracy, fast food 
consumption and so on. Are they equally important? Do some `globalised 
localisms' dominate? Furthermore while Santos provides a clear conceptual 
framework for understanding differential power relations between North and 
South for accounting for the preponderance of globalised localisms coming from 
the developed North, he is less attentive to explaining unequal power within and 
among nation states and between social classes. What Santos lacks is an explicit 
emphasis on the workings of contemporary capitalism and the class relations that 
compose them. In order to overcome this weakness I intend to draw on the work 
of the Neo-Gramscian School who develop a non-deterministic Marxist 
understanding of globalisation which can shed greater light and conceptual rigour 
on some of the key insights offered by Santos. 
1.4 Neo-Gramscian Theory 
The Neo Gramscian School, wary of an overly structural Marxist account, 
critique this form of Marxist analysis for underplaying cultural and social aspects 
and the role of agency and resistance. This meeting point between Santos and the 
Neo-Gramscian School offers the possibility for a richer, more nuanced, 
understanding of processes of globalisation and the possibilities of resistance 
which, I will argue, helps to avoid the pitfalls of both excessive `culturalism' -what 
Santos (1999a, p. 42) calls `Celebratory Postmodernism'- and excessive 
`structuralism' which obscures resistance and agency from processes of social 
change. 
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The Neo-Gramscian School are loosely grouped around a mode of analysis 
developed by Robert Cox (see Cox, 1996; Gills, 2000; Gill, 1991; 1993; 1993a; 
Germain & Kenny, 1998; Robinson, 1996; 2003; Bieler & Morton, 2004). They 
have applied the writings of the Italian political activist and philosopher Antonio 
Gramsci to assist in the analysis of the emerging global political order. They see 
Gramsci's work (1986) as opening up a non-deterministic pathway for Marxist 
scholarship enabling them to avoid the economism of much structural analysis (see 
Murphy, 1998). Cox, the founding theoretician of the School, was drawn to 
Gramsci's ideas as a "sympathetic critique" of Wallerstein's more structural World 
System Theory which was seen to have a "static sense of history" and 
"disappointing concept of change and discontinuity"(see Murphy, 1998). Gramsci 
provided an ontological and epistemological foundation upon which the school 
could construct a non-deterministic yet structurally grounded explanation of 
change (Germain & Kenny, 1998). 
1.4.1 Neo-Gramscians and Neo-liberal Globalisation 
Broadly the Neo-Gramscian School sees the last decades of the 20th 
Century as ushering in a new era in the history of world capitalism (c. f. Bieler & 
Morton, 2004; Robinson, 2003; Cox, 1996)'°. They argue that the world economic 
crisis of the 1970's could not be resolved within the national state capitalist model 
that had developed in the wake of World War II. The constraints imposed on 
capital during this period through state-led control and redistribution mechanisms 
- the Keynesian social structure of accumulation - was 
becoming too costly for 
capital's profitability and mobility and thus needed to be dismantled in order to 
restore profitability. In response `capital' and its most powerful representatives 
launched a global offensive. Transnational class fractions of capitalists and their 
allies within nation states captured the state apparatus in large parts the world 
during the 1980's and 1990's and utilised the power that ensued to fundamentally 
restructure the working of capitalism via the mechanism of a neo-liberal informed 
10 While I recognise there are a range of different perspectives with the Neo-Gramscians School (as 
with any school) my objective here is to present a sketched outline of the major thrust of their arguments. 
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political project aimed at restructuring states and in turn integrating individual 
nation states within the orbit of a highly unequal system of global capitalist 
accumulation. This twin development, the rise in the transnational capitalist class 
and the move from a national state led model of economic development within an 
international economy to competition states (Cerny, 1997; 1995) in a globally 
integrated economy, represented a fundamental transfer of power and wealth away 
from the working class and the poor and towards a small high consumption group 
of capitalists, middle class professionals and bureaucratic elites that prosper amidst 
the generalised immiseration of large sections of the world's population (Robinson, 
2003; Pieterse, 2002) 
. 
This process was neo-liberal globalisation, the dominant 
ideology of globalisation of the era. In order to understand how they perceive this 
process occurring there is a need to explore in greater detail the Neo-Gramscian 
understanding of social change. 
1.4.2 Between Structures and Agents and the Neo-liberal Global Order 
Cox's draws on the concept of `historical structure' or `historic block' (Cox, 
1996, p. 98) to highlight the dynamics of the relationship between different social 
forces in the contemporary era. This `picture of a particular configuration of forces' 
that makes up the `structure' of `world order' represents a combination between 
ideas, institutions and material capabilities, which, though not deterministic, 
imposes limits to actions: 
Individuals and groups may move with the pressures or resist and oppose 
them, but they cannot ignore them. To the extent that they do successfully 
resist a prevailing historical structure, they buttress their actions with an 
alternative, emerging configuration of forces, a rival structure (Cox, 1996, 
p. 98). 
The dialectical relationship between `institutions', `material capabilities' and 
`ideas' is non-deterministic; changes in one domain interact with the others in 
different ways in different locations. Understanding these processes of change 
requires concrete analysis in different historical and geographical locations. The 
emphasis on the dialectical relationship between ideas, institutions and material 
capabilities reflects the Neo-Gramscian understanding of `power' and `control' that 
is consolidated not only in the military or economic domain, but also in the social 
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and cultural. The social forces that compose the `historic bloc' do not only rule by 
force but also through `hegemony' in the cultural and social spheres. Gramsci 
theorised hegemony as a form of `infra-elite compromise/co-option and also inter- 
class compromises which, while not challenging the underlying means of 
production, allows for a process of partial re-distribution of wealth. In Gramscian 
terms, hegemony is rule based more on consent rather than coercion (Gill, 2003, 
p. 118). Gramsci's concept of hegemony, however, always implies a balance 
between coercion and consent - "the iron fist in the velvet glove" which, while 
varying over time, implies domination and consent in a range of fields from the 
military to the social and ideological. 
In order to explore the balance between hegemony and coercion there is a 
need to move beyond a focus on military power and the repressive apparatus of 
the state and to explore the way consent is developed amongst population groups. 
In order to address this I will briefly explore the relationship between states and 
civil society in the contemporary era in order to understand in greater depth the 
contemporary terrains of contestation, how they are structured, and how the 
behaviour and action of different agents reacts and constructs the contemporary 
order. 
1.4.3 Top-Down and Bottom-Up Civil Society: Unpacking Globalisation From Above and Below 
The concept of civil society and its relationship to the state has enjoyed a 
renaissance in the last decades (Colas, 2002; Baker, 2002), though its definition 
remains highly contested. Cox (1999) traces the concept historically and suggests 
that `civil society' can only be understood within its particular historical context. It 
is, therefore, with an understanding of the contemporary relations of social forces 
at both global and local levels that we begin to unpack the concept relating it to 
particular concrete societies. Gramsci saw civil society in two juxtaposed ways. In 
his formulation it was both the foundation of the existing order: `state = political 
society + civil society' - or what he termed `hegemony protected by the armour of 
coercion' (Gramsci, 1986, p. 263), and also as the potential territory where 
revolutionary transformation could take place; in other words the creation of a 
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counter-hegemonic bloc that would challenge the contemporary order in what he 
called a `war of manoeuvre'. 
As Cox (1999) suggests, the two competing forces could be viewed as top- 
down, and bottom-up approaches to civil society. The top-down process 
expresses the idea of the dominant forces of capitalism creating an intellectual and 
cultural hegemony that secures the acquiescence of the majority of the population 
within a given historical structure. The bottom-up approach implies a process led 
from below by those disadvantaged sections of the population who aspire to 
develop sufficient support in the population to replace the existing order. From a 
top-down perspective, powerful states and corporate interests intervene in the 
development of civil society attempting to steer it towards stabilising the status 
quo. This is done through activities such as the co-option of elements of popular 
movements, and subsidies to NGOs pushing them to conformity with established 
norms (Robinson, 1996), or through the use of economic or military force and 
other disciplinary mechanisms. From a bottom-up perspective, oppositional 
groups will, likewise, try to win over disaffected sections of the elite bloc that are 
losing out in particular ways under contemporary relations, and construct a broader 
base to their movements. Analysis of this process needs to go beyond a narrow 
focus on the territorial boundaries of the nation state, to explore a range of 
geographical scales for the problem of hegemony in the contemporary world order 
is located on a range of terrains from the global to the regional, national and local. 
While writing in the 1920's Gramsci recognised this, arguing that "international 
relations intertwine with these internal relations of nation states, creating new 
unique and historically concrete combinations" (Gramsci, 1986, p. 182). This 
relationship, he observes, strengthens according to the level of international 
integration or strategic importance of the particular state. If that were true in 
Gramsci's time it is equally so in the contemporary era of globalisations. As we 
will see, cutting across the `relations of forces' are transnational actors and factors 
that influence their development. 
So far I have been exploring the Neo-Gramscian position and the 
conceptualisation of top down and bottom up contestation within the 
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contemporary world. This contestation is now commonly conceptualised as 
globalisation from `above' and `below'. Implicit in this idea of contestation is 
power and how it has been exercised. In the following section I want to articulate 
a conception of `power' that I will be deploying in this thesis in order to see the 
different modalities or faces of power as it is mobilised by agents and institutions - 
focusing particularly on the hegemonic status of the neo-liberal political project. 
1.4,4 What is the Neo-Gramscian conceptualisation of Power? 
Neo-Gramscians have focused on the relationship between the US and the 
leading powerful capitalist countries, the World Bank and the IMF, a series of 
private MNCs and local corporations and elites in a range of different countries in 
promoting a series of market reforms over the last two decades that have radically 
altered the socio-economic and political map of the world. This `constellation of 
social and political forces regulate, police and protect a disciplinary neo-liberal 
world order' (Gill, 2003), but how exactly do they do that? Is it military, structural, 
discursive, coercive, or seductive power? How does it operate, and how does it 
relate to the differential resources of oppositional movements? While the thesis 
seeks to explore this empirically within space and time in Colombia, the purpose in 
this section is to identity the kinds of theoretical tools that might assist us in 
developing an understanding of power that can guide the research? 
Gill's uses the concept of `disciplinary neo-liberalism' as a means to 
combine both macro and micro dimensions of power and discursive and extra- 
discursive elements in describing the range of mechanisms utilised by agents to 
mobilise and embed what he calls `neo-liberal globalisation'. Gill talks of the 
structural power of capital, which reflects the ability of those at the top of the 
structured global order to exercise their economic power to influence policy 
development. This includes the capacity to shape the rules of the game, such as the 
agendas of the World Bank and the IMF, to provide material constraints and 
incentives - access to loans and credits, and the ability to promote uniformity and 
obedience amongst groups, parties, institutions, class formations through a range 
of mechanisms. Beyond that, it is also the ability to use military force, economic 
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power, and discursive persuasion (Gill, 1995; 1995a; 2003). He also notes a clear 
hierarchy within the global system both between classes and nations: 
Neo-liberal forms of discipline are hierarchical in both the sense of social 
classes and in terms of inter-state politics. At the heart of the global economy 
there is an internationalisation of authority and governance that not only 
involves international organisations (such as the BIS, IMF and World Bank) 
and transnational firms but also private consultancies and private bond-rating 
agencies which act, as it were, as arbiters in the supply of capital for public 
finance and corporate investment, partly acting as private makers of global 
public policy. I call this politico-economic structure and the internationalisation 
of authority that it entails, the G7 nexus (Gill, 2003, p. 137). 
This `G7 nexus' utilises its material capabilities, ideas and institutions to 
ensure that alternative development pathways are closed off both materially and 
discursively. Gill highlights the `discursive power' of neo-liberalism as it presents 
potentially highly controversial policies "as an abstract hyper-rational and largely 
uncontested set of social forces and processes" (Gill, 2003, p. 137). This was perhaps best 
encapsulated by the ex-UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatchers famous slogan - 
There is no alternative" (TINA) - which exemplifies the `globalisation as 
juggernaut thesis' which does not merely describe globalisation but simultaneously 
discursively produces it as something `unstoppable' and `inevitable'. Neo- 
liberalism's highly unequal development model is thus discursively portrayed as 
`common sense', while other alternative possibilities are `removed' from the 
agenda, by what Samoff (1992; 1994) called "The Intellectual Financial Complex" 
of the World Bank and IMF which went around the world, particularly the South, 
using the debt crisis of the 1980's as leverage for policy conditionalities. 
Beyond aid conditionalities, `disciplinary neo-liberalism' also acts through 
the structural power of global capital markets and credit rating-agencies (Sinclair, 
1994) reflecting the changed nature of the global financial system. National 
currencies are floated on international stock markets and capital controls on 
national borders are removed to allow financial speculators to `discipline' any 
policies that may challenge the profitability of globalised accumulation strategies. 
Other more traditional forms of discipline are both military and political, and 
operate on a range of scales from the local to the transnational, policing the global 
order in its different scales. Pieterse describes this vividly: 




On one side of the border, in the global margins, there is discipline-the 
financial and developmental regimes of the international institutions and 
conditional aid, or coercive intervention in cases of turbulence (as in Rwanda, 
Somalia, Bosnia). In the ghettos, banlieues and favelas, another discipline and 
surveillance is in operation-the discipline of zero tolerance policing, racial 
profiling and incarceration. Those who cross the border zone do so at their 
peril, facing humiliation, disenfranchisement and punishment, and risking 
death (Pieterse, 2002, p. 1039). 
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Robinson argues that the US shift in the 1980's, from supporting military 
dictatorships to `democracy promotion', reflects the utilisation of different types of 
`power'. Robinson's (1996) hypothesis is that the shift to supporting a form of low 
intensity democracy or 'polyarchy' - where elites compete in highly restricted 
democracies - was not the benevolent product of western enlightenment but a new 
and effective means of managing the world system in the interest of an emerging 
transnational capitalist class. Simply put, authoritarian regimes were unreliable 
allies both because they occasionally asserted their own independence (Saddam 
Hussein was one such ally) and because their repressive nature often produces 
resistance in turn engendering popular democratic movements. The promotion of 
democracy as policy was implemented to ensure that `popular' democratic 
movements did not achieve power. The aim of the US government was to enter 
into the organs of civil-society and ensure that transformations from `authoritarian' 
to 'democratic regimes' did not produce governments that contradicted the 
priorities of the US. Robinson (1996) sees 'democracy promotion' as the political 
complement to neo-liberal economics in the emerging architecture of world order. 
More recently disciplinary neo-liberalism is becoming institutionalized 
through what Gill (2003) calls `new constitutionalism' whereby new layers of global 
and regional legislation emerge through organs such as the IMF, The World Bank, 
the WTO and regional bodies such as the EU, APEC, OAS etc. Agreements such 
as NAFTA and GATS, Gill argues, are attempts to `lock in' national policy to neo- 
liberal imperatives, and insulate economic policy from any political changes that 
might take place within nation states in the future. In this process we can see a 
clear shift in the rights of capital over the rights of citizens. As Gill notes: "new 
constitutionalism confers privileged rights of citizenship and representation to 
corporate capital, whilst constraining the democratization process that has involved 
struggles for representation for hundreds of years" (Gill, 2003, p. 132). 
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In response to the hierarchical nature of power within the contemporary 
order between nations and classes many commentators have argued that the nation 
state has lost its power. In line with Tickell & Peck (2003) I take a contrary view 
and characterise "neo-liberalisation" as "the mobilisation of state power in the 
contradictory extension and reproduction of market (-like) rule. " This definition 
allows for a more complex understanding of the way that states - as the principal 
architects of the shift towards neo-liberalism - actually deploy their powers in order 
to promote an expansion and extension of the commodification of social life to 
ever-broader spheres. This definition assists in dispelling the myth that neo- 
liberalism requires less state intervention and emphasises that the state continues to 
act in a range of domains albeit differently from before. The role of the state has 
been transformed into what has variously been called the `internationalisation of 
the state' (Cox, 1996) or the `competition state' (Cerny, 1997; 1995). This changed 
state is the product of the effects of new transnational social forces that have 
reorganised and rearticulated state roles within the global economy. This does not 
necessarily imply a weakening of the state, nor its demise, but rather a 
reorganisation of roles which in turn shifts power upwards and downwards 
according to new priorities and necessities brought about by the 
internationalisation of the economy" 
However, the conceptualisation does not imply that states are equally in 
control of these processes. In line with Gill's notion of a hierarchy in the neo- 
liberal global order, some states - such as the USA and the members of the G7 - 
have more power and influence than others Qessop, 2001; Laffey and Weldes, 
2002). In the international realm, those states that have more power are not only 
active agents of the neo-liberal order but are also actively engaged in imposing their 
will on other states (states that do not have the same capacity and power) through 
a range of coercive and consensual methods. While powerful agents of the neo 
liberal global order can influence outcomes of negotiation and decisions, the 
11 Both the concept of the `competition state' and the `internationalization of the state' have been 
criticised for being overly top-down in their understanding of globalisation. Cox originally 
conceptualised the `competition state' as the transmission belt for global policies. However, as Bieler & 
Morton (2004) note this phrase is no longer used by Cox reflecting a more dialectical understanding of 
the relationship between global and national processes. 
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weaker agents face heavily constrained choices or agendas which they have little 
role in defining (Hurrell and Woods, 1995, p. 453). Bolivia has very different 
capacities to negotiate its entry in to the global market than the United States12. 
In this understanding, nation states, the IMF and the World Bank and 
MNCs are not mutually antagonistic but co-constitute and in fact promote the 
reproduction of each other (Hobson and Ramesh, 2002). The international 
institutions that are implementing neo liberal policies are themselves the agents of 
specific national capitals who derive their powers of enforcement from nation 
states. Therefore states and their institutions are crucial in the process of the 
internationalisation of the global order and, far from disappearing, may actually be 
becoming more powerful, albeit in very different ways. 
This takes as its starting point an understanding of the state as a social 
relation (a reflection of the balance of social forces within that particular territorial 
space). Furthermore, when we talk of states being strengthened or weakened, then 
we are talking of the social power of particular relations of forces. In those states 
that have been captured by neo-liberal elites intent on promoting the transnational 
agenda, then they may find themselves actively strengthened by internal and 
external forces, while if the state has been captured by social forces opposed to 
these process then we may find their movement further constrained. In this 
process we can observe the current situation in Venezuela and Brazil where both 
Presidents have been elected on the basis of their broad opposition to neo-liberal 
policies but find their actions constrained by the extent to which neo-liberalism has 
become embedded in programmes and institutions. Colombia, actively pursuing a 
neo-liberal strategy in contrast has become the third biggest recipient of US aid in 
the world and has been able to exempt massive military expenditure from its IMF 
austerity programme. 
At its most basic level, then, the Neo-Gramscian understanding of `power' 
is derived from three major assumptions. Firstly, power appears as the idea that `A 
12 Some less powerful states may, by virtue of their geo-strategic/geo-political location be able to 
negotiate better terms of entry. Egypt, Israel and Turkey are examples. Interestingly all these state are 
also big recipients of US military and humantarian aid. 
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-forces, exercises power, influences B to do X, if X is something that B would not 
otherwise do' (Ball, 1978, p. 98). Secondly, both A and B exist in a structured 
environment where resources are not evenly distributed. Thirdly, the action -A 
getting B to do something- can be done in a number of ways such as by implying 
force, exercising power, influencing, persuading, using authority and so on. This is 
at the heart of the difference between consensual power and coercive power, the 
first being based on some notion of recognition of the justification of A's action 
and the second on force and submission. While the boundaries of the two are 
fuzzy, they roughly represent the difference between force (economic, political and 
military) and persuasion in the deployment of power. In the contemporary 
international relations literature this is often conceptualised through the use of 
phrases such as `hard' and `soft' power popularised by the IR realist scholar Joseph 
Nye Jr (Nye, 2002; 2004). Lukes (1974) `third face of power' appears useful here 
when he suggests that the greatest source of power is to make somebody/an agent 
do something by `shaping their perceptions', (making them do something you want 
them to do, by making them think that it is their best option): 
Is it not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to prevent people, 
to whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, 
cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the 
existing order of things, either because they can see or imagine no alternative 
to it, or because they value it as divinely ordained and beneficial (Lukes, 1974, 
p. 24). 
The relationship between coercion and consent for the Neo-Gramscians is 
thus not necessarily a binary one but rather more dynamic and complex with a 
range of coercive and consensual mechanisms at work in each case. The neo-liberal 
global order thus has at its epicentre the neo-liberal economic model (neo-liberal 
globalisation) but that `order' is based upon a combination of consensual and 
coercive mechanisms. The balance between these forms of power is dependent 
upon the environment within which it operates, shifts over time, and may 
simultaneously utilise different mechanisms in the same and different places. For 
example at the global level, the `neo-liberal order' may be consolidated by neo- 
liberalism, low intensity democracy and human rights while in other spaces it may 
be secured through neo-liberal economics, military repression and violent human 
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rights abuses - as was the case in much of the Southern Cone in the 1970's and 
early 1980's. 
In that sense `power' as a mechanism of control can take many forms and 
exists, albeit unequally, in a range of things and can be possessed by different social 
forces: individuals, groups but also objects such as money etc. In the next section I 
wish to develop the Neo-Gramscian concept of power through exploring the work 
of `critical realist' Andrew Sayer (2004), who provides a valuable analytical tool for 
the analysis of power. 
1.5 Towards a Critical Realist Theory of Power 
Part of the problem of defining power is the fact that power, in order to be 
activated, relies on a range of things that are not frozen in time. For this reason, as 
Sayer (2004) notes, there is not a great deal that can be said about power in the 
abstract. In order to illuminate the real workings of power there is need to move to 
more concrete examples -- as this thesis does in particular times and in particular 
places, through an exploration of Sintraemcali's attempts to challenge the process 
of privatisation in Cali. However, what can be said at the abstract level is important 
and provides the theoretical underpinnings for much of the research that follows. 
In the following section I will lay out a `critical realist' perspective on `power' 
drawn largely from a recent paper by Sayer (2004) on `geographies of power', 
highlighting the aspects most relevant to my own particular research. 
Sayer (2004) differentiates between two types of power: powerl and 
power2. The first type of power is related to the causal power of objects. This type 
of power exists because of the structure of the objects. The term `objects' can 
encompass a range of things including individuals, social institutions and relations 
with other objects, such as those of an audience with a speaker, a discourse and so 
on. Causal powers, such as the ability of a person to speak or of a judge to send 
someone to prison, also have particular causal susceptibilities such as that they can 
be injured, killed, or embarrassed. Most powers are acquired - as in our power to 
speak or to work as a judge. Causal power can also exist without being utilised; we 
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may not choose to speak or to make a decision. Some causal powers may decline if 
not used frequently. Crucial here in an understanding of `causal powers' is that 
there is nothing necessarily constant about them, that they may not necessarily be 
used, and that both causal power and susceptibility may change over time and 
space. 
The activation of causal powers or susceptibilities is contingent and 
depends on relations to other objects that similarly have powers and 
susceptibilities. Furthermore, when they are activated, their effects are dependent 
on the causal powers of the other objects which they are in contact with which 
may block, strengthen, modify, and so on. Sayer (2004) discusses this through the 
idea of a `double contingency' which implies that just because an object has `causal 
powers' and `susceptibilities' it doesn't mean they will be activated, and even if they 
are, the outcomes is open-ended and contingent on other causal powers and 
susceptibilities of other relational objects. 
Taking on board the idea of double contingency, we can then move to an 
understanding of powerl as being the power to do something under certain 
conditions. This is different to the notion of `power to' which implies that 
something has the `capacity to do something' regardless of circumstance. Sayer 
(2004) offers the example of somebody attempting to open a door as illustrative of 
this. While the person has the `causal power' to open the door, the realisation of 
the objective is dependent on the door not being locked or bolted. However, while 
my power to open the door is thus dependent on it not being locked, that does not 
preclude me trying. Powerl can, then, be conceptualised as `potential power'. 
Power2 in this understanding thus becomes the actual `activation' of power. This is 
often referred to as `power over' but again this needs to be modified in light of the 
double contingency in order to recognise that `power over' does not necessarily 
mean domination as that is dependent on these relational factors. Having outlined 
these two conceptions, of powerl (potential power) and power2 (activated power), 
we can now make a number of points about a critical realist understanding of 
power: 
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Firstly, causation is unlikely to be linear due to the relational nature of the 
double contingency. Hence objectives and outcomes may be quite different and 
thus we need to explore the unintended outcomes of purposeful action. Secondly, 
space clearly makes a difference to the exercise of power with different objects in 
different places modifying and mediating the effects of power. Thirdly, for critical 
realists, while social systems are structured, they are also open and in that sense 
subject to change. For that reason, those agents who seek to maintain or change 
situations need to work at it. Similarly the reproduction of power is not constant 
and may change over time. Fourthly, power2 (activated power) can have 
constructive and positive effects as well as the opposite. Fifthly, all objects have 
causal powers and susceptibilities, thus power is everywhere. However, this should 
not lead us to believe that causal powers should be equal. The causal power of an 
MNC and a worker are not equal. However, the power of that corporation may be 
different over different spatial terrains, thus power may be concentrated in certain 
places and diffused in others. Sixthly, while power2 (activated power) cannot be 
held, seized, monopolised it does make sense for (potential power) to be described 
in that way, albeit qualified with the double contingency. Seventhly, while powert 
may only be activated in contact with other causal powers it still may have that 
causal power within it regardless of other objects. This understanding of causal 
powers relying on `activation' through relations with other causal powers such as 
agents, individuals, institutions etc is consistent with the understanding of power in 
situations where powerl and power2 depend on recognition from other objects 
such as authority and respect - the power of money is contingent on recognition of 
its value by other individuals and in other contexts. Eightthly, this conception of 
power can also recognise discourse as potentially a causal power. Ideas and other 
discursive phenomena may have causal properties; that is, they have the potential 
to produce change (Fairclough et al, 2003). This understanding applies both to the 
dominant and the subordinate agents in relations of power and to how consent 
and resistance is activated. Power may, thus, operate with the active consent of 
those subjected to it and even their active involvement. Ninthly, this 
understanding of power also addresses the idea of freedom and responsibility. 
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While discourses and circumstances influence our reasoning our capability for 
reflection give us some freedom to act and therefore responsibility for action. 
Hence power may act through the exercise of freedom. This ties in with Foucault's 
notion of self-discipline. 
One final point is to understand that the combination of different causal 
powers may produce an `emergent power' which, while constitutive of different 
causal powers, is more than the sum of its parts. This is similar to the concept of 
immanence in the Foucauldian literature, or `synergy'. These emergent powers can 
take place in both relatively stable and also in temporary relationships, such as 
mobilisations and demonstrations that bring together different causal powers in 
turn producing more than the sum of their parts: 
These are causal powers dependent on but irreducible to those of their 
constituent elements, just as water has emergent powers from those of its 
constituents, hydrogen and oxygen. Emergence typifies not only the physical 
world, in which the physical, chemical, and biological stand in asymmetric 
relations such that each stratum can exist without the one above it but not 
without that below it (Bhaskar, 1975), but the social world (Sayer, 2004, 
p. 267). 
Hence we have a conceptualisation of power that can understand both the 
idea that objects and institutions have `casual powers' (powerl) but also that these 
powers in order to be activated (power2) rely on relationships with other causal 
objects which can transform, support or block the causal powers of different 
objects. Furthermore, the combination of causal powers may result in `emergent 
powers' that represent more than the sum of their parts and hence to unpredictable 
and contingent outcomes. This conceptualisation allows us to talk about the 
`structural power of capitalism' as powerl, or the power of MNCs and big 
corporations without reifying that power and recognising that its activation is 
always contingent and relational, and always potentially susceptible to the counter 
effects of other `causal powers'. This complex understanding of power can lead us 
to a more nuanced and contextualised exploration of the workings of 
contemporary power relations which always leaves open the possibility for 
alternative possibilities and outcomes: causal powers decline, new causal powers 
emerge, and differential powers combine to produce unexpected and unintended 
outcomes. 
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1.6 Class Power and Neo-liberal Globalisation in Latin America 
The complex modalities of power outlined above, as exercised by both 
dominant and oppositional forces, are at the centre of my analysis of Colombia. At 
the heart of this analysis is an understanding of `class power' which recognises the 
unevenly structured nature of social reality under capitalism and how the political 
project of neo-liberalism is sharpening those inequalities. In this section I explore 
how this has manifested itself in Latin America more generally, while focussing in 
particularly on Colombia. In doing this I draw methodologically on Hoogveldt's 
(1997) concept of `post-colonial formations' in which she argues that while each 
individual country has specific characteristics it is possible to delineate certain 
regions whose component countries share certain traits by virtue of a common 
cultural and political history. Latin America is one such region that shares a 
common history of colonialism, popular resistance movements, and intense US 
intervention (particularly since 1959), which shapes its historical development. In 
Chapter Four I complement this analysis with a more in-depth background to 
Colombia that focuses on the specific state/civil society relations that define its 
particularity. 
As we will see in this section, the economic and social statistics for the 
period between 1975 and 2000 in Latin America highlight a fundamental 
transformation in class power and social relations. Economic resources were 
shifted away from the working class and poor, transnational capitalist interests 
expanded their penetration in the region, and class relations became increasingly 
polarised. In order to understand the nature of neo-liberalism's entry into Latin 
America we first need to explore the dominant mode of economic and social 
development that preceded it and the social relations that prevailed. 
1.6.1 From Fordism(s) to Neo-liberalism(s) in Latin America 
Firmly rooted in the era of nation state capitalism Fordism emerged as the 
`common-sense' state led economic development model in the wake of WWII. It is 
often associated with the `golden age of capitalism' and based on mass production 
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techniques and mass consumption societies (Munck, 2002, p. 31). While this may 
have been true for some parts of the world, for others, Fordism was a far less 
inclusive phenomena. As Santos (1999c, pp. 10-11) notes, the `welfare state' 
commonly associated with the Fordist era was confined to a small number of 
European states and may be seen as an oddity rather than the norm in the 
historical development of capitalism. The uneven and varied nature of Fordism 
has been explored by Tickell and Peck (1995) who highlight the wide range of 
different types that emerged throughout the world during the 1940's and 50's. 
They emphasise the separation between Fordist production techniques and 
Keynesian welfare modes of social regulation across time and space. The types of 
Fordism that emerged in different parts of the world were shaped by their position 
within the hierarchy of the world economic order, and also by the particularities of 
different state/civil society complexes (Boyer, 1995, p. 27). As Wallerstein notes, 
there were always limits to the number of people who could be included in the 
Fordist model particularly in the South: 
One could cut in several-hundred-million western workers and still make the 
system profitable. But if one cut in several billion Third World Workers, there 
would be nothing left for further capital accumulation (Wallerstein, 1995, p. 25). 
Nevertheless, despite its limitations, the period of Fordism represents a 
marked contrast to the laissez-faire capitalism of the 1930's which preceded it and 
the neo-liberal model that followed it, reflecting a more `human face' for capitalist 
development (Munck, 2002). In Polanyi's terms the period can be understood as a 
swing in the pendulum towards bringing capital under the control of societies, 
albeit to different degrees. In several parts of Latin America, including Colombia, a 
form of `peripheral fordism' emerged whereby a state-led import substitution 
industrialization (ISI) model of economic development was coupled with 
authoritarian state structures and limited wealth distribution. The state-led ISI 
model often included within it the nationalisation of foreign enterprises, subsidies 
for national companies, and held the basic assumption that the state should 
intervene in the private sector, control prices, subsidise basic necessities for the 
poorest sectors of society and ensure the provision of both economic and social 
infrastructure such as health and education (Petras, 1997, p. 14). There also was a 
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range of corporatist structures set up whereby labour, capital and the state could 
negotiate over the distribution of the benefits of the economic model. In that sense 
there was a degree of compromise between capital and labour, though a far less 
stable one than in Western Europe and the United States as evidenced by the series 
of popular uprisings that occurred from the 1950's onwards in many parts of Latin 
America. 
The region benefited from the more general world capitalist boom of the 
1950 and 1960's and GDP between 1940 and 1970 grew on average 5% (ibid, 
p. 14). Portes and Hoffman (2003) in their comprehensive study note that during 
the ISI period the emphasis on industrialisation and its related policies also brought 
with it an emerging organised industrial working class, which while remaining a 
small percentage of the working population in the region nevertheless became 
influential in many parts of Latin America. The percentage of informal workers in 
Latin America slowly but steadily diminished, and between 1950 and 1980 over 
60% of all new employment was created in the formal sector (ibid). 
Despite these developments, there were always serious tensions over 
distribution within the economic model throughout Latin America. Sharp 
economic inequalities between social classes remained persistent throughout the 
period and conflict over wealth and land distribution and access to public services 
was widespread. National popular movements emerged throughout the region 
seeking more widespread social reforms. In Colombia a radical populist reform 
movement was halted in 1948 when their Liberal Presidential candidate Gaitan was 
assassinated leading to a civil war between Liberals and Conservatives. Known as 
`la violencia' this resulted in more than 200,000 deaths and lasted until 1958 
(Guzman et al, 1962). 
In the wake of revolutionary upheavals in Cuba in 1959 the United States 
developed a programme of major intervention throughout the region under the 
guise of the Alliance for Progress which, while ploughing over $20 billion into the 
region in order to avoid any more `communist' turns, also began closer contact 
with dissatisfied sections of the regions elites and military to seek out more 
coercive measures to head off any further leftward moves that might challenge US 
Chapter One 41 
dominance in the region. During this period US counter-insurgency tactics 
emerged that continue to produce widespread human rights violations across the 
region and shape state/social movement relations (Mclintock, 1985; Stokes, 2004). 
In Colombia in the wake of the ending of the civil war in 1958 the ensuing peace 
led to a pact between the Liberal and Conservative Party's who would rotate power 
every four years until 1974 in what was known as the `National Front'. The pact, 
which ensured inter-elite peace, largely excluded the vast majority of poor peasants 
and workers that had provided the foot soldiers for the civil war from any 
substantial benefits (Guzman et al, 1962). 
Throughout the 1960's and 1970's in Latin America a wide range of armed 
and unarmed `popular' revolutionary and nationalist struggles exploded which 
sought more radical redistribution policies and land reform. In Colombia this led 
to the creation of, among others, the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia) who represented the interest of the peasantry left out of the `National 
Front' and the ELN (National Liberation Army), which drew its inspiration from 
the Cuban revolution. Today they represent the two most powerful guerrilla forces 
in Colombia and in the wider region. In response to the rising tide of militancy the 
US backed military regimes throughout the Southern Cone during the 1970's and 
early 1980's which provided the catalyst for the neo-liberalisation of the region. In 
Chile, the election of Salvador Allende and the subsequent military coup 
highlighted the limits to the electoral road to social reform. Meanwhile, in 
Nicaragua in 1979 the armed guerrillas of the Sandinistas gained power but 
widespread social reforms were undermined during the 1980's by a ruthless US 
backed counterinsurgency movement -'the contras'. Revolutionary forces in both 
El Salvador and Guatemala came close to overthrowing their governments but 
were beaten back by repression and US military aid - overt and covert - as national 
liberation movements became entangled within the geo-politics of the Cold War 
(Koonings & Kruijt, 1999; Mariano, 2003; Corradi et al, 1992). 
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1.6.2 The Rise of Neo-liberalism in Latin A1. merica 
The free' market in a global society means freedom of accumulation vis-ä-vis 
institutional constraints and the social forces that have imposed those 
constraints. In this sense, the neo-liberal state intervenes in order to support 
capital over diverse social forces that may constrain its freedom of 
accumulation (Robinson, 2003, p. 47). 
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The project of neo-liberalism in the 1970's thus emerged within a context 
of strong popular movements for social reform, the beacon of Cuba as an 
alternative development path, and widespread US counter-insurgency involvement. 
The military coup in Chile was the first US warning shot of the consequences for 
seeking a more independent economic trajectory whether through democratic 
mandate or revolutionary upheaval (Petras, 2003; 1997; Robinson, 1998/9; 2004; 
Mclintock, 1985). Likewise, the violence deployed and the failure of the 
international community to address the flagrant human rights violations provided a 
green light for state repression as the means of implementing the new economic 
model aimed at overcoming the emerging economic crisis of the 1970's. During 
the initial months of the military coup in 1973, thousands of labour and political 
opponents, students and activists, were arrested. Many disappeared, were tortured, 
assassinated or violently repressed, serving to break the strongest working class 
movement in the region (K. oonings & Kruijt, 1999; Mariano, 2003; Corradi et al, 
1992). This was matched by similar dictatorships in many of the Southern Cone 
nations Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Brazil. 
That a crisis of capitalism occurred in the 1970's is largely accepted by most 
academic analysts (Robinson, 2003), and while its causes continue to be debated 
there is a general recognition that it ushered in a period of radical restructuring of 
the global economy and that neo-liberal economic policies have been central to 
that transformation. While state led political violence was the key initial mechanism 
to push through neo-liberalism in Latin America other power mechanisms above 
and beyond violence were later deployed. 
A key milestone in the spread of neo-liberalism was the 1982 Mexico debt 
crisis (Branford & Kuchuwski, 1988). Mexico's default on debt repayments led to 
shockwaves across a range of IFIs that had lent vast sums of money during the 
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1970's to Latin American governments as the Western economies slowed and 
capital sought other terrains for profitable investment (Weeks, 1995 quoted in 
Petras, 1997). The Mexican crisis led to a dramatic shift in the policies of the 
World Bank and the IMF who developed a set of policies (now referred to as neo- 
liberalism) that served to ensure that debtor countries were able to service their 
debts. The policies were collectively known as Stabilisation and Structural 
Adjustment Polices (SAPs) and by the end of the decade had been adopted by 
virtually all governments in Latin America to differing degrees. 
SAPs generally involved a combination of short and long-term measures 
typically including fiscal discipline, new public spending priorities, tax reform, 
financial liberalization, competitive exchange rate, trade liberalization, increased 
foreign direct investment, privatisation and deregulation of economy (Williamson, 
1993, pp. 1332-1333). The policy measures were imposed on many Latin American 
countries through conditionality clauses on loan agreements issued by the IMF. 
Conditionality clauses thus became the key power mechanism through which neo- 
liberal economics spread throughout the region and the wider world. The 
worsening economic situation in Latin American stemming from the 1973 OPEC 
oil crisis meant that many countries had spiralling debts, and were left with little 
choice but to accept SAPs (Streeten, 1988). Between 1980-98 the World 
Bank/IMF made 958 adjustment loans across the world (Easterly, 2001), and with 
the exception of Cuba all of the countries of Latin America came under the orbit 
of widespread restructuring programmes to a greater or lesser degree during the 
last two decades of the century. 
Colombia, unlike many other Latin American countries, avoided the debt 
crisis of the 1980's through steady economic growth assisted by the illicit `cocaine' 
economy (Urrutia & Ponton, 1993; Rocha, 2000) and thus was immune to the 
disciplinary power of the IMF and the World Bank to push through neo-liberal 
economic reforms. In the 1990's under the leadership of President Cesar Gaviria 
the decision to adopt a neo-liberal economic model was taken as a means to 
control inflation and discipline state funding (Hylton, 2003), reflecting national elite 
interest in reform rather than external pressure. 
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The advocates of these polices both in Colombia and more broadly in Latin 
America argued that neo-liberal economic policies would put countries back on 
track to sustained economic growth and move towards resolving the debt crisis 
(Mosley et al, 1991; 1994; Collier & Gunning, 1999; Corbo, 1991 quoted in Petras 
1997). The free market was presented as a far more efficient means of allocating 
resources than the state, and more able to tackle problems of poor economic 
growth, inflation, and inadequate employment. They also emphasised that the 
`state' had often used national resources for particular private interests and not for 
the general interest of the country, and argued that the market was a far better 
distribution mechanism and able to avoid the corruption and clientelism that had 
plagued the region for decades. While the previous period was characterised largely 
by an Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) economic model the new 
economic model for the region became one of Export Led Development (ELD) 
whereby each nation would focus on the key `comparative advantages' that it had 
by virtue of its geographical location and natural and human resources. 
While the immediate material reason for most countries undergoing neo- 
liberal reforms was the rationalisation of the external debt and the control of fiscal 
imbalances, the range of policy measures served to open up each of the countries 
in the region to the penetration of transnational capital. Reductions in subsidies for 
local firms and industry, reductions in tariffs for imports and the removal of 
barriers to the movement of capital and goods all served to facilitate the entry of 
transnational capital into the nations (Green, 2003). The privatisation process 
meant that a whole range of state industries and public utilities companies went on 
sale. Furthermore, the ELD model meant that `development' by focussing on 
`niche markets' and `comparative advantage' became orientated towards a nation- 
state's insertion into the world economy rather than on national 
production/ consumption needs. In that sense neo-liberalism, as Robinson notes, 
can be seen as a: 
... mechanism 
that adjusts national and regional economies to the global 
economy by creating the conditions, including an appropriate macro-economic 
and policy environment, the legal framework, and so on, for internal productive 
reorganization and insertion into the global economy (Robinson, 2004, p. 137). 
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Public enterprises in key sectors of the economy: electricity, oil, water, 
telecommunication were privatised in many parts of Latin America albeit to 
different degrees and this process was reflected more globally. By 1992 more than 
80 countries around the world had privatised some 6800 previously owned state 
enterprises, mostly monopolies of suppliers of essential public services (Hoogvelt, 
1997, p. 138). Mortimore (2000) in research on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in 
Latin America highlights the massive shifts during the 1990's which increased FDI 
from a maximum of $10 billion annually during the previous decades to $70 billion 
in 1997-98. This shift was greatly facilitated by new legislation allowing FDI in the 
service sectors, particularly electricity and telecommunications, but was also due to 
increased access to natural resources. In certain regions there was widespread 
investment in the apparel and clothes industry and the transfer of manufacturing 
production to the region. Colombia, despite its late adoption of the neo-liberal 
model, increased its FDI sharply during the 1990's. Facilitated by the 
transformation of the Colombian Constitution in 1991 new laws were enacted that 
allowed for increased foreign involvement in natural resource extraction, the 
privatisation of public services and state companies and the liberalisation of the 
financial sector. MNCs from the US, Europe and Japan invested heavily in the 
country and now control large sectors, often in joint ventures with local 
corporations (Ramirez & Nunez, 1999; ECLAC, 2003). 13 
Mortimore (2000) in a study of FDI in Latin America notes that while 
MNC objectives have often been achieved, this has not accompanied by the 
achievement of national development objectives of growth and distribution. Here 
the question of what is `the nation' is crucial, with different social forces having 
very different conceptualisations of what the `national interest' implies. According 
to the `transnational capitalist class' theses for those neo-liberal elites holding the 
reins of state power the objectives may no longer be rooted in `national 
development' goals but in expanding and making more profitable the operation of 
transnational capital (Robinson, 1999; 2003). Homedesa & Ugalde (2004) in a 
13 Coinvertir - Invest in Colombia Corporation has a range of documentation on FDI in Colombia 
available at http: //www. coinvertir. com (last accessed 26/09/04). 
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comprehensive analysis of neo-liberal health sector reforms advocated by the 
World Bank and IMF across Latin America found that while they did not improve 
quality of care, equity, and efficiency they did however note that the main 
beneficiaries appeared to be transnational corporations, consultant firms, and 
World Bank staff - the transnational capitalist class and their functionaries 
(Robinson, 2003). For those opposed to the processes of privatisation across Latin 
America these effects have meant that campaigns have often focussed on 
questions of national autonomy and sovereignty, drawing on a long history of 
Latin American nationalism and anti-imperialism (Santos, 2001). 
Despite arguments that market led development would reduce clientelism 
and corruption there is also widespread evidence of illicit personal gain throughout 
the region facilitated by the opportunities that neo-liberal economic reforms 
provided for local elites (Boehm & Polanco, 2003, pp. 19-21) a phenomenon that 
has been noted in other continents as well (c. f. Bayart et al, 1999). Herrera, Cortes 
& Rosen (2003) note in the influential NGO Transparency International's annual 
report that Colombia has been particularly subject to high level corruption: 
Colombia has suffered the tragic consequences of endemic theft by politicians 
and public officials for decades.. .A World Bank survey released in February 2002 found that bribes are paid in 50 per cent of all state contracts. Another 
World Bank report estimates the cost of corruption in Colombia at US $2.6 
billion annually, the equivalent of 60 per cent of the country's debt (2003, 
pp. 108). 
While corruption is nothing new in Colombia, neo-liberalism by opening up 
the state sector to a range of privatisation processes has increased the opportunities 
for corruption. In an extensive study of corruption in Colombia carried out jointly 
by the World Bank and the Colombian government (World Bank, 2000b) 
widespread corruption amongst public officials was noted. The privatisation 
processes of the 1990's led to widespread corruption among public officials as 
different national and international private investors competed to capitalise on the 
new investment opportunities (World Bank, 2002c). As the Controller General of 
Colombia, Carlos Ossoa Escobar, stated in May 2000: "The history of privatisation 
in Colombia leaves much to be desired because one can almost suppose that 
behind each case lies a theft. " (quoted in PSI, 2002, p. 20). As we will see in the 
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exploration of Emcali, corruption has played a central role in undermining the 
financial liquidity of the company and `anti-corruption' became a key plank in 
Sintraemcali's counter-hegemonic strategy. Having laid out the broad trajectories 
of neo-liberal development in the region in the next section I will explore the 
differential socio-economic effects. 
1.7 The Socio-Economic Effects of Neo-liberalism in Latin America 
1.7.1 Economic Growth and the External Debt 
In the 1980's when many Latin America countries began `structural 
adjustment' policies the region was hit by its worst economic recession since the 
1930's leading to what was known as the `lost decade' (Green, 2003). Despite 
widespread economic reform little foreign investment entered the region and 
between 1980-89 average incomes in Latin America dropped by 11%. During this 
period development indicators rapidly stagnated leading some to call this process 
`the Africanisation of Latin America' referring to Africa's exclusion and 
marginalisation from the world economy. During the 1980's, while world annual 
economic growth averaged 3.1%, in Africa it declined from 4.2 % (1965-1980) to 
2.1% (1980-89)14. In Latin America (Robinson, 1999, p. 45) growth during the two 
periods shifted from 6.1% (1965 - 1980) to 1.6% (1980-89). 
While growth picked up moderately during the 1990's and FDI increased 
markedly, Latin America began a new economic downturn in 1997 in response to 
the Asian Financial Crisis highlighting both the growing integration (and thus 
vulnerability) of the global economy and the fragile basis for economic growth that 
had been established during the 1990's. In Colombia, which had only began its 
neo-liberal reforms in the early 1990's, the figures were even worse. While in the 
1980's GNP had grown on average 4%, in the 1990's it grew only 2.6%, the lowest 
in a century. In 1998 there was zero growth, and in 1999 it was -5%. In the wake 
14 In Sub-Saharan Africa this was even more extreme. Between 1980-1988 the average annual growth 
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of the Asian Crisis between 1998 and 2000 GDP per capita dropped by 3.3% in 
Argentina, 6.2% in Colombia, and 10.5% in Ecuador (Robinson, 2004, p. 142). 
Despite overall stagnation during the last two decades of the 21St century 
Latin America remained a net exporter of capital. Between 1982 and 2002 Latin 
America on average exported $42 billion dollars per annum in profits and interest 
to pay the external debt (Robinson, 2004, p. 140), highlighting that the last two 
decades were not `lost' for everyone. Furthermore, predictions that the neo-liberal 
economic model would relieve the external debt crisis proved illusory. In 1980 the 
region's debt was $230 billion (Robinson, 2004, p. 140). By 1994 this had risen to 
$533 billion and continued to rise to $800 billion in 1999. 
In Colombia the public debt multiplied during the 1990's (Castillo, 2000; 
Ahumada, 1998; 2001; Nueva Gaceta, 2001). Between 1997 and 2001 alone 
Colombia's public debt increased by 17% of GDP and in 2001 represented 47% of 
total GDP (Clavijo, 2001). In 2001, out of all of the major economies in Latin 
America, Brazil is now the only country that has a greater public debt (Clavijo, 
2001). In 1998 the failure of the economic model led to the Colombian 
government summoning the IMF for assistance during its worst ever recession. 
From that point on Colombia has been locked into a range of `conditionalities' 
demanding further liberalisation of the economy and reductions in social spending 
in return for loans and credit. 15 
Despite the rather negative economic figures, three things can be clearly 
noted that were beneficial for transnational capital and their local allies. Firstly, 
major defaults on international loans had been avoided by the application of SAPs. 
Secondly, new legislation had facilitated the easy entry of FDI into the region, and 
thirdly the increasing national debt meant that the development trajectory of Latin 
America was increasingly tied to the `disciplinary' influence of the supranational 
institutions and the global currency markets and credit rating agencies (Robinson, 
2003). For the working classes and the poor in Latin America things were not so 
propitious. 
15 Due to Colombia's `special' security situation, military expenditure is excluded from any fiscal 
discipline, and has risen sharply since the late 1990's. 
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1.7.2 Inequality and Poverty 
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As a consequence of the repression of progressive social movements 
advocating moves towards fairer redistribution and the harsh fiscal austerity 
measures related to structural adjustment policies, it should come as little surprise 
that inequality in Latin America has increased during the neo-liberal era16. Portes & 
Hoffman (2003) note that in 1998 inequality had reached levels comparable to 
those of 1970 with the top five percent of the population drawing incomes at least 
twice those of similar countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD), and the bottom 30 percent surviving on 7.5 percent of 
total income, that is, only 60 percent of the equivalent proportion in the advanced 
nations. In Colombia in 1990 at the beginning of the neo-liberal period the ratio of 
income between the poorest and richest 10% was 1: 40. At the end of the decade 
that rested at 1: 80 (Palacio, 2001, p. 89). While Colombia was always a highly 
unequal society the neo-liberal model has further polarised the situation. 
The absolute numbers of the poor increased steadily during the neo-liberal 
period throughout the region. From 1980-1992 over 60 million people became 
poor in Latin America. By 1995 over 230 million people in Latin America were 
classed as poor which represented 48% of the population (Robinson, 2003, p. 143). 
In Colombia this was more extreme, according to the World Bank's own figures 
64% of the population live below the poverty line (World Bank, 2002b). During 
the 1990's Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Costa Rica, Mexico, Panama, Venezuela, 
Colombia, Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia and Guatemala all lost ground on the 
Human Development Index which monitors not only GDP but also life 
expectancy, health and education (UNDP, 2000, p. 7). While economic growth 
overall in Latin America began to recover during the 1990 this was not matched by 
improvement in the socio-economic status of the poor. Inequality and poverty 
actually increased during the period reflecting the polarised model of development 
(Robinson, 1999, p. 48). Deprivation created by the model is reflected in statistics 
from Brazil and Mexico which, between them, represent over half the 165 million 
16 Similar rises have been noted in more global studies on the effects of neo-liberalism. See for example 
UNDP, (1997); Pieterse, (2002); Wade, (2001) and Sutcliffe, (2001). 
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population of the region. In Brazil between 1985 and 1990 child malnutrition 
increased from 12.7% to 30.7% of all children (ibid, p. 49). Women have 
disproportionately borne the burden of neo-liberal restructuring in Latin America 
(Robinson, 1999) which is backed up by evidence from other regions of the world 
(Jauch, 1999). Deeply implicated in the shift towards increased poverty and 
inequality has been the reorganisation and restructuring of the labour market. 
1.7.3 Casualisation of Labour 
It is generally accepted that neo-liberalism has increased both 
unemployment and the casualisation of labour, with many people forced to seek 
work in the informal sector where conditions are insecure and salaries lower 
(Lopes, 1999; Lloyd & Weissman, 2002). Portes & Hoffman (2003) in the most 
comprehensive study of the effects of neo-liberalism on the class structure in Latin 
America find three key related findings: (a) a sharp decline in the number of public 
sector worker throughout the region, (b) a corresponding drop in the number of 
formal workers, and (c) in response to the decline in formal labour opportunities, 
there has been an increase in petty entrepreneurs and a rise in informal labour. 
Portes & Hoffman (2003) note that while during the ISI model the percentage of 
informal workers was steadily reduced the neo-liberal model `rolled back' and 
reversed that tendency. During the 1990's the formal sector reduced its share of 
employment creation to 20%. Furthermore they noted that in 1998 100% of new 
jobs in cities were in micro enterprises with the majority of workers excluded from 
health and welfare benefits. The International Labor Organisation (ILO) reported 
that between 1980 to 1993 80% of all new jobs were in the informal sector (cited 
in Robinson, 1999, p. 51). 
The shift in employment patterns reflects a decentring of the working class 
which moves from the industrial and public sector into the communities and poor 
neighbourhoods (Robinson, 2003). However, the informal economy is not 
necessarily independent from the formal economy but often functionally integrated 
within it, providing the services that the formal economy requires. The difference 
is that within the informal economy labour generally has lower salaries, less rights 
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and little access to social and welfare benefits, hence the cost of social 
reproduction is removed from the responsibility of capital in terms of national 
insurance and health, welfare and pensions contributions. Likewise, workers in the 
informal economy can be hired and fired at will. As Robinson notes: 
As national circuits become reorganised and integrated into these 
transnational circuits, informality becomes a central feature of the new capital- 
labour relation, whereby subcontracted and outsourced labour is organised 
informally and constitutes and increasing portion of the workforce. Public and 
private employers more frequently use contract work and contingent labour 
over permanent employment and collective contracts, with a consequent 
decline in the role of trade unions in the labour market and of working class 
negotiating power (Robinson, 2004, p. 145). 
These general patterns have been reflected in Colombia. Rising 
unemployment within the formal sectors of the economy has been matched by a 
marked increase in informal labour and the National Trade Union School notes 
that while in 1996 the percentage of work in the informal sector was 52.7% by 
2000 this had reached 60.3%, with more than 80% of these workers falling outside 
the social security system and not earning enough to survive. The report goes on to 
say that between 1992 and 2000 there was a drop of 7% in workers employed in 
the formal sector, while the number of self-employed workers has risen from 38% 
to 49.4% (ENS, 2003). According to their estimates, the vast majority will be 
earning less than the minimum wage a fact that becomes even more worrying 
when we recognize that, according to recent estimates, in order for a family of four 
to live just above the poverty line they would need 225% of the minimum wage. 
Returning more generally to the Latin American region Portes & Hoffman (2003, 
p. 58) note that 75 percent of the employed population in Latin America -roughly 
the sum of the formal and informal sectors-do not earn enough to surpass the 
poverty level: "Throughout Latin America, to be a worker is to be poor" (Portes & 
Hoffman, 2003, p. 59). 
This attack on the working wage and the changing terms and conditions of 
employment provide a key defining aspect of the neo-liberal model in the region 
and reflect the shift in class power during the period. One important effect of this 
rise in inequality, poverty, unemployment and casualisation of labour has been the 
twin exit roots of emigration and crime. Portes & Hoffman (2003) note that by 
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1997 more than 50 percent of the U. S. foreign-born population (over 13 million 
people) came from somewhere in Latin America, with growing concentrations 
from places other than Mexico (2 million Central Americans). Ecuador provides a 
startling example where during the economic crisis of the 1990's an estimated 1 
million people (8 percent of the population) left the country. 
Crime and violence have, likewise, been steadily increasing throughout this 
period (Portes and Hoffman, 2003) While evidence of the direct relationship 
between neo-liberalism and crime and violence remains inconclusive, the neo- 
liberal period has seen a widespread increase in violent crime and murder. 
According to the Colombian government's homicide statistics (cited in World 
Bank 1999, p. 22), Colombia has had, during the 1990's, around 25,000 violent 
deaths per annum. A recent study on violence in Colombia (World Bank, 1999, 
p. 4) highlighted how violent deaths increased from 15 to 92 per 100,000 
inhabitants between 1974 to 1995 making Colombia one of the most violent 
countries in the world. As we will explore in Chapter Four political violence 
accounts for around 20% of these deaths, and while incredibly high (around 5,000 
people)" the other 80% attributed to general crime and violence is similarly 
shocking. While the causes of homicide and violent crime are complex (World 
Bank, 1999; Fajnzylber, Lederman & Loayza, 2002), a recent comprehensive cross 
country study carried out by World Bank researchers on the relationship between 
violent crime and inequality highlights a high positive correlation (Fajnzylber, 
Lederman & Loayza, 2002). 
As we can see from the above, the polarisation of extreme wealth and 
poverty co-existing in Colombia in particular and Latin America more generally 
contributes to what Santos (2001) calls `territorial fascism' whereby the rich live in 
luxury gated communities, though often in fear for their own and their families 
lives and property, while the poor reside in ghettoes excluded from basic human 
rights and subject to highly repressive policing by state and private security firms, 
and more likely than any other social group to experience violent crime and 
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homicide. For Latin America, social exclusion and marginalisation continue to 
define the neo-liberal experience and threaten social collapse. 
1.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has laid the key theoretical foundation stones for this thesis. 
This has involved locating the study conceptually within a `critical theory' frame 
before turning to `critical theory' to develop a working definition of globalisation 
and a way of conceptualising neo-liberal globalisation as the dominant form of 
`globalised localism' in the contemporary era. This allowed a way of breaking down 
the `meta' concept of globalisation into a set of processes and, in doing so, reveals 
agency and contestation that is the central focus of this thesis. 
The Neo-Gramscians then provide a route towards exploring the key 
terrains of contestation that define the social relations that constitute neo-liberal 
globalisation. While delineating and pinpointing agency is crucial, this then needs 
to be complemented by an understanding of the range of `power' resources that 
the agents promoting neo-liberal globalisation have utilized to attempt to achieve 
their objects. Sayer's critical realist understanding of power provides a way of 
extending the Neo-Gramscian analysis and exploring the uneven, contested, and 
open-ended nature of the neo-liberal globalisation process while nevertheless 
retaining an ability to differentiate between the unequal power resources available 
to different social groups and institutions. The final section has explored these 
unequal relations through an examination of the evidence on the devastating 
consequences of the neo-liberal economic model for the working class and poor in 
Latin America. 
My central argument so far is that `power' comes in many shapes and forms 
and the neo-liberal global order is a social, political and economic system that 
needs constant support, attention and originality to sustain it (Sharma & Kumar, 
2003). The agents of the neo liberal order have exercised different types of powers 
17 While these figures would be disputed by the major Colombian human rights organisations that 
suggest a figure of between 6-8000 political assassinations per year, it still reflects the fact that the 
overwhelming majority of homicides are not related to political violence. 
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(Laffey & Weldes, 2002) through their institutions and agents at domestic, regional 
and international level in attempts to stabilise the model. These methods change 
over time and place, with more coercive policies such as those deployed by the 
dictatorships in the Southern Cone existing alongside more apparently consensual 
policies such as those associated with low-intensity democracy. In line with 
Robinson (2004), Petras (1997), Amin (1997), Hoogveldt (1997) and Portes & 
Hoffman (2003) I believe that while the process of neo-liberal globalisation has 
been uneven within Latin America because of the different capacities to use and 
realise power (as a result of historical, structural and agentic conditions) it is 
nevertheless clear that national and transnational elites have been broadly 
successful in realising their `objective' class interests. 
However, there may well be a whole range of `unintended outcomes' of 
these processes. While neo-liberalism has been projected across the world, political 
consensus has not (Pieterse, 2004). Legitimacy thus becomes neo-liberal 
globalisation's major contemporary obstacle. Increasingly, the failure of neo- 
liberalism in Latin America to deliver any benefits to the poor as a result of the 
polarising nature of neo-liberalism has meant that the model itself is beginning to 
unravel. In Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela, Argentina, Ecuador, and Bolivia powerful 
social forces are all seeking an alternative development model. Meanwhile the 
shared negative experience of neo-liberal globalisation for the world's working 
class and poor provides new possibilities for transnational solidarity and action, as 
reflected in the emerging World Social Forum process. In the next chapter I will 
move away from an exploration of `order' under conditions of neo-liberal 
globalisation and towards an exploration of `rebellion' and `solidarity' and in so 
doing outline the possibilities of alternative globalised localisms emerging. 
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In recent years there has been an upsurge in resistance to neo-liberal 
globalisation in many parts of the world with talk of a `movement of movements' 
encapsulating a spirit of resistance to the contemporary global order. From the 
Zapatistas to the World Social Forum (WSF) in Porto Alegre, to the 
demonstrations and counter-summits/conferences, to the successful struggles 
against privatisation in Bolivia Peru, Cali18' and the unprecedented mobilisations 
against the US/UK-led war of occupation against Iraq, we are witnessing a re- 
emergence of struggle in a range of forms and shapes that positions itself against 
the homogenising tendencies of neo-liberal globalisation to reproduce a highly 
unequal and exclusionary development model. So far in this thesis I have been 
arguing that a `neo-liberal global order' is being created and sustained by a powerful 
transnational capitalist class. In this chapter I want to focus our attention on the 
oppositional tendencies that are emerging in reaction and response to this 
emerging order through an exploration of what might be called `globalisation from 
below' -a strategy that seeks to reign in the `power' of the neo-liberal global order. 
Given that resistance is now more visiblel9, there is a need to understand 
these processes and to recognise oppositional movements as `active agents', and to 
seek to learn from those practices that have been, even if partially, successful in 
their objectives. Just as I have explored the disciplinary mechanisms and power 
resources of those agents promoting the neo-liberal global order, so too do we 
18 For a brief article on the struggle against water privatisation see Lopez Levy (2001), and for a similar 
process in Arequipe, Peru see Martorell (2002). 
19 I use the word `visible' because there was always resistance through out the period -a cursory glance 
at the differing outcomes of structural adjustment policies in different locales highlights how it was 
always contested, to lesser or greater degrees. See A brief history of resistance to structural adjustment 
http: //www. nadir. org/nadir/initiativ/agp/free/imf/resistance_sap. htm and the website of 50 Years Is 
Enough, U. S. Network for Global Economic Justice, www. 50years. org 
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need to examine alternative social forces and the `power' resources that they 
deploy. A range of studies on counter-hegemonic social movements is now filling 
that gap in the research. Some studies have begun to do this through a focus on 
the activities and strategies of the transnational anti-globalisation/anti-capitalist 
movements (Escobar, 2000; Callinicos, 2003; Sen et al, 2004), and others on 
particular social movements that have challenged the imperatives of hegemonic 
globalisation, such as the Zapatistas in Mexico (Holloway & Peläez, 1998, Morton, 
2002), the Landless Workers Movement in Brazil (Branford & Rocha, 2002), and 
the anti-water privatisation movement in Bolivia (Olivera & Lewis, 2003). 
Across these and other movements there are a range of alternative `power' 
resources and strategies being deployed: armed struggle, mass demonstrations, land 
occupations, and a range of new (or renewed) tactics such as the development of 
transnational solidarity and human rights networks (Keck & Sikkink, 1998), the 
strategic targeting of certain global institutions and organisations such as 
demonstrations against the World Bank and the IMF (for example, Seattle, Genoa) 
and also the construction of alternative `power' mechanisms such as the WSF that 
was created as a parallel institution to the World Economic Forum' (Santos, 2004). 
Powerful new democratic forms for the organisation of the polis have emerged 
such as `participatory budgeting' in Porto Alegre (Wampler, 2004; Goldsmith & 
Vainer, 2001; Santos, 1998) that have brought `legitimacy' and `authority' to 
oppositional `alternatives'. Likewise, in many parts of the world anti neo-liberal 
coalitions have emerged who, through pooling their differential power resources, 
have collectively challenged the top-down `power' of neo-liberal agents. These 
contingent alliances have, more recently (particularly in Latin America) emerged as 
political coalitions that have sought to gain electoral success at the national leve120. 
However, much of the research on counter-hegemonic movements has 
focussed on `New Social Movements' and far less on the `traditional' social 
movement of `organised labour'. This chapter seeks to redress this imbalance by 
exploring the role of organised labour in these processes, reviewing the recent 
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literature on labour renewal, and laying out a theoretical and methodological 
framework for studying labour movements. In line with Santos (1999a) I begin by 
developing a notion of a `Sociology of Rebellion and Solidarity' that draws from an 
understanding of working class resistance to neo-liberal globalisation. The overall 
purpose of the chapter is to provide a theoretical framework for studying 
contemporary labour movements that allows us to move between the macro- 
sociological processes of neo-liberal globalisation down to the micro-processes of 
organisational resistance. 
2.2 Towards A Sociology of Rebellion and Solidarity 
In order to develop a sociology of `rebellion and solidarity', Santos argues 
that we need to start by `listening to the South' (Santos, 1995, p. 506) as the site 
where those suffering under global capitalism exist and resist. This necessitates a 
normative affiliation with the South, though one that neither implies the simple 
dissolution of the social scientist into the activist nor one that keeps a distance 
between social science and activism (Santos, 1999a, p38). Secondly, we need to 
work towards what Santos (1999a; 2003a) calls a `sociology of absences' that 
uncovers the hidden histories and struggles of the resisting `other'. `Knowledge as 
regulation' destroyed alternative knowledges, particularly those under the dominion 
of colonial rule. Those alternative knowledges need to be respected but that task is 
made difficult by the very destruction wrought by colonial domination. The 
question, then, is how is it possible, in Spivak's terms, for the subaltern to speak? 
(Spivak, 1988). In this process Santos calls for a multicultural dialogue which forges 
a pathway towards communicating different knowledges, and creates those spaces 
to hear different voices. 
Thirdly, in moving from mono-culturalism to multi-culturalism a further 
major obstacle is that of `difference' which requires a `politics of translation'. In the 
context of the emerging process of the WSF and its local and regional offshoots 
20 For example, the coalition that emerged around the Brazilian Workers Party, the Frente Amplio in 
Uruguay, the Social and Political Front in Colombia, the MAS (Movement to Socialism) in Bolivia and 
perhaps most important around Hugo Chavez in Venezuela. 
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Santos has posed the problem as to how different groups with different histories, 
objectives, trajectories and protest repertoires can come together to unite on 
certain common issues. At the global level he talks of the possibility of drawing 
together the concept of human rights and the Hindu and Islamic concepts of 
human dignity; between western strategies of development and Ghandi's swadeshi 
(Santos, 1999b); between western philosophy and African oral sagesse; between 
`modern' democracy and traditional authorities; between the indigenous movement 
and the ecological movement; and between the workers' movement and the 
feminist movement. 
The task of a `politics of translation' is to facilitate communication between 
different resisting subjects. The three processes of `listening to the South', `a 
sociology of absences' and `a politics of translation' provide, simultaneously, both 
an ethical framework and a research agenda that guide this work. In the next 
section I will explore work on Labour Geographies pioneered by Andrew Herod 
which has a similar framework and agenda and combines a normative commitment 
to labour movements with an analytical focus on uncovering labour movement 
strategies in the neo-liberal era. 
2.3 Labour geographies 
Herod's central argument is that belief in `labour' as an active, 
transformatory subject has been neglected in much recent critical research (Herod, 
1997). While there has been a great deal written on capital's spatial reorganisation, 
there has, until recently, been a notable gap in the literature in relation to labour's 
response (Herod, 1995; 1997; 1998; 2001; Waterman & Wills, 2001; Munck, 2002). 
Herod's argument is that the geographical history of capitalism has been written 
from above, with labour essentially fitting in to the needs of the ever-expanding 
accumulation process vis-a-vis. imperialism, inter-capitalist rivalry, and advances in 
scientific and technological revolutions. He suggests, however, that labour has also 
been important in shaping the geographical landscape of capitalism and that, while 
not moving to the other extreme and arguing that labour is determinant, labour is 
not just `a dependent variable': 
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Whereas corporations are theorized as powerful social agents whose actions 
have important consequences for the geography of the global economy, 
workers are invariably portrayed simply as the recipients of the economic and 
geographic transformations wrought by global capital (Herod, 1998, p. 343). 
Agreeing with Massey (1973), Herod (1997, p. 7) suggests that the world is 
not simply the product of capital's requirements and that space and ensuing 
structures are objects of contestation and political struggle, just as capital seeks to 
make its `spatial fix' so then does labour: 
Harvey's (1982) argument about how capital seeks to make a "spatial fix" 
appropriate to its conditions and needs at particular times in particular 
locations, it is also necessary to see workers' activities in terms of their desire 
to create particular spatial fixes appropriate to their own condition and needs 
at particular times in particular locations (Herod, 1997, p. 17). 
He provides evidence that workers' geographical praxis can shape the 
evolution of the economic landscape at scales from the local to the global in quite 
significant ways. Herod's work has focussed on counter-posing the traditional 
theories that capital is the determining factor in shaping the geographical terrain of 
capitalism and instead offers a more dialectical understanding of class relations 
whereby labour is given back its agency. He critiques both classical and Marxist 
accounts of the geography of capitalism for under theorising the agency of labour, 
and focusing instead on research on FDI whereby prominent bodies of thought 
suggest that FDI can be explained by first, wage levels, and secondly, proximity to 
markets i. e. transportation costs. Workers are studied only in the sense that their 
productivity, militancy and rates of unionisation are taken into account in 
corporate decision making processes. The point here is that labour is considered a 
factor in these analyses, but capital is the active agent. 
The second commonly-stated factor is that while capital can act globally, 
labour is condemned to operate locally and nationally. Workers, by virtue of 
national differences, languages, distance, national labour laws and so on, appear 
trapped in fixed spaces. This leads to the argument that while workers can put 
pressure on the local or national environment they cannot do so globally and thus 
suffer from a fundamental weakness in terms of the geographical reach of their 
power in the contemporary era. While it is true that capital can act globally much 
more easily, this approach denies the theoretical possibility that labour can create 
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new structures which can allow it to operate globally. Geographic scales, just like 
geographic spaces, are actively created structures. The point is that TNCs have 
actively created new spaces and scales of operation and why do we seem unable to 
theorise why workers might not do the same? 
Building on this basic assumption, this research can be broadly understood 
as seeking to put labour once again at the centre of research and to reconstruct 
agency, resistance and challenge as key to understanding the historical development 
of capitalism. Of central importance is the understanding of the relational nature 
of capital's power, which needs labour and exerts its power in relation to it. Hence 
we would expect the outcome of `capital' and `capitalists' activity to always be 
conditioned in some way by `labour' and `workers' activity whether that be to 
assist, to modify, or to prevent capital's exercise of power (see Section 1.5). This 
`terrain of contestation' between capital and labour thus provides `possibilities' and 
not just `limitations' for oppositional labour movements. 
2.4 De and Re-territorialisation of Power and the Changing Nature of the 
Working Class 
In the literature on `labour geographies', and also in the work of the Neo- 
Gramscians and in that of `social movement unionism' (to be outlined in Section 
2.5), there is a recognition of two key structural transformations produced by neo- 
liberal globalisation over recent years that have altered the nature of the 
relationship between capital and labour. The first major transformation is the 
process of re-territorialisation and de-territorialisation of power to a range of 
different scales that reflects the reorganisation of capitalist production, 
accumulation and regulation in the newly emerging global economy. Secondly, the 
process of neo-liberal globalisation has also radically altered the nature of work, the 
labour/capital relation and hence the composition of the working class. 
Increasingly, informal labour has become the norm, and exclusion increasingly 
common (see Section 1.7). This has serious implications for the question of 
working class organisation and particularly for trade unions. These twin processes 
of de-territorialisation and re-territorialisation and the changing composition of the 
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working class provide the structural underpinnings for an emerging `sociology of 
rebellion and solidarity' that can explore labour strategies of `globalisation from 
below' as they begin to grapple with these changes and seek mechanisms to 
overcome them. 
2.4.1 Exploring the New Scales of Global Capitalism: De terrztorialisation and Ke 
territorialisation 
As I noted in Chapter One, `capital' in the wake of the economic crisis of 
the 1970's sought to break free from the nation-state regulation that it was 
previously bound to (taxation, national subsidies, import controls and tariffs). The 
shift beyond national borders has meant that capital has sought new forms of 
regulation to manage the expanding accumulation process. As the prior stage of 
Fordist accumulation was based on national economies and inter-state relations, 
the new emerging form of regulation needed to find mechanisms beyond the 
nation state. This shift entailed a range of processes of rescaling and shifting the 
spatial relations of political, social and economic accumulation. The shifting scales 
of accumulation, together with advances in technology, have redrawn the 
parameters for governance, power and control and have important implications for 
strategies of contestation and resistance covered in the rest of the thesis. One of 
the crucial elements of capitalism relates to the changing relationship between 
space and time, `time-space compression', and `fixity and motion'. These involve 
conflicts between the need of capital to circulate globally, yet still needing to be 
located in fixed territorial spaces (Brenner, 1999; Harvey 1989) that need to be 
managed in order for accumulation to take place. Conflict arises over the means of 
regulating these new spaces. 
Scale is produced through this process of negotiation between the need to 
move to different geographical locations and the need to be fixed in a particular 
place to produce goods. Neo-liberal globalisation has broken down old `spatial 
fixes', `settlements' or `social contracts' and sought to forge new ones. We can see 
in the conflicts over attempts to `fix' new territorial pacts such as the EU or the 
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) as battles between different social forces 
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that may benefit or lose out in new territorial arrangements (Higginbottom, 2003). 
Likewise we can see the shift to both the local scale with increased policies of 
`decentralisation' occurring simultaneously with a rise in the importance of 
supranational organisations such as the IMF, World Bank and the WTO. At these 
different scales we can see competition between different countries over the type 
of future Europe or Latin America under construction, between corporations, 
between different sections of capital, and between labour. 
Unlike in conventional understandings of scale (e. g. Hart, 1982) which 
perceive scales as being fixed or pre-given i. e. the local, national and regional as 
permanent entities, research in economic and political geography (Brenner, 1999; 
Cox, K. 1998) has conceptualised `scale' as being actively constructed for particular 
purposes by different social forces. Scales are thus arenas for social struggle that 
are both fought over, expanded and constructed. Hence, shifts in scale both 
upwards and downwards are means to shift contradictions and the potential for 
conflict to different locations where different social forces might be privileged. As 
Harvey (1989) notes, there are differential relations between different classes at 
different scales, and some social forces are better able to command and control 
certain spaces. This leads us to Castells's (1997) argument that because of its lack 
of mobility labour, and labour movements, are likely to fade away as capital in its 
hyper mobile and fluid form shifts around the globe. 
Yet this is a highly static and undialectical understanding of power and 
presupposes the inability of labour to organise beyond local levels. Drawing upon 
the conception of power outlined in the last chapter, I would argue against this 
position. Neither capital's power nor labour's is static - both the power of capital 
and labour may change over time. Secondly, capital's power is always relational and 
contingent on certain other factors to activate it (transforming powerl into 
powert) hence situations are always `open-ended'. Thirdly, the notion that capital is 
global and labour fixed fails to recognise either the varied terrain of the global - 
with different relational forces present in different places - or that the global is also 
localised in some or other place where its power relations may be differentialised 
(think of global production chains with each component locally based). Ultimately, 
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while it may be true that capital's newfound mobility has strengthened its structural 
power (conceived as powerl), it still has susceptibilities and labour has the 
potential to alter its own `powerl' resources through strategic change (see Section 
1.5). 
2.4.2 Informalisation and the Changing Composition of the Working Class 
The second major structural transformation has been that of the increased 
`casualisation' or `informalisation' of labour. As we saw in the last chapter while 
there was always a large informal sector in Latin America, this has increased 
exponentially during the period of neo-liberal globalisation. In attempting to 
address these changing social relations, Cox (1999) extends Marxist conceptions of 
class relations beyond the fundamental contradiction between owners of the means 
of production and those who sell their labour in order to survive: the bourgeoisie 
and the proletariat. He talks of those population groups that are `integrated', 
`precarious' or `excluded' within global production systems. The integrated are 
those population groups at the apex of the world system who manage, carry out 
research, maintain the productive apparatus and propagate the ideology of 
globalisation. At the next level there are those workers whom he terms as being in 
a `precarious' situation, subject to poor working conditions, insecure contracts, and 
likely to be disposed of when production falls. The third and final level is 
composed of those producers who are `excluded' from international production, 
the unemployed and the under employed, who are often outside of any protection 
schemes and live in a state of extreme poverty and insecurity. Santos (2003a) offers 
a strikingly similar schema of the composition of `civil society' highlighting his 
complementarity to the Neo-Gramscian approach. 
Santos distinguishes between intimate civil society, strange civil society and 
uncivil society, which parallel Cox's `integrated', `precarious' and `excluded'. Santos' 
categories also complement those of Cox by broadening them out into the 
cultural/social domain of human rights. He argues that Cox's `integrated' category 
enjoys the full three generations of human rights: civil and political, socio- 
economic, and cultural. The `precarious' have a mixed life experience, depending 
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on production needs, and may occasionally have political and civil rights, partial 
economic and social rights, but are largely excluded from cultural or `post 
materialist' rights. The final category, Cox's `excluded', are deprived of virtually all 
human rights and forced into what Santos, drawing on Hobbes, terms a new `state 
of nature'. He talks of a `circle of social fascism' where people have `no stabilized 
expectations' because they have no rights. One only needs to travel beyond the 
elite suburbs of the major cities of the South to gain a mental picture of what he is 
talking about. 
In both of these conceptualisations, `inclusion' and `exclusion' categorise 
population groups according to consumption relations rather than the classical 
Marxist analysis of production relations. While there are a range of criticisms in this 
shift of analysis from production to consumption (Colas, 2002), a focus on 
inclusion and exclusion allows a way to incorporate an analysis of `race', gender, 
sexuality, and ethnicity that are typically blurred in many forms of class analysis. 
Furthermore, a focus on exclusion and inclusion is also able to capture the vast 
expansion of those informal workers whom Portes & Hoffman (2003) have called 
the Informal Proletariat. For both Santos and Cox there is also recognition that the 
composition and distribution of each of the categories is sharply contrasted 
between North and South. While percentage distribution of the different categories 
in the developed North may be something along the lines of 30/40/30 in the 
geographic South it may be 10/20/70 reflecting the uneven geography of 
capitalism. 
Crucial in this process is a broader understanding of `working class' people 
that recognises their diversity, their (often) lack of employment, and their 
heterogeneity. Rather than seeing the working class as "an undifferentiated mass in 
some `heroic proletarian' sense" (Herod, 1997, p. 35) there is a need to recognise 
internal differentiation both by sector, gender, race and geography which would 
affect their praxis in different ways leading to different outcomes. This non- 
essentialist understanding of the working class does not, however, preclude the 
retention of the category, as despite the diversity: 
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Working class people - waged and unwaged - organize along many cross- cutting political, social, racial, gender and cultural lines. And yet the fact that they do so as working class people rather than as capitalists distinctively 
shapes their spatial praxis and, hence, their production of geographical landscapes (Herod, 1997, p. 12). 
The argument being put forward by Herod is that we need to understand 
both the commonality of working class people in their abstract relationship to 
capital itself - i. e. they sell their labour, and their more day-to-day existence which 
divides people by ethnicity, gender, geography and culture. Recognising 
heterogeneity and addressing the real differences in interests that people have, or 
perceive they have, is crucial in building solidarity between different groups and 
furthering the project of a `politics of translation'. In order to illuminate this I want 
to explore below the question of international solidarity and how a broader 
conceptualisation of the working class can assist us in understanding the limitations 
so far to this project. 
2.4.3 International Solidarity and the Working Class 
Contrary to the expectations of the nineteenth-century labour movement, 
capitalists of the entire world, not the workers, have united. While capital 
globalized itself, labour unions built their strength at the national level. In 
order to confront global capital, the labour movement must restructure itself 
profoundly (Santos, 2003b, online version Section 6.2). 
The contemporary era certainly presents the project of international 
working class solidarity with good opportunities for building common alliances and 
struggles. Eric Toussaint argues that neo-liberal globalisation is producing certain 
commonalities of experience across different parts of the world which facilitate 
transnational action and collaboration: 
We are on similar paths on different spots of the earth. A qualitative leap of 
ideas and a convergence is occurring after the brutal offensive of capital 
against labour, and of the ruling classes of the industrialized world against the 
people of the periphery (Telopolis Journal, 2002, p. 2). 
When asked why `convergence' appeared to be taking place, he responded 
that it is a direct result "... of the globalisation of common enemies - institutions, 
corporations, governments. " To illustrate this convergence, in an article for the 
Guardian Weekly (2002) Tony juniper, director of Friends of the Earth highlights 
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how different social struggles are leading in the same direction, producing new 
possibilities for alliance building: 
Talking about rainforests led us into talking about Third World debt. Talking 
about climate change led us to talk about transnational corporations. The 
more you talk about these things, the more you realise the subject isn't the 
environment any more, it's the economy and the pressures on countries to do 
things that undercut any efforts they make to deal with environmental issues. 
By the time we got to Seattle, we were all campaigning on the same basic 
trend that was undermining everybody's efforts to achieve any progressive 
goals. The trend is the free market and privileges for big corporations and rich 
people at the expense of everything else. 
Naomi Klein (2002, p. 122) calls this emerging commonality the struggle 
against "the privatisation of every aspect of life. " There are however, many 
conflicts, tensions, and contradictions between different organisations operating 
along different spaces from the local to the global: between labour and indigenous 
movements, peasants and women's organisations, between movements with a 
radical transformatory agenda and those with more regulatory agendas, and within 
these different movements between those from the developed North and those 
from the South. Santos sees `the politics of translation" as an approach expressing 
a break between old notions of the `universal subject' towards a broader 
recognition of diversity, tolerance and respect for different social groupings 
(Santos, 2004, pp. 73-77). As noted earlier neo-liberal globalisation has the effect of 
fragmenting communities, breaking down social bonds and driving population 
groups towards Hobbesian state of nature, but the flip side of that fragmentation 
can be the emergence of new alliances /understanding between social groups that 
previously had little interest in coming together to work for common goals. 
One of the central obstacles to building international solidarity after WWII 
was the East/West cold war divide. The collapse of the Soviet Union has more 
recently led many commentators towards hope in the possibility of the 
international structures of the trade union movement moving away from a 
supporting role for capitalist development and towards putting a `brake on neo- 
liberal industrial relations' (O'Brien 2000; Munck, 2002). While the end of the cold 
war is undoubtedly important, it fails to address the other conflicts and differences 
between workers in the rich Northern industrialized countries who have 
traditionally remained in control of the major trade secretariats and the mass of the 
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worlds workers (or workless workers) who live in the `South'. While globalisations, 
in their range of forms, have increased interconnections, the neo-liberal global 
order has also increased inequality between North and South. The view of 
globalisation is thus very different depending on where you are located, and 
certainly the leaders of the structures of the international trade union movement, 
located and based in the North - are likely to have different views as to how best 
to address the situation. 
While processes of globalisation have increased the homogeneity of 
economic and social policy (Yeates, 2001) the experience of those polices and their 
effects remains sharply unequal according to the location of the country and region 
in the international economic order. Geography still matters even if, as Robinson 
suggests (2002), there is a necessity to reconceptualise `development' as a social 
division between North and South with pockets of the social conditions of the 
South in the North, and pockets of Northern conditions in the South. However, to 
argue that the North/South divide has disappeared is neither empirically correct 
not theoretically useful as we seek to analyse the changing trajectory of 
contemporary development and the motivations for international solidarity. As 
Bagchi notes, the difference between North and South has a long pedigree: 
While capitalism penetrated all the cells of daily life in the countries that came 
under its sway, the vast majority of the people in the dependent colonies 
experienced it primarily as deprivation: deprivation of land, of occupations, of 
social status, of dignity as human beings, and of life itself. There were 
increases in productivity and in some amenities of daily existence, but the 
latter were reserved for the colonial rulers and the collaborating elite of the 
respective countries (Bagchi, 2002, p. 242). 
The crucial point is that "the worst sufferers of the contradictions of 
capitalism have been the poor and working classes of the third world -about three 
fourths or more of the global population-" (Bagchi, 2002, p. 242). Imperialism is 
one of the missing ingredients of a more thorough understanding of this 
fundamental difference between North and South, but has become absent from 
much of the analysis of globalisation. Sivanandan (1998/99, p. 5) puts it well when 
he says: "If imperialism is the latest stage of capitalism, globalism is the latest stage 
of imperialism". 
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Geographical inequalities and the legacy of the cold war raise suspicion 
from many trade unionists based in the `South' of the intentions of `trade union 
federations' led from the `north'. This tension was evident in conflict over attempts 
by the ICFTU to push through labour clauses in trade deals at the supranational 
level, which some see as protectionism on behalf of the Western powers (Munch, 
2002). Furthermore, the legacy of the practices of the ICFTU during the Cold War 
and their involvement with the CIA and oppressive regimes, particularly in Latin 
America, remains a thorny issue. There is also evidence to suggest that the Cold 
War did not end these practices, and the AFL/CIO, the US international union, 
has been accused of involvement in the recent 2002 coup attempt in Venezuela 
against the populist regime of Hugo Chavez (see Labor Notes, 2002; Radtimes, 2002). 
The question of why workers may act in the interests of particular sections 
of the working class and against the general interests of working class 
internationalism challenges one of the central propositions of Marxist theory in 
these matters. As Silver (2003, p. 23) notes, while Marx and Engels were correct in 
suggesting that for `capital' all members of the proletariat were interchangeable 
(clearly evidenced by the shifting mobility of capital over recent years) they were 
wrong in conflating the interests of capital and labour. Just because capital treats 
labour as an interchangeable commodity, it does not mean that workers will treat 
themselves as homogenous and forget any non-class based identity. As Silver 
argues, precisely because capital treats labour in this way, so the working classes 
seek to differentiate themselves from each other and "draw non-class borders and 
boundaries as a basis for claims for protection from the maelstrom" (Silver, 2003, 
p. 22). 
Returning to the more general theoretical points made by Herod on his 
non-essentialist understanding of the working class, what this leads us to recognize 
is that working class people may act at different times and in different places, 
motivated by different reasons and political projects: gender, culture, nation, class, 
ideology. Recognising this fact does not preclude internationalism; rather, it opens 
up for analysis the range of real obstacles that exist to the construction of a broad 
counter-hegemonic project. This critique extends beyond the more internationalist 
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debates to the more localised questions of alliances between organised trade unions 
and the unemployed, indigenous movements, and social movements. A `politics of 
translation' and a non-essentialist view of the working class can help us to explore 
these possibilities upon which to build a better theory of solidarity, as part of the 
broader project of studying rebellion. 
In essence then a `politics of translation' is concerned with building 
commonality between different oppressed groups. If we recognise the emergence 
of a global economy and the corresponding emergence of a `transnational capitalist 
class', then the politics of translation is centred on building solidarity between the 
emerging `transnational working class' divided by employment, gender, geography, 
culture, and religion. While an old task, it nevertheless remains a pressing one. 
2.5 Mapping out the Literature of Trade Union Renewal 
One crucial body of work that complements the Labour Geographies 
research and addresses the structural transformations that have taken place during 
the period of neo-liberal globalisation is that of theories of `social movement 
unionism'. This research, which has its roots in and around the struggles of South 
African trade unions in the 1980's, has sought to chart the re-emergence of labour 
struggles across the world (e. g. Waterman, 2001; Munck, 2002; Moody, 1997; 
Johnson, 1998; Lambert & Webster 2003) and more recently has sought to 
theorise these within the context of the `neo-liberal global order'. The next section 
will critically analyse this literature and explore its major components. As Munck 
notes: "Just like capitalism, trade unions as a social movement are capable of 
mutation, transformation and regeneration' (Munck 2002, p. 190) and this body of 
work seeks out those movements that appear to be developing in `new' directions. 
The literature appears to broadly express two major processes that are 
occurring at a variety of levels within the international trade union movement. The 
first relates to trade union responses to the globalisation of capital and the 
subsequent `de-territorialisation' `re-territorialisation' of power, and shows how 
trade unions and international trade secretariats are finding new geographical 
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terrains/spaces to wage their protests, and promote the interests of their members. 
This is often referred to as the `new internationalism', but Waterman recognises 
that "the relevant places/spaces of such new internationalisms must also surpass 
physical borders to include those of cyberspace" (Waterman & Wills, 2001, p. 3). 
This research highlights how trade unions are now acting across different 
geographical `spaces' and `scales', emphasising that processes of globalisation create 
not only limitations but also new possibilities for social struggle. Case studies are 
presented from a range of countries highlighting how trade union organisations 
have been able to 'jump scales' and address capital and corporations' ability to 
operate beyond the local and national (e. g. Waterman & Wills, 2001; Munck, 2002) 
in a range of ways. 
Herod (2001), however, cautions against a tendency towards determinism 
prevalent in much of the `internationalist' trade union literature; that international 
solidarity and praxis is always necessary for labour to achieve its objectives. He 
argues, instead, for an analysis of how processes of globalisation and the 
geographical transformation of the global economy are affecting workers in 
different locales and in different locations. From there he seeks out an 
understanding of strategy, offering an example from the US in 1998 whereby 
workers from the United Auto Workers Union by stopping production in two 
General Motors plants in Flint, Michigan caused the company to close down or 
significantly cut back production in 27 out of 29 GM plants across the country due 
to the nature of the just In Time (OIT) production chain (Herod, 2003, p. 510). 
Herod's work recognises that globalisation is not only about transposing `power' 
and as a consequence `resistance' to the global level but that processes of 
globalisation actually involve 're- and de-territorialisation at a range of scales as I 
outlined above. For this reason, rather than advocate the concept of 
`internationalism' (Waterman & Wills, 2001) as a methodological or conceptual 
tool for exploring the spatial praxis of workers under processes of globalisation, I 
use the concept `transborderisation'. This term captures the idea of crossing new 
borders and operating on new scales but does not reify the global level or insist in 
the national - and thereby fall into the trap of simplistic scalar solutions for trade 
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union strategy. The geography of capitalism is highly uneven and different scalar 
strategies may be successful according to the particular type and location of the 
conflict. 
While many authors recognize that this new geography of resistance (what I 
call transborderisation) is important under conditions of neo-liberal globalisation, 
they also assert that the question of trade union renewal is not only about new 
geographical scales of operation but also the internal re-organisation of trade 
unions into more `social' or `citizenship' oriented movements - hence the `social' in 
`social movement unionism' and the `citizen' in `citizenship unionism' (Johnston, 
1998). This second aspect of the research on labour renewal (e. g. Moody, 1997; 
Waterman, 2001) focuses on what I will call the `horizontalisation' of trade union 
structures. It argues for a more rank and file democratic unionism that can interact 
and ally with other social groups and movements that have been marginalized by 
processes of neo-liberal globalisation. I see this process as a response to the 
changing nature of class formation outlined above, particularly the increased 
casualisation and informalisation of work. It stresses that the `old social 
movements' are not the only historical subject; rather there are a plurality of 
resisting subjects: environmentalists, community activists, indigenous 
organisations, women's movements, non-unionised labour, and that trade union 
renewal takes the form of articulating union struggles in alliance with these 
different `resisting subjects'. I see this as an extension of Santos's (2004) `politics of 
translation' into the domain of the labour movement that allows for 
communication between different groups. Beyond a recognition of the changing 
nature of work and the composition of the working class, `social movement union' 
theorists also chart the changing relations that prevail between labour and capital in 
the contemporary world order. Unlike the situation during the Fordist period, trade 
unions no longer have `an automatic seat' at the table in negotiations. As a 
consequence the mobilisation of members and allies, as a means of pressuring 
corporations and states, thus now becomes much more important. 
In social movement union literature there is an explicit emphasis on the 
need to address the binary between economics and politics that has developed over 
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the decades during previous `social pacts'. Simply put, trade unions were perceived 
as responsible for the day-to-day economic necessities of their members, while 
social democratic parties were regarded as responsible for developing the political 
interests of the working classes. The early literature on social movement unionism 
focused on South Africa, Brazil and the Philippines, and it is important to note that 
in authoritarian regimes or military dictatorships and in the absence of legal 
political parties (the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa for example 
was banned) the trade union movement was often forced into a more political role 
by virtue of it being the only legal expression of popular aspirations". Furthermore, 
these movements were also `pro-democracy movements' calling for the restoration 
or implementation of democratic regimes. More recent literature notes the 
emergence of similar tendencies towards more politicised social movement unions 
in the United States (Moody, 1997; Johnston, 1998) reflecting the failure of 
political parties to represent the interests of organised labour. 
Comparing two of the leading advocates of `social movement unionism', 
Peter Waterman (2001) and Kim Moody (1997) provides one way of unpacking 
some of the tensions and differences in the broader literature with respect to an 
understanding of this process. While Waterman (2001) argues for a fundamental 
shift toward a true `plurality of resisting subjects' with none necessarily leading the 
struggle, Moody appears to retain an element of the `vanguardist' role of the 
unionised working class, albeit a much more grassroots rank and file unionism that 
can operate with a range of different social movements (Moody, 1997). For both, 
however, there is a meeting point which is that trade unions need to democratise 
their structures, broaden their social perspective and reach out to new 
constituencies. This goes beyond `tactics' towards a radical re-orientation of the 
`culture' of trade union organisations away from the hierarchical and bureaucratic 
and towards the diversity and plurality of the grass roots. In this sense, social 
movement unionism has some commonality with `new social movement' theories 
that emerged in the 1980's to account for movements that appeared to be focussed 
21 The Church appears to have played a similar role during the Civil Rights movement in the US, the 
struggle against apartheid in South Africa, and a range of struggles against military regimes in Latin 
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not only on goals of redistribution, but on recognition and identity. While Nancy 
Fraser (Fraser & Honneth, 2003) notes there is no clear-cut binary between 
recognition and redistribution, `social movement unionism', particularly the 
Waterman (2001) variety, focuses on the diversity and plurality of movements. In 
many ways both the `social movement unionism' and `citizenship unionism' 
literature represents a different ethos for a trade union, moving away from the 
narrow corporate goals of traditional `regulatory' trade unionism towards a more 
inclusive and `emancipatory' trade unionism that is engaged in all fields of social 
and political life. The `citizenship unionism' conceptualization of Johnston (1998), 
for instance, more clearly reflects the idea of a trade union struggling for the 
broader citizenship rights of the working class community: economic, civil, 
political, social and cultural. 
In line with Holdt (2002), Lambert & Webster (2003), 1 agree that rather 
then get bogged down in developing and struggling over the specific definition of 
the concept of `social movement unionism', or `citizenship unionism' as `ideal 
type', it is more fruitful to examine how a more `movement' focus is emerging (or 
re-emerging) in some trade unions, and how this relates/co-exists and interacts 
with more `traditional' forms of trade union practice and with the particular 
historical and cultural traditions/ conditions within which trade unions are 
embedded". My own approach is to examine the existence of processes of 
transborderisation and horizontalisation in Sintraemcali, and how these relate to 
more `traditional' forms of trade union practice, locally, nationally and 
internationally. This, in turn, will be located within an analysis of the specific 
political, cultural and socio-economic conditions in the region /country where the 
trade union is based and its relations to broader global forces and actors so as to 
assist in explaining why particular forms of horizontalisation and 
transborderisation take place and to what effect. The question then to be 
considered is how transformations in these processes might take place. This takes 
America. In El Salvador, much of the repression was directed against the Catholic church (McClintock, 
1985). 
22 These debates have led to a range of alternative vocabulary `new social unionism', `international 
social movement unionism', `new internationalism' (c. f. Waterman, 2001 a, p 12-13) 
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centrality of pedagogy and education in trade union 
2.6 Exploring the Pedagogical Process of Trade Union Renewal 
Despite the growing literature on trade union renewal, far less intellectual 
inquiry has been devoted to exploring how these trade unions are able to transform 
their activity, and what might be the specific processes through which trade unions 
become aware of the need to shift strategy. Further, how do trade unions develop 
these new strategies? In these processes, education and learning appear crucial, yet 
they are largely absent in the literature23. 
Part of the reason for this absence lies in the narrow conceptualisation of 
education as taking place only in classrooms or through formal means. My 
argument, however, is that trade unionists, as political activists, do a great deal of 
learning through their activities, organisational and political work, and that this 
praxis is an educational process in itself. This process of `education' and `learning' 
is thus intimately tied to broader social processes, and can only be understood 
within that context. The question is how best to understand the conditions under 
which trade unions and their members might change focus and direction and shift 
towards new patterns of organisation and solidarity practices. In the next section I 
will attempt to bridge that gap by providing a framework to assist in that research 
task. 
2.6.1 Pedagogy and the Production of Conformist or Rebellious Subjectiwities 
Pedagogy is usually considered as a lower order concept that refers to sets 
of practices of upbringing and education, methods and processes of transmission 
and acquisition that seek to develop knowledges, skills and moral order. However, 
drawing on Bernstein, Bonal & Rambla (2003, p. 172) note that, "Each pedagogy 
could and should be studied by looking at the social forces that induced, 
maintained and legitimated it. " Dominant pedagogies are thus studied with the aim 
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of understanding how communication systems might produce individual and 
collective subjectivities, ways of understanding and interpreting the world. 
Pedagogical modalities are realisations of symbolic control and therefore centrally 
implicated in cultural production and reproduction. As Bernstein himself noted: 
"Symbolic control through pedagogy seeks to shape and distribute forms of 
consciousness, identity and desire" (Bernstein & Solomon, 1999, p. 269). 
In this research I intend to explicitly link pedagogy to the particular social 
forces that both produce and defend these practices. Hence pedagogies within 
state education systems could be seen as being related to particular modes of 
production and divisions of labour within societies. The pedagogic device, the 
condition for the materialising of symbolic control, is the object of a struggle for 
domination, for the group who appropriates these devices have access to a ruler 
and distributes consciousness, identity and desire. The question is whose ruler, in 
whose interests, or for what consciousness, desire and identity (Bernstein & 
Solomon, 1999, p. 269). 
This leads to the task of inquiring into the different forms of "socialization, 
education and work that promote rebellious or, on the contrary, conformist 
subjectivities" (Santos, 1999a, p. 41). Focusing on contemporary conditions of neo- 
liberal globalisation', and drawing on Bernstein's concept of the Totally 
Pedagogised Society (TPS), Bonal & Rambla (2003), explore how `fast capitalism' 
necessitates that the worker is continually in a process of reforming and reskilling 
to `cope with the new requirements of work and life. ' Gone are the securities of 
stable occupations; a pedagogy of `trainability' is therefore deployed to propagate 
and justify the continual need for reskilling. This form of neo-liberal subjectivity 
transfers responsibility from the state to the individual by pressing the individual to 
continually upgrade their skills and adapt to the shifting needs of the market. 
While this is an important aspect of pedagogy, the process extends to other 
spheres of social life, conceptualizations of the individual, of rights and of values, 
23 An exception to this is an interesting article by Herod & Salt (2001) which explores how different 
trade unions deal with the issue of globalisation in worker education programmes. 
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of consumption habits and of instilling the `common sense' conceptualisation that 
there is no alternative to the contemporary status quo. 
While these new pedagogical modalities serve to produce conforming 
subjectivities, what might an alternative pedagogy of producing rebellious 
subjectivities look like? And what would be its social base? Within this 
understanding of pedagogy related to particular social forces with particular goals 
and objectives we can begin to explore what a `critical pedagogy of Sintraemcali' 
might look like, the nature of the social forces that give it life, and what the 
particular pedagogical modalities were that might be deployed in the construction 
of counter-hegemony. 
2.6.2 Education and Counter Hegemony 
Every relationship of "hegemony" is necessarily an educational relationship 
and occurs not only within a nation, between the various forces of which the 
nation is composed, but in the international and World-wide field, between 
complexes of national and continental civilizations" (Gramsci, 1986, p. 350). 
Bernard Lassen, founding member of ATTAC (Association pour la Taxe 
Tobin pour 1'Aide aux Citoyens)24 and one of the most important new movements 
to emerge in Europe against the effects of neo-liberalism and a leading partner in 
the WSF process, sees his organisation as primarily an `action-oriented movement 
of popular education' (Cassen, 2003, p. 45). In essence, he sees its function as 
equipping members with the necessary knowledge to deal with the contemporary 
globalising era. In his words; "militants must be well-informed, intellectually 
equipped for action" (ibid). 
The importance of education in the contemporary era has not been lost on 
those engaged in processes of hegemonic globalisation, and it is common to hear 
corporations talking of themselves as `learning organisations', discussing the 
`learning society', the `information society' and recognising the need to set up 
structures able to change and adapt to new circumstances, be that fast capitalism, 
lean production, flexible accumulation, which reflect the need for more mobile 
24 ATTAC is an `international movement for democratic control of financial markets and their 
institutions', with a presence in 33 countries. For further information see 
http: //www. attac. org/indexen/index. html 
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structures and a workforce skilled to adapt to a fast changing environment 
(Ranson, 1994; Jarvis, 2001). In this context it appears logical to ask how counter- 
hegemonic and labour movements are taking seriously the necessity to rethink 
strategies through processes of research, investigation and learning. 
Beyond `instrumental' understandings of education and learning as 
providing `new skills', education plays a key role in raising political consciousness. 
In the battle of hearts and minds, it could be argued that education is a key process 
for contestation in the struggle to develop a counter-hegemonic movement and 
incorporate new allies into the political project. Central to any alternative pedagogy 
of resistance is the necessity to address the diminishing of hope in social change. 
Panitch and Gindin (2000) call this possibility, this belief in an alternative future, as 
a `concrete utopia' necessary to address contemporary pessimism of the 
possibilities of social change: 
"One can everywhere sense the anxiety - an anxiety as omnipresent as 
'globalization' itself - that has emerged with accumulating awareness of the 
enormous odds against actually 'beating this racket' and escalating doubts 
about the worth of a life defined by the freedom to compete. At the same time, 
however, we still live in an era of foreclosed hope in the possibility of a better 
world.. . even people who wonder whether 
the capitalist dream isn't the wrong 
dream see no way of realizing a life beyond capitalism, or fear that any 
attempt to do so can only result in another nightmare. Overcoming this 
debilitating political pessimism is the most important question anyone 
seriously interested in social change must confront" (Panitch & Gindin, 2000). 
The crux of the problem appears to be the simultaneous decline -in Santos's 
terms- of the regulatory paradigm of social welfarism, Keynesianism, and its 
alternative emancipatory paradigm of socialism or communism. In essence, both 
the revolutionary and the reformist road to `utopia' have been on the decline in the 
last decades of the 20thcentury. Crucial in this process is declining self-belief on the 
part of alternative forces of the possibility of social change. For social movements 
this translates into the task of overcoming lack of self-belief and a lack of belief in 
social change or that individuals can make a difference. This point was well made 
by the leader of national federation of Argentinean workers: 
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There is a great scepticism amongst our people, amongst our comrades. Lack 
of faith in politicians, in trade union leaders. I'm not very worried about that: I'm more worried when they believe in certain politicians and trade union leaders, which is regrettable. My worry is that with the excuse of not believing they end up not believing in themselves. They end up believing that it's not 
worth showing solidarity, organising, being protagonists, and fighting for their 
liberty, for their rights. This is our problem. Our problem is not convincing the bosses in power that they must modify and open doors so that we can move forward and survive better. We are going to do that. That's the fight. That's the 
resistance. Our challenge is to begin to convince our comrades that the only 
means of being able to change this situation and transform society is to return 
to the belief that it is possible, and to return to the belief that the only force 
capable of this, is inside ourselves (Gennaro, 2001, p. 54, authors translation). 
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One of the key questions is to address the question of how self-belief is 
created inside the movement and beyond, and what were the pedagogical processes 
that led to this. The question to be posed, then is where the sense of the possible 
might emanate from? 
As Gramsci notes every `revolution has been preceded by an intense labour 
of criticism'. In reference to the French Revolution he argues that "The bayonets 
of Napoleon's armies found their road already smoothed by an invisible army of 
books and pamphlets that had swarmed out of Paris in the first half of the 
eighteenth century and had prepared both men and institutions for the necessary 
renewal" (Gramsci, 1977, p. 12). Within this process, Gramsci talked of the 
important role of `organic intellectuals', committed to an alternative counter- 
hegemonic project and able to articulate, strategise and transmit this to broader 
publics (Gramsci, 1986, pp. 3-24). While Gramsci often portrayed this function 
rather mechanistically and unidirectional, another influential Marxist educator, 
Paolo Freire, would later provide a far more dialectical conceptualisation of this 
process. 
2.6.3 Popular Education in Latin America 
In searching for models of education that can be deployed to generate 
counter-hegemony, Latin America provides a fertile ground. `Popular Education', 
initially proposed by Paolo Freire, has captured the imagination of many social 
movements seeking to challenge elite structures of domination. In Nicaragua, the 
work of `popular educators' prepared the ground for the 1979 Sandinista 
revolution (Arnove, 1986), and one can see the legacy of Freire's work being 
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continued throughout the continent. According to Freire (2000), true education 
was not a monological but a dialogical process between teachers and learners: 
leaders cannot merely tell activists what to do. If this occurs, then even a victory is 
a hollow achievement. Nor can education ever be understood as `neutral'; quite the 
opposite. It is a process riven with differences in power and placed at the service of 
competing political projects. 
Popular education is thus seen as one of the vehicles through which the 
process of challenging unequal structures can be achieved (Kane, 2001). It has, at 
its centre, a fundamental commitment to social change in the interests of the 
`popular' classes. Furthermore, there is a direct relationship between this type of 
education and the institutions and organisations that have historically emerged to 
defend the interests of the poor, such as trade unions and social movements, and 
seeks explicitly to strengthen these movements Qara, 1989 cited in Kane, 2001, 
p. 9). This organic relationship means that the `organisation' becomes the `school' 
in which popular education takes place, and their "struggles and actions, their 
forms of organisation, their `culture', in the broadest sense, constitute the starting 
point of popular education and its on-going field of enquiry" (Kane, 2001, p. 13). 
In that sense, `popular education' needs to be seen as not only involving 
formal educational events but is part of much bigger processes which, though 
appearing `informal' and `arbitrary, ' are very deliberate. In this definition, both the 
`popular education' events that take place, and the actual practice of `strategy 
development' and `protest actions' can be seen as examples of popular education, 
whereby the `school' (the social movement) learns. The first occurs whereby 
people consciously engage in educational practices (schooling), and the second 
whereby people are learning through social action. Foley (1999) suggests that a 
broad conception of education and learning should include formal education 
(taking place in educational institutions), incidental learning (taking place as we live, 
work and engage in social action), informal education (where people teach and 
learn from each other in workplaces, families, communities, social movements) and 
non-formal education (structured systematic teaching and learning in a range of 
social settings). 
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If we are to explore these processes, then we need to extend our gaze 
beyond formal training courses for activists and develop an analytical framework 
that is `open' and which allow for the rich diversity of ways that social movements 
(their activists and supporters) engage in learning. In studying these different types 
of education and learning, Foley (1999, p. 10) suggests this needs to be firmly 
grounded in an analysis of the political economy, ideology and discourse of the 
focus of study and suggests several key questions that can ground this: 
What forms do education and learning take? What are the crucial features 
of the political and economic context? How do these shape education and 
learning? What are the micro-politics of the situation? What are the ideological and 
discursive practices and struggles of social movement actors and their opponents? 
To what extent do these practices and struggles facilitate or hinder emancipatory 
learning and action? What does this all mean for education? What interventions are 
possible and helpful? 
2.6.4 Strategic Learning 
In order to address these questions and operationalise the notion of 
learning and education taking place within time and space through struggle and 
contestation, what is needed is a dynamic model that can capture the dialectics of 
this process. Hay (1995) talks of `strategic learning' and offers a useful diagram to 
highlight it as a process in motion: 
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Figure 1 Strategic Learning 
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Hay's model provides a way of theorising the process whereby a trade 
union engages in strategic analysis which in turn leads to strategic action, then to 
intended and unintended consequences of action, and to further reflection/ analysis 
and action -a strategic pedagogy. The agency of the trade union itself is immersed 
in structural constraints, which provide possibilities as well as limitations (Cox, 
1996), while the strategic action often changes the structures upon which it acts. 
Throughout these entire processes incidental, formal, informal and non-formal 
education will be taking place and influencing strategy and outcomes to differing 
degrees. Hay's model provides a way of exploring how a trade union strategically 
develops. A critical realist understanding of `power' which is at the heart of this 
thesis expects this process to be open ended, contingent, non-linear, dialogical and 
dialectical yet nevertheless grounded within a highly structured environment. This 
understanding allows us to recognise the existence of `power 1' (potential power) 





In this chapter I have tried to explore two major phenomena. The first is 
the reality of the emerging mass opposition to neo-liberal globalisation which was 
understood both as a reaction to and a product of the profound structural 
transformations taking place across the world. In exploring this from the 
perspective of a non-essentialised working class politics I have sought to highlight 
the complex dialectical relationship between capital and labour and provide a 
sketch of the emerging panorama of contestation and the possibilities for strategic 
resistance. Central to the renewal of labour strategies has been the politics of 
`transborderisation' and `horizontalisation' which seeks to address these structural 
transformations. Secondly, I have sketched out a framework for beginning the 
process of exploring trade union transformation and the pedagogical and 
educational practices involved which sees these processes as not just taking place in 
`formal settings' but as fully integrated into the day-to-day activities of working 
class organisations. This dual focus on the macro-sociological processes of `neo- 
liberal globalisation' and the `micro-processes' of organisational resistance will 
provide the theoretical framework for the case study of Sintraemcali's struggle 
against privatisation. In the next chapter - Critical Case Study Methodology -I will 
highlight how that research was carried out and the principles that guided it. 
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Central to this research is an exploration of power and the mechanisms 
through which oppositional movements in general and a local trade union in 
particular, are able to activate counter-strategic resources to challenge the socially 
fascistic nature of contemporary neo-liberal reforms. As processes of neo-liberal 
globalisation increasingly lead us towards a more globally integrated economy there 
is a need to develop methodologies able to make sense of the multi-scalar nature of 
the dynamics of power relations between those agents pursuing the global neo- 
liberal project and those resisting it. In attempting to explore the process of 
Sintraemcali's development of a successful anti- privatisation movement I sought 
to develop a theoretically informed and empirically grounded case study that could 
reveal the complex and contested sets of social relations that exist on a range of 
scales from the global to the local which combined to produce the CAM Tower 
Occupation. In order to achieve this I have used a methodological approach that 
was able to focus on the local micro-practices taking place without obscuring the 
transnational nature of processes of neo-liberal globalisation. 
Beyond the need for a multi-scalar methodology there was also a need to 
draw upon `Critical Tools' for research that not only serve to critique and bear 
witness but also contribute to the broader project of social emancipation (Sayer, 
1992, p. 255) (or to paraphrase Marx's axiom -a methodology that sought not only 
to analyse the world, but also to change it). In a situation of widespread human 
rights violations, such as that experienced by the Colombian popular movement, 
this was both a pressing and a necessary task. One place to start was putting into 
practice the three principles laid out by Santos (1999a) and explored in Section 2.2: 
`listening to the South', `a sociology of absences' and `a politics of translation'. As 
both a research agenda and an ethical framework, this necessitated a close 
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interaction and engagement with the movements, the subjects, and the 
environment within which `rebellious subjectivities' are produced and `order' is 
contested - in other words, getting close to the South. It also implied an attempt 
to bridge the gap between research as the production of academic knowledge and 
research as the practice of solidarity. Through the course of this chapter I will 
outline a critical ethnographic approach that combines a multi-scalar analysis with 
an ethical and politically committed approach to studying social movements as a 
means of both uncovering and revealing the power relations and dynamics of 
Sintraemcali's struggle against privatisation while simultaneously contributing to its 
own organisational development. 
3.2 Approach, Models, Method and Techniques in Ethnography 
While ethnography can be defined as "writing about the world from the 
standpoint of participant observation" (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1994) how that 
ethnography is carried out is dependent on a range of theoretical and practical 
decisions relating to ontological, epistemological and methodological preferences. 
In order to enter the fieldwork site with some understanding of the context that I 
was researching, I worked as a member of the Sintraemcali human rights 
department for three extended periods totalling 10 months over a period of 16 
months, and subsequently returned on two more occasions for shorter periods. 
Throughout the fieldwork I engaged in participant observation and `learning by 
doing' and developed my work through a process of dialogue with leading trade 
union and community activists, Emcali workers, technical advisers and a range of 
academics in Colombia. These constant conversations were complemented by 
carrying out interviews and through gathering a range of documentary materials 
that were subsequently analysed. All of these methods of data collection and 
analysis correspond to the more general features of ethnographic research (Davies, 
1999; Hammersley & Atkinson, 1994). 
As Jordan & Yoeman (1995, p. 394) note, while there remains a broad 
consensus on the `techniques' of ethnography, what has defined ethnographic 
research over the last quarter of a century has been its theoretical eclecticism and 
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methodological divisions between Marxists, feminists, postmodernists, symbolic 
interactionists who each bring with them a different set of ontological and 
epistemological ways of seeing and knowing the world, all with consequent effects 
on the way that they carry out research. 
Drawing from aspects of Burawoy's (1998) work I want to explore this in 
relation to `approach', `model', `method', and `technique' which will allow me to 
move between meta-theoretical assumptions down to the micro-practices of 
gathering research data and understand them not as independent categories but as 
inter-related to each other and having important implications for the how's and the 
why's of research. By `approach' I refer to my meta-theoretical positionality within 
the field of social science, which, in my case, I call-drawing on Cox's (1996) 
understanding outlined in Chapter 1- `critical theory' (as opposed to `problem- 
solving theory). Its application in this instance would be critical ethnography (as 
opposed to conventional ethnography). The `model' of science - which Buroway 
groups into two categories as `reflexive or positive' - refers less to the researchers 
meta-theoretical stance than to their conceptualisation of their relationship to the 
social world under study- `separate from' or `inevitably embedded within'. The 
Research `Method' develops directly out of the research model and refers to the 
particular way of carrying out the research, which in this case is an adaptation of 
Burawoy's extended case method, extending out from the researcher to participant, 
from the social process to the structure, and from structure to theory. Through this 
process I aim to bridge the gap between the local/global, micro and macro 
processes under investigation - essentially locating ethnographic study within a 
global political economy while recognising the researchers own positionality within 
that process. The contrary method would be `grounded theory' which seeks to 
bracket out the researcher and the outside world from the `case study' while 
seeking to develop theory from the emerging data. Finally, research techniques are 
the particular tools used to gather data and information. In the case of my own 
research, these were participant observation, semi-structured interviews, gathering 
and analysing documentary evidence and the dialogical technique of producing a 
video. The way that each of these techniques is utilised is rooted in the approach, 
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model and method highlighted above. These relationships are presented graphically 
in Figure 2 to highlight my overall research framework. As the chapter proceeds I 
want to explore these different levels as I describe the research process. 
Figure 2 Critical Case Study Methodology 
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3.3 Approach to Research: Critical Ethnography 
From the outset, I saw my research as enabling me to act as both `witness' 
to the hidden story of Colombia and to contribute towards transforming and 
transcending the current state of affairs - even if in a small way and concerned 
with the basic decencies of living. I had a very clear idea in my mind that the 
research was a process rather than just a product, and that I wanted to contribute 
in some way to the struggles of those people I was researching. This would enable 
me to go some way toward breaking down the relationship between subject and 
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object, not only through intellectual production but through activity and practical 
engagement; that is through the practice of solidarity. Here, as Santos notes, lies 
the question of normative commitment - Which side are you on? ' - that is central to 
critical/ emancipatory theory. 
The question of `which side you are on' is an important one in Colombia. 
Every year between 4-6,000 political assassinations take place. Since 1988 over 
3,000 trade union leaders and activists have been assassinated (CUT, 2004). The 
production of a doctoral thesis in the face of this situation was not, for me, a 
sufficient contribution to challenging these atrocities. For this reason I sought out 
an ethical and more comprehensive research approach. The PhD funding placed 
me in the privileged position of being able to dedicate myself to engaging with 
issues relating to Colombia. From the outset I engaged in practical solidarity work 
(translating documents, organizing meetings, advocacy work) with sections of the 
Colombian exile community based in London, and with trade union and political 
activists in Colombia, alongside more theoretical work. 
In the early stages of exploring the relationship between activism and the 
academy, I was engaged by rich and ongoing debates. In 1996 one such debate 
broke out in Current Anthropology in response to an article by Nancy Scheper 
Hughes (1995) entitled `The Primacy of the Ethical: Propositions for a Militant 
Anthropology'. The debate focussed around the role of political engagement 
within anthropology and the threat that it may pose to `objectivity' and `science'. 
Scheper-Hughes recounts her transformation from `objective' researcher to 
`companera' (comrade) during her work in researching poverty in Brazil. 
Dissatisfied with both notions of the anthropologist as `spectator' (politically 
`neutral') or as `witness' (politically committed but distant) she advocated an 
ethnography of `engagement', whereby the line between researcher and activist 
becomes blurred (Scheper-Hughes, 1995; 1996). At the same time, in the field of 
geography, Routledge (1996) argued for a `Critical Engagement' approach to 
research that straddled academic inquiry and political activism for ethical, political 
and practical reasons. 
Chapter Three 88 
Critical engagement seeks not only to carry out research of value to social 
movements but also to engage with those movements and the processes of change, 
in turn using the skills of the researcher (whatever they may be) in response to the 
needs of the movement being researched. While this may involve "contributing 
some of one's academic labour to the purpose of a particular political (rather than 
careerist) trajectory", it also extends to physically engaging with the movement and 
"the body as a site of resistance" (Routledge, 1996, p. 409). Here I believe there are 
separations between two types of committed intellectual, (though this is not a 
binary either/or, but rather points on a continuum between activist and critical 
researcher, with the balance shifting according to personality, research demands, 
topic, time factors and a whole range of related elements). Ultimately, as 
Routledge notes, active engagement with the issues attempts to avoid `spectator 
knowledge', and can be seen as a `third space' between academia and activism a 
`borderland zone' (Routledge, 1996, p. 407) where the researcher is not truly at 
home in either space. 
Conceptualising my research approach as a `third space', has allowed me to 
grapple theoretically with the `ambiguities' and `contradictions' inherent in the 
research process and to understand the dilemmas that I faced during my research 
as being central to the development of the thesis. Furthermore, while `engagement' 
is rooted in an ethical position, it also represents a methodological advance from 
`spectator' knowledge in that it allows for the researcher to engage with social 
movements, participate in their activities and open up the possibility of gaining 
privileged access to the `lifeworld' of social movements through building up trust 
through mutual engagement. In a place such as Colombia where social movements 
are under attack from powerful social forces `critical engagement' can provide the 
mechanism through which a more equitable relationship between researcher and 
researched can develop. By adopting this approach my perceived research needs 
and the needs of the social movement I was studying were drawn closer together. 
The research itself became a pedagogical process of solidarity, opening up new 
possibilities for the production of `critical consciousness' - to paraphrase Freire's 
dictum, research itself becomes the practice of freedom. 
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With `engagement' inevitably comes accusations of lack of `objectivity' and 
Scheper- Hughes' article provoked several highly critical responses (Gledhill, 2000). 
In many ways this is ironic, particularly in anthropology, as many scholars have 
clearly highlighted the crucial political role of apparently `objective' research in 
contributing to the hegemonic projects of powerful states and alliances. Edward 
Said, in his classic work Orientalism (Said, 1978), highlighted how `objective' 
academics assisted in constructing the `Orient' or `exotic other' through texts and 
research that served the project of imperialism. Escobar (1995), and later Rist 
(1997), following methodologically in the footsteps of Said, provided a similar 
deconstruction of `development' which they argued had become, in the wake of 
World War II and the onset of US hegemony, a new tool in which the `South' was 
mapped out, measured and managed in the interests of the wealthy North- 
politically, economically and discursively. As Gledhill (2000) notes, this was not just 
a problem of a politicised science feigning `objectivity' but also a politics of `silence' 
to the difficult issues that might unsettle and embarrass the powerful -a form of 
self-discipline in the conceptualisation of power laid out earlier. 
Here we can return to Cox's understanding that "theory is always for 
someone and for some purpose" (Cox, 1996, p. 87) which emerges out of 
competing political projects. This understanding develops the work of Antonio 
Gramsci and his notion of the `organic intellectuals' who serve the interests of 
different competing social forces. Edward Said, drawing on Gramsci's work, saw a 
stark choice for the intellectual25. He suggested that either you could `speak truth 
to power', or work `in the service of power' (Said, 1994). At its centre `critical 
theory' seeks to destabilise and challenge those social forces that dominate our 
unequal social order. However, while `speaking truth to power' is important, an 
equally important task is that `truth' be spoken to people, and my concern is that 
many critical intellectuals who spend their time `speaking truth to power' often 
forget to speak to people and engage with their social realities in language that they 
can understand and in forms that they can use. In this we face, as Jordan & 
25 The definition of intellectual used here is derived from Gramsci who suggested that everyone in 




Yoeman (1995) note, a central `paradox' of `critical theory'. `Critical academics' 
operate in the academy and much of their work is directed at fellow academics and 
validated by the institutions of the academy itself. As a result they remain distant 
from the struggles and activities that provide the rationale for `critical theory' itself. 
Here, at least in part, we can find potential reasons as to why `critical theory' has 
lost its radical edge (see Section 1.2) and the need for `critical theory' and its 
theorists to judge their success by less conventional means that take on board its 
broader emancipatory objectives and rationale. 
As a move towards this I believe `critical theory' could be enhanced by a 
greater connection with social movements, engaging, learning and contributing to 
their development, not only for the purpose of reconnecting with `critical theory's' 
own rationale, but also to move the project of social emancipation forward by 
learning from the insights and experiences of `resisting subjects' facing the brunt of 
the restructuring of global capital under conditions of neo-liberal globalisation - 
Listening to the South. In this task, the writings of the Zapatista spokesperson 
Subcommandante Marcos and the philosophy that has developed around the 
notion of `aprender caminando y hablar escuchando' or `learning while walking and 
speaking while listening' (Cleaver, 1994) have been instructive and can be useful in 
grappling with the dialectical relationship between intellectuals and research 
subjects. This departs from the Leninist notion that the intellectual comes from 
outside to contribute to a movements' theoretical development (Eyerman & 
Jamison, 1991) and instead understands the process more dialectically as one 
whereby each party to a dialogue brings with them a rich set of possibilities and it 
is in their interaction and fusion that new knowledges can be produced. Here the 
intellectuals theoretical knowledge can be enhanced through drawing on the 
practical experience of those engaged in struggle, and the activist can benefit from 
new ways of exploring the struggles that they are involved in. When this dialogue is 
inter-cultural and international between activists and intellectuals, further 
possibilities are developed whereby an interchange of the different geographical 
and historical experiences can produce deeper understandings of the whole -a true 
politics of translation in Santos's (1999a) terms. 
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3.4 Linking the local to the global: The Extended Case Method & the Reflexive 
Model of Social Science 
Buroway's `Extended Case Method', and particularly its refinement in more 
recent work on `Global Ethnography' (Burawoy, 2000), provides a valuable 
framework for addressing the methodological problems of linking up broader 
`macro-sociological' theories of globalisation with the more `micro' field of the 
ethnographic case study. While ethnography has been associated with the study of 
the local, more recently many ethnographers have begun to explore transnational 
processes related to globalisation. For example, in an article exploring the 
relationship of ethnography to global processes, Henry (2003), offers up the 
concept of `globography' to describe these new practices. 
In Global Ethnography (2000), Burawoy sets out a case for the contribution 
that ethnography can bring to understanding global processes, an approach that 
builds upon more than 20 years of his work. This method is called `the Extended 
Case Method' (Burawoy, 1998). At the centre of Burawoy's method is an attempt 
to locate ethnographic inquiry within the unequally structured political economy of 
capitalist society - an approach that is consistent with the broader `critical theory' 
approach outlined in Chapter One. The Extended Case Method begins from the 
central ethnographic technique of participant observation extending out from the 
researcher to participant, and then from the social processes that exist in the local 
to the structures within which subjects are embedded. It then moves from the 
structures to theory. However, the linear conceptualisation is misleading as 
Burawoy recognises a far more iterative process at work, moving back and forth 
between each level through a process of dialogue and exchange (ibid, 1998)26. 
26 In developing his work he has used his experience of working in the Zambian Copper Industry to 
develop Frantz Fanon's theory of Postcolonialism (1972), his experiences of working as a machine 
operator in Chicago to explore Gramsci's theory of hegemony (1979), and more recently worked in a 
small furniture factory in Northern Russia to develop theories relating to the transition from socialism to 
capitalism (1999). While for some the leap from the micro processes of everyday life to macro- 
sociological theories may be a leap too far, Burawoy sets out a rationale for this rooted in a 
conceptualisation of `reflexive science' that builds on a far longer tradition of ethnographic inquiry (c. f. 
Burawoy, 2000,1998). Here he cites the Manchester School of Social Anthropology (Burawoy 1998, 
p5) but extends this to a range of studies that while not explicitly using the term `Extended Case Method' 
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3.4.1 Research Model. Two Models of Science and Ethnography 
Burawoy (1998, p. 5) suggests that the ethnographic condition can be dealt 
with in two broad ways. The first is to attempt to limit the researcher's 
involvement in the process as much as possible, distancing ourselves from those 
we study and developing a set of data collection tools to assist us in the process 
which in turn allow us to bracket external conditions. This is what he calls the 
`positive' approach to science. The second approach, which he calls `reflexive 
science', rejects the notion of `positivist objectivity' that is based on `sense data' 
and instead uses theory as a guide that provides `cognitive maps through which we 
apprehend the world' (Burawoy, 1998, p. 5). Reflexive science embraces its 
engagement with the world and seeks to link up the micro-practices under 
observation with the wider world through a process of dialogue at a range of levels. 
Positive science can be best encapsulated in the idea that "there is an 
`external world' that can be construed as separate from and incommensurable with 
those who study it" (Burawoy, 1998, p. 10). The purpose of positive science is thus 
to map out the workings of this external world. This separation of researcher from 
object of study requires a method of `procedural objectivity' which Katz calls the 
`4Rs' (Katz, 1983 cited in Burawoy, 1998, p1O). Firstly, the researcher needs to 
avoid `distorting' the world we study - the struggle against `reactivity'. Second, 
because the world is made up of an infinite variety of phenomenon we need 
criteria for selecting data: reliability. The third, which builds on this, is the idea that 
selection of data should be clear allowing for the possibility of `replicability' i. e. that 
the same research could be carried out again. Finally, that the phenomenon under 
study is a slice of the bigger phenomena there is a need for representativeness in the 
process of sampling (ibid). 
Katz suggests that reactivity, reliability, replicability, and representativeness can all be 
applied to the technique of participant observation (ibid). Approaching 
ethnography from the `positive science' model results in `grounded theory' (c. f. 
have in fact deployed much of its core notions relating to participant observation and ethnographic 
inquiry. 
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Burawoy, 1991), whereby the researcher attempts to distance themselves from the 
subject of research thus addressing the problem of `reactivity'. Reliability is 
addressed by gathering and analysing data in a systematic manner and coding and 
recoding that data. Replication is less concerned with replicating the data gathering 
than the analysis of that data, highlighting how categories were derived from the 
data. Finally, `representativeness' is aimed at maximising variation within the field 
through constant comparison and the searching for `extreme cases' in what is 
called `theoretical sampling' (Buroway, 1998, p. 25). 
Judged in these terms my own research has failed to fulfil the criteria on all 
counts. But even if I had followed the model of positive science, could these 
objectives really be achieved? As Burawoy notes (1998), interviews take place in 
social contexts and questions do not exist in isolation from broader social relations. 
He cites four major context effects that threaten the validity of `positive science'. 
Firstly there are interviewer effects, which might be related to interviewer 
characteristics, such as age, gender, colour and so on. There may also be questions 
related to the order of questions which significantly effect responses - all effect 
reactivity. Secondly there are respondent effects whereby the meaning of questions 
are interpreted differently according to the different histories of the respondents 
and these cannot be removed through standardisation. Thirdly, there are field 
effects whereby the particular space, time and location of interviews cannot be 
separated from the broader economic, social and political context where they take 
place. Replicability thus cannot be achieved as external effects cannot be changed. 
Finally, the problem of representativeness is undermined by situation effects 
whereby, if we accept that meaning, attitudes, and even knowledge do not reside 
with individuals but are constituted in social situations, then a representative 
sample must be selected from a population of social situations and not individuals. 
Despite its shortcomings, those committed to a positive science would seek to 
address those problems of context and come as close as possible to eliminating the 
interference that they bring to the research project. 
While there is nothing new in the critique of positive science and its 
inability to eliminate context effects, Burawoy's suggestion, unlike many who 
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advocate the abandonment of any pretension towards science, is neither to 
abandon science nor to seek to accommodate `unachievable positive principles'. 
Instead he calls for "an alternative model of science, a reflexive science, that takes 
context as point of departure but not point of conclusion" (Burawoy, 1998, p. 13). 
Where positive science proposes to insulate subject from object, reflexive 
science elevates dialogue as its defining principle and intersubjectivity 
between participant and observer, knowledge and social situation, situation 
and its field of location, folk theory and academic theory. The principles of this 
reflexive science can be derived from the context effects that pose as 
impediments to positive science (ibid, p. 14). 
In this alternative model of science, what are perceived as being 
impediments become possibilities for developing a deeper understanding of social 
processes. The alternative model of science necessarily requires a different set of 
criteria to judge its effectiveness. While Burawoy provides a critique of positive 
science he does not dismiss its usefulness, suggesting that different `models of 
science' may be appropriate for different types of research problems. Interestingly, 
though using different language, such as intensive and extensive research designs, 
Sayer (1992, p. 243), reinforces many of Burawoy's points. He suggests that 
intensive and extensive research designs (paralleling reflexive and positive models 
respectively) may actually be asking completely different questions and thus require 
different sets of methodologies. Intensive research is more interested in causal 
groups and relations and seeks to uncover how processes work in particular 
situations. Extensive research, on the other hand, is more descriptive, seeking to 
explore commonalities and regularities in social processes. While at one level this 
could be understood as the difference between discussions of `breadth' and `depth' 
in more conventional methodological approaches it goes beyond this in asking 
different research questions, different methods, and different definitional terms 
(ibid, p. 242). While standardisation of methods may be appropriate for extensive 
research, a more exploratory approach may be more appropriate for intensive 
research where the researcher is trying to trace causal relations by moving from 
one piece of information to another, asking different questions of different people 
at different times - rather than seeking procedural standardisation. 
This will be 
explored in greater detail in the following section. 
Chapter Three 95 
3.4.2 The Extended Case Method developing the Reflexive Model of Science 
The Extended Case Method is the application of the principles of reflexive 
science to ethnographic inquiry. It begins as a dialogue between researcher and 
participants (intervention) and then embeds this within a second dialogue between 
local and extra-local forces (process) while exploring these relationships 
(structuration). This process can then be understood through a dialogue with 
theory itself (reconstruction). It is based on the notion that the researcher's own 
participation in the world can be a tool to expand knowledge and that objectivity is 
not achieved through "procedures that assure an accurate mapping of the world" 
(Burawoy, 1998, p. 5) but by a reflexive science that builds on theory and utilises 
the real world to test out the usefulness of such theory. Theory is thus 
reconstructed through active engagement with the world. 
Figure 3 The Extended Case Method 
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V 
RECONSTRUCTION "- EXTENDING THEORY 
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Crucially the cornerstone of Intervention, Process, Structuration and Reconstruction 
within reflexive science is dialogue as Buroway notes: 
Dialogue is the unifying principle of reflexive science. It is dialogical in each of its four dimensions. It calls for intervention of the observer in the life of the 
participant; it demands an analysis of interaction within social situations; it 
uncovers local processes in a relation of mutual determination with external 
social forces; and it regards theory as emerging not only in dialogue between 
participant and observer, but also emerging among observers now viewed as 
participants in a scientific community. Theories do not spring tabula rasa from the data but are carried forward through intellectual debate and division. They 
then re-enter the wider world of participants, there to be adopted, refuted, and 
extended in intended and unintended ways, circulating back into science. 
Science offers no final truth, no certainties but exists in a state of continual 
revision (Burawoy, 1998, p. 16). 
In this research I have followed the principles of `reflexive science' and the 
`Extended Case Method', seeing my work as a process of dialogue and engagement 
operating on a range of scales from the local to the global. Throughout my own 
fieldwork I engaged in a process of `learning by doing' and developed my work 
through a process of dialogue at a range of scales from the local to the global with 
intellectuals, activists, and academics, both through texts and real time contact. 
This dialectical and dialogical process has allowed a steady development of moving 
from concrete events within Cali to more abstract debates surrounding the 
reconfiguration of power under conditions of globalisations and the limits and 
possibilities that the contemporary era places on the development of alternatives. 
It was an iterative process that moved up and down between theory and 
practice. But this was always grounded in the real social struggles that were taking 
place in Cali which provided a sounding board for the various theories that I have 
used to explain the complex and complicated social relations and processes that 
exist in contemporary Colombia. Like a traveller moving across the world of ideas 
and having privileged access to an amazing local struggle, I have utilised my own 
experience and the data I have gathered to reject theories, as well as to modify and 
to reconceptualise theory, until I reached a set of theories that could illuminate the 
events that had taken place. In the next section I want to follow the development 
of the research more chronologically outlining how the solidarity work and the 
academic research ran parallel. 
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3.5 From theory to practice: Research as the Practice of Solidarity 
My first contact with Sintraemcali began in December 2001 in the UK, 
when I met Alexander Lopez, the union's President, during his period in 
temporary exile. In May 2001, when he returned for a shorter visit I explained my 
intended research to him and offered to work in Sintraemcali from June 2001 
onwards to assist in building up the international solidarity work that he had 
initiated during his visit. 
Upon arriving in Cali I set about carrying out whatever duties the trade 
union thought might be useful, while simultaneously seeking to develop a greater 
background knowledge of the nature of the relationship between social 
movements and the state in Colombia. As a British male I was inevitably seen as a 
novelty inside the union, and I sensed a level of scepticism regarding my 
intentions. From the beginning I was honest and told whoever asked that I was in 
Colombia to work in solidarity with Sintraemcali and to carry out research. I also 
decided that the only way to overcome their scepticism was to work as many hours 
as I could for the union. In those early months, life was difficult and the transition 
not easy. The union building, due to threat of paramilitary attack, was protected by 
armed bodyguards and there was a sense of continual tension which was 
unnerving. 
I shared a small office with a Colombian human rights activist Berenice 
Celeyta, who, at that time, was living clandestinely within the union building after 
managing to avoid an assassination attempt against in April 2001. She had been 
targeted due to her work in researching the role of state and paramilitary collusion 
in human rights violations and massacres in the South of Bolivar, a region rich in 
gold, but desperately poor27. Amnesty International had offered her the possibility 
27 For the research that she had carried out in the South of Bolivar she was awarded on November 9th, 
1998 the Robert F Kennedy Award for Human Rights. The US based award was set up in 1984 to 
"honor individuals who, at great personal risk, take powerful stands against oppression in the non-violent 
pursuit of respect for human rights. For those who refuse to be silenced by an abusive authority" 




of living outside of Colombia for a year, but she had refused not wanting to leave 
her country and her vocation. 
During this period, my role in Sintraemcali was to translate and transmit 
information about the situation in Sintraemcali and their long struggle against 
privatisation. I worked from lam until late at night, working my way through 
documents and compiling files. Since Berenice's arrival Sintraemcali's Human 
Rights department had been created and was responsible for dealing with human 
rights violations suffered by union members and supporters and other trade union 
and social movements in the city: following up local, national and supranational 
court cases, documenting human rights abuses, and training local activists in 
mechanisms of human rights defence and protection. Berenice had a long history 
working within the field of human rights and despite being only in her mid-thirties 
she had over 16 years of experience of working in a range of conflict zones in 
Colombia. 
In the first month Berenice was very sceptical of my presence there, having 
worked with many `foreigners' during her years whom she felt had let her down. 
While I had no idea of this at the time, I did feel the tension. My solution was just 
to keep working and over the months she began to warm to me and to take me out 
with her whenever she went to different parts of the city to gather data, interview 
human rights victims and train local activists. During that first research period, 
which lasted until late November 2001, I became immersed in the human rights 
situation in the city and underwent the steepest learning curve in my life under the 
mentoring of Berenice. 
In five months I had received a `crash course' in being a Colombian human 
rights activist; I learned how to take testimonies from human rights victims, draw 
up `urgent actions' 28, and understand the principles of Colombian law and the 
national and international mechanisms of human rights defence. I was a graduate 
28 An `urgent action' is a document that details a particular event or set of events related to a human 
rights violation. It normally states the events surrounding the human rights violation, the specific 
incident and lays out a set of demands. The `urgent action' is then distributed through transnational 
human rights and solidarity networks producing letters with the objective of pressuring the violating 
government or ministry to change its behaviour. 
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in the first `pilot' human rights Diploma that covered the history of the armed 
conflict, the history of the Colombian popular movement, the recent history of 
human rights defence mechanisms and the cases of taking the Colombian 
government to the Inter-American Human Rights Court (see Appendix 7). 
Through the internet I was responsible for maintaining contact with a whole range 
of international trade union and human rights organisations and expanding those 
contacts. I gained experience in working with a range of different community 
organisations and worked as a translator for several delegations that came from the 
UK, Canada and the USA. I also had privileged access to a range of meetings: the 
weekly meeting of the union's leadership, the regular meetings of the Sintraemcali 
delegates from the different work sites, and the general workers assemblies which 
were held at least monthly and where all Sintraemcali members had to attend or 
lose a day's pay. I was learning by doing, a phenomena that would become much 
more important as my thesis progressed. 
More importantly, in terms of my research approach, I was gathering 
important knowledge and information relating to the broader context of the 
conflict between social movements and the state in Colombia, whilst learning this 
from a perspective of those who were opposing the neo-liberal economic reforms 
as they manifested themselves in Colombia. In Santos' terms, I was `listening to the 
South'. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, my own personal involvement and 
presence within the union resulted in a sense of mutual trust between myself and 
my colleagues, breaking down the inevitable barriers that existed between us. We 
were learning about each other, and sharing experiences through a process of 
struggle -a politics of translation was taking place. This was crucial in a situation 
of violent conflict such as Colombia where state and para-state organisations 
attempt to undermine solidarities between people through a politics of fear and 
suspicion. 
The intensity of the experience meant that by the time I returned to the UK 
in November of 2001, I felt a sense of inner transformation and a deep seated 
feeling of attachment, belonging, and commitment to the popular movement in 
Cali. Moving back to the UK allowed for a period of reflection, with distance 
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providing the spatial tool to allow me to process my own experience and begin to 
write and think around the issues involved. 
The entire course of my research was to change on Christmas Day 2001 
when I received an email from Sintraemcali saying that they had taken over the 
CAM Tower. They asked for the Colombia Solidarity Campaign to do what it 
could to assist them. The Christmas period is not the best one to build up 
international solidarity; most trade union contacts were away, and their union's 
headquarters closed. It wasn't really until after the New Year that we began to 
make some headway, organising a picket of the Colombian embassy in London 
and sending out `urgent actions' and letters of protest. In the UK our organizing 
committee discussed the possibility of me returning to Cali to work with the union. 
While there were complications for me in terms of my programme of research 
within the University I decided that I had a responsibility to Sintraemcali and in the 
early New Year I flew back to Colombia and arrived in Cali. 
Arriving at the airport on the 8th of January I was picked up and 
immediately taken to the surrounds of the CAM Tower. The building was 
surrounded by heavily armed riot police with armoured personnel carriers. Around 
them were hundreds of local activists, families of those inside, and members of the 
union who provided a 24 hour security cordon. On an annex to the building on the 
fourth floor, scores of masked workers draped in the Colombian flag were on the 
rooftop calling out to friends and family (see Picture 3). It was a powerful scene. I 
realized then that I was witnessing an important event. 
I set about documenting the event that was taking place. I began to write a 
daily `eyewitness account' from the occupation that tried to inform the 
international community of what was going on. This was distributed through the 
Colombia Solidarity Campaign's email list and also through a range of labour, 
human rights and anti-globalisation networks. Much of it was published in the 
Morning Star, a British left wing daily newspaper29 (see Appendix 3). At the time of 
writing these accounts I wasn't aware of how broadly these writings were being 
distributed and later found out that they had been translated into French, Japanese 
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and German by different transnational activist networks. This in itself highlighted 
how technological developments and the increasing emergence of opposition to 
neo-liberal globalisation can combine to facilitate transnational solidarity. At the 
same time I worked on translating key documents and `urgent actions' to be sent 
via the same networks at different times during the occupation, liaising with a 
range of international labour representatives via email and phone. In these activities 
I was acting as a translator in its most literal sense, but also more broadly in 
`translating' this local struggle against privatisation using a vocabulary that could 
readily understood in different parts of the world. 
While the international solidarity work was developing there was one aspect 
of the occupation that I was unable to document; what was taking place inside the 
building. After the initial few days of the occupation, a deal was made with the 
local mayor and the police and military to allow several local trade union leaders to 
act as spokespersons for the union in the delicate negotiations that were taking 
place. These people were allowed access to the building and could move relatively 
freely in and out. Berenice Celeyta, as a representative of NOMADESC (her 
national human rights organisation), was one such spokesperson. She suggested 
that we should try to attempt to get me special permission to access the building. 
This was put to the leadership of Sintraemcali inside the occupation and they 
agreed. They contacted the local mayor and the police and military and after several 
days of refusals they eventually produced a signed letter from the Colombian 
military allowing me to enter the building. From the 16thof January onwards I was 
thus allowed to enter and leave the occupation at will, enabling me to document 
what was taking place inside the occupation and to translate from inside the 
occupation the words of the leaders and activists in the series of video-links that 
were carried out via the sophisticated technology that existed inside the 
headquarters of a major telecommunications provider. From that day until the end 
of the occupation I divided my time between the CAM Tower and its environs and 
the union headquarters, doing whatever I could to assist the trade union in its 
campaign both in terms of writing the eyewitness accounts and translating 
29 An edited version of these accounts was 
later published by Public Services International (PSI, 2002) in English and Spanish 
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documents. I also engaged in more practical activities such as helping with the 
cooking in the make-shift kitchen set up outside the CAM Tower, attending 
community organizing meetings, and assisting in the demonstrations and events in 
the city that had been organized by the local strike command. 
When the occupation ended on the 30thJanuary, 2002, I left the following 
day and returned to England to talk at a range of meetings about the story of the 
occupation which had garnered a great deal of interest amongst the British trade 
union movement and the political left. Moving from Colombia to the UK allowed 
me to witness both sides of the relationship in the processes of solidarity that had 
been built up, and in later February I travelled with, and translated for, Berenice 
Celeyta in meetings across England, Scotland and Northern Ireland where she 
explained the occupation and the story of Sintraemcali's struggle against 
privatisation. 
It was during this period that I took the decision to focus the thesis entirely 
on Sintraemcali and their struggle against privatisation. I recognized that I had had 
privileged access to one of the few cases of a successful struggle against one of the 
key planks of contemporary neo-liberal reforms: privatisation. Exploring the 
research carried out on social movements struggling against neo-liberalism I 
realized that there was little documentation, and virtually no detailed case studies, 
of how an anti-privatisation initiative by a labour movement operated and 
developed. The advantage was that I had already spent nearly half a year working 
intensively inside the union, had translated a whole series of documents, and had 
experienced the life of the union from within. The CAM Tower Occupation 
provided a rich case study which I had been actively involved in. Furthermore, I 
had built up strong relationships with many of the workers both inside and outside 
of the occupation who would be willing to give interviews and trusted my 
motivations. I also had detailed and privileged knowledge of what went on in the 
union. Above and beyond this, there were also important reasons for documenting 
Sintraemcali's struggle against privatisation for all those trade union and social 
movements struggling against similar processes throughout the world. All of these 
factors were too important to ignore. 
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I returned to Colombia in March 2003 for a further five months where I 
continued to work in the human rights department and engage in a range of 
human rights training courses. It was also during this period where I carried out 27 
interviews with a range of participants in the CAM Tower Occupation (see 
Appendix 4), and gathered relevant documentary data. Furthermore, it was also 
during this period where I was involved in the research and production of a short 
30-minute video of the occupation. This provided a crucial dialogical tool with 
which to engage with the different interpretations of the factors that both 
contributed to the occupation and the main events and their implications. The 
process of making the video became a key research technique for developing a 
framework for understanding the occupation as I will outline in a later section. 
Upon returning to the UK in the summer of 2002 1 also began to work 
with War on Want and Sintraemcali to develop a two-year project proposal that was 
accepted by the Department for International Development under its Civil Society 
Challenge Fund. The (220,000,3 year project began in May 2003 and included 
provision for the training of several hundred trade union and community leaders in 
the South West of Colombia in mechanisms of human rights defence and 
protection, the production of 2 videos charting the impacts of neo-liberal 
globalisation in the region, and the production of a quarterly human rights 
magazine. The project also involved a UK advocacy component with funds to 
organise conferences in the UK on the Human rights situation in Colombia and on 
non-violent strategies of trade unions and social organisations. These projects 
allowed for a broader dissemination of the key findings of the research, particularly 
relating to the utilisation of human rights mechanisms and alternative strategies for 
social and trade union organisations. 
During the period between October 2002 and October 2004 1 focussed on 
analysing the data, writing up the thesis, and producing accounts of Sintraemcali's 
struggle against privatisation in a variety of formats ranging from academic articles 
to newspaper and magazine publications and conference papers. I have also used 
the research to work with War on Want on running trade union workshops on 
globalisation and labour, often using both the video and the case of Sintraemcali as 
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an example of the possibilities of resistance to neo-liberal globalisation in the 
contemporary era. I have also returned to Colombia on several occasions for 
shorter periods combining solidarity work with follow up meetings and interviews 
with trade union leaders and activists. Likewise, through the Colombia Solidarity 
Campaign, we have facilitated several further visits of Sintraemcali leaders to the 
UK and also facilitated their participation in the first European Social Forum in 
Florence in November 2002. 
Table 1 highlights the parallel development of the academic research and 
the practical solidarity. In conceptualising this process I pick up on 4 key aspects of 
the approach: watching - through observation, asking - through interviews, 
engaging - through solidarity work and finally searching - through seeking out 
documentary materials. All of these processes were ultimately facilitated by my 
own commitment to and work for the union which opened doors to facilitate 




Ke Research Events Timetable 
December 2000 to June 2001 " Initiated contact with Colombian exiles in UK and Solidarity 
activists. Engaged in practical solidarity activities. Became a 
founding member of the Colombia Solidarity Campaign 
(launched in April 2001). CSC set up Urgent Action Network to 
respond to human rights violations and raise awareness. 
June 2001 - Nov 2001 " Initial ethnographic field-work. Worked at the headquarters of 
Sintraemcali in the human rights department, Cali. Translated 
documents, developed contacts with international trade union 
organisations, human rights groups and solidarity organisations. 
Gathered documents and engaged in a process of participant 
observation. 
" October 2001, Facilitated official UK trade union and Solidarity 
delegation to Cali: War on Want, Haldane Society, UNISON, 
CSC Delegation (6-12th October, 2001) 
December 2001- Feb 2002 " CAM Tower Occupation Dec 25th - January 29th, 2002 
" Returned to Cali on January 10th, 2001, Day 17 of the CAM Towet 
Occupation 
" On January 16111,2002 I gained permanent access to the CAM 
Tower Occupation. 
" Wrote daily eyewitness accounts distributed via electronic 
networks and published in Morning Star, UK, (later published bl 
PSI). 
" Gathered Documents and Visual Materials 
Feb 2002 to March 2002 " Sintraemcali Victory Tour, Berenice Celeyta, head of 
Sintraemcali Human Rights Department accompanied by the 
CSC toured UK and Northern Ireland telling the story of the 
CAM Tower Occupation 
March 2002- July 2002 " Conducted Interviews with 27 participants of the CAM Tower 
Occupation. 
" Produced Video of the CAM Tower Occupation. 
" Transcribed Interviews 
" Held Focus Groups as part of popular human rights education 
work 
December 2002 " PSI International Delegation to Colombia. Launch of PSI 
publication Cali. December 10th, 2002 International Human 
Rights Day launch of PSI booklet "Keeping Public Services 
Public: Sintraemcali's Campaign in Colombia to Stop 
Privatisation Dec 2001 -Jan 2002 based on Mario Novelli 
Eyewitness Accounts. 
October 2002 - January 2003 " Data Analysis of Texts and Interviews 
January 2003 - February 2003 " Returned to Cali for Gathering further documentary evidence 
and assist in preparation for International Solidarity Week. 
" Discussed with key leaders of CAM Tower Occupation over 
initial research findings and hypothesis 
February 2003 - November 2003 " Continued with data analysis and began initial writing up period 
December 2003 " Returned to Cali to present academic paper at international 
Conference Against Privatisation 
January 2004 - August 2004 " Final writing up period 
" Presented research findings at a series of international 
Conferences. 
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Drawing on Burawoy's Extended Case and the critical realist insights of 
Sayer (1992; 2004) in the next section I want to focus in on the particular data 
collection and analysis techniques deployed during the research and the related 
ethical considerations. 
3.6.1 Field Notes 
During both extended field trips I kept a diary detailing my experiences 
working in the trade union. This provided the basis for email dialogues with my 
mentors in the UK where I could discuss findings, thoughts and perceptions about 
what was going on. During the occupation this diary became the basis for the 
eyewitness accounts that were transmitted via electronic networks. These daily 
observations also provided the basis for discussions with local trade union and 
human rights activists and a source for returning to explore how my own thinking 
about the socio-economic and political situation in Cali was developing. My own 
role in the human rights department meant that I was also involved in 
documenting and translating human rights violations against trade union and 
community activists and these form part of the broader content of the field notes. 
3.6.2 Gathering Documentary Evidence 
The choice of research instruments has been arrived at through a 
combination of the necessities of the research questions, the availability of 
materials, and the theoretical underpinning of the research. The CAM Tower 
Occupation was a very important event in Colombia and therefore there were a 
range of newspaper articles, commentaries, and editorial columns relating to the 
36-day occupation, and the events that led to it. Secondly, there was a rich 
Sintraemcali database of photographs documenting the events of the previous 8 
months. Thirdly, during the occupation the union had used a video camera and 
had filmed over 200 hours of footage from inside the CAM Tower. This was 
complemented by a range of video footage gathered from local TV channels that 
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had covered the occupation. Fourthly, the trade union has produced a range of 
documents relating both to the occupation, and to the previous years of the 
union's work. These are particularly important in relation to Human Rights issues 
both in the union and in the region, and also in relation to the development of 
educational and cultural events. Fifthly, the union has a range of internal 
documents related to the `PARE' salvation plan for Emcali, laying out the union's 
position on issues of corruption, the financial liquidity of Emcali, and the day to 
day issues that the union has confronted in the last year. The union also has several 
documents relating to the history of the union, its structure and organisation. 
Sixthly, there were government documents relating to issues of privatisation such 
as Law 142 of 1994, and Plan Colombia, and also press statements that were 
released during the occupation via the government press office. Seventhly, there 
was also a range of Sintraemcali e-mail correspondence distributed during the 
CAM Tower occupation via transnational advocacy networks. 
3.6.3 Interviews 
In total, I carried out 27 initial interviews between May 2002 and June 2002 
(see Appendix 4 for a list of interviewees, their occupations /positions within the 
union/community, and their gender). These were a sample selection of trade union 
leaders of Sintraemcali, key human rights activists, local trade union leaders that 
were deeply involved in the CAM Tower Occupation, community leaders and 
activists, and Sintraemcali members that were both either inside the occupation or 
actively involved in the occupation infrastructure on the outside of the 
CAM 
Tower. 
Participants were selected following discussions with Berenice Celeyta, 
Alexander Lopez and Carlos Gonzalez, who advised on the different roles and 
responsibilities of participants in the occupation and the different aspects they 
might be able to illuminate. The majority could be understood as 
`movement 
intellectuals' of the different components that made up the trade 
union/community alliance and they provided 
insights into the history of the 
processes of constructing the movement 
in defence of public services in Cali. The 
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activists selected reflected their particular involvement and roles during the 
occupation: inside or outside of the CAM Tower Occupation and I also 
interviewed several activists who were involved in the second occupation that took 
place in Bogota (see Appendix 4). 
Interviews lasted between 45 minutes and 2hrs and were all later 
transcribed. The interviews were semi-structured, and this technique was chosen 
for its flexibility, which allows a happy medium between what Powney & Watts 
(1987, pp. 17-21) call respondent and informant interviews. The first, respondent, 
is where the interviewer retains total control throughout the interview, while 
informant is where the interviewee has total control. In line with the dialogical 
approach adopted throughout the thesis this method fitted with the overall 
framework by allowing for the possibility of unexpected directions for the 
interviews to take. 
While a similar broad set of themes was addressed in each of the interviews 
(see Appendix 5 for the interview schedule), subsets of questions in particular 
themes were developed according to the specific role of the interviewee during the 
period. The aim was for the interviews to be as dialogical as possible and allow not 
only for data to be gathered, but also for a process of self-reflection on the part of 
the interviewees. Many of the interviews were very emotive and intense 
experiences as people reflected back on the occupation and what it meant. 
As part of the collaborative research process, it was also agreed that a set of 
the entire tapes and transcripts would be kept by the trade union to allow for the 
future production of their own research on the occupation and as part of a broader 
objective of maintaining the `historical memory' of the popular movement in Call. 
For research on the importance of `historical memory' in Latin America, 
Leinhard's (2000) work is particularly instructive. Interviews were all conducted in 
Spanish. I then paid for the tapes to be transcribed by several Colombian students. 
In arranging this I worked alongside Sintraemcali as there were ethical and security 
issues relating to the content of the tapes and the identity of the interviewees. The 
union identified some local students who were considered `trustworthy'. While my 
own Spanish is of a high level, accurately transcribing interviews is difficult for a 
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non-native speaker of a language. In the analysis process I was assisted by 
colleagues within the union on the meanings of particular colloquial phrases. 
Translation was only carried out on those sections of the interviews that were used 
for the purpose of the thesis and for academic articles and conference 
presentations. They are all my own translations, and where I perceived there was 
not a suitable English word that could express the Spanish I have included an 
interpretation and the Spanish in the original. 
Ethical Considerations relating to interviews 
The security and safety of the interviewees guided my approach to the 
interview process. Anonymity was negotiated with the interviewees dependent on 
their interpretation of security considerations. Apart from the leaders of the 
occupation, all those inside the CAM Tower wore balaclavas to protect their 
identity, and remain unknown to the authorities. These worker interviewees were 
given numbered `codes' to protect their identities, and any identifying comments 
were removed from the texts. In the thesis I have used pseudonyms for these 
people and these are marked with an asterisk in Appendix 4. Where there was any 
possibility of the contents of the interview being of potential danger to the 
interviewee or anyone else the content was removed. Many of the high profile 
leaders decided that there was no need for anonymity as they were already in the 
public spotlight as the leaders /negotiators and spokespersons for the trade 
union/community alliance during the period and I recorded their consent to be 
quoted. One copy of the tapes and the transcripts were taken out of Colombia and 
are stored securely in the UK. The other set as mentioned above, remain in the 
possession of Sintraemcali. 
3.6.4 The Production of a Video of the CAM TOWER occupation as a research technique 
In March 2002 the trade union leadership of Sintraemcali suggested that we 
produce a video of the occupation in both Spanish and English to be distributed 
amongst the networks of supporters that had shown solidarity to the union as a 
tool to further the solidarity work. 
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The major tasks of constructing the video were delegated to Maria del 
Carmen, Press Officer for Sintraemcali, Berenice Celeyta and myself. This process 
necessitated watching the over 200 hours of digital videotape taken both inside and 
outside the occupation during the 36 days, along with a range of video-footage that 
we were given by local television channels. The process also allowed me to engage 
in a collective analysis of the events of the occupation and to and to visually 
experience those events that I had not been party to in the early days of the 
occupation whilst in England. I also viewed footage of the second occupation that 
took place in Bogota in the Headquarters of the Superintendent of Public Services. 
This process proved crucial to understanding the different interpretations 
of a range of actors involved in the occupation, and provided me with crucial 
insights into my own broader research project, allowing me to frame the key areas 
of focus. Condensing the occupation into 30 minutes was never an easy task, but 
different versions of the video provoked huge discussions and debates amongst 
those leaders, workers, activists and leaders that were invited to view different 
versions as they developed. 
The process initially began with a brainstorming session between Maria del 
Carmen, Berenice Celeyta, Alexander Lopez and myself. We drew up a list of 
factors that were agreed to be crucial in understanding the occupation. From this 
initial debate an outline of the development of the occupation was constructed 
focussing in on key causal factors for the occupation and the key events. Following 
on from this, Berenice Celeyta and myself spent several days viewing the different 
video evidence and selecting different material along the major themes. Berenice 
Celeyta began to develop the script for the documentary and, using editing 
equipment, we began to compile the first version of the video. Within two weeks 
the first version was compiled and produced in a local community TV channel. 
We then invited around ten people to discuss the video and provide an 
initial critique. The response, while overwhelmingly positive, provided strong 
critiques on missing aspects of the occupation, particularly the way that it had 
integrated itself within the Cali `Carnival' that took place every year during 
Christmas period. Likewise, missing from the initial video was evidence that public 
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services, despite the occupation, went on uninterrupted. This led to further 
modifications and additions for a second version, viewed by a different audience 
that in turn produced different critiques. By the time we reached version four we 
felt we had produced an acceptable interpretation of the events incorporating as 
much of the ideas and suggestions of those who had previewed the video. 
I then went about translating the entire documentary into English, 
providing the voice-over myself and inserting subtitles in English where 
appropriate. We then distributed the video to local, national and international 
colleagues in the appropriate language. We also organised a first screening at the 
Union Headquarters on June 27th, 2002 that was attended by over 200 people, the 
majority of whom had been active during the occupation. The video was well 
received by the audience. However, one key remark emanating particularly from 
those involved in the organisation of the occupation outside and the work of 
building solidarity within the communities was that too much emphasis had been 
placed on the dramatic events, and not enough focus on the long process of 
community/union work that had gone in to building that solidarity. Some 
suggested that the video depicted the local community almost spontaneously 
developing solidarity with the occupation whereas, in fact, it had been a long 
process both prior to and during the occupation of educational events and 
meetings across the poor neighbourhoods informing local communities of what 
was going on. This understanding of the process of struggle that led to the 
occupation deeply affected my own research focus from that point onwards. I 
realised that I needed to trace the educational and organisational processes that had 
led to the occupation as the route to explain the `agency' factor within the CAM 
Tower occupation. Here I began to develop a deeper understanding of the 
necessary conceptual distinction between a social movement process and a social 
movement episode (Yarrow, 2002). In the context of my research, the former 
refers to the diachronic development of the trade union since the early 1990's, 
while the latter refers to the synchronic events that took place during the 36 
days. 
During the same period the Human Rights Department were also running a 
Human Rights Diploma for local activists. Berenice Celeyta and I decided to 
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devote one morning to showing the video and then, through participatory 
techniques, to elicit opinions and interpretations of the events and how they related 
to the video. This was a type of `focus group' whereby the video was utilised as a 
mechanism to stimulate the responses of the participants. The majority of these 
participants were key activists during the occupation and this session provided rich 
data on the debates over the interpretation of the occupation, and the self- 
understandings of the participants of its broader implications. I recorded the 
events on cassette and later took detailed notes of the differing interpretations of 
the experiences. 
The concrete dialogical process of producing and disseminating the video 
provided me with a possibility to develop a collective sense emanating from these 
important debates of the understandings and interpretations of key events during 
and leading up to the occupation by active participants. In that sense my thesis 
structure was developed through interaction within the movement rather than 
being an isolated process of academic inquiry. Obviously, this dialogical process 
incorporated within it a broader dialectical engagement with the literature on 
globalisation that was informing my research and it was this tension between 
practitioner/participant knowledge and the academic literature that became the 
catalyst for theory development and extension. I found myself testing out the 
theoretical work on globalisation and new social movement unionism with this 
lived collective experience and searching for meeting points and conflicts. 
3.6.5 Documentary Analysis 
All interviews, written texts and visual materials were treated as texts. To 
different degrees each of the document types were evaluated under criteria 
recognising the role of bias, the possibility that facts and figures may be distorted 
or inaccurate, and that each may offer only partial insights to the situation under 
investigation. This included my own field notes and the eyewitness accounts. Rose 
(1999) notes the importance that numbers have assumed for governments, and the 
analysis and evaluation of this relating to the feasibility of Emcali was an important 
aspect of the dispute between the union and government with both offering very 
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different figures. Where there was widespread disagreement I have erred on the 
side of caution and presented the most conservative estimates. 
There were different points of focus for different documents according to 
the research aims, however, it is important to state that documents were not taken 
at face value, but critically analysed. All texts are `socially constructed' and it is 
important to locate those texts in the context in which they were produced, and 
the intended audience - `urgent actions', trade union communiques, my own 
eyewitness accounts were all written with a purpose and emerged in particular 
places at particular times. In this process, aspects of Norman Fairclough's work on 
critical discourse analysis (1995; 2003) have been used as a guide, and while I have 
not analysed documents at the micro-level for syntax and structure, I have drawn 
on the broader principles of his work on discourse that recognizes it `causal power' 
and potentiality to produce change. 
Fairclough's (1995; 2003) method of discourse analysis derives from the 
belief that language is a form of social practice. This provided an initial means of 
analysing the competing discourses of the actors involved in the CAM Tower 
Occupation which assisted in relating the `micro' text to broader processes, 
structures, and strategies in social formations. Fairclough highlights the relationship 
between discourse, ideology and power. He investigates these links through an 
examination of how processes of text production, distribution and consumption 
are related to events (instances of socio-cultural practice) and texts (made up of 
already produced texts) and also to wider social and cultural structures, 
relationships and processes. He has a three-dimensional model which sees 
discourse as a spoken or written text, as a discourse practice, and as a socio-cultural 
practice. Furthermore, he sees the role of discourse analysis as having the task of 
describing, interpreting and explaining. Within this framework it is crucial to 
understand language as a `socially constructed' phenomena, which seeks, in 
Gramscian terms, to perform a hegemonic function, of gathering support for 
specific social projects or actions. Within the context of the CAM Tower 
occupation, texts are described, interpreted and explained in terms of the different 
hegemonic and counter-hegemonic functions that they have been constructed to 
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achieve. Likewise, interview documentation were analysed in relation to a 
recognition of the subject positionality of the responsondents. All of these 
processes were embedded within the broader methodological approach of the 
extended case linking the local micro texts to broader processes, structures and 
theories. 
3.7 Some Problems of the Critical Ethnographic Approach 
Just as the methods and techniques of positivist science fail to reach the 
lofty heights of the 4Rs of `positive' social science, so the techniques and methods 
of `reflexive science' and the critical ethnographic approach adopted in this 
research have their limitations. While context impedes the positive model, the 
reflexive model is impeded by unequal power relations that provide the `context' 
for dialogue and while the committed approach brings many methodological 
advantages it likewise brings with it a price both in terms of research and personal 
life. 
3.7.1 Time 
Firstly, by immersing myself in solidarity activities during these last four 
years, the question of time management became a major issue. Combining 
academic and activist work both during my extensive field work in Colombia and 
the data analysis and writing up in the UK has posed a range of problems. During 
the first field trip there were a whole range of tasks that were undertaken on a daily 
basis that often left inadequate time for the research, and it was difficult to refuse 
tasks when the situations were often life threatening. Back in the UK there has 
been a constant battle between my responsibilities to Sintraemcali and the 
Colombia Solidarity Campaign and my responsibilities to my supervisors and 
funding body. Here I find myself being envious of the `critical academic' who sees 
her role as `witness' but does not engage with the social movements as activist. My 
role was much more contested and I continue to make daily decisions on whether I 
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should translate an `urgent action', do work for the Colombia Solidarity Campaign, 
or complete my research and writing objectives. 
3.7.2 Engagement 
The second factor related to my experience of committed research is the 
problem of `engagement'. If we accept that `objective ` science is not neutral, then 
committed science can be no less so, yet there is obviously a dilemma in 
`committed research' that needs to be addressed from a range of angles. In my own 
research I have encountered a whole series of research dilemmas resulting from my 
political commitments. In engaging as activist/ academic the balance between 
advocacy and critical analysis of the situation under investigation has been "a 
tension between studying resistance from a distance, and becoming uncritically 
involved in a struggle" (Routledge, 1996, p. 410). My feelings on this issue have 
been greatly helped by long discussions with colleagues inside the union about 
what research is needed within the Colombian popular movement and the need for 
critical analysis of the union's own practices. Furthermore, the movement between 
sites - field work and the University - has provided the distance which gives space 
for reflection and reflexivity. Now that my fieldwork is over I can now no longer 
spend the extensive periods of time in the union that I once did. This raises 
questions as to how to maintain solidarity relations and the disappointment of 
comrades and friends in Sintraemcali that I cannot be there more permanently. 
This anxiety has been eased by facilitating other activists to work in Colombia and 
in that sense being involved in an organisation such as the Colombia Solidarity 
Campaign rather than just operating as an individual allows for the possibility of 
sustaining these types of relationships. 
3.7.3 Domination 
Entering into the field, engaging in interviews, and participating in social 
processes inevitably draws the researcher into unequal power relations. 
As a 
Western, white male working in a Colombian environment I was 
inevitably an 




located within a particular section of the trade union. While aligning myself and 
working with the `oppressed', my location of working closely with the union 
leadership placed me within the unequal power structures of the popular 
movement. I spent much time with the leadership and less with rank and file 
workers, and local community activists. In my attempt to overcome this I sought 
out possibilities to have contact with different workers, to spend time in rank and 
file and community events to chat with people and to explore their own 
understandings and perspectives on the situation. Nevertheless, my own 
understandings are inevitably tainted by my location within these unequal power 
relations. 
3.7.4 Silendng 
As an extension of this process of unequal power, research often privileges 
certain voices while excluding others. While a trade union struggle, the union relied 
for its success on the alliance of community organisations that developed, but 
often these voices were silenced within meetings, absent in interviews. If I had had 
more time I would have liked to explore in greater detail and more critically the 
trade union/ community alliance, the gendered discourse of the overwhelmingly 
masculine leadership and the prioritisation of the organised working class as the 
leadership within the alliance. This remains an area for future study. Often these 
differences are also obscured by the categorisation of participants and the internal 
conflict left unsaid. This process of silencing also extends to how data and 
evidence is examined and presented, how this `voice' is presented, which parts are 
selected, and the need to ensure that it does not become a form of `romantic 
ventriloquism', "creating the magic illusion of the Other's coming to voice" 
(Spivak, 1988 quoted in Routledge, 1996, p. 415). 
3.7.5 Objectification 
Extending from social processes to the broader social forces and structures 
that exist beyond the site of study leads to the possibility of the `objectification' of 
social forces that exist beyond the site where the fieldwork is carried out. Here 
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there is a danger of exaggerating the external power and internal cohesion of social 
forces such as MNCs, supranational institutions, the US government and the 
Colombian state. The danger is that social forces, which are ultimately 
configurations of social relations, are crudely reduced to a homogenous and 
overarching `power' without allowing for recognition of the `susceptibilities' and 
thus possibilities of resistance. An example of this process occurred during the 
research in relation to the mass media. Due to the concentration of wealth and 
property in Colombia, and the interrelationship between private enterprises and 
high state positions, the media is crudely represented as narrowly serving the 
interest of the state. Interestingly the complex configuration of forces and tensions 
within the media emerged during the occupation through the work of several 
journalists that published sympathetic portrayals of the occupation. Likewise, the 
limits of the capacity to fully theorise all aspects of the `extended case' makes any 
research vulnerable to these kinds of `objectification'. 
3.7.6 Normalisation 
In the pursuit of reconstituting theory there is always a double danger of, on 
the one hand, forcing context to fit theory and, on the other, forcing theory to fit 
context. Here the danger lies in producing neat and tidy visions of the world that 
can be managed, controlled, and disciplined. The work of Said (1978), Escobar 
(1995) and Rist (1997) on development provide clear examples of the danger and 
power of theory to map out and dominate other spaces, and how seemingly 
progressive theories can be utilised for a range of unhappy and unintended 
purposes. Social movement unionism can likewise serve as a catch-all theory and 
solution to contemporary trade union dilemmas without exploring the underlying 
processes of social exclusion and marginality, privileging certain knowledges while 
undermining others. It can lead to a highly negative understanding of traditional 
national and international trade union structures and potentially legitimate the 
further marginalisation of the official trade union movement. Recognising these 




There are two central pillars to the approach adopted to the investigation of 
Sintraemcali's struggle. Firstly, this approach is a politically committed pedagogical 
process deeply embedded within the broader socio-economic and political 
struggles emerging between activists in the UK and Colombia. As I have shown it 
is not a discrete item that can be understood separately from them. In that sense 
the approach to this research was a process that has had a range of outcomes, 
many unintended; from `consciousness raising', to practical financial and political 
solidarity, to the final production of this thesis. All of these processes involved a 
lot of people. The research process was far more of a collective project than many 
PhD's and is ongoing. Secondly, beyond the ethical approach, the methodology 
adopted in this study sought to bridge the gap between the macro and the micro 
and transcend national boundaries in order to better understand processes that 
transcend the conventional scales that social science research has been based on, 
particularly the nation-state. Inevitably, both of these factors lead to a degree of 
methodological messiness, with the lines between research and activism continually 
blurred, and shifts between the local and global under-developed. Nevertheless, I 
am convinced that both aspects provide the seeds for a radically different type of 
research which can begin to address the two crucial binaries of activist/intellectual 
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MILITARISED NEO- 
LIBERALISM : DEFINING 
COLOMBIA WITHIN A 
`STRUCTURALLY ADJUSTED' 
LATIN AMERICA 
"The World Bank says its goal is to eliminate poverty. That is not a lie. They 
are doing it in Colombia by eliminating the poor. " 
Berenice Celeyta, Director of the Human Rights Department Sintraemcali 
speaking at the Annual General Meeting of War on Want, London School of 
Economics, February 28th, 2004. 
4.1 Introduction 
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In a detailed World Bank report published in 2002, Cali, Colombia: Towards a 
City Development Strategy (World Bank, 2002a), the stark reality of the economic, 
social and political crisis taking place in Cali at the end of the millennium was 
represented in the final conclusions: 
"First, Cali suffers from institutional devastation. Widespread corruption, 
brought on to a large extent by the boom in drug dealing activities, has caused 
a generalized decline in the trust that citizens and city stakeholders once had 
in their local leaders and institutions. Second, the city is in the midst of its 
worst economic crisis in its recorded history, with a GDP that has fallen more 
than 2 percent a year since 1995, and an unemployment rate of 20 percent. 
Although Colombia as a whole is in a severe economic recession, Cali is 
fairing worse than other large cities in the country. Third, the social picture of 
Cali, a city that used to be a model of civic engagement and progress, is now 
bleak. Poverty has increased over the past years, with the latest figures 
showing a doubling between 1994 and 1998 of the percentage of the 
population living in misery. Inequality is rising, and the education system is not 
closing the gap between social classes or providing young people with the 
skills necessary to participate successfully in the labor market. In fact, the 
quality and coverage of education have worsened over the past 10 years. 
Violence, and particularly the rising number of homicides, has become one of 
the most important problems for Calenos and the most tangible sign of the 
decline in the city's liveability. Fourth, the financial situation of the municipality 
is so critical, with a debt of US$196 million in 1999 and corresponding 
financial expenses at 200 percent of the gross current balance, that the very 
functioning of basic public services is at stake" (World Bank, 2002a, p. 98). 
While the statement clearly captures the multi-dimensional and devastating 
extent of the socio-economic crisis in the city, what it fails to do (in the entire 
report), is to provide the reader with any way of understanding the dynamics of 
how Cali deteriorated to such an extent during the 1990's, nor any notion of its 
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relationship to the neo-liberal economic policies that were initiated during the same 
period and promoted by the World Bank and the IMF. Furthermore, absent from 
the analysis is the role of agency, whether they be national and local elites, 
supranational institutions (such as the World Bank itself), the US government and/ 
or paramilitary death squads, all of whom have contributed to promoting this 
highly skewed and deleterious development model that now exists in Cali and 
more broadly in Colombia. 
In this chapter I will seek to make those links, and in so doing provide a 
sketch of the geographical, political, military, economic, and social dimensions of 
the contemporary conflict in Colombia, highlighting the configuration of 
competing forces, their differential strategies, and the outcomes of 14 years of 
attempts to promote the neo-liberal model. In doing this I will provide the 
contextual background for the struggle over public service provision in the city of 
Cali which will be detailed in the rest of the thesis. At the core of my argument is 
that while the general mechanisms of implementation and effects of neo-liberal 
globalisation outlined in Chapter One and Two are present in Colombia, the nature 
of the balance of social forces, the particular historic development of Colombia 
and its geo-strategic political and economic importance for the United States 
uniquely shapes the terrain of contestation setting both limits and also opening up 
particular possibilities for struggle and contestation at a range of scales from the 
local to the global. Central to the top-down strategy of the Colombian state is the 
deployment of `state terror' to achieve its class objectives. This is done by the 
construction of a `parallel state' which covertly eliminates oppositional forces while 
allowing the `official' state to deny involvement. Combined with a massive increase 
in military aid from the United States the `parallel' and `official' states operate 
together to produce a `militarised' variant of neo-liberal implementation. The 
dominance of violence to achieve political control conditions not only the nature 
of the neo-liberal model but also the strategies of resistance deployed by social 
movements in opposition. 
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4.2 Analysing State and Social Forces in Colombia 
In order to structure this analysis I have applied Gramsci's framework for 
the analysis of the `relations of forces' outlined in the Modern Prince (Gramsci, 
1986, p. 180) and updated it to contemporary times through the use of Cox's Neo- 
Gramscian approach to bottom-up and top down civil society in the contemporary 
era developed in Chapter One. In The Modern Prince, Gramsci breaks down these 
relations into three `moments': the military, the social and the political (ibid, p. 180) 
which while occurring simultaneously, can be separated analytically. The balance 
between the social, the political and military according to Gramsci determines the 
nature of the conflict between different blocs. Proceeding now to the case of 
Colombia what I will highlight from an analysis of the different moments of 
military, social and political relations is a highly complex and unequal neo-liberal 
development model. Capitalism in Colombia is being profoundly restructured 
albeit in a particularly extreme and brutal manner with clear parallels to Chile and 
Argentina in the 1970's and 1980's. In the following sections I will explore these 
military, social and political relations respectively. 
4.2.1 Military Relations 
In Colombia a low level civil war has been fought out between Marxist 
guerrilla and state and para-state forces since the early 1960's. The two major 
contemporary guerrilla organisations are the ELN (National Liberation Army) and 
the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia). The roots of this armed 
conflict he in the failure/refusal of the Colombian elite to develop a broad enough 
cross-class consensus to be able to rule `hegemonically', that is with a minimum of 
force. From 1948 to the present, unlike in many other parts of the World, no left 
of centre or social democratic government has been allowed to gain electoral 
power. The bullet and the bomb have been the preferred option of the Colombian 
elite from the assassination of Liberal presidential candidate Gaitan in 1948 which 
lead to 200,000 deaths to the systematic elimination of oppositional forces which 
continues to date and leaves between 6-8000 political assassinations per annum. 
Chapter Four 
123 
In 1985 there was a serious attempt by the FARC to enter into the electoral 
political process with the formation of the Union Patriotica (UP). Under an 
agreement with the then President of Colombia Betancur, some guerrillas were 
demobilised and entered into an electoral coalition with the communist party, 
sections of the trade union movement, and a range of other leftist leaning social 
movements. In 1986 they won several seats in the Colombian Congress and Senate 
and several hundred representatives in local government. In the same year, 230 
members of the UP were assassinated (Pearce, 1990, p. 281) and the policy of para- 
state extermination had begun. By 1994 over 3,000 members of the UP had been 
assassinated (Reiniciar, 1995) and the genocide against the UP continues (El 
Tiempo) 24/01/04). The assassination of Gaitan and the elimination of the UP are 
merely two examples in a long history reflecting the intransigent nature of the 
Colombian elite and its willingness to resort to extreme violence in its struggle to 
maintain control and block attempts aimed at challenging the extreme social 
inequality in Colombia. 
However, these conflicts cannot be understood purely within the 
framework of the nation-state. Colombia became deeply entangled within the 
broader processes of the Cold War when after 1959; the US launched its Alliance 
for Progress in the region. Since that point there has been a strong military alliance 
between the USA and the Colombian state, extensive counter-insurgency 
involvement, and the broader incorporation of Colombia in the geo-political and 
geo-strategic US control of the region. In the post Cold war era the `communist' 
threat that discursively legitimated US `foreign intervention' and Colombian state 
repression has been refashioned into the `narcotics' threat, while Colombia's 
infamous role as cocaine producer has provided the justification for increased US 
intervention via Plan Colombia, a multi-billion dollar, largely military, aid package 
that began in 2000 aimed at eliminating drugs and the `narco-guerrillas' who 
allegedly live off this. In 2000 Colombia became the third biggest recipient of US 
military aid after Israel and Egypt, highlighting the increasing importance that the 
US state has given to Colombia. In the wake of September 11th, 2001, the focus on 
counter-narcotics has taken a further twist and been complemented by the War on 
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Terror' with guerrillas now being labelled `narco-terrorists'. As one recent detailed 
study of US foreign policy in Colombia has noted, while the language has shifted, 
the target and tactics of counterinsurgency continue to follow historic patterns 
(Stokes, 2004). These historic patterns are targeting of the civilian population with 
the objective of diminishing the popular support that insurgent forces may 
command. Commonly known as `removing the water from the fish' the price of 
this strategy has been widespread human rights violations against civilians 
(McClintock, 1985). 
From the 1990's until now, formal military confrontation largely takes place 
in the rural regions of the country where the two major guerrilla organizations, the 
ELN (National Liberation Army) and the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia), vie for military, political, and territorial control against state and para- 
state forces, backed by US military assistance. In the urban areas, where more than 
70% of the population now live, the state is militarily more firmly in control. 
Central to an understanding of the nature of the relationship between the state and 
social movements is a deeper exploration of what the `dirty war' means in 
Colombia to those member of non-violent movements seeking to challenge this 
highly unequal state of affairs30. 
Paramilitarism 
Crucial to any understanding oppositional struggles against neo-liberal 
globalization during the 1990's in Colombia is a recognition of the role of 
paramilitary organisations whom it is estimated are responsible for over 4000 
assassinations of trade union leaders and activists in Colombia since 1986 (CUT, 
2004). While counterinsurgency can take a variety of forms, it is the particular role 
of `paramilitary' organisations that has dominated Colombia, particularly during the 
30 For clear reasons that will be outlined in the next section on Paramilitarism, in Colombia there is a clear distinction to 
be drawn betuween the activities of guerrilla organisations and unarmed social movements, particularly trade unions. 
While there may be ideological preferences and commonalities between individual trade union members and the 
guerrilla organisations there are not relationships between trade union institutions and the guerrilla movement. Trade 
union organisations are particularly sensitive about this and the danger for their members of being labelled as guerrillas 
and terrorists. This lack of contact means that the activities and objectives of the guerilla organisations and the trade 
unions and social movements may conflict and undermine each other. In the case of Sintraemcali this clearly 
happened when the FARC called for an armed strike across the South West of Colombia that coincided with a 
Muncipal Strike called in Cali in opposition to the privatization of EMCALI. Sintraemcali and the Municipal Strike 
Command quickly cancelled their planned strike to avoid any connections with the guerrilla protest. See page 214-215. 
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1990's. Paramilitary organisations in Colombia were originally set up in the 1960's 
by large landowners as a means of protection against guerrilla incursion and to 
suppress peasant demand for land reform31. They developed in a range of different 
directions during the 1980s. They are now well-funded and well-armed units that 
have prosecuted a terror campaign against leftist insurgents and their supposed 
`social base', and have complex relationships with both drug cartels, particular elite 
interests, and sections of the military (Human Rights Watch, 1996; 2000; 2001). 
The debate over the relationship between the Colombian state and 
paramilitary forces is one of the most controversial in contemporary Colombia, 
and successive Colombian governments have fiercely denied any direct 
relationship32. If state funding were the defining characteristic of state/paramilitary 
relations then the Colombian government's denial would seem to be fair. Carlos 
Castano, the head of the largest paramilitary organisation in contemporary 
Colombia, the AUC (United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia), has admitted 
publicly that 70% of the funding for his operations is obtained through 
involvement in the drug trade (CNN, 2000). However, if we conceptualise the 
state as a social relation, that is to see a particular configuration of social forces as 
an `historical bloc' in Gramscian terms, then it is also clear that the paramilitary 
organisations act in the interests of this dominant historical bloc, particularly the 
national and international business community, that have been the driving force 
for the shift to a neo-liberal development model. 
In a letter in 2000, Castano, the AUC leader expressed indignation at the 
Colombian government's attempts to prevent national and international companies 
from funding his organisation: "Why shouldn't national and international 
companies support us when they see their investments limited by the terrorism and 
barbarity of the guerrillas? " and goes on to state that "We have always proclaimed 
that we are the defenders of business freedom and of the national and international 
industrial sector. We have said over and over again that Colombian subversives are 
31 The legislation for allowing the right of the military to arm civilians was provided in Decree 3398 of 
1968 (World Bank, 1999, p. 36). 
32 A recent report highlights the Colombian government's position Observatory on Human Rights and 
International Humanitarian Law (2003). 
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preventing the adequate development of productive forces" (CNN, 2000). This 
statement suggests at least a convergence of interests between state economic 
policy and the paramilitaries. Furthermore, there is clear evidence in several 
Human Rights Watch reports (1996; 2000; 2001) of more direct involvement by 
Colombian military forces in paramilitary operations or, at the very least, non- 
interference into those operations. In its third Special Report on Colombia, Inter- 
American Commission of Human Rights, an organ of the Organisation of 
American States (1999, paragraph 18), argued that: 
The apparent convergence of interests between the paramilitary groups which 
attack labor unions and official persecution lends credence to allegations that 
State agents are either directly involved in the violent attacks against labor 
union members or encourage and support such attacks.. It is also suggested 
that paramilitary groups receive intelligence information necessary to carry out 
attacks against union member targets from the State's security forces. These 
allegations are further supported by the fact that the State's security forces 
have in fact prepared intelligence reports, sometimes made public or used in 
criminal proceedings in the regional justice system, which identify labor union 
leaders as guerrilla collaborators based on their union work. 
In terms of the relationship between state and paramilitary forces, the 
systematic elimination of the Patriotic Union, mentioned earlier, provides evidence 
for a cautious approach to the Colombian government's contemporary denials of 
their relationship to human rights violations committed by the paramilitaries. In 
1997 the case of the UP was taken to the Inter-American Human Rights Court and 
the court found the Colombian government guilty of involvement in the 
elimination of the organisation. One year later, faced with overwhelming evidence, 
the Colombian government officially accepted responsibility (El Tiemo, 24/01/04) 
In the specific region of the Valle de Cauca where the struggle of 
Sintraemcali against privatisation takes place, Human Rights Watch (2001) found 
clear evidence that the Colombian Army's Third Brigade had, in 1999, helped to 
set up an AUC paramilitary group called the Calima Front. The Calima Front now 
dominates the region and has been implicated in a series of massacres and the 
selective assassination of many trade union and social leaders from the region: 
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Investigators from the Attorney General's office told Human Rights Watch that 
they had compiled compelling evidence linking the Calima Front to active 
duty, retired, and reserve military officers attached to the Third Brigade along 
with local landowners and hired paramilitaries taken from the ranks of AUC. 
According to these government investigators as well as eyewitness testimony 
obtained by Human Rights Watch, the Third Brigade provided the Calima 
Front with weapons, intelligence, and logistical support and coordinated 
actions with them (Human Rights Watch, 2001, p. 45). 
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The report draws on evidence from `Felipe', an ex military intelligence 
informer now in protective custody. He refers to his presence at a meeting in the 
headquarters of the Third Brigade in March 1999 where a list of "rich people in the 
area" was drawn up "so that they could contribute money to bring the 
paramilitaries into the region" (Human Rights Watch, 2001, p. 40), and that he 
worked with soldiers paid $500 per month for `moonlighting' with the 
paramilitaries. While the Colombian government would argue that these examples 
reflect the presence of `rogue elements' within the military rather than systematic 
state involvement, there does appear clear evidence that the Colombian state, local 
elites, military and paramilitary forces are interpenetrated, with at least sections of 
the state apparatus committed to the paramilitary option for the resolution of the 
armed conflict and the social crisis that engulfs the country. 
Central to the functioning of paramilitary violence is the ability of those 
perpetrating human rights violations to avoid prosecution. Widespread impunity 
provides further credence to the notion that the Colombian state is centrally 
involved in these abuses. Padre Javier Giraldo, a Jesuit priest and perhaps the most 
famous and authoritative human rights leader in Colombia, reflects on the 
relationship between the paramilitary organisations, the widespread 
immunity and 
impunity that persists in Colombia and the Colombian state's somewhat 
schizophrenic role whereby it is both engaged in and attempts to stop paramilitary 
violence: 
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My conclusion is that the Colombian state is contradictory. It tries to fulfil two functions. On the one hand it's a violent, discriminatory institution that must favor a small wealthy minority. Even basic necessities are denied to the great 
majority of its people. By its very nature, at its core, it is not democratic. On the other hand, in public discourse, it presents itself as a state based on law, 
one that respects and implements justice, human rights norms, democratic laws. How do government functionaries manage this contradiction? They 
maintain a duality: the para-state, a structure that is illegal and clandestine, increasingly takes over the dirty work, the repression. It doesn't appear to be 
part of the state. For many years now Colombia's government has been 
creating and maintaining these structures. The legal, constitutional structure 
exists parallel to structures of a para-state and paramilitary. This is how the 
government has avoided doing justice (Giraldo, 2003, p. 21). 
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The structures of this para-state have been central to the implementation of 
neo-liberalism in the country and the ensuing human rights violations that have 
resulted. 
Exploring the Patterns of Human Rights Violations During the Neo-liberal Period 
Political violence across Colombia increased markedly during the 1990's in 
tandem with the rapid growth of Paramilitarism33 (World Bank, 1999), and the 
paranvlitaries are responsible for the overwhelming majority of human rights 
violations (Human Rights Watch, 2000; 1996). The paramilitaries see trade 
unionists, along with social movements and popular organizations, as legitimate 
military targets. Carlos Castano, has stated publicly that: "... every killing has a 
reason. . . we 
kill trade unionists because they stop people working" (El Pais, 
23/07/2000). 
Some authors suggest a strong correlation between military and paramilitary 
strategy, US intervention and natural resources (Arco Iris, 2004; AFSC, 2003). In a 
recent report carried out by the AFSC (2003) parallels are clearly drawn between 
increased US military aid through Plan Colombia and the defence of strategic 
resources, particularly oil. The report traces the increased concentration of US 
military aid and selective US military personnel, in two strategic areas of Colombia: 
Arauca and Putamayo (in the North and South of the country respectively) where 
the biggest proven resources of oil are located, and the pipelines used to transport 
33 According to the Colombian government the numbers of paramilitary members has increased from 93 
in 1986 to 8150 in 2000 (Observatory on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, 2000). 
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it out of the country". The report highlights the role of major corporate oil 
producers, such as BP-Amoco, Occidental Petroleum and Exxon Mobile, in 
lobbying the US government via the 'US Colombia Business Partnership' to 
increase military aid to Colombia through `Plan Colombia'. They also note the big 
corporations own independent contribution to the military escalation in the region 
through contracting private security corporations such as Defence Systems Limited 
(BP-Amoco), and AirScan (Occidental Petroleum) who have been implicated in 
human rights violations and are linked to paramilitary organisations (AFSC, 2003, 
p. 12). 
Other sources suggest a further relationship between types of economic 
interests and state and Para-state military tactics (Higginbottom, 2004a). Those 
zones that contain strategic resources coincide with the main areas where peasants 
have been forced off their land and massacres have been carried out which serve as 
a catalyst to mass exodus (Arco Iris, 2004). Over 3,000,000 Colombians have been 
displaced since 1989. This exodus has facilitated the construction of roads and 
waterways and the extraction of energy (petrol and electricity), mining (gold and 
coal) and genetic products. Furthermore, this type of human rights violation can 
also be understood within the context of the development of Agro-Industrial 
projects: African Palm, wood, citric fruits, bananas, flowers and sugar cane, among 
others (Loingsigh, 2003). The burden of these forced displacements has been 
borne disproportionately by those black and native indigenous communities 
concentrated in some of the richest natural resource zones and bio-diverse areas. 
Amongst the displaced populations there is also a disproportionate number of 
women and children. This process of forced displacement is a particularly 
brutal 
form of what Marx called primitive accumulation, where the peasants and their 
mode of survival are separated, thereby expanding the urban proletariat 
(Marx, 
1976)". In this we can see how the general tendency of neo-liberal globalisation to 
34 An interactive map highlighting the relationship between Occidental Petroleum investment and US 
and Colombian military build up is available at http: //www. afsc. org/colombiaoil/map. 
htm 
35 "The process which creates the capital-relation can be nothing more than the process which 
divorces 
the worker from the ownership of the conditions of 
his own labour; it is a process which operates two 
transformations, whereby the social means of subsistence and production ar turned into capital, and the 
immediate producers are turned into wage-labourers" (ibid, p. 874). 
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expand capitalism into more spheres of life takes a particularly brutal form due to 
the nature of the balance of social forces and the violent mode of class domination 
that exists in Colombia. Similar processes were noted in both Guatemala and El 
Salvador (Robinson, 2003). 
On the other hand, where opposition to the privatisation of state industries 
and and/or cut backs in public services are concerned, there is a pattern of the 
selective assassination of trade union and community leaders and activists, the 
objective being not to shift population groups off land, but to weaken/eliminate 
activists /organisations opposed to these processes. According to the Central 
Union of Workers (CUT), the biggest trade union confederation in Colombia, 
paramilitaries were responsible for the assassination in 2002 of over 184 trade 
unionists across the country (CUT, 2004) and more than 4000 trade union leaders 
and activists since 1986. The hypothesis of the relationship between human rights 
violations against trade unionists and opposition to neo-liberal economic reforms 
is further demonstrated by a UN investigation highlighting the concentration of 
violations in certain trade union sectors that have been most active in opposing 
state reforms in the late 1990's. These reforms have been focused primarily on 
health, education, public administration, and the privatisation of state public 
utilities and natural resource extraction companies. 
The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights annual report 
(LJNHCHR, 2001, paragraph 178) notes that: 
The worst-affected unions have been those that represent educational, health, 
municipal and departmental workers, in particular the National Association of 
Hospital Workers (Asociaciön Nacional de Trabajadores Hospitalarios, 
ANTHOC), the Colombian Education Workers' Federation (Federaciön 
Colombiana de Educadores, FECODE) and the Union of Municipal and 
Departmental Workers (Sindicato de Trabajadores de Empresas Municipales 
y Departamentales, SINTRAEMSDES). Among the regions most affected by 
the growing violence against unionists was the Department of Valle del 
Cauca, where attacks were aimed mainly at SINTRAELECOL workers in the 
power industry and Sintraemcali public utility workers. It is the Department of 
Antioquia, however, where violence against workers remains most prevalent. 
Another city with a high rate of violence is Barrancabermeja (Santander), 
which has also had the largest number of displaced workers, especially 
amongst unionists working for the Empresa Colombiana de Petröleos 
(ECOPETROL) and Gases de Barrancabermeja. 
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In this process, two major trade unions stand out at the national level in 
terms of the level of assassinations carried out by paramilitary organisations: 
FECODE, the major teaching trade union has lost over 600 members as it 
attempted to oppose several major waves of reform in the state education sector 
since the late 1980's, and USO, the trade union that groups workers for 
ECOPETROL, the major state owned petroleum extraction company, that has 
lost 82 members since 1988 (USO, 2003) as it attempted to prevent the 
privatisation of the Colombian oil industry. 
For Colombian trade union and social leaders and activists it is this dirty 
war carried out by the `parallel structures of the state' and the fear that it produces 
that shapes their lives. Many trade union leaders and activists carry weapons for 
self defence, have bodyguards, trade union headquarters have been bullet-proofed, 
and many of the most prominent leaders are forced into a semi clandestine life as 
they try to avoid assassination and/or arbitrary arrest under accusations of 
`rebellion' and `terrorism' as they carry out their internationally recognised right to 
organise and form trade unions. However, the fact that the Colombian 
government also operates a `parallel' discourse of respect for human rights and the 
law also provides an avenue for legal and judicial challenge, particularly beyond the 
nation state. Recourse to `international legitimacy' has provided one means through 
which the trade union and other social movements have attempted to weaken the 
`covert' and `overt' military strategy of the state. Many organizations have 
challenged the Colombian government at a range of scales for failing to protect the 
human rights of workers and social leaders in Colombia via local, national and 
international legal bodies such as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(IACHR), and lobbied for sanctions to be imposed at the United Nations and the 
ILO, a process which I will explore more deeply during the thesis. 
4.3 Social Relations 
The reason for the severity of the conflict in Colombia lies in the fact that, 
underpinning the military conflict is a deeply rooted transnational social conflict 
being fought over the distribution of the benefits of Colombia's rich natural, 
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agricultural, and human resources. The country has vast deposits of coal, emeralds, 
oil, ferronickel, gold, and water (Livingstone, 2003; IDEAM, 2003), a fertile 
agricultural terrain which makes Colombia a leading producer of coffee, flowers, 
and bananas, and a vast pool of skilled and unskilled labour available at a fraction 
of the cost of workers in the industrialized north (Fernandez, 2003). Geo-politically 
and geo-strategically it also finds itself at the crossroads both by land and by sea to 
a range of crucial transnational communication links (See Figure 4; Petras, 2001). 
Topographically it is also a highly mountainous country, making state control of 
territory a difficult task. This, coupled with its fertility, helps to explain why it has 
become one of the world's major producers of illegal narcotics, particularly cocaine 
INTEROCEANIC and INTERCONTINENTAL CROSSING POINT 
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This conflict has been intensified since the beginning of the imposition of a 
neo-liberal economic model in the country in the early 1990's. The introduction of 
a New Constitution in 1991, facilitated a peace process between several smaller 
guerrilla organisations, " bringing some progressive democratic reforms. 
However it 
also paved the legislative path for the rolling out of the neo-liberal economic 
36 This included M19 (an urban guerrilla movement), the EPL 
(a Maoist guerrilla mov( it) and several 
smaller organisations. 
Chapter Four 133 
model, particularly the decentralisation of national budgets. Crucially for the focus 
of this research, in the area of public service provision the new constitution 
allowed for the state to shift from being the `provider' of basic public services to 
becoming the `regulator', paving the way for increased foreign direct investment by 
transforming property laws that had secured the previous national state led 
development model. 
This shift in the economic model led to wide ranging transformations of 
social relations as the economy `opened up' to global markets. During successive 
governments during the 1990's a range of policies based on a classic neo-liberal 
recipe of decentralisation, liberalisation, privatisation and fiscal austerity were 
attempted, with varying degrees of success, as workers, campesinos, indigenous 
communities, black communities, social organizations, students and trade unionists 
contested policy and engaged in defensive struggles to hold on to gains won under 
the previous economic model (Castillo, 2000; Ahumada, 1998; 2001; Sarmiento, 
1999; 2001). Despite widespread opposition, the balance of these struggles has 
been largely negative for those opposing these neo-liberal reforms. Trade union 
membership has dropped as an effect of the dirty war (Fernandez, 2003), but also 
due to state sector employment being reduced and/or workers fired and then re- 
hired under new terms and conditions much inferior to before37. New labour 
reforms have been pushed through despite mass opposition, eliminating overtime 
payments, increasing the length of the working week, and making it easier for 
employers to fire workers. 38 All of these reforms were presented as `job creating' 
measures to attract foreign investment. 
As we explored in Chapter One the patterns of unemployment, 
casualisation of labour, social inequality and poverty have all worsened with over 
3' The most recent example was the liquidation of Telecom; the Colombian state owned 
Telecommunications Company in June 2003, where over 5,000 workers lost their jobs. See National 
Coordination of the Colombian Platform for Human Rights, Democracy and Development (2003, p. 78). 
38 See the Colombian government's COINVERTIR web page (2004) which states: 
"Colombia has one of the most flexible labor regimes of Latin America. The following aspects show it: 
The diurnal labor journey has extended from 6 am to 10 p. m. With this, an employer can hire two work 
turns without paying extra hours or nocturnal overcharges. The apprentices contracting modality of the 
National Vocational Training Service (SENA), allows an employer to hire work force through a services 
installment contract and without labor linking with the company. With this, the employer doesn't have to 
pay social benefits. Compensations 
by dismissal without just causes have been reduced. " 
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64% of the population living in poverty (World Bank, 2000). Likewise there has 
also been a strong shift in ownership patterns as the national economy has become 
increasingly integrated within global capital circuits. The shift in both volume of 
investment and in the patterns of that investment is reflected in the diagrams 
below (all taken from Coinvertir, 2004). Figure 5 clearly highlights the growth of 
FDI coinciding with changes in the 1991 constitution that facilitated the entry of 
private capital into a whole range of strategic sectors of the economy. Figures 6 
and 7 contrast the pattern of that FDI from 1979 to 1990, and from 1990 onwards. 
Two crucial points can be made. The first is the relative decline in investment in 
agriculture and mining between the two periods, and the second is the massive 
increase in infrastructural investment, in the form of the buying up of privatised 
public services and corporations. 
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For national and transnational capital during the 1990's both the social and 
legislative conditions were in place for profitable investment (cheap and flexible 
labour and private sector investment rights in all sectors). The rise in violent crime 
and the ongoing civil war remain serious obstacles for the stabilisation of the neo- 
liberal model with many major corporations reluctant to invest further in the 
country. During the 1990's the rise in kidnapping for political and economic 
reasons has played a key role in deterring FDI as it disproportionately affects those 
at the top of the social strata. While this type of human rights violations has been 
particularly attributed to the Colombian guerrilla it is also a common method for 
more traditional crime groupings. According to the Human Rights Observatory of 
the Vice Presidency of Colombia (2003), between 1996 and 2000, over 12,834 
people were kidnapped. 
The evidence above highlights the more general processes of neo-liberalism 
outlined in Chapter 1 of de-territorialisation and re-territorialisation of power and 
the informalisation of labour at work in Colombia. These have been intensified by 
the forced proletarianisation though mass displacement of poor rural communities. 
Once again the prevalence of violence as a significant outcome of these processes 
is evident. These patterns are further reflected in the final relation of forces - the 
political . 
4.4 Political Relations 
As might be expected from the unequal patterns of distribution in 
Colombia, the political configuration of forces promoting the neo-liberal project in 
Colombia can be understood, drawing on Gill (2003, p. 118), as a `supremacist 
historical bloc' rather than a `hegemonic' mode of control. The supremacist 
`historical bloc' applies a confrontational rather then consensus model of 
governance, and develops a range of coercive measures to defend the unequal 
development model from those ever increasing population groups that are left out. 
As the economic and social crisis worsened in the late 1990's, and the civil war 
intensified with the introduction of Plan Colombia, traditional authority 
fragmented. The two historic elite parties, the liberals and the conservative that 
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have shared power since the 1940s, have seen their support bases weaken 
(Leongömez, 2002) as old clientelist politics failed to deliver to the masses 
disadvantaged by the neo-liberal economic model. This disenchantment extends to 
a smaller section of the elite, particularly those based in agricultural production and 
smaller industries, who have lost out to foreign imports as the economy `opened'. 
Weakening support for the traditional parties reflects their inability to provide 
solutions to both the internal civil war and the deleterious effects of the neo-liberal 
model, and underscores a broader crisis of legitimacy in the country. Emerging out 
of this crisis in 2001 was a neo-fascist project headed by the controversial ex- 
governor of Antioquia, Alvaro Uribe Velez, who eventually became President in 
2002, on a pledge to end the internal civil war militarily. During his time as 
governor of Antioquia he was central to setting up armed civilian organizations, 
the `CONVIVIR', who eventually became paramilitary organisations. His election 
signified a political victory for the paramilitary organisations in Colombia. This 
resulted in an escalation of the armed conflict and a move towards an even more 
repressive and authoritarian state (Higginbottom, 2003a). 
The 1990's have has also produced a crisis of legitimacy among the leftist 
political organisations both in their political and military form. This can be partly 
explained through the effects that the collapse of the Soviet Union has had on the 
left internationally. However, in the particular case of Colombia other factors 
appear to be weakening that support. The first of these is the effect of the 
Colombian state's `dirty war' and the difficulty that this poses for organising 
political parties. For the armed movements popular support has been weakened by 
two major factors. The first is revelations of involvement in the drug trade (the 
FARC). The second has been negative public opinion produced as a result of the 
use of kidnappings as a political tool (both the ELN and the FARC). 
A further factor that has altered the balance of social forces has been the 
changing nature of the composition of the working class brought about 
by the 
neo-liberal economic reforms outlined above. Reductions in 
formal sector 
employment and increases in the informal sector have meant that the vast majority 
of the working population are no 
longer organised in trade unions. If they are 
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organized at all, it is in social movements and local community organizations such 
as indigenous organisations, black community organisations, women's groups, 
community groups, human rights NGOs, gay organisations. These organisations 
often lack inter-movement coordination, as well as having different social, political 
and cultural agendas. They also tend to focus on strategies for immediate survival, 
struggling over land, providing soup kitchens, public services, minority rights, all of 
which have been attacked over the last decades (Archila & Pardo, 2001; 
Higginbottom, 2004). 
An attempt to unite these fragmented forces began in the late 1990's with 
the foundation of the Social and Political Front seeking to create a broad social 
democratic political opposition that united the `social' movements, trade unions, 
and `political' organisations of the left. In the 2002 elections a broader electoral 
front was created incorporating dissident liberals under the `Polo Democratico' 
(Democratic Pole), which despite optimistic predictions failed to provide a real 
challenge to Alvaro Uribe Velez. However, in the 2003 Municipal Elections, some 
important political gains were made, particularly in Bogota, the Colombian capital, 
where Lucho Garzon, ex-President of the CUT won the Mayoral elections. 
However, there remain significant tensions in holding together this broad alliance 
of forces. 
Despite these attempts, there remains a sharp polarization between the 
armed insurgency and the highly militarised agenda of the new Colombian 
government. Violence once again shapes and conditions the relationships taking 
place in Colombia. For those in the Social and Political Front, the memory of the 
experiences of the Patriotic Union is never far away. Despite the `supremacist' 
model outlined above, the role of constructing legitimacy through discourse should 
not be underestimated within the context of Colombia, or transnationally, as the 
Colombian government presents itself not as `terror state' but as the oldest 
democracy in Latin America and the legitimate face of the `parallel structure' of 
the Colombian state. 
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4.4.1 The Competing Discourses of Bottom Up and Top Down Civil Society: 
Within the discourse of `top down' civil society in Colombia there appear to 
be four key discursive strategies that operate both at home and abroad to justify 
and legitimate its actions in both the military and the social field. None of these 
discourses can be explained purely from a local perspective but must be 
understood as emanating from the interaction between the local and the global and 
continually emerging and adapting as they relate to changed circumstances and 
counter-discourses. The first strategy is the discourse related to the criminalisation 
of social protest which has strong roots in classic US counterinsurgency methods 
and seeks to blur the line between armed and unarmed oppositional groups an 
organisations. While armed struggle emerged as one route towards the resolution 
of the economic and social crisis, it has always been one option amongst many 
different forms of struggle that the Colombian popular movement has adopted. 
The battle of these non-armed organisations to separate their opposition to 
government policy from armed actors is one of the defining discursive 
contestations of the Colombian conflict. There are a range of competing 
discourses emanating from elite sources surrounding this that justify the repression 
of the non-armed popular movement by blurring the distinction between popular 
organisations and armed guerrilla movements in relation to the economic and 
social struggles taking place. Popular movements are, according to these voices, 
infiltrated by `subversive elements' or `puppets of the guerrilla'. Legitimate protest 
and collective organisation is thus undermined beneath the pretext of the `war on 
insurgency'. More recently it has been termed the `war on terror'. In Appendix 6 
(CIP, 2003) a list of comments made by senior Colombian officials in 2003 alleging 
a link between human rights defenders and the guerrilla demonstrates how this is 
discursively presented. 39. The second major discursive strategy is targeted at the 
guerrilla organisations themselves and seeks to `criminalise' and `de-politicise' their 
39 This treatment is extended to international NGOs. Referring to the director of Human Rights Watch 
Jose Miguel Vivanco, the National Prosecutor General, Luis Camilo Osorio, said in 2003 that "He has 
never been a friend of the truth nor of the internal conflict in Colombia.... some of the people who 
collaborate with the Director of this human rights NGO are ideologues of the Colombian guerrilla" (El 
Pais, 18/03/2003). In April 2003 Human Rights Watch wrote a letter to President Uribe highlighting the 
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objectives. In a range of ways guerrilla organisations are argued to be no longer 
fighting for the economic and social well being of the poor and marginalised but 
own particular economic interests. This argument, rooted in neoclassical economic 
conflict theory (Collier, 2000; 2000a; Collier et al, 2003), highlights how the 
Colombian guerrilla has lost its direction. In classic terminology, their actions have 
moved from `grievance' to `greed' (Collier, 2000)4°. This leads then to a policy 
which advocates a military solution to the conflict, seeking to cut off access to 
financial resources for these organisations, and disregard any connection between 
violent conflict, and social, cultural and economic inequality that exists in 
contemporary Colombia. The third discursive strategy relates to the way that the 
Colombian state obscures its links with Giraldo's (2003) `parallel state structures' 
and the paramilitaries. This discourse posits the state as caught between extremes - 
left and right. Drawing on aspects of the `weak state thesis' (Migdal, 1988) the 
discourse argued that the Colombian problematic is rooted in the failure/inability 
of the state to control the entire territory, and thus needs to be supported by the 
international community and strengthened through increased military aid. A 
stronger state is posited as a solution to the internal conflict41. The final and by far 
more common strategy posits neo-liberal reforms as both `necessary' and 
`inevitable'. It constructs a narrative of Colombia in crisis due to state industries 
becoming bloated and inefficient, hence the necessity for decentralization and 
fiscal constraint and the primacy of the efficiency of the private sector over the 
public sector in all domains. This draws heavily on the discourses of World Bank 
and IMF. Organised labour is represented as `privileged', `rigid' and the major 
cause of unemployment, while labour law reforms are advocated to allow increased 
flexibility, reductions in benefits as the solution to attract national and international 
investment (ENS, 2002a). A balance of these four discursive strategies can be 
found relating to most of the pressing issues that face the Colombian state in the 
present conjuncture. 
aggressive and misleading attitude of the Colombian states towards human rights defenders and refers 
directly to these personal attacks on the Director of Human Rights Watch (HRW, 2003). 
40 There is a great irony here in that the state appears to lament the loss of idealism and egalitarianism of 
the armed guerrilla. Suggesting that `prior to their loss of ideals' the state was somehow sympathetic. 
This respect is not borne out by well-documented counter-insurgency tactics since the 1960's. 
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Each of these strategies are contested by broad counter-hegemonic parallel 
discourses, though without the material access to a media industry dominated by 
four major groups. The overt and covert suggestion that social leaders and activists 
are engaged in `subversion' draws on international human rights discourses and the 
Colombian constitution to support the right to organise collectively, to peacefully 
oppose policies, and to develop alternative political parties and organisations. The 
role of human rights organisations have been crucial here in providing a legalistic 
language to articulate this discourse within internationally accepted norms, and 
thus counter the criminalisation of social protest. The delegitimisation of the 
guerrilla is countered by challenging the thesis that that the major conflict in 
Colombia is a military one. It argues that the roots of the Colombian problematic 
lie in a highly unequal social order, and an intransigent elite, allied to the US, that 
prefer recourse to violent repression rather than social reform. This discourse 
highlights the various attempts to adopt social reforms and construct democratic 
political alternatives in Colombia have resulted in violent opposition from an elite 
that refuses to address the unequal division of resources. In response to the `weak 
state' thesis, oppositional discourses argue that, rather than being caught between 
far left and far right, the state actually makes a conscious decision to deploy 
violence through covert means. In that sense it is not the problem of a weak state, 
but a strong `unchecked' state that selects repression as a means of control, and 
believes that it can get away with it. This discourse draws on locally produced 
research and research produced by the major international human rights 
organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch (c. f. 
Human Rights Watch, 1996; 2000; Nunca Mas, 2002) which link sections of the 
Colombian state to the dirty war. It also draws on the broader experiences of `state 
terror' that have plagued state social movement relations across Latin America 
since the 1960's. Finally, the discourse of the necessity and inevitability of neo- 
liberal reforms is countered by recourse to a series of discursive strategies which 
critique the idea of state services being inevitably inefficient, which challenge the 
interpretation of the present fiscal crisis by arguing that it emanates from elite 
41 For a powerful critique of weak state, failed state, and collapsed states, see Bilgin and Morton {2002). 
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corruption rather than state employee privileges and furthermore, that neo- 
liberalism represents the loss of sovereignty over national resources to foreign 
powers and MNCs, that is, a strategy of `re-colonisation'. Oppositional discourses 
thus construct themselves as the defender of the `nation' and its `resources' sold off 
by a corrupt and unpatriotic national elite in alliance with imperial power. 
4.5 Conclusion 
The past fifteen years have been momentous for Colombia, and shaped by 
powerful military, social and political forces. This wider framing is important for 
understanding the particular nature of the struggle of Sintraemcali in their 
opposition to privatisation. These conditions; a situation of generalised crisis; the 
violent nature of the Colombian state historically and its refusal to allow for 
alternative political forces to develop; the rise of a `parallel state' which executes 
this violence while simultaneously enabling the state to project itself as defender of 
the law and human rights, and the major tendencies of neo-liberal globalisation 
outlined in Chapter One - in particular the re-territorialisation and de- 
territorialisation of power and control and the growing casualisation of labour - all 
play a key defining role in shaping the parameters under which the struggle against 
privatisation in Cali emerged and developed. In the rest of the thesis I will highlight 
how these factors interacted with the strategic development of the trade union's 
opposition to privatisation producing unintended and unexpected outcomes. 
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The chosen model of organization, and its evolution over time, are the product 
of complex processes of adaptation to the environment, attempts to change it, 
conscious strategic choices and acceptance of tradition. In general, the 
models of organization adopted by social movements are continually 




This chapter seeks to understand Sintraemcali's renewal as a trade union 
organisation through understanding the strategic pedagogy that developed in the 
organisation. This pedagogical action produced a developing `social movement 
frame', a new organisational `ideology' and `culture' stemming from the cross 
fertilisation and interaction of four key processes: firstly, the strategy of developing 
a material critique of the management of public utilities in Emcali; secondly, the 
construction of a trade union/community alliance that linked Emcali workers and 
local consumers, particularly those in the poorest areas of the city, in opposition to 
privatisation; thirdly, a commitment to militant mobilisation strategies that centred 
on direct actions and occupations of prominent buildings and work plants and 
fourthly, a human rights strategy which provided both mechanisms for the defence 
of fundamental rights and a political strategy and discourse to unite Sintraemcali 
with broader sections of the local, national and international community in 
opposition to both privatisation and the `parallel' Colombian state and its practice 
of covert terror. Collectively, these four strategies served to breathe new life into 
the organisation and produce a dynamic social movement able to challenge the 
top-down strategy of the Colombian state and its transnational allies. 
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This multi-dimensional and multi-scalar strategy created what in the broader 
social movement literature they call `a social movement frame'. This frame implies 
a clear understanding of where the trade union comes from, where it is going, and 
how it intends to get there (Johnston, 2000). 1 will demonstrate how these 
processes broadly operated along the twin trajectories of transborderisation and 
horizontalisation that I discussed in Chapter Two while at the same time being 
firmly rooted in the particular temporal, economic, geographical, cultural and 
political environment of contemporary Colombia. In Chapter Six I will show how 
this process of Sintraemcali's transformation crystallised in the particular episode 
of the CAM Tower Occupation, and how the different strategies came together to 
produce a powerful and `emergent' movement in opposition to the Colombian 
government's attempt to privatise Emcali. 
Prior to exploring these strategic developments I want to begin with a brief 
introduction to the history of Sintraemcali and to an examination of the initial 
roots of Sintraemcali's transformation in the early 1990's. This can be understood 
as emerging from the internal tensions of the trade union organisation as it 
confronted the new public service policy environment emanating from the 
changed 1991 Constitution and the neo-liberal economic `apertura' (opening). 
5.2 The Emergence of Trade Union Renewal 
Sintraemcali, as a public service union representing affiliates in Emcali, 
stretches back to the foundation of public utility provision in Cali in 1937 
(Sintraemcali, 1997). The trade union represents Emcali workers in the 
telecommunications, electricity, water and sewage sections of the company and 
currently has just over 3000 members representing 95% of non-management 
employees (Sintraemcali, 2004). The union delineates four clear periods in its 
history. The first begins with its foundation and ends in 1948. This period involves 
contestation surrounding the right of trade union recognition and early attempts to 
represent the interests of its affiliates and to work toward improving both salaries 
and working conditions. The second period, from 1948 until 1968, saw the 
development of trade union strategies of participation within Emcali in committees 
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of selection and promotion of employees and also increased involvement in the 
financial situation of the company. During this period, a `social welfare fund' was 
created aimed at providing a safety net for workers and their families suffering 
unexpected economic or medical hardship. During the period between 1968 to 
1991 Sintraemcali continued its previous trajectory. However, during this period 
the trade union broke away from the CTC (Central de Trabajadores Colombianos), 
one of the major national labour federations which it had previously been affiliated 
to. After a long period operating independently of any national federation it joined 
the newly formed CUT (Central Unitario de Trabajadores) in 1986 to which it 
continues to remain affiliated. The CUT emerged in response to increasing 
demands amongst the organised working class for a labour federation independent 
of the traditional Liberal and Conservative parties. The fourth period began in 
1991, and is clearly marked by the onset of neo-liberalism and the necessity to 
reorient strategy as Emcali came under threat of privatisation (Sintraemcali, 1997). 
The impulse to begin a process of transformation within Sintraemcali in the 
early 1990's resulted from recognition that the way the union had operated up to 
then was no longer appropriate or sufficient for the successful defence of public 
services in the city (Interview with Alexander Lopez, 2002). This change needs to 
be understood with reference to the breakdown of a prior social contract (albeit 
contested and unstable) that existed between labour and capital, state and society in 
Colombia, and the entry of the new model of neo-liberal development (see 
Chapter Four). The entry of neo-liberalism into the policy agenda radically altered 
the patterns of relationships that had developed during the previous decades, and 
old methods of trade union negotiation appeared increasingly ineffective 
(Interview with Luis Hernandez, 2002). Carlos Gonzalez, one of the leaders of the 
University Workers Union (Sintraunicol) and one of the chief spokespeople for 
Sintraemcali during the CAM Tower occupation explained the nature of the 





Before we used to present our demands and a process of negotiation would take place. Then there came a point in the 1990's when the answer would always be the same, there is not enough money. That forced us to ask the question of where then is the money? How is the University run? ... and we began a process of investigation to find out (Interview with Carlos Gonzalez, 2002, p. 4). 
For Sintraemcali, the constitutional changes removed the obligation of the 
Colombian state from being the `sole provider' of public services to that of being 
regulator42 (Interview with Nelson Sanchez, 2002), and also shifted ownership to 
the municipality through a process of decentralisation advocated by the World 
Bank (ibid). This paved the way for legislation to facilitate the privatisation of 
public utilities, enacted in Law 142 of 1994, and 143 of 1994 (the latter specifically 
for electricity), and for a reduction of resources emanating from central 
government as part of fiscal austerity measures. Alexander Lopez expresses the 
effect of these constitutional and legislative changes on Sintraemcali: 
At the time I was working in the public sector. In 1994, law 142 was passed, 
allowing the state to sell its enterprises. Until that point, the union I was part of 
was just a calm, normal union working on normal grievances (my emphasis). I 
was studying law at the time as well, and I got to studying law 142.1 realized 
that the law was against the interests not only of the union, but of the users of 
these public services as well (En Camino, 2003). 
The move from being a `normal union' focusing on `normal grievances' 
towards `something else' reflects the embryonic shift from corporate unionism to 
social movement unionism, a process that would see the trade union moving from 
a position of being largely concerned with defending the economic needs of the 
workforce to becoming a citizenship movement struggling for the interests of the 
broader Cali community. It also reflects the union's self-understanding that it was 
`external' changes that provided the catalyst for the union's changing direction. 
During the previous economic model when the trade union was accorded a clear 
role in negotiation for its members and the future stability of the corporation 
42 Article 365. Public services are inherent to the social purpose of the state. It is the duty of the state to 
ensure their efficient provision to all the inhabitants of the national territory. Public services will be 
subject to the juridical regime determined by the law, may be provided by the state directly or indirectly, 
by organized communities, or by individuals. In any case, the state is responsible for the regulation, 
control, and application of such services. If for reasons of sovereignty or social interest, the state, by 
means of a law approved by the majority of the members of both chambers upon the initiative of the 
government, should decide to assign to itself specific strategic or public service activities, it must first 
indemnify fully those individuals who by virtue of the said law are deprived of the exercise of a lawful 
activity. (author's emphasis) 1991 Colombian Constitution, Chapter 5, Article 365. Available online at 
htt2: //confinder, richinond. ed«Icolumb. ia const2. html#tit12ch5 
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appeared secure, it had little reason to probe deeply into the management of the 
company and had a clear focus on members' salaries and conditions. With the new 
discourse and practices of neo-liberalism, both financial and long-term 
employment security were thrown into doubt. One unintended consequence of the 
new neo-liberal policy environment was that Sintraemcali, in order to justify its 
members salaries and secure the longevity of the company, would begin a process 
of analysis of the company that would have a range of unintended consequences 
for both the Colombian state and Emcali management as the trade union delved 
deeply into management issues. 
Neo-liberal discourse emanating from the local municipality, the state and 
upper management responded to Sintraemcali's opposition to privatisation with a 
now familiar response: that public services were inefficient, that the company was 
in debt, that it was financially unviable, and that in order to expand and improve it 
needed extra financial resources and technology which necessitated privatisation 
(Interview with Nelson Sanchez, 2002, p. 9). However, these same arguments in 
many parts of the world have often led, not to a shift in union culture towards a 
more belligerent `social movement unionism' but, to `business unionism' (Moody, 
1997). Business unionism accommodates itself to the new imperatives of neo- 
liberalism through a process of accepting the erosion of members' rights and 
conditions. This may well have been the course of events for Sintraemcali 
had it 
not been for a radical change in leadership that occurred in the second 
half of the 
1990's which enabled process of strategic transformation within the trade union. 
5.2.1 The Rank and File Committee 
The new leadership emerged from a `comite 
de base' (rank and file 
committee) that was born in the Sewerage Plant of the company. 
Alexander Lopez, 
who led the union's transformation, entered the company 
in 1984, but his active 
involvement began after the 1991 constitutional changes: 
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"In those early days there were union elections and I had the opportunity to listen to several leaders who talked about everything apart from the situation 
of the country, apart from the deplorable working conditions in this area, and 
one day I took the decision to question these comrades from the union leadership that were giving information, and at the same time ask the workers 
who were gathered there (a group of 200 workers), and I had the opportunity 
to discuss directly with these workers" (Interview with Alexander Lopez, 2002, 
p. 5). 
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The initial challenge to the trade union leadership was related to the 
deplorable working conditions in the Sewerage Plant: lack of disinfectants, 
protective clothing, and hygiene facilities. As these workers began to organise and 
mobilise, these conditions improved, and as a result a group of around 250 
workers began to develop a political direction within the union itself meeting twice 
a week in the plant (Interview with Luis Hernandez, 2002, p. 13). From the early 
improvements in material conditions the group began to campaign for a seat in the 
`junta directiva' (Executive Committee (EC)) of Sintraemcali. Despite working in a 
large plant they had not had a representative for 14 years in the union's leadership. 
After an internal election in the plant, Alexander Lopez was chosen as the 
candidate and eventually entered the union's Executive Committee (EC) in 1994. 
Inside the union's leadership there was deep suspicion concerning the 
intentions of this group, and Alexander Lopez was immediately marginalised. The 
union leadership refused to agree his application for `permiso sindical' which 
allowed members of the EC to work full time for the union (whilst receiving their 
company salary), and instead called for him to continue working in the sewerage 
plant without any specific leadership position. The vote was 9 against 1, but 
Alexander Lopez returned to his work-plant and after a meeting with the workers 
they decided to occupy the union headquarters, a tactic that would later become 
the trademark of the union's new mobilisation tactics. After an occupation of three 
hours, the EC succumbed to the demands of the group and Alexander Lopez was 
allowed to have full time `permiso sindical' and assume the position of Treasurer 
(Interview with Alexander Lopez, 2002, pp. 5-8). 
The position of Treasurer enabled him to investigate the finances of the 
union and it was during this period he discovered irregularities 
in the handling of 
money by some of the union leadership. He denounced these 
irregularities at the 
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Workers Assemblies and became a `stone in the shoe' (Interview with Alexander 
Lopez, 2002, p. 9) for the union leadership, whilst simultaneously gaining credibility 
amongst the workers, and strengthening his position within the union. " From 
modest beginnings the `Comite de Base', under the leadership of Alexander Lopez 
began to develop in other directions and lay the foundations for the later 
development of a comprehensive `material critique' of the company - to provide 
an answer to the `common sense' of privatisation, a community alliance to 
strengthen opposition beyond the workforce, a mobilization strategy - to 
physically challenge any moves towards privatisation, and a human rights strategy - 
to respond to the attacks on the union membership by covert and overt military 
and paramilitary forces. This was a dialectical process moving from strategic 
analysis, strategic action, intended and unintended consequences of action that led 
to further transformations. Rather than a clear blueprint it can be seen as a set of 
emerging ethics and tactics revolving around the necessity to unite workers and 
community in the defence of public services and a conviction that success could 
only be achieved through struggle (Interview with Luis Hernandez, 2002). 
From the beginning, the newly emerging leadership recognised the need to 
build alliances and develop a clear educational direction that could raise both 
political consciousness and inform strategic development. Sintraemcali alongside 
other national and regional unions set up the `National Coordination for Public 
Services' (El Coordinador Nacional De Servicios Püblicos) in 1994. In 1995 the 
group occupied the Spanish Embassy in Bogota. This event ended with a signed 
12-point agreement between the trade unions and the then President of Colombia, 
Ernesto Samper, to halt the privatisation processes - an agreement that was never 
implemented. During this period a clear consensus within the national trade union 
movement was emerging on what was at stake in the processes of privatisation, 
focused particularly on questions of national sovereignty and citizenship rights: 
43 The role of both union leaders and workers in corrupt practices would necessitate a transformation of 
the culture and attitude of the workers towards the company in the new environment. A sense of civic 
pride and responsibility had to be brought into the attitude of the workers. This will be addressed later in 
the chapter. 
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'We were clear that behind a privatisation, behind the sale of a public service, 
in the case of water, or electricity we were handing over national territory and 
if we look at the scenario of telecommunications and electricity we were 
handing over the aerial space, the electromagnetic spectre and all our 
resources in these areas, and when we refer to water companies we are 
handing over a source of natural resources represented in the rich virgin 
forests that we have in our country" (Interview with Alexander Lopez, 2002, 
p. 8). 
150 
Here we can note a recognition of the way neo-liberalism `locks' in national 
development trajectories to the necessities of the global economy (Robinson, 2003; 
2004). In Cali, the union developed a range of activities against the planned 
privatisation of Emcali by the then Mayor Mauricio Guzman, which included in 
1996 a 6-day occupation of the workplants which failed (according to Alexander 
Lopez due to a lack of leadership), resulting in over 600 workers being suspended 
from work for 60 days. The union itself was also heavily fined. This defeat 
represented a bitter blow, paving the way for the continuing plans for privatisation 
of the company (Interview with Alexander Lopez, 2002). That defeat led 
Alexander Lopez to work towards deepening the internal educational processes 
taking place in the union and to direct the union to begin to take more seriously 
questions of strategy development: 
'We began a process that went beyond the national alliance, and started 
travelling from work plant to work plant, and brought some comrades from 
other unions at the national level to share their experiences with the Emcali 
workers. Each one would come and stay for a couple of weeks, even up to a 
month, and in that way we began regular work in each of the plants, in each of 
the work places to chat and discuss the real situation of the company. We 
also developed at that time a very important trade union education course with 
the teacher Eduardo Umana Mendoza44 and with members of USO (Petrol 
Workers Union), ETB (Bogota Telecommunication Workers Union), 
Sintramunicipio Jumbo (Municipal Workers Union of Jumbo), and comrades 
from other unions who came and gave talks and seminars to the workers. In 
this way we began to develop a core of workers, which today we call the 
`base 
fuerte' (strong base) and the `base consciente' (conscious base) of workers in 
the union whom continue to sustain the union's activities" (Interview with 
Alexander Lopez, 2002, p. 7). 
What can be observed here is the emergence of a process of collective 
analysis of what was taking place inside the country, enriched 
by national input 
(and its most militant sections), and how that was likely to affect 
Emcali as a public 
utilities company. As the realisation that privatisation was 
imminent began to 
44 An eminent Colombian lawyer and activist who was assassinated 




dawn on many workers, a growing base of support inside the union developed for 
a radical shift in direction. As a consequence Alexander Lopez gained increasing 
power. In 1996 two other close allies from the sewerage plant, Luis Hernandez and 
Robinson Masso, were elected to the EC. From that stage onwards, the union 
began to take on more fully the form of a `social movement union'. As Johnston 
notes: 
When labor surfaces as a social movement... it typically produces and in turn 
depends for its development on a very specific type of labor organization: 
labor as a social movement organization. Social movement organizations 
broadcast agendas for social change and mobilize, support and deploy 
networks of membership and collective action in support of those agendas 
(Johnston, 2000, p. 144). 
Despite the increasing influence of the `comite de base' within Sintraemcali, 
there remained tensions between different sections of the trade union and workers. 
Traditionally the Liberal Party and the chentelist politics that dominated the 
country (see Section 4.4) had influenced much of the union leadership. Linked to 
this was conflict over the strategy to `defend' Emcali as a public service company 
and fears that Alexander Lopez was bringing `anarchist' tendencies to the union 
through his commitment to militant direct actions (Interview with Alexander 
Lopez, 2002, p. 4). The battle for hegemony within the union leadership continued 
up until 1998, but from the early days in 1995 Alexander Lopez had become 
increasingly influential amongst a significant section of the workforce that were 
committed to a new strategy of militant defence of Emcali (Interview with Luis 
Hernandez, 2002, p. 8). 
Central to this development was the willingness on the part of the new 
union leadership to open itself up to alternative ideas, embrace new people with 
different expertise, and to make a long-term commitment to changing the union's 
strategy so as to adapt to the new neo-liberal environment. Internally within the 
union there had already emerged a collective understanding of the notion of public 
services being a question of national sovereignty, but what was lacking was a 
negative critique of neo-liberal arguments on the inefficiency of public services, 
and a positive critique of how public services within Emcali could become more 
efficient. The pursuit of the answers to these two questions eventually led to the 
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development of the Plan PARE; an action research project whereby workers 
developed a critical analysis of the history and functioning of the company and 
then experimented on methods to improve the administration, production and 
delivery of public utilities with the objective of constructing an `alternative Emcali'. 
An alternative based on the defence of public services and natural resources as a 
question of national sovereignty, and of the `social role' of public services within 
society (Sintraemcali, 2000). 
5.3 Plan PARE: Economic Strategy for the future of Emcali 
The application and execution of the Plan PARE that emerged was another 
tool of struggle, and as part of a workers strategy that was not only about 
fighting, not only about mobilising, but also located in the ideological terrain 
and in the technical terrain where we demonstrated that we are capable of 
managing a company.... what we developed was the fundamental basis with 
which to go out and defend Emcali as a `social company' and as the 
patrimony of the Colombian people (Interview with Alexander Lopez, 2002, 
p. 11). 
The development of the Plan PARE can be divided into three overlapping 
stages. The first period dated from around 1995 to 1999 focussed on the 
investigation of corruption inside the company and its relationship to local, 
national and international political and economic elites. This emerged directly as a 
result of the trade union's need to refute the local and national government's 
assertions that Emcali, as a state owned public service provider, was economically 
unviable. The second stage, from early 1999 to May 2001, saw the shift from a 
negative critique of the company's present and past management strategies towards 
the positive development of an alternative management plan based on making 
Emcali a viable economic unit rooted in the interests of the community. The third 
stage, lasting from May 2001 to December 2001, represented the implementation 
phase of the development plan that was interrupted by the dismissal of the 
Managing Director of Emcali and which led to the 36-day occupation that will be 
explored in Chapter Six. 
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5.3.1 Stage One: Critiquing Corruption 
- 1995-1999 
The process of investigating corruption in Emcali was administered by Luis 
Hernandez and Robinson Masso. Worker teams were set up in all the different 
workplants to monitor management activities, gather documents and analyse the 
evidence drawing on Sintraemcali's financial and legal advisers to assist (Interview 
with Luis Hernandez, 2002, p. 5). During this process it was discovered that 
between 1996 and 2000 Emcali's debt had increased from 36 thousand million 
pesos to 500 thousand million pesos (that is from approximately $18 million to 
$250 million US dollars45), and that much of this money had gone on several large 
infrastructural projects as joint ventures between Emcali, local private corporations 
and foreign MNCs (Sintraemcali, 2000; Revista Valle 2000, (2003)). 
One investigative journalist, now forced into hiding and demanding security 
protection from the Colombian state46 for his part in uncovering corruption in the 
company, poses the question well: 
the technical bankruptcy of the Municipal Enterprises of Cali has been the 
hardest blow to the conscience of Cali citizens who cannot comprehend the 
corruption, administrative chaos, the mediocrity, and the `politicking' that has 
finished a company that only 15 years ago was the second biggest public 
service provider in Colombia, and one of the 50 biggest of any nature in the 
country" (Revista Valle 2000, (2003, p. 1)). 
The biggest incidences of corruption occurred between the years 1993 and 
1999 in the construction of a Thermo-Electrical Plant (Termoemcali) and a Water 
Treatment Plant (PTAR). Both of these cases of corruption involved millions of 
dollars `disappearing' in bogus contracts, unnecessary consultancies and 
overspends on estimates. The PTAR plant, initially estimated at US $75 million, 
eventually cost US$175 million (Interview with Nelson Sanchez, 2002). Of this 
total it is estimated that at least $15 million dollars was siphoned off in corrupt 
practices (Revista Valle 2000, (2003, p. 2)). The Termoemcali plant not only had a 
45 Exchange rate for US dollars has fluctuated greatly between 1996 to 2004 due to a series of 
devaluations. Colombian pesos per US dollar - 2,564 (September 2004) 2,241.43 (January 2001), 
2087.90 (2000), 1,756.23 (1999), 1,426.04 (1998), 1,140.96 (1997), 1,036.69 (1996). Despite the 
fluctuation in the rest of the statistics presented I will provide the 2000 US dollar conversion rate for 
convenience. 
46 For a list (in Spanish) of the threats against the magazine, its journalists, and salespeople see 
http"/ `va11e2000 tripod. com. coiatagues. htm 
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US$50 million overspend but also included a PPA (Protected Price Agreement) 
that obliges Emcali to buy a certain volume of electricity each month at 111 pesos 
per kilowatt. On the open market, electricity currently costs 40 pesos per kilowatt. 
This contract, which lasts for a further 15 years, costs Emcali $4.5 million dollars 
per month for the same volume of electricity that would cost just over US$3 
million on the open market. As the Revista Valle 2000 notes, the two plants: 
.. are true monuments to negligence and corruption... which need to be denounced... but which no means of communication in Cali nor in Colombia has published, perhaps because in this tragedy the owners of these means of 
mass communications are implicated, whom through their financial 
enterprises and political machinery have participated in feasting on the 
resources of Emcali (Revista Valle 2000, (2003, p. 2)). 
There are clear reasons why many incidents of corruption in Emcali 
remained in impunity, not least of which is the intricate web of political 
involvement in the corruption on the part of both the Liberal and Conservative 
Parties and the elite families that sustain them. The Lloreda family is one such well- 
connected politico-economic group who has benefited from the widespread 
corruption taking place. The reference to the `means of communication' in the 
quotation above (Revista Valle 2000, (2003)) points towards this family who are one 
of the biggest landowners in the Valle de Cauca Region and own the El Pais 
newspaper - the biggest daily in the region. In 1998, Ricardo Cobo, who married 
into the Lloreda family, was the Conservative mayor of Cali who presided over 
some of the worst corruption. The family is deeply implicated in the corruption in 
Emcali between 1993-1999 but high level political protection has meant that this 
remains in impunity. During the Pastrana government, Francisco Lloreda -a 
prominent member of the family, was the Minister of Education (Interview with 
Alberto Bejarano, 2002, p. 8). It was only at the end of their candidates rule in the 
local council at the end of the 1990's that this stranglehold was ended, although 
"by then it was too late, for they had already compromised the entire future of the 
company" (Kevista Valle 2000, (2003, p. 3)). 
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While the specifics of all the cases of corruption that had gone on during 
that period are beyond the scope of this work' several points are key to 
understanding corruption inside Emcali. Firstly, as both the financial adviser of 
Sintraemcali and the Revista Valle 2000 (2003) magazine notes, the main engine of 
corruption was the political machinery firstly of the Liberal Party and later the 
Conservative Party that had control of the local council and used the resources of 
the company as their `Caja Menor' (second bank account) (Interview with Nelson 
Sanchez, 2002, p. 18). According to Edwards (2003, p. 38) while the Liberal Party 
engaged in widespread `pilfering' during the early 1990's, when the Conservative 
took power of the local municipality between 1993 and 1998 this turned to 
`plunder'. Using their political power they were able to appoint managers and 
administrators to Emcali who served their interests and furnished their political 
masters with funds (Interview with Nelson Sanchez, 2002; Revista Valle 2000, 
(2003)). In relation to this, it is important to appreciate the danger that Sintraemcali 
and its affiliates were facing when they began to reveal the magnitude of this 
corruption and the people involved. Secondly, it was the commissions paid by 
private contractors, of up to 15% of the total cost, to directors and managers of 
the company which was the principal mechanism of corruption and which made 
managerial work in Emcali a highly attractive proposition48. Thirdly, 
`democratisation' in the form of decentralisation processes advocated by the World 
Bank and the IMF further fuelled this corruption by devolving central power to 
local municipal authorities (RevistaValle 2000, (2003, p. 4)) allowing local 
47 Research on the issue of corruption in Emcali was gathered from a series of interviews carried out with 
the anti-corruption team in Sintraemcali. They also kindly allowed me access to a series of documents 
and newspaper articles. The assertions are now well known in Cali and confirmed by a range of different 
sources. For Spanish speakers a more complete investigative analysis can be found at 
http: //rvalle2000. tripod. com. co/denun. cia giebraemcali2, htm. For English readers interested in research 
on corruption and the crimes of the powerful in Colombia see Higginbottom, (2004a). 
48 The most well known scandal occurred in 1982 when Eriksson was given a $16 million dollar contract 
to install 65,000 new telephone lines in the city. A local politician challenged the decision on several 
counts, including that $5 million dollars was not accounted for in the budget, and that the British 
company PLESSEY had a similar offer but that the British government was prepared to underwrite 25% 
of the cost. In 1983 it was discovered that Adolfo Vargas Jimenez and Humberto Chavez Navia, top civil 
servants in the Ministry of Communications had received payments of $153,000 dollars each into their 
private accounts from Ericksson. Furthermore, it was discovered that many more members of the 
Emcali management were spending time in Sweden, "living like kings' at the expense of Eriksson. The 
British government filed a formal complaint, but noone was prosecuted. The final cost of the contract is 
estimated at over $30 million, almost double the initial contract! (see full story on 
http: //rvalle2000. tripod. com. co/denuncia giebraemcali3. htm) 
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government and the controlling elite even more autonomy and protection from 
investigation then they had before. 
What is clear in the developing analysis of the situation in Emcali is that 
corruption both pre-dated and continued during the neo-liberal period. While this 
reflects continuity between the two models of development - state led and neo- 
liberal - privatisation and liberalisation provided new avenues and profitable 
directions for increasing these corrupt practices. In each period, local and national 
elites were well positioned to take advantage of the surrounding environment to 
further their own particular interests. The financial adviser and leader of the Plan 
PARE process Nelson Sanchez laments this nefarious role of the Colombian elite: 
This is the tragedy of our patrimony.... who were administering Emcali? The 
politicians, the families, political barons of the Valle de Cauca Region: the 
Lloredas, the Holguines, the Carvajal's, the Sinisterra's (Interview with Nelson 
Sanchez, 2002). 
What is crucial to understand in the process of uncovering corruption in 
Emcali is that it served as a powerful counter-critique for arguments by the World 
Bank/IMF and Colombian elite that `national industries' were necessarily 
inefficient. The union had evidence and presented legal charges alleging that up to 
1 billion pesos was siphoned off (US$400 million) in corrupt practices during the 
1990's (Desde Abajo, 2003). The argument that emerged from these investigations 
was that corrupt officials linked to foreign multinational private interests had 
driven the company towards bankruptcy, not worker inefficiency, and that more 
transparency and worker control could remedy the situation49. The union 
highlighted that total salary costs, including pensions, represented only 28% of the 
total income of the company, while the debt accrued through corrupt practices 
amounted to 70% of income. It was those in charge of the company during this 
period of bad administration, and therefore responsible for the crisis, that were 
pushing through plans to privatise the company and hide their practices once and 
for all (Desde Abajo, 2003) 
49 The major multinational corporations involved in the PTAR and Termo-Emcali were Bechtel, 
Mitsubishi Suido, Tokyo Engineering, Degremont, and the Japanese government backed development 
bank JBIC (Sintraemcali, 2000a). 
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What this research and investigation highlighted was that the problems of Emca/i did not stem for the salaries of the workers, nor that the business was 
unviable, but that the finances of Emcali had been put at risk by local political 
clientelism linked to multinational corporations" (Interview with Nelson Sanchez, 2002, p. 6). 
Beyond the political critique, the process of investigating and denouncing 
corruption also served as a key mechanism through which consciousness was 
raised amongst the workforce and the community, and a moral and ethical 
justification for the anti-privatisation position was developed {Interview with Luis 
Hernandez, 2002, p. 16). This process began to broaden the critique, moving it 
away from merely corruption towards an understanding of the financial situation. 
This in turn led to the beginning of an analysis of the "aggressive factors facing the 
company" (Interview with Nelson Sanchez, 2002, p. 7). These `aggressive factors' 
were the debts from the PTAR and Termoemcali plants, the lack of provision for 
pension payments, and the lack of operational savings. This resulted in a second 
stage of the `action research project' - the construction of the Plan PARE, a 
detailed alternative company development plan for Emcali. This second stage 
represented a shift to the development of a positive critique of how the company 
could be efficiently managed to the transformation of the culture and attitude of 
the workers towards their company. 
5.3.2 Stage Two: Developing an alternative - 1999 to 2000 
In early 1999, an advisory team made up of lawyers, financial analysts, 
business administrators, and experts in public service utility provision was set up by 
Sintraemcali. This group worked alongside professionals and managers inside the 
company who were supportive of the union's opposition to privatisation. This 
group of around 50 people from the water treatment, sewerage, 
telecommunications, energy and corporate clients sections of the company worked 
alongside the advisory team to develop alternative management practices. 
The 
combination of workers, technicians, engineers and financial advisers, assured that 
the trade union would integrate within its `social discourse' a component of 
business management. As Nelson Sanchez notes, "the business component was 
located within an understanding that the company was a public good of the 
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citizens of Cali which should serve them" (Interview with Nelson Sanchez, 2002, 
p. 6). The Plan PARE team in turn worked in direct coordination with the `anti- 
corruption commission'. It was a multi-disciplinary organisation, an external team 
coordinated with each one of the management teams from the different sections, 
and with them began to develop positions for the recuperation of the company" 
In August 1999 Sintraemcali called a weekend meeting for those workers, 
technicians and professionals who wanted to join the union in its plan for the 
salvation of Emcali. Around 120 people attended. This meeting, Nelson Sanchez 
suggests, represented the beginning of the shift from a negative to a positive 
critique of the company, and an important milestone in the union's development: 
We began with a presentation by the advisory team on the changing reality of 
the situation in the country for public services in a globalised world. This was 
crucial because the workers had to understand `gain consciousnesses' about 
the impact of neo-liberal policies in Latin America and in Europe. This was 
firmly located in the changed constitution of 1991 which despite having some 
democratic gains, altered the hegemony of public services as controlled solely 
by the state - as a social function of the state, and represented a break from 
Keynesian state intervention (Interview with Nelson Sanchez, 2002, p. 2). 
The new constitution "displaced the state as the strategic agent into a 
regulator of private operators, which we knew would be multinationals", thus 
bringing "the voracious appetite of the multinationals into the area which was 
previously the social responsibility of the state to guarantee basic health: drinking 
water, sewerage treatment, management of the environment, the electromagnetic 
space. All of them for us were themes of national sovereignty" (ibid, p. 3). 
The 
rationale for all the reforms was `efficiency' and `productivity'. 
Central to the process of investigation was recognition of the `re- 
territorialisation' of power taking place throughout Latin America as major MNC's 
began to buy up public utilities and link them together through regional 
distribution grids (Sintraemcali, 2000a). For the leadership of the union, the 
implications were clear. The future struggle for the defence of 
Emcali as a state 
owned company was "not a trade union theme, 
despite the obvious support from 
50 Sanchez notes the it was crucial for the advisory team to remain 
independent. They needed the ability 
to be able to criticize not only the management, 
but also the trade union and its way of operating. It could 
not become a mere adjunct to the union nor 
its cheerleaders but a critical think tank that could generate 
alternatives (Interview with 
Sanchez, 2002, p. 9). 
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the strength of the union movement, but eminently social and political" that 
threatened the national sovereignty and future development and well-being of the 
community (Interview with Nelson Sanchez, 2002, p. 3). The discussions in that 
weekend meeting provided the catalyst for the plans that were later drawn up. It 
was a meeting of sharing knowledge, of marketing, engineering, economics, 
finance, and designing the ideal company, the company that the participants 
aspired to (Interview with Alexander Lopez, 2002, p. 18). Developed from the 
classic business form of analysis, Emcali was assessed according to its strengths, 
weaknesses and threats, and the company was conceptualised as a `business' with a 
social function. This weekend provided the ingredients for a reframing of the 
problem of Emcali away from a conflict between Sintraemcali and the state, 
towards a conflict between Cali citizens and the state. For that reason it could not 
remain within the domain of the trade union and the process had to be extended 
out to the local community (Interview with Luis Hernandez, 2002, p. 9). 
The problem prior to this was that the union was accused of merely 
defending its own interests, fighting for the `particular' rights and benefits of its 
members. However, with a shift in discourse and focus, the union could not be so 
easily attacked by the government and media for defending the `private' interests of 
its members as it turned its focus on the social and political issues facing the city 
produced by the economic model being imposed from without. "This allowed us 
to make a qualitative leap forward in the populist vision of the trade union 
leadership" (Interview with Nelson Sanchez, 2002, p. 5). 
In the five months between August and December 1999 the group of 
workers and advisers developed an alternative analysis of the situation of the 
company. This was crucial because there were already diagnostic documents 
available following work carried out by Arthur Anderson and other consultancy 
corporations. These documents, based on `market logic', advocated privatisation as 
the solution. These clashed fundamentally with the union's analysis 
based on 
`social' and `patriotic' needs (Interview with Nelson Sanchez, 2002, p. 
6). Emerging 
out of the process was a clearer understanding of the 
financial viability of the 
company and the underlying reasons why the company was attracting the attention 
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of a range of MNCs engaged in water, electricity and telecommunications 
management. 
Emcali, it was noted, was attracting far more attention from a range of 
MNC's, then similar entities in Bogota and Medellin. The reason for this lay both 
in the unique geo-strategic position of the company, located as it is as the company 
closest to the Pacific Costal port that provides for the exportation of 80% of all 
Colombian production and 90% of all imports, and also in the resource and 
institutional capacity of the company. Emcali provided water, electricity, and 
telecommunications to nearly two million users, and had both the resources and 
technical capacity to expand this production (Sintraemcali, 2003). 51 For the MNCs 
control of Emcali would allow them to link this rich technological platform with 
others running across Latin America. The task of the Plan PARE team was, 
therefore, to develop a business plan for the company that allowed it to run 
efficiently and socially. Emerging out of this analysis was a plan that would cut 
wastage in the company via new work practices, reduce upper level management 
by giving workers increasing control over production, and renegotiate the external 
debt which was crippling the operational viability of the company. Crucially, the 
Plan, while having a clear social vision was also firmly rooted in the actual 
economic reality facing the company. In that sense it was by no means `utopian'; 
rather, it was firmly located in the realms of the possible while pointing towards an 
alternative future where workers would take increasing control of production. 
The plan was presented in 1999 as a solution to the crisis faced by Emcali. 
However, it was not accepted by Emcali management, by the local Municipality, or 
by the Superintendent of Public Services. From that point onward the union began 
to confront the local mayor, Ricardo Cobo and the Superintendent of Public 
51 According to a recent report (Sintraemcali, 2003) it has 30 telephone offices, 527 kms of fibre optic 
lines, 787 thousand external connections, and 605 thousand internal, and 80 thousand in reserve with a 
telephone density of one per 5 inhabitants. In basic health, it has over 3000 hectares of water basin in the 
rivers Cauca, Cali, Melendez, Pichinde, Pance, Canaveralejo and Lili, which represent the ecological and 
cultural patrimony of the Municipality of Cali. There are four processing plants capable of producing 12 
cubic metres per second, of which only 60% of the capacity is necessary at present; 2600 kms of water 
pipes, 2400 of sewerage pipes, and two water treatment plants. In electrical infrastructure it has a 
capacity of producing 228 Mega Watts, 18 Energy substations covering an area of 1879 kilometres. In 
coverage Emcali provides 96% of the population with water, 96.4% in sewerage and 95% in energy. 
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Services, linking up with other unions to provide a broader critique of the 
economic model that was being applied. Three crucial factors intervened during 
2000 to change the political situation in favour of the union's proposals. The first 
occurred in May 2000 when the Colombian government, due to the financial crisis 
in Emcali, temporarily took control of the company. This process was managed by 
the Superintendent of Public Services, though Sintraemcali challenged this ruling, 
forcefully claiming that the Superintendent himself was corrupt and therefore 
incapable of saving the company (Interview with Alexander Lopez, 2002, p. 14). 
The second related development was the revelation of corruption at the highest 
levels of national government relating to private sector involvement in public 
service provision, vindicating Sintraemcali's allegations. In tandem with Sithe 
Energies, a US MNC, a web of false contracts, bribes and corruption was 
discovered centring on a proposed Thermo-Electric Power Plant - Thermo Rio 
which began in 1997. These detailed revelations led to the imprisonment of the 
Superintendent for Public Services, Enrique Ramirez Yanez, and a range of high 
level resignations. The scandal was made more difficult for the Colombian 
government by virtue of the fact that the disgraced minister was a close personal 
friend of the President of Colombia Andres Pastrana (Bosshard, 2002; Bocagrande; 
2002, Molinski; 2002; PSI, 2002). 
In this environment Sintraemcali's anti-corruption struggle began to receive 
a broader reception within the city. Corruption became a key issue in the Municipal 
elections in the second half of 2000. Sintraemcali backed the entry of an 
independent candidate, Jon Maro Rodriguez, who stood on a platform of anti- 
corruption. Jon Mato Rodriguez was an ex-journalist and radio broadcaster, well 
known for his outspoken commitment to anti-corruption. Jon Maro Rodriguez 
won the election and broke the stranglehold that the two traditional parties, the 
Liberals and Conservatives, had had over the Municipality of Cali for decades. Jon 
Maro Rodriguez began his term of office on the 1St of January 2001. This 
represented an important strategic leap for the union, as they now had an ally in 
local government which controlled the company and the new Mayor committed 
himself to implementing the Plan PARE, which began in May 2001. This electoral 
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victory meant that the unintended outcome of the decentralisation process 
advocated by the World Bank in Colombia was the possibility that the Cali 
municipality could now begin to follow a more independent development path that 
ran contrary to the central government's. Furthermore, and crucially in Colombia 
(see Chapter Four), it was not only Emcali that the mayor had responsibility for 
but also the metropolitan police and some limited control over the military. These 
contradictions within the Colombian state provided the space upon which an 
alternative Emcali was constructed. 
5.3.3 Stage Three. implementing Plan PARE 
In May of 2001 Juan Manuel Pulido was appointed Managing Director of 
Emcali through an agreement between the new Superintendent of Public Services 
and the incumbent mayor of Cali. Juan Manuel Pulido was a civil servant with an 
impeccable record of honesty and transparency and he began to implement the 
Plan PARE in alliance with Sintraemcali. Between May and December 2001 a 
strong working relationship emerged between the new Managing Director and 
Emcali workers that was based on a shared commitment to avoiding privatisation. 
The new situation provided the union with the chance to put its plan into action. 
This assisted the union in rapidly "converting itself into a movement managing the 
company, a very important leap forward" (Interview with Nelson Sanchez, 2002, 
p. 3). This process created increased tensions between local and national 
government and represented a cleavage in power within the state, with local 
government intent on doing everything to keep Emcali public while central 
government pushed ahead with plans for privatisation. In response, as Nelson 
Sanchez notes: 
Pastrana pressured the Superintendent of Public Services, business elites 
and the multinationals pressured Pastrana, and Pastrana pressured the 
superintendent to carry on disinvesting in the company (ibid, p. 3). 
Two narratives thus emerged from different branches of government over 
the situation in Emcali. The first emanated from the national 
level via the 
Superintendent of Public Services and the mass media where it was argued that 
Emcali needed external `capitalisation' and that Emcali was financially unviable. 
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The second came from the local Mayor, the manager of Emcali Juan Manuel 
Pulido, and Sintraemcali, that Emcali was a good business and that Emcali was 
financially viable. This generated a break/fissure of power within state structures 
(ibid, p. 5). This tension increased as the Plan PARE began successfully to 
restructure and organise the company, and as productivity increased. 
During the first eight months of implementing Plan PARE there was a 
notable shift in the financial fortunes of the company. The plan led to a reduction 
of spending by 221 thousand million pesos (US$100 million), and increased 
revenues by 38 million pesos (US$17 million). This allowed the company for the 
first time in years, excluding debt repayments, to have an annual operating surplus: 
In the seven months we achieved a reversal of the deficitary tendency of the 
company, and although the prediction for that period was that we would end 
with a deficit of three hundred million pesos in fact we ended in credit... the 
structure of the budget changed radically because in the recuperation plan for 
Emcali we gave priority to cutting expenses and generating new sources of 
income, and attacking corrupt practices. Thus for the first time in 7 years the 
company had a viable budget, that being a balance between outgoings and 
expenses (interview with Nelson Sanchez, 2002, p. 4). 52 
The success of Plan PARE created enormous tensions within the 
Colombian state. Here one had the example of a public service company being run 
by a business plan developed and led by the workers inside the company. A plan 
that had a clear `social ethic' and `patriotic focus' on both the defence of natural 
resources and the poorest sectors of the community through strict controls of 
price increases. It stood in stark contrast to the national policy of privatisation, 
increases in user costs, and sale of national property to foreign and national private 
interests. As Sanchez notes: 
The government couldn't cope with that, so whilst it continued to negotiate 
with us, it also developed a plan for the liquidation of the company. Then 
came the critical conjuncture, the beginning of the electoral campaigns where 
corruption emerges everywhere, as much for gaining electoral funds, as also 
for those private and multinational interests who want to promote those people 
who will best represent their interests (ibid, p. 6). 
That conjuncture led to the announcement on the 24th of December 2001 
of the dismissal of Juan Manuel Pulido as Managing Director of Emcali, and to the 
militarization of Emcali workplants which led directly to the 36 day CAM Tower 
52 The Annual Report from the Cali Municipality confirms these statistics (Mayor of Cali, 2002) 
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Occupation. The reason why the government felt the need to call in the army can 
be understood in reference to the other key strategy that Sintraemcali had 
developed over the same period as the Plan PARE -a strategy of mass 
mobilisation and selective occupation of workplants to push through its alternative 
plans for the company. This strategy will be explored in Section 5.5, but first I will 
turn to the construction of the trade union/community alliance that provided a 
crucial second strategic development that strengthened Sintraemcali's project. 
5.4 Worker/ Community Alliance 
One of the crucial strategies that Plan PARE addressed was the need to 
reframe the conflict over public services in order to move it away from a trade 
union/ state problem to one between the Cali community and the state. This 
necessitated a broad strategic alliance, but the construction of this was not an easy 
task. There was a problem within Emcali that could not just be explained by 
corrupt management practices. There also existed a certain level of complicity 
between workers and managers in the weak performance of the company, and a 
lack of `service ethic' in the performance of duties carried out by the workforce. 
This poor `service ethic' served to legitimate government and media accusations 
that the workers benefited from a good salary and benefits provided by the 
company at the expense of the community. There was a need to change the 
attitude of workers, and the attitude of the local community towards them, 
requiring a sustained process of education on both sides and a meeting point 
whereby workers and local communities could come together (Interview with 
Alexander Lopez, 2002). The question that was posed to Sintraemcali was how to 
break down these barriers and demonstrate to the poorest sections of the 
community that the trade union was not fighting for itself but for all those sections 
of the Cali community suffering from the effects of neo-liberalism. 
This process of building up relations with the local community had begun 




This is the objective of our organisation, to educate the people, to generate 
education `obrero-popular' (worker-popular). That means that both the 
workers and the community need to learn their rights, their constitution, to develop their sense of belonging, of class consciousness, and to move closer to what it means to defend The public', to become part of the process of 
struggling for sovereignty (Interview with Luis Hernandez, 2002, p. 4). 
This community work ranged from public meetings, to workshops, to the 
setting up of the Sintraemcali Institute, 53 to joining in local community 
demonstrations and protests: 
We have done this work in a whole range of neighbourhoods over the last five 
years. We have been working in the neighbourhoods with the `popular sector, 
with some of the most marginalized sectors. Many of these are citizens 
without work, with their spirit broken. We try to raise their spirits and their 
consciousness so that they can go on living, not from a perspective of a 
process of begging, as the politicians do in this country, but through a process 
of organisation and struggle. In this I think we have played an important role in 
this educational process. Many of these social sectors have responded 
positively to the social struggles of the trade union organisation and joined in 
the support of Sintraemcali because they recognise that we are an 
organisation of struggle... an organisation above all that struggles for social 
rights and which has become a true defender of the rights of the Cali 
community and the Colombian people (Interview with Luis Hernandez, 2002, 
p. 6). 
A key strategy in building links between the local community and Emcali 
workers was the creation of Minga Comunitarios, 54 or collective work-ins. This 
involved a commitment on the part of Emcali workers to give up one weekend per 
month to work voluntarily. Emcali workers carried out repairs and damage to 
infrastructure in the poorest areas of the city. As the Minga's developed, other 
trade union organisations became involved leading to the provision of free health 
care consultancy, hairdressing, and legal advice. They became a form of `popular 
fiesta' with music, food and dancing. The N inga's were also an important 
economic contribution by Emcali workers to the financial well being of the 
company. But, more than the economic contribution, they served an important 
social, symbolic and cultural function. The Minga's provided the practical space for 
the community and workers to engage in voluntary work together in the poorest 
areas in the city. For Emcali workers it served to promote a spirit of solidarity with 
local communities and pride in their company; for the communities it allowed for a 
better understanding of the objectives or activities of the union and how these 
53 A formal technical school based at the union's headquarters aimed at teenagers unable to afford 
Secondary Education. 
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relate to their own struggles. Pedagogically it was understood as part of the process 
of reconstructing the social fabric of society, developing trust between workers and 
communities, and changing the culture of the trade union (Interview with 
Alexander Lopez, 2002, p. 14): 
There has been a closening of links with the community which has changed 
the mentality of the workers, so that they don't see consumers of Emcali as 
clients, but see them as owners whom we are defending, as the owners of this 
company... we have tried to change the culture of the workers and this has 
resulted in the community seeing us in a different light, it has been important 
in changing the attitude towards the provision of services, to be attentive to 
the needs of the community, it has meant a big change on the part of the 
workers, but also a change in the relationship on the part of the community 
who see us as defenders of the company (ibid, p. 14). 
This `changed mentality' reflects the process of `horizontalisation' whereby 
the culture and structure of the trade union flattens out and interacts more broadly 
and politically with the local community. This shift was crucial in strengthening the 
third major strategy, the necessity for the union to exert its mobilisation capacity. 
5.5 Mobilisation Strategy 
The ideal movement strategy is one that is convincing with respect to political 
authorities, legitimate with respect to potential supporters, rewarding with 
respect to those already active in the movement, and novel in the eyes of the 
mass media. These are not entirely compatible demands (Rockion, 1988, 
p. 109) 
So far I have mapped the emergence of the Plan PARE bottom up 
development plan but have left out the contested nature of the project and the 
interests that it challenged locally, nationally and transnationally including extent to 
which certain actors would go to defend those interests. In opposition to those 
that understand the process of development as being somehow a technical process, 
I want to highlight its fundamentally conflictual nature, particularly in Colombia. 
What that meant for the development of a strategy for the defence of Emcali as a 
state owned public service was a repertoire of defensive mobilisations and protest 
methods that countered the structural and military power of the Colombian state 
and its transnational allies that sought to implement privatisation. 
sa The word Minga comes for one of the indigenous languages and expresses the idea of coming together 
to carry out a communal project. 
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As Favre (1990) notes, the repertoires of action for a social movement are 
finite, evolve slowly, and are typically constrained in both time and space. The 
balance between the necessity of exerting pressure on the Colombian government 
and the need to build a broad base of support in the city of Cali and its environs 
has meant the careful selection and utilization of mobilization strategies. The logic 
of numbers, the logic of material damage, the logic of bearing witness (Della Porta 
& Diani, 1999, p. 178) are all seen as the three broad rationales behind forms of 
protest. Sintraemcali's tactics often reflected a combination of all these with mass 
based, colourful demonstrations, blockades and mass meetings that would often 
block traffic and bring the city to a standstill. But the hallmark of the union from 
1994 became the `occupation'. An occupation served as a highly symbolic tool that 
focussed attention on an issue without inflicting material damage. In Sintraemcali's 
(2003a) presentation at the World Social Forum, Porto Alegre in 2003, they 
presented a list of their "most important actions", and one can clearly see the 
preference for this particular type of mobilisation: 
Occupation of the Spanish Embassy, August 1994, Occupation of the National 
Council, Bogota, November 1994; Occupation of the Murillo Toro Park, 
Ibaque, 1995; Occupation of the Departmental Government, Valle de Cauca, 
1995; Occupation of Emcali for 6 six days, 1996; Occupation of Emcali 
workplants, 1997, Occupation of the Municipal Administration, 1997; 
Occupation of the CAM Tower, Emcali Central Administration for 16 days, 
September, 1998; Occupation of the Municipal Administration, 1998,1999; 
2000; Occupation of the CAM Tower, Emcali Central Administration for 36 
days, December, 2001. 
The occupation appears to have become a learnt tool of action, one that 
surfaced every time there was a serious conflict. Within the union, a core of several 
hundred activists had been involved in the majority of the occupations since 1994. 
They had developed a clear understanding of what to do, how to do it, and felt 
comfortable in the environment. They had become `occupation experts' 
(Interview with Wilson Bortes, 2002, p. 6), knowing exactly how to control and 
defend the space taken: perimeters patrolled, doors and windows electrified, some 
areas alarmed, cleaning rotas, psychological counselling, recreation activities. 
Here 
we have a further example of learning through social action, a 
form of incidental 
learning that would be passed on informally to newcomers during successive 
occupations (Interview with 
Carlos Guttierez, 2002, p. 4). Outside the occupations, 
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depending on how long they lasted, a network of workers, their families, and 
members of the local community provided the food, security and moral support 
for those inside, this also became a key meeting place and publicity point for the 
discursive presentation of the union's case. While Sintraemcali managed the 
internal workings of the occupation, it was heavily reliant on community support 
for the successful resolution of any conflicts. The main vehicles for the 
mobilisation of communities in Cali was the Municipal Strike Command - variants 
of which were created across Colombia in the early 1990's to coordinate civic 
strikes (as opposed to national strikes which would be only for public employees) 
in opposition to neo-liberal reforms. This `space of action' includes elected 
members of JACs (Local Action Committees), local councillors, representatives of 
rural constituents on the outskirts of the city, other trade unionists, students, 
activists and representatives of community TV channels. Through these members, 
links are provided with broader non-organised sectors of the Cali community. It 
also includes other trade union movements in the area with representatives of 
individual unions and elected members of the regional headquarters of the CUT 
Valle de Cauca Section (Interview with Arial Diaz, 2002, pp. 6-10). 
This `space of action' can also be seen as a pedagogical space where workers 
and local communities learn to work out their differences and plan common 
actions. It is a forum for political, trade union and community activists to meet 
together in a non-hierarchical environment where issues are debated and decisions 
taken by consensus. While there are no formal positions within the Strike 
Command, working groups are set up to deal with particular activities between 
meetings. Otoniel Ramirez, president of the CUT Valle and a leading participant in 
the Strike Command, refers to it as a space of "unity of action", "when we agree 
on something, a common problem, we plan action. " The Municipal Strike 
Command played a pivotal role in the major Sintraemcali occupations of 1998 and 
2001 and one of the key mechanisms for building horizontalisation within the city 
(Interview with Otoniel Ramirez, 2002, p. 6). 
Obviously, different degrees of commitment are necessary for different 
types of mobilisation: direct involvement in an occupation requires a 
high level of 
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commitment, largely restricted to the actual members of the union, " and the very 
committed at that, as lives were under threat. Solidarity outside occupations drew 
on a more extensive reserve of supporters. Likewise marches and blockades may 
draw in broader constituencies: local communities, other social movements etc, as 
would public meetings and forums. Crucially the trade union's mobilisation 
strategy was broad enough to allow for a range of levels of participation seeking 
`inclusion' rather than `exclusion' (Interview with Luis Hernandez, 2002, p. 18). 
The question as to why `occupations' were the preferred tool for the trade 
union to exert its power and authority is a central one. There appears to be several 
reasons: firstly, strikes were seen as counter-productive as they would effect not 
only the government but also the citizens in the city who were their potential allies 
thus providing an easy tool for state/mass media propaganda and in turn lead to 
the breakdown of processes of constructing horizontalisation amongst the 
different community groupings. Secondly, the space of the occupation is clearly 
defined, unlike in a demonstration where the immediate environment is less 
controllable and easily subject to `agent provocateurs' and police attacks. Thirdly, 
and related to this, the `spectacular' nature of an occupation appears able to raise 
the profile of a situation and make the `opportunity cost ratio' for state terror more 
costly (Sluka, 2000). Military intervention would have a potentially high price to pay 
in terms of the international legitimacy of the Colombian government if it were 
seen to result in the death of occupying workers. There are also other issues related 
to visibility, as many conflicts go unreported, whereas occupations of strategic and 
important buildings in the city, particularly when the form that the occupation 
takes is very symbolic, tends to prevent the disappearance of a conflict. The 
psychological power of the occupation of the Emcali buildings also lay in the fact 
that control over production was challenged and taken over by the workers, but 
services were maintained, the right to govern was removed from the state, but the 
ss However, as we will see in the next chapter, the second occupation - that of the headquarters of the 
Superintendent of Public Services was actually carried out with a susbstantial group on non-Sintraemcali 
affiliates. These included a large group of SINTRAUNICOL members who were all undertaking a 
trade 
union education course at the time, but postponed their classes to 
fully support the Cam Tower 
Occupation (Interview with Carlos Gonzalez, 2002, p. 6). There were also two young students from the 
Sintraemcali institute and several University Students from the local state university. 
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right to public services for the public was not. This proved strategically important, 
building credibility amongst the local population. Ultimately, the fact that 
occupations had achieved objectives in the past was probably the single biggest 
reason for why it was so often utilised (Interviews with Luis Hernandez, 2002; 
Alexander Lopez, 2002 and Nelson Sanchez, 2002). 
The high stakes involved in Sintraemcali's development of an anti- 
pnvatisation movement and the clash of forces that it entailed would also lead to 
the trade union's development of a human rights strategy in response to state and 
para-state violence against members and supporters that their campaign ignited. 
This human rights strategy would eventually extend the trade union's operations 
beyond the local and national scales to the transnational field and it is to this final 
major strategy that I will now turn. 
5.6 Sintraemcali & Human Right and Solidarity Networks 
The union's determination to mobilise to defend Emcali and its uncovering 
of high level corruption placed it in direct confrontation with sections of the 
political and economic elite and state and parastate forces, and there have been 
frequent attacks on the union premises and union members by state and para state 
forces. Sintraemcali has had sixteen members assassinated in the last 8 years; 
several wounded, kidnapped, and countless members have received death threats 
and were forced to leave the region, and some the country. Furthermore, there 
have been 3 assassination attempts against the life of the ex-President of the 
Union, and the entire board of directors have received death threats. The current 
President of Sintraemcali, Luis Hernandez, has recently been forced to live a semi- 
clandestine life as attempts to assassinate him were uncovered. In 1996,600 
workers were arrested for involvement in the 6-day occupation. In 1997,300 
workers were fined and 22 imprisoned and in total 55 members of Sintraemcali 
have been charged with rebellion (Sintraemcali, 2004). Several workers have been 
arrested and imprisoned under charges of subversion and terrorism and there has 
been a persistent campaign aimed at undermining the union's legitimacy through 
allegations that it is linked to the armed insurgency that is active in the country 
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(Amnesty International, 2000). It is no exaggeration to suggest that for local elites 
in Cali, and state and para-state forces, Sintraemcali has become public enemy 
number one. 
The increase in human rights violations from 1998 onwards led the union 
ever closer to a range of human rights organisations active in the country. With the 
increased involvement of Berenice Celeyta, President of the Colombian NGO 
NOMADESC, the trade union embraced human rights defence and promotion as 
a central plank in its anti-privatisation strategy. NOMADESC56 was central in 
setting up a Human Rights Department based at the union's headquarters, 
monitoring human rights abuses across the city and beyond. It also carries out 
education and training work, providing local activists with practical knowledge of 
human rights mechanisms at their disposal. The department has become a type of 
community or drop-in centre for organisations and individuals facing problems in 
the field of human rights, broadly defined: economic, social, cultural, political and 
civil. The human rights focus has also injected a fresh range of practices and 
discourses into the activities of the union itself (Interview with Berenice Celeyta, 
2002), and diffused this information to other popular organizations in the region. 57 
The discourse of human rights has provided a key mechanism through which 
Sintraemca]i's opposition to privatisation has been rearticulated as a struggle for 
economic and social rights, allowing it to transcend traditional `member' conditions 
and embrace citizenship rights. The actions of the human rights department take 
place on a range of scales, from local mediation of conflicts to national and 
transnational advocacy, lobbying and legal work, providing new spaces within 
which the trade union could strengthen its ability to oppose privatisation. 
56 The name stems from the root NOMAD (expressing the reality that many Colombians have been 
displaced from their homes- 3 million according to the United Nations), and DESC (derechos 
economicos, sociales y culturales) economic, social and cultural rights. Berenice was also a student of 
Eduardo Umana Mendoza, the prominent lawyer and human rights activist who was involved in the 
early workers education training courses. 
57 In June 2003 it secured a £220.000 grant from the UK's Department for International Development for 
a two year project to train trade union and social movement activists in human rights defence and 
protection and to carry out research and investigation on the human rights situation in the region. 
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5.6.1 Local, National and Transnational Human Rights Advocacy 
At the local level, the human rights department has been instrumental in 
training local activists in human rights norms and mechanisms for self-defence. 
The training provides participants with methods of intervention into conflicts, how 
to set up a local human rights network among social movements, and a 
background into the human rights legal frameworks that exist at regional and 
global levels (see Appendix 7 for an example of the courses). The courses typically 
involve both trade union and community leaders and activists and thus provide a 
further point of interaction and communication between workers and community 
activists. In June 2001 this process was expanded with the setting up of the 
`National and International Human Rights Campaign Against Corruption Privatisation and 
the Criminalisation of Social Protest, uniting over 20 social organisations and carries out 
legal, political, cultural, educational, and lobbying work. In all of the direct actions, 
it is crucial to note that human rights activists and representatives of Human Rights 
NGOs were present and were able to contact the appropriate authorities and 
ensure that the local police and military response was measured. Much of the 
power of these human rights activists derives from their ability to link up to 
transnational human rights networks, which are able to pressure the Colombian 
government to follow accepted international norms of behaviour (Keck & Sikkink, 
1998). 
At the international level the human rights department has facilitated the 
involvement of major human rights organisations in Sintraemcali's situation, and 
representatives of Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have 
intervened several times. These powerful organisations engage in lobbying, the 
production and distribution of `urgent actions', the compilation of reports on the 
human rights situation in the region and high level visits to representatives of the 
armed forces, the government and supranational organisations such as the United 
Nations Commission for Human Rights (UNCHR). The involvement of Amnesty 
and Human Rights Watch is understood discursively by the union's leaders as 
providing a cordon of protection within which they carry out their activities and a 
means of addressing and revealing Colombia's `parallel state' of covert repression. 
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These organisations have particular skills and abilities to influence governments by 
applying selective pressure and lobbying (Interview with Berenice Celeyta, 2002). 
5.6.2 Access To Supra-Legal Networks 
Closely related to this network is the role of the supranational labour and 
human rights bodies, such as the UNCHR, and the IACHR, that have the ability to 
sanction national governments for the failure to enforce and protect human rights. 
These organisations, the supranational equivalent of state labour and justice 
departments, have the power to sanction states rather than individuals. In the 
particular case of Sintraemcali, the union with the assistance of national human 
rights organisations, took their case of systematic persecution from state and 
parastate forces to the Inter-American human rights court who, on 21 st June 2000, 
found the Colombian government responsible for not providing adequate security 
for the trade union to carry out its internationally legitimate duties. The court 
ordered the Colombian government to provide protection for the entire leadership 
of the union including bodyguards, weapons, bullet-proof vehicles and 
communications equipment. 58 This protection, while not eliminating the danger, 
at least allowed some `space' for activity and was a severe political defeat for the 
government that vigorously apposed the application and denied any responsibility.. 
The ability, experience, and success, of Colombian human rights organisations to 
prepare cases for these processes has been a great source of concern for the 
Colombian government. 
5.6.3 International Solidarity Networks 
The human rights department has also been a fundamental catalyst in 
building transnational links with trade union, solidarity and other activist 
organisations in the North. In the United Dingdom, strong international links 
began during the President of the union's brief period of exile in London from 
October to December 2000. Since that point there have been delegations, 
58 Inter-American Human Rights Court verdict can be found at 
http: //www. cidh. oas. org/medidas/2000. sp. htm. 21. 
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exchanges, and several invitations for Sintraemcali representatives to talk at British 
trade union conferences (see Picture 4). Sintraemcali forged strong links with the 
Colombia Solidarity Campaign, UK, which campaigns on human rights and 
political issues in Colombia, and several of its members have worked as volunteers 
in the human rights department of the union. Since 2000, there has been an 
almost continual process of communication and regular delegations which have 
forged strong bonds between Colombian and British activists. This strategy has 
extended more recently to Spain, Canada, the USA, and Australia and has included 
links with sympathetic politicians, human rights groups, NGOs and social 
movements in each of these countries. The rapidly expanding Colombian exile 
community in these countries has strengthened the transnational links and many 
are founding members and activists in solidarity organisations, as is the case in the 
UK. 
More traditional international trade union activity has been developed 
alongside the Colombian CUT59, and other national trade union organisations. 
With the backing of the British TUC, it has also put forward motions for the last 
three years at the annual ILO conference in Geneva to call for a `Special 
Commission of Inquiry' into the human rights emergency for Colombian workers. 
The motion was defeated each time by intense lobbying by the Colombian 
government. Interestingly, the ILO, with its tripartite structure giving equal weight 
to capital, state and workers, has meant that to date no serious sanctions have been 
brought against the Colombian government. Likewise the union has, on a range of 
occasions and often via the British TUC, managed to obtain the intervention of the 
ICFTU and the PSI. 
All of these Links with of trade union, solidarity groups, and activist organisations 
in a range of countries have facilitated the union's ability to enter a range of transnational 
human rights and solidarity networks such as the anti-globalisation movement, " and 
59 The CUT is the biggest of the national union federations comprising of around 67.3% of all unionised 
workers (ENS, 2003). 
60 In 2003, Luis Hernandez (current President of Sintraemcali) participated in the World Social Forum in 
Porto Alegre. In November 2002, Berenice Celeyta, head of Sintraemcali's Human Rights Department 
was invited by War on Want; a British based NGO to talk about Sintraemcali at the European Social 
Forum in Florence. 
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transnational human rights networks. These have been particularly effective, as we will see 
in the next chapter, in relation to specific disputes and actions where human rights 
violations had taken place or were likely to take place. Sending out `urgent actions' on 
these networks result in protest letters and pickets of Colombian embassies which union 
representatives feel act as a means of protection for those workers and communities 
involved (Interview with Berenice Celeyta, 2002). When Alexander Lopez visited the 
UK in 2001 a UNISON representative asked him what solidarity with Sintraemcali 
meant in real terms and he replied "it makes it more difficult for them to kill us" 
(Unison, 2002). 
5.7 Conclusion 
What I have sought to show in this chapter is how Sintraemcali 
transformed itself from a `quiet normal union' in the early 1990's to an organisation 
that was jointly administering one of the biggest companies in Colombia and had 
prevented a privatisation process promoted by a range of powerful transnational 
and national forces. I also argued that in doing so Sintraemcali revealed 
widespread corruption and lost 16 of its members to the assassins bullet as it 
became a major adversary to the Colombian state and its parallel structures of 
covert repression. What is evident is the developmental and pedagogical process 
that this transformation involved. There were several strands to this strategy 
including education for consciousness raising as well as strategy development, 
research, investigation and action on a range of scales from the local to the 
international. These processes constructed a formidable coalition of support 
involving fellow local trade unionists, community members from the poorest 
neighbourhoods in the city, local professionals and non-aligned politicians and 
human rights and political activists beyond Colombia. 
Central to understanding this are the twin processes of transborderisation 
and horizontalisation. The process of `horizontalisation' necessitated a shift from a 
corporate top-down hierarchical union mediating between management and 
workers -a form of regulatory trade unionism - to a social movement union, which 
had a bottom up approach that appealed to local communities. Furthermore, while 
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continuing to mediate between capital and workers Sintraemcali's strategy also 
pointed and acted towards a far more transformatory and therefore `emancipatory' 
role which addressed the tensions between its own workers' interests and the 
broader working class community - in their different shapes and forms. By doing 
so, Sintraemcali challenged the dominant neo-liberal trajectory of public service 
management being advocated by the Colombian government and its transnational 
allies. The fierce repression that the movement provoked, and also the trade 
union's broader appeal to the justice of its anti-corruption and human rights 
struggle also facilitated the transborderisation of that struggle allowing it to operate 
- just like capital and capitalists - on a range of scales from the local to the global. 
Crucially these new scales of operation included transnational advocacy networks 
and also the new local space of decentralised government alongside the 
strengthening alliance with the local poor community coordinated through the 
Minga's and the Municipal Strike Command. In the next chapter I will explore how 
these processes came together during the 36 day CAM Tower Occupation. 
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"You have been fighting alongside us for thirty six days in the historic defence 
of Emcali as a Commercial and Industrial State Corporation. You have 
accompanied Sintraemcali, the citizens of Cali and the Colombian people in 
conducting one of the fiercest struggles in history against privatisation, 
globalisation and the neo-liberal model. You witnessed how we the workers had to cover our faces so that the government would see us. You protected the Emcali tower that declared itself on from 25th December a Permanent Popular Assembly.... We say to you all say fight on, because the struggle 
continues" (Sintraemcali, 28/01/02, Appendix 1). 
6.1 Introduction 
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In this chapter I show how the process of Sintraemcali's development of a 
social movement in defence of public services in Cali explored in Chapter Five 
came together in one episode of social protest - the CAM Tower Occupation. This 
event, which began on the 25th December, 2001, ended 36 days later with an 
overwhelming victory for the transnational alliance that had been constructed. I 
focus particularly on the centrality of the four major strategies outlined in Chapter 
Five, demonstrating how they operated along the twin trajectories of 
horizontalisation and transborderisation. The first reflects the intricate network of 
alliances, and the second the multi-scalar nature of their operation. Behind these 
twin trajectories lay the strategic pedagogy of Sintraemcali that had developed 
during the second half of the 1990's to facilitate this multi-scalar activity and the 
range of alliances. The monumental events that will be explored in this chapter 
can, I argue, be understood as a `learning outcome' rather than as a spontaneous 
set of events. Moreover, the CAM Tower Occupation can be seen as a `learning 
process' in itself, providing new insights into the dialectical relationship between 
top-down and bottom up social forces in Cali and contributing to the further 
development of Sintraemcali's strategic learning process. 
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The structural pressures of a deepening recession in 2001 and the strict 
fiscal austerity requirements of the IMF agreement signed by the Pastrana 
government in December 2000 both increased the likelihood of the government 
reneging on its promise to provide state funding to assist in the resolution of the 
crisis in Emcali. Nevertheless, both the local Mayor and Sintraemcali remained 
optimistic that the Plan PARE would ensure Emcali remained in state hands. This 
optimism stemmed from the successful implementation of the Plan PARE during 
the previous 8 months. This administrative success was accepted, albeit with 
certain reservations, by the Finance Minister, Juan Manuel Santos (EI Tiempo, 
22/12/01). Despite this there were serious tensions between the Superintendent of 
Public Services Humberto Caicedo, and his appointed Managing Director of 
Emcali, Juan Manuel Pulido, over the future direction and necessities of the 
company (see Section 5.3). 
These conflicts came to a head in December when President Pastrana failed 
to attend the opening ceremony of the PTAR water treatment plant and tensions 
escalated (El Tiempo, 06/12/01; El Pais, 06/12/01). In a newspaper interview the 
local Mayor, Jon Mato Rodriquez, responding to a question on the willingness of 
the government to collaborate in the resolution of the financial crisis stated that 
the government had failed consistently to provide the necessary resources for 
Emcali's survival (El Occidente, 02/12/01). Furthermore, he went on to state that 
"for 14 months the Superintendent of Public Services has intentionally and 
systematically tried to destroy the company", but that through the commitment of 
workers, managers and the local administration they had managed for the first time 
in six years to balance incoming revenue and outgoing expenditure. He announced 
that "whilst I am Mayor, Emcali will not be liquidated (ibid). 
The importance of this debate at the national level was reflected by the 
intervention of the liberal Presidential candidate Horacio Serpa. He stated that the 
Pastrana Government had let the people of Cali down by refusing to pay the 80% 
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of the $175, million dollars that the PTAR water treatment plant eventually cost" 
(El Occidente, 03/12/01). Speculation expanded across the press as to the likely 
consequence of the government's refusal to pay the 80% share that it had 
promised. Fernando Montoya, the regional ombudsman suggested that if the 
government did not pay then prices could rise for consumers in Cali by between 17 
and 54% the following year (El Pais, 22/12/01). The debate over whether the 
government had committed itself to paying 80% of the cost of the PTAR when 
the initial contract was signed would provide one of the central discursive 
contestations during the occupation. 
While this conflict between local and national government played itself out 
during December, the crisis in Argentina and the virtual collapse of the economy 
after the failure of widespread neo-liberal reforms was covered on the front pages 
of the national and local media (c. f. El Occzdente, 21/12/01; El Occzdente, 
21/12/01a). A general strike in Argentina was held on the 3rd December, called in 
opposition to a planned fiscal austerity plan. On the 17th of December the 
Argentinean government announced a 19% cut in public expenditure forced by the 
IMF. The following day riots spread across the country which left scores of people 
dead. The resulting crisis generated a great deal of debate in Colombia over the 
direction of economic and social policy. This debate took on two key dimensions, 
the first related to predictions of the likely `Tango effect' of Argentina's collapse on 
the rest of Latin America - that Argentina's collapse would 
lead to more 
widespread disinvestment in the region. The second dimension criticised the role 
and increasing power of the IMF in Latin American policy development. For many 
years both the World Bank and the IMF had lauded Argentina as the 
`model' for 
the rest of the region. One prominent leader of the CUT argued that the 
IMF 
reforms were likely to lead to the same kind of conflicts in 
Colombia as in 
Argentina (ElOcczdente, 24/12/01). 
A further important political development was the dwindling collapse of the 
Pastrana initiated `Peace Process' with the FARC. Begun in 1998, the `peace 
61 One of the other major Presidential candidates, 
Naomi Sanin, would also later criticize the Pastrana 
Government from an identical perspective, while Lucho Garzon would provided strong vocal support to 
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process' led to the creation of a `zone of distension' in the South of the country. 
Since the events of September 11th, 2001, the US government had become 
increasingly unhappy with the Colombian government and its negotiations with the 
FARC, and this was reflected in the less than positive reception provided by the 
US government to Pastrana when he visited the US in November of 2001 (Ruiz, 
2001). Commentators noted that the incoming Bush Administration had given up 
on both Pastrana and the Peace Process. The low key visit represented a marked 
contrast from Pastrana's visit in 1998 at the beginning of his Presidency when the 
Clinton Administration committed itself to over $2.5 billion dollars to assist the 
government in the US inspired Plan Colombia, making Colombia the third biggest 
recipient of US aid. The deadline for a peace deal was December 2001, but by 
November the two sides appeared increasingly estranged. The US administration 
under Bush had its sights already set on the new Colombian Presidential 
candidates, and was too embroiled in its planned intervention in Afghanistan to 
pay much heed to Pastrana's attempts at securing increased resources and trade 
agreements (Ruiz, 2001). The final factor that shaped the terrain of the CAM 
Tower Occupation was the increasing hostility between the CUT national trade 
union federation and the Colombian government over negotiations on a planned 
package of labour reforms that were agreed by the Colombian government in the 
IMF agreement signed in December 2000, and over the annual increase 
in the 
minimum wage (El Tiempo, 20/12/01; El Occidente, 26/12/01). 
" The CAM Tower Occupation: Phase 1 
6.3 Securing the Protest Space 
On the morning of 24th December, 2001, Christmas Eve and a 
day in 
Colombia when families traditionally spend time at 
home together, a message was 
received by the trade union leadership that police and military troops 
had taken up 
positions outside all of the Emcali work plants. 
These events coincided with the 
Superintendent of Public Services announcement that Juan Manuel 
Pulido, 




Emcali's managing director, would be replaced with Oscar Halim Reveiz 
(Interview with Alexander Lopez, 2002, p. 15). 
Alexander Lopez had received some information the day before and the 
union leadership had met all day on the 23rd, and continued on the 24th 
December to plan and debate the trade union response. While there was a clear 
consensus on the necessity of carrying out a direct action, the debate revolved 
around both the focus of that action and the timing (Interview with Luis 
Hernandez, 2002, p. 14). On the following day the annual Cali Festival began, 
lasting four days. During that time the entire city was celebrating, enjoying music 
concerts and the annual horse parade (Interview with Alexander Lopez, 2002, 
p. 16). Some of the leadership suggested postponing action until the New Year, 
arguing it would be easier to mobilise popular support. Others suggested that by 
then it would be too late, and the government would have the psychological edge 
(ibid). By 8pm on the evening of the 24th December it had been decided that the 
union would occupy the CAM tower the following day at 1.00pm and utilise the 
opportunity that the Cali Festival would offer to gain access to media and the local 
community. The annual horse parade passed through the Avenida Colombia, the 
main road directly outside the twin towers of the CAM Tower and the Local 
Council Tower (ibid)62. 
Once the decision had been taken, there was a pressing necessity to ensure 
the involvement of as many workers as possible while keeping the plans secret 
from the authorities. Several people began to call around to the most trusted 
Emcali workers telling them that there would be a meeting outside the CAM 
Tower at 1. pm63. The planned occupation was not known by any of them, and 
some speculated that they would be called on to block the Colombia Avenue and 
prevent the annual horse parade from happening in protest at government actions 
(Interview with Asdrubal Gonzalo, 2002, p. 8; Interview with Claudia Caritas, 2002, 
p. 7). 
62 Here we can see how a potential 'constraint'-the Cali festival , was instead reconceptualised into a 
`possibility' for facilitating collective action. Highlighting the contradictory and contingent nature of any 
`structural limitation' and the possibility of agential activity. 
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On the following day workers began gathering outside the CAM Tower, 
but there were also 20-30 soldiers who were guarding the environs of the building, 
and preparing for the blocking off of the main road in anticipation of the Annual 
horse parade. Alexander Lopez approached the commander of the unit and 
explained that they were directors of the trade union and that they were here for a 
meeting. According to Alexander, after a brief discussion, the commander "gave us 
permission to enter" and they passed "like Pedro going home"" under the noses of 
the police and the army, "with chains and a thousand things that we needed to 
secure the building" (Interview with Alexander Lopez, 2002, p. 17). G5 
Once they had entered, they closed and secured the door. Within half an 
hour a police Colonel arrived at the entrance and demanded that the workers leave. 
Alexander Lopez responded that "this is a peaceful organisation, Colonel, and a 
peaceful Permanent Assembly, and we will not leave from here until the 
government drops its plans to privatise the company" (Interview with Alexander 
Lopez, 2002, p. 17). The Colonel asked to be allowed in to discuss the situation. 
Alexander Lopez replied that "we have nothing to talk about with you, call the 
national government, the Superintendent of Public Services, the Minister for 
National Planning, and the Finance Minister who are the people who design 
national policy in this country" (Interview with Alexander Lopez, 2002, p. 18). 
According to Alexander Lopez, the Colonel laughed and insisted that he be 
allowed in, warning that otherwise they would enter forcibly with the police and 
the army. Alexander replied that he also had his own army, and showed the 
Colonel the presence of the twenty armed bodyguards that accompanied the trade 
union leaders (Interview with Alexander Lopez, 2002, p. 17)66. Having made clear 
63 Those that were contacted were the `base fuerte' (strong base) that had accompanied the union in the 
previous occupations and direct actions (Interview with Alexander Lopez, 2002, p. 15). 
64 A Colombian expression signifying the act of doing something completely habitual and normal. 
65 While this may sound surprising it perhaps best reflects a refutation of the idea that domiant power 
doesn't make mistakes and is not vulnerable. As would be later discovered, the order given to miltarise 
Emcali work plants did not extend to the CAM Tower. The thirty or so troops that were surrounding the 
CAM Tower were there to provide security for the Horse Parade and thus would have probably had little 
or no idea of the emerging conflict between Emcali and the state. This was discussed in Interviews with 
Luis Hernandez (2002), Alexander Lopez (2002) and Carlos Gonzalez (2002). 
66The bodyguards were part of the `protection measures' provided by the Colombian government under 
the orders of the Inter-American Human Rights Court judgement (see Chapter 5). 
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the likely outcome of a forcible entry, the Colonel retreated, and the trade unionists 
began the process of securing the building (see Picture 5). 
Unaware of the situation, the existing Managing Director, Juan Manuel 
Pulido, was working in his office on the 3rd floor, and Alexander Lopez 
approached him to explain that they were sorry for the inconvenience, but that 
"we will not permit the liquidation of the company by the newly appointed 
Managing Director and we demand that his nomination is withdrawn" (Interview 
with Alexander Lopez, 2002, p. 17). Juan Manuel Pulido agreed to leave the 
building. While many more workers entered over the following two days via a 
range of ingenious methods" to strengthen the occupation, the initial task was to 
secure the weak points of the building. Luis Hernandez, then Vice President of 
Sintraemcali, was in overall control of security. According to him there were 42 
vulnerable points in the building, which were well known to all those that had been 
engaged in previous occupations. They ranged from external passages that linked 
the CAM Tower to the Local Government Tower next door, a series of ground 
floor windows, the roof of the tower, and a range of air vents that provided 
potential access for the military or police to storm the building (Interview with Luis 
Hernandez, 2002, p. 2). While chains were utilized, the trade union also rewired 
electricity points so that vulnerable areas such as connecting doors and windows 
became electrified, and electronic alarms were installed. Vulnerable points were 
also guarded 24 hours a day. As the occupation was strengthened this process was 
organized in shifts. 
Within a 100 metre radius of the CAM Tower workers outside the 
occupation operated 24 hours a day in shifts, and all of the security was 
coordinated via Emcali hand radios that certain workers possessed" (Interview 
with Carlos Guttierez, 2002, p. 2). Thus communication between the heads of the 
security team, the guards at each of the vulnerable points in the building, and the 
workers surrounding the perimeter were coordinated on a 20 minute basis, 24 
67Many entered through windows at the back of the building, one entered on the third day disguised as a 
nurse attending an emergency, and others scaled the wall leading to the first floor terrace adjunct to the 
building (Interview with Alexander Lopez, 2002, p. 19). 
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hours per day, using passwords to prevent military interference (Interview with 
Carlos Guttierez, 2002, p. 2). This military precision, and the disciplined conduct of 
the workers, later led to accusations of guerrilla penetration of the organisation (El 
Tiempo, 03/02/02). Apart from the Security Committee, there were also several 
other committees that developed: health, operational (to ensure that public services 
continued functioning), food, and later on an education and recreational committee 
(Interview with Luis Hernandez, 2002, p. 3; Interview with Carlos Guttierez, 2002, 
p. 2). While all of these committees developed and expand their activities during the 
course of the occupation, in the initial days it was security and the acquisition of 
food that was prioritised. The accusations of `military' organisation reflected more 
the focused and disciplined nature of the Emcali workers who had taken up the 
mantle of defending their company and their city. This was a clear product of the 
shift in culture of the union developed over the previous years towards a far more 
politicized and horizontal ethos and structure. 
Most of the workers had entered with few basic necessities. Food and 
blankets were searched for throughout the building, and this kept people sustained 
until the humanitarian agreement allowing clothing, basic hygiene products and 
food to enter the building was signed on the 28th of December. What little food 
that was garnered through a search of the fridges, and thrown in by workers and 
families outside the occupation, was evenly distributed amongst those inside. The 
first days of the occupation for most of the workers were the most difficult 
both in 
terms of security and vulnerability to attack, and in terms of the 
lack of food and 
clothing (Interview with Carlos Guttierez, 2002, p. 4; Interview with 
Asdrubal 
Gonzalo, 2002, p. 3; Interview with Luis Hernandez, 2002, p. 3). 
6.3.1 Constructing the Protest Frame: The early, discursive response 
While organizing the security and basic necessities of those 
inside the 
occupation was a crucial first step, there was also the necessity 
to project the 
occupation outwards to the community: 
local, national and international, and begin 
68 These radios would be normally used so that workers could respond 
to calls notifying them of repairs 
that were needed of the city's electricity, telecommunications and water 
infrastructure. 
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the process of framing the conflict. From the 24th of December the trade union 
had begun to make official statements and press releases, focusing on the 
underhand manner in which the government was acting. In its first press release on 
the 24th December, which was subsequently sent out internationally, it focused on 
several key themes (Camana Prohibido Olvidar, 24/12/02). The title of the press 
release was "the Colombian government rises early on the 24th of December to 
play dirty", and proceeds to explain firstly how the government had used 
Presidential powers to militarize the Emcali work-plants in preparation for the 
announcement of the appointment of a new manager. Secondly, it suggested that 
the government had used the cover of Christmas to unilaterally appoint a new 
Managing Director who had been implicated in several cases of corruption, with 
the aim of destroying the `unprecedented success' of the Plan PARE aimed at 
overcoming the financial crisis caused by corruption in past administrations. The 
press release went on to state that Juan Manuel Pulido in his eight months of 
service had worked tirelessly to ensure that the company remained in state hands 
and would not be handed over to `foreign capital'. The national government had 
attempted `to boycott' this process and threatened `five times to stop the 
recuperation plan'. Despite this, `the trade union and workers have used all 
constitutional mechanisms such as `the right to protest', `legal processes' and 
`disciplinary processes' to punish past corruption and prevent privatisation. The 
press release finished with a call to the national and international community `to 
defend the national patrimony' of the people of the Valle de Cauca region, and 
emphasized the underhand manner in which the government had made the 
announcement on Christmas eve whilst Emcali workers were in the city's poorest 
neighbourhoods giving out presents to poor children. This `provocative action' 
highlighted how the `government's economic interests are placed above the rights 
of workers' (Campana Prohibido Olvidar, 24/12/01). Embedded within the press 
release we can note the discursive construction of the government as 
being 
corrupt, underhand, and favouring the interests of the rich and powerful against 
the national Colombian interest and its natural resources. 
In contrast, the trade 
union is depicted as `defending' the company, 
its natural resources, and the 
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interests of the poorest and most vulnerable sectors of the community. This clear 
framing - `good versus evil' binary construction - was sustained throughout the 
conflict. 
6.3.2 Presenting the Demands 
As the occupation began on the afternoon of the 25th of December, a 
group of prominent local trade union leaders gathered at the headquarters of 
Sintraemcali and were in communication via cell phone and two-way radio with 
Alexander Lopez. Amongst those present was Carlos Gonzalez, a leader of the 
University Workers Union (SINTRAUNICOL), Wilson Arias, leader of the SENA 
technical college (SINDISENA), Arial Diaz, human rights officer of the local 
section of the CUT Valle, William Escobar, Sintraemcali lawyer and member of the 
metal workers Union (SINTRAMETAL), and Alberto Bejarano, member of the 
Social and Political Front. Each of them would play an important role in the 
ensuing conflict and they represented a range of political tendencies within the 
trade union left in Cali (Interview with Alberto Bejarano, 2002, p. 2). In 
conjunction with discussions by phone with Alexander Lopez they began to draw 
up the demands of Sintraemcali for the resolution of the conflict. By 10. pm in the 
evening the Petition For The Defence Of Emcali had been faxed to local and national 
government (Sintraemcali, 26/12/01, see Appendix 8). 
The introduction of the petition sets the scene of the conflict locating the 
dismissal of Juan Manuel Pulido and the appointment of Oscar Halim Reveiz as an 
act in the "interests of multinational companies" (ibid). It proceeds to highlight 
how `imperial' interests, as shown in Argentina recently, "have necessitated the use 
of the State's repressive apparatus" which in the case of Emcali meant the "the 
installation of riot police in all of Emcali's plants". In response to these acts the 
petition announces the occupation of the CAM Tower in response to this "serious 
attack on the citizens of Cali and the imminent threat to national resources" (ibid). 
The petition contained four major demands. The first point called on the 
Colombian government to `Suspend the policy of privatisation and end the 
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corruption' and links the appointment of Oscar Halim Reveiz to an older system 
of political chentelism that the union, the local Mayor and the Managing Director 
Juan Manuel Pulido, had eliminated over the last eight months in its struggle 
against corruption. The petition argued that corruption had `devastated' the 
financial liquidity of the company and facilitated its handover to multinationals. It 
proceeded to frame corruption as being "part and parcel of neo-liberal policy" and 
calls on "workers and citizens from 'popular' sections of the city" to protest. The 
objective is to `defend' "Emcali, its natural resources and its social capital, which 
for forty years has allowed the city to develop and has provided satisfactory public 
services". Privatisation would have "terrible consequences for the citizens of Cali" 
while enriching "a few owners of capital" through increases in tariffs. 
The second point called for the creation of "an acceptable policy of tariffs". 
It argues that the plan being supported by the World Bank and the IMF to remove 
subsidies would have terrible consequences for the poorest sections of society". 
This policy "benefits the owners of public services, particularly national and 
foreign banks, to the detriment of productive national enterprises and the social 
role of the state which uses subsidies to redistribute income". The petition 
furthermore argued that this process `prepares the ground' for privatisation by 
making companies more profitable and attractive to foreign capital. They 
contrasted this state solution to their own anti-corruption policy which can 
"maintain low prices and provide good public services" (ibid). 
The third point called for the Colombian government to "respect justifiable 
social protest and the dignity of workers struggles against the use of the state's 
repressive apparatus used to push through privatisation". It calls for lives of the 
workers inside the occupation to be respected and that protesters should not be 
treated "as common delinquents", and become the target of violence as happens 
so regularly in Colombia and Latin America. The final point called for setting up a 
negotiation commission "made up of the Minister of the Interior, the Director of 
69 The public services in Cali are organised in 6 stratas. Stratas one to three, located in pooer areas, have 
subsidies while stratas 4 to 6 pay above the market rate, similar to a system of progressive taxation. The 
strata system for payment of public services was one of the 




National Planning, the Minister of Labour, various local authorities and 
organisations and Sintraemcali" (ibid). This can then "pave the way for a peaceful 
political solution and can put an end to the impasse brought about by the arbitrary 
actions of the national government and the Superintendent of Public Services". 
What we can see through an analysis of the Petition is the conscious linking 
up of the local conflict with the much broader global context of neo-liberal 
economic policy. This is done by linking processes of corruption and violence as 
being `part and parcel' of neo-liberal policy and pinpointing the role of the 
supranational institutions of the World Bank and IMF, with Argentina providing 
the immediate illustrative example. Further highlighted is the link between a 
corrupt national government and the interests of foreign capital and MNCs that 
would take away the `national patrimony' of the people of the region. This threat to 
the `national interest' is contrasted with the `peaceful' efforts of Sintraemcali to 
challenge corruption within the company, and calls on the community to engage in 
social protest to defend the company and its resources, legitimate acts that should 
not be `criminalised'. Furthermore, the call for a negotiation commission with 
high-level ministers of the government serves to discursively shift the conflict away 
from the `local' to the `national level'. Finally, by calling for a negotiation 
commission composed of "various local authorities and organisations and 
Sintraemcali it reframes the conflict away from one between Sintraemcali and the 
state, to one between the Cali community and its representatives alongside 
Sintraemcali. Noticeably absent from any of the petition demands is the issue of 
the jobs and rights of Emcali workers. This serves to reinforce the central 
argument that this was not a struggle about workers rights, but the rights of the 
citizens of Cali to affordable public services. 
As the conflict developed, each of the major financial points related to tariff 
increases and the more general financial situation in Cali would be fiercely debated 
over. However, the essential threads of the petition remained constant, and were 
crystallized into four key organizing slogans: no privatisation or liquidation of the 
company, a high level commission of inquiry into corruption, no price increases 
for the poorest sections of the community, and no penalisation of the `legitimate' 
Chapter Six 
189 
social protest engaged in by the community. What is clear from both the petition 
and the initial communique (Sintraemcali, 26/12/01; Campana Prohibido Olvidar, 
24/12/01) is the clear sense of the role of the trade union as defender of 
community and nation, rather than the defender of the `particular interests' of their 
membership -a clear reflection of the transformation of the culture of the trade 
union and its rationale. 
With the occupation secured, at least temporarily, and the demands laid out, 
the task of the trade union and its supporters was to then broadcast this to 
supporters following the networks of alliances built up over the preceding years 
(see Chapter Five). Crucial to this strategy was a pledge on behalf of the union that 
Sintraemcali's struggle was not against the people of Cali, and that, despite being in 
occupation, public utilities would continue to be provided normally (Sintraemcali, 
26/12/01). 
With all of the Sintraemcali leadership inside the occupation, Alexander 
Lopez nominated four of the five local trade unionists" and Jesus Gonzalez, 
national human rights director of the CU 71, as the official `voceros' 
(spokespeople) of the union and gave them license to begin negotiations with the 
government and build solidarity and support, acting as the bridge between 
government, community and Sintraemcali. 
6.3.3 Consolidating the Occupation and Expanding the Protest Space 
On the evening of the 25th of December, the first task of the `voceros' was 
to track down the local Mayor to ensure that force would not be used to enter the 
tower that night (Interview with Carlos Gonzalez, 2002, p. 7). As Carlos Gonzalez 
noted, these first days were the most difficult as people were away on holiday, and 
it was difficult to gain access to local and national officials. Meetings would take 
place in cars and at the most unusual times. The national government, believing 
70 Ariel Diaz, human rights officer of the CUT, who had been present at that first meeting was the only 
one who did not become a `vocero'. The reason for this is that he was to play a much more hands on role 
in the organisation and development of the Municipal Strike Command. Effectively, he was to become 
the chief spokesperson for the strike command. 
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that the trade union had made a strategic error to act at Christmas were attempting 
to avoid any contact: "I warned the government in an early meeting that time was 
on their side at the moment but after the 2nd of January it would be the trade 
union who would have time on their side and the national government would be 
pressing to resolve the conflict and regain administrative control of the company" 
and "effectively that was what happened" (ibid). 
On the 27th of December a humanitarian agreement was signed between 
the trade union, a delegate of the Ministry of Interior, and the Secretary of the 
Municipal government which agreed on the need for a negotiated solution to the 
conflict, that the government would not use force, and that food, medicine and 
health care could be provided to the workers inside the tower. This represented a 
major consolidation of the occupation, and for the first time allowed the `voceros' 
from the 28th of December onwards to enter and leave the CAM tower at will in 
order to facilitate the negotiations, thus providing a concrete link between the trade 
union inside the occupation and the other trade unions and the community outside 
(EI Occidente, 28/12/01; El Pais, 28/12/01) 72. 
6.3.4 Reconstituting the Municipal Strike Command 
On the 27th of December the Municipal Strike Command was relaunched 
(see Section 5.4,5.5). The meeting was attended by around 80 people (Interview 
with Martha Losada, 2002, p. 8; Interview with Arial Diaz, 2002, p. 5) and began 
with an explanation from the `voceros' on the conflict and the progress made to 
date. The attendees agreed to organise a Forum on Public Services outside the CAM 
Tower on the 4th of January, and plan towards two major events -a Municipal 
Strike in defence of Emcali, and a popular assembly where citizens could vote on 
the future of the company (Interview with Arial Diaz, 2002, p. 5). 
71 Despite being heavily involved in the early stages, Jesus Gonzalez would return to Bogota at the end 
of December top resume hios responsibilties with the CUT. 
72 In this editorial in the biggest newspaper in Cali, El Pais, entitled "the World Turned Upside 
Down", 
the writer ridiculed the fact that a `humanitarian commission' 




Each of these objectives required preparation, and a range of commissions 
were set up. The first commission was `press and publicity' who were charged with 
developing leaflets for the public events and arranging press conferences and 
liaising with the community, TV channels; the second commission was the `cultural 
commission' who were in charge of setting up and inviting local music and dance 
groups from local neighbourhoods to perform on the makeshift stage that would 
be constructed outside the CAM Tower, and the third commission was 
`convocatoria73' and this group would have free access to the Sintraemcali's 
telephones to contact local community leaders and activists and to build support 
for the different events. The commissions met daily to develop their activities 
(Interview with Axial Diaz, 2002, p. 5). 
In each of the commissions there was a balance between trade union and 
community activists reflecting the broader objectives of the `Strike Command' to 
unite workers and community. However, in this first meeting, question were raised 
as to the decision-making role of both the Strike Command and the local 
community. The first debate revolved around the autonomy of the Strike 
Command to make decisions and to act. Here it was agreed that despite working 
alongside Sintraemcali the trade union had to respect the autonomy of this `space' 
and involve it in the process of negotiations. While it was recognised that the 
`voceros' were part of the Strike Command, it was also noted that they were all 
trade unionists, and that all the decisions could not remain located within trade 
unionism. A proposal was therefore put forward that a further two `voceros' 
should be nominated from the `community representatives'. 'We believed that if 
we are here and we are struggling for something in partnership with the union, 
then we must have participation in the decision-making process" (Interview with 
Martha Losada, 2002, p. 9). It was later agreed that Martha Losada, the President of 
the `Junta de Accion Comunal' in a local neighborhood and Diego Padilla, 
President of the `Asociacion de juntas Administradoras Locales in another 
neighbourhood would be nominated as `voceros', and they have access to the 
CAM Tower throughout the dispute. 
73 The literal meaning of `convocatoria' is to summon people, or to call people. 
Chapter Six 192 
6.4 Towards a Community Communication Strategy 
6.4.1 Community Meetings 
Emanating from the strike command was a further decision relating to the 
importance of building up awareness amongst the local community. The strike 
command had two key methods with which to do this. The first stemmed from 
recognition that many of the poorest people in the city did not have the resources 
to travel by bus to the CAM Tower. It was agreed that "we had to go to the 
communes (sectors) and inform the people, and leave a little strike command in 
every place... in order to counter the information coming out of the traditional 
media (Interview with Martha Losada, 2002, p. 8). This decision meant that the 
`voceros' were travelling constantly to meetings in different neighbourhoods across 
the city. 
As Alberto Bejarano notes the `voceros': 
had the task of bringing the whole story to the community, and to generate an 
educational-political function of mobilizing the people. Oh! This was never 
ending. . . our 
team would be doing easily 7 or ,8 meetings a day (Interview with 
Alberto Bejarano, 2002, p. 9). 
Prior to these meetings a `pedagogy' was discussed of how to get across to 
the communities what was happening, what language to use, what were the key 
points: 
it was important politically and organizationally because these meetings were 
what mobilized the communities. It was a very intense and very interesting 
job, but also we have to say that it was a very big educational and 
pedagogical task, because you cannot just arrive in the communities with the 
same language that you use in a trade union meeting or in a political meeting. 
We had to reflect on our educational activities and think about how we would 
connect with the communities... we did a lot of work and we explored a range 
of ways of talking to the communities, to develop some workshops where we 
discussed the idea of `defending the public' and what was going on in the 
tower ... 
1 remember some activities that we carried out, about what was The 
public' and what was 'the private'. and what did a `public company' mean, and 
why we had to defend 'the public' Very interesting. . . and crucial and we 
carried on with these meetings afterwards (Interview with Alberto 
Bejarano, 
2002, p. 9). 
Here we can see the process of horizontalisation at work through a 
`politics 
of translation'. This entailed new strategies to address the 
differing expectations 
Chapter Six 193 
and realities of distinct communities. This politics of translation is not a purely a 
discursive shift, but a material one which necessitated the participation of the 
`community' in the decision-making process. While there remained tensions within 
this process new roles were being produced during these early stages to strengthen 
the `voice' of the communities in any future negotiations (Interview with Ariel 
Diaz, 2002, p. 18). 
6.4.2 Local Community Channels 
The second communication strategy was to utilise the community cable TV 
channels to gain access to the community. This was carried out not only through 
the `voceros' but also directly from the CAM Tower. Here the benefits of having 
taken control of the central administration offices of a communications company 
would become important. The trade union leadership was able to use a video-link 
up to connect to the satellite channels and broadcast there message directly. This 
means of communication was also used to talk directly to the Municipal Strike 
Command in several of their meetings at the trade union headquarters, and also to 
the British TUC, and to students in the local University. The leadership thus 
quickly embraced technology, and the possibilities that it provided for 
strengthening the occupation. 
6.4.3 The Stage of Dignity and Resistance 
The third communication strategy was more physically connected to the 
CAM Tower Occupation. This was the decision approved by the Mayor on the 
28th of December to set up a makeshift stage across the road from the CAM 
Tower. The day after the occupation began, speakers and an amplifier had been set 
up across the road from the occupation which played protest music, the national 
anthem and the Sintraemcali anthem, and a microphone was installed to 
facilitate 
informing the passers by of what was going on. The idea of creating a stage where 
musical and dance groups could perform was an extension of this, and aimed at 
integrating the occupation into the Cali Festival (Interview with Ariel Diaz, 2002, 
p. 12, see Picture 6), which was taking place 
in a range of sites across the city. It 
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became known as the `stage of dignity and resistance'. Strategically this initiative 
was aimed at encouraging local members of the community to come to the 
environs of the CAM Tower to listen to music and to celebrate the Cali Festival, 
but at the same time be exposed to the arguments of the trade union/ community 
alliance (ibid). 
These three strategies represented key planks of a counter-hegemonic 
communication strategy that posited itself against the dominant media within the 
city. As Alberto Bejarano notes : 
there was a fierce dispute, really strong at that moment, on winning over 
public opinion and of winning a place of interlocution within the city. That is to 
say that, from the alternative groupings - from the workers, from Sintraemcali, from the Strike Command, from the communities there was an open 
conflict ... not only over the Tower but over who told the story of what was happening in the tower. 
. . the elite, the national government and the elites in the city have the media in their favour. That is, in the media they have their 
trenches and we had several little trenches, not as powerful, but little trenches 
that let us develop (Interview with Alberto Bejarano, 2002, p. 5). 
These strategies were complemented by Sintraemcali's own media work 
6.5 Sintraemcali's media strategy 
Sintraemcali's own media strategy was headed up by the union's press 
department, led by Maria del Carmen, the union's press officer. From the 
beginning of the occupation she had organised the permanent presence of a video 
camera filming the events outside the occupation. Apart from recording the events, 
this also served as a psychological factor in restraining the police and military, who 
were conscious of being caught on camera using repressive measures (Interview 
with Maria del Carmen, 2002, p. 5). 
But the media strategy went beyond defensive attempts at preventing the 
use of force by the police and military to broader attempts at countering the 
discursive attacks on the trade union in the local and national media. Each morning 
at 6. am, Maria del Carmen would be in contact with Alexander Lopez, informing 
him of the day's news, and facilitating interviews with journalists. Press 
conferences were organised on a daily basis to counter information and accusations 
in the press. Particularly, in the early days of the occupation this was a difficult task, 
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but as the occupation continued Sintraemcali was able to gain important spaces 
within the media (ibid, p. 6). Crucial in this strategy was the ability of the trade 
union to counter accusations in the press that they were fighting for their own 
`particular' interest and not that of the community in general. Typical of this stance 
was an early editorial (El Tiempo, 27/12/01) where the author argues. "They 
(Sinlraemcalz) pretend to be fighting for the good of the city, but they are merely 
defending their own interests and precipitating the liquidation of Emcali". In 
response to these attacks the union, according to Maria del Carmen, had to 
produce a clear alternative narrative: 
we had to make it clear that the union was not fighting for a salary increase, 
that they weren't interested in anything in favour of their workers but more so 
that they were fighting for the community. To stop an increase in tariffs and to 
avoid the loss of the national patrimony of all Calenos... that they were 
defending the social role of the company and the social work that they were 
carrying out. This was crucial and in that aspect the media played an 
important role in this process (interview with Maria del Carmen, 2002, p. 8). 
According to Maria del Carmen, in this process it was important to have a 
`subtle strategy', `to pass information on at the right time to the right people', and 
to deal with the individual `personalities of the journalists'. Maria del Carmen knew 
all of the local journalists personally and through close contact was able on 
occasions to gain important spaces within the elite controlled media. Her ability to 
arrange direct contact with Alexander Lopez meant that the individual journalists 
had an interest in maintaining good relations with the union, which opened up 
possibilities for alternative voices to emerge in the press (ibid, p. 9). One clear 
example of this was an article that appeared prominently in the El Pais newspaper 
(06/01/02, Appendix 9). The article was written by one of the participants of the 
occupation inside the tower and apart from exploring the logistics of the 
occupation it presented the justification clearly and persuasively of the union's 
objectives. This marked a clear turning point in the ability of Sintraemcali to get its 
message broadcast to the population. 
6.6 Extending the physical terrain of the occupation 
While communication of the message of the trade union/ community 
alliance was crucial, it had as its objective the aim of mobilising communities and 
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strengthening and consolidating the occupation. In this sense, the construction of 
the `stage of dignity and resistance' served to consolidate and expand the physical 
terrain upon which opposition to the privatisation of public services was taking 
place. With the humanitarian agreement of the 27th of December came the 
necessity to feed the hundreds of workers inside the occupation. This led to the 
construction of a makeshift kitchen on the left side of the CAM Tower, staffed by 
a team of volunteers who would prepare breakfast, lunch and dinner for the 
workers inside. With the addition of the `stage of dignity and resistance', and the 
permanent security patrols around the perimeter of the area, the physical surrounds 
of the CAM Tower were being reframed and reshaped. Banners in support of the 
occupation adorned the 17 floors of the CAM Tower (see Picture 2), and were 
hung across the stage and the makeshift kitchen. In this manner the CAM Tower 
and its environs emerged as a focal point of the city, and provided a space for 
communities to gather, to chat, to exchange ideas and to show their solidarity. 
Each morning the workers were woken by the playing of the national 
anthem, the Sintraemcali anthem, the `Internationale' and the protest song `no nos 
moveran' (we shall not be moved). Periodically the road in front of the CAM tower 
would be blocked by supporters who would wave white hankies at the workers 
inside the tower. In this manner, the power of the community was tested against 
the power of the state. As the occupation developed from the first days of the 25th 
and 26th of December it also expanded outwards. By the end of December the 
environs were beginning to resemble a small village, an island of protest within the 
city expressing the ideas of the trade union/community alliance. Physically there 
was the presence of the community and the trade union together, aurally the 
protest songs blared out from the speakers. Visually, the trade union banners, and 
Colombian flags adorned the CAM Tower and the surrounding structures of the 
kitchen and the Stage of Dignity. On the adjoining annex to the CAM tower, 
which ran parallel to the third floor, the occupying workers would gather, with 
their masks on to hide their identity74, many of them draped in the Colombian 
flag 
(see Picture 3). All of this physical and visual restructuring of the occupation space 
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provided a means of communicating the message of the occupation, and providing 
security to prevent any attempted forced entry by the police and military. Figure 8 
below highlights the expansion of the occupation as it spread outwards over the 
first 4 days. 
Figure 6 The Layout of the CAM Tower Protest Zone 
6.7 Expanding the Occupation Transnationally 
While information had begun to be transmitted internationally from the 
opening moments of the conflict, more permanent communication was established 
upon the return of Berenice Celeyta, head of the Human rights department of 
Sintraemcali from Bogota on the 27th of December. Initial `urgent actions' were 
sent via the email contacts developed over previous years of solidarity work in the 
UK, Canada, the USA, Spain and Australia (see Chapter Five). In the United 
Kingdom, these documents were translated and redistributed through the range of 
contacts and electronic networks that the Colombia Solidarity Campaign had 
access to (Interview with Andy Higginbottom, 2002, p. 3). Furthermore, initial 
contact was begun in the UK with representatives of the TLJC and of UNISON, 
74 This was a decision of the Sintraemcali leadership to protect the identity of the workers inside the 
occupation for fear of later paramilitary reprisals. 
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the public service union that had supported Alexander Lopez during his temporary 
forced exile. 
Initial progress was slow due to the holiday period, but advances were made 
in early January. An article was published in the Morning Star (02/01/02), a 
newspaper read in leftwing trade union circles. The article explained the 
background to the occupation and called for a picket in support of Sintraemcali 
outside the Colombian Embassy on the 4th of January. Through email and 
telephone contact with a range of trade union contacts Andy Higginbottom, 
chairman of the Colombia Solidarity Campaign, and other members were able to 
begin the process of mobilising support via official letters from trade unions and 
sympathetic, left wing politicians calling on the Colombian government to resolve 
the conflict peacefully and to press for pickets outside the Colombian embassy in 
London. 
The practice of picketing had become a common tool of the Colombia 
Solidarity Campaign, but the first picket on the 4th of January, 2002 was 
strengthened by the presence of several high profile trade unionists and a labour 
member of Parliament. Jeremy Corbyn. Louise Richards and Mike Folliard from 
UNISON, and Gary Fabian from ASLEF met with Charge d'Affairs Juan Carlos 
Duran inside the embassy. The delegation called on the Colombian government to 
respect Sintraemcali's right to protest, and not use the police to forcibly enter the 
CAM Tower Occupation; and conveyed concerns of paramilitary threats against 
the trade union's leaders. The delegation emphasised support for the campaign to 
stop the privatisation of Emcali, and urged that in no event should prices of water 
and other domestic services be increased. Mr. Duran agreed to pass on these 
concerns to the Colombian authorities. Jeremy Corbyn MP called for a campaign 
of support for the occupation, "We see the Emcali occupation as part of the 
momentous struggle across the whole of Latin America and the world against the 
curse of privatisation" (Colombia Solidarity Campaign, 2002, p. 22). 
Through the work of Simon Steynes, International Officer of the TUC, a 
live video link-up was made for the 8th of January to coincide with the 
forum on 
public services that was 
being held outside the CAM Tower in Cali. The meeting 
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on the UK side was attended by several trade union leaders from UNISON and 
the TUC, and several Colombian political exiles and members of the Colombian 
Solidarity Campaign, UK. While there were technical hitches and delays on this 
first link-up, it nonetheless served to provide an important face-to face contact 
between the UK solidarity and trade union groups and the Sintraemcali leaders and 
workers during the dispute, and served as a catalyst for developing the solidarity 
work further (Colombia Solidarity Campaign, 2002, p. 23). 
In response to these early successes, the Colombian Solidarity Campaign 
organising corns-Bittee decided to mount a weekly picket for the duration of the 
occupation, to produce a special bulletin on the occupation, and to begin holding 
public meetings in London in solidarity. They also decided to raise funds for 
Sintraemcali, set up another live video link-up, and prioritise attempts to get the 
information out into the UK press (Colombia Solidarity Campaign, 2002, p. 23). 
One of the strategies to assist in this was to send a delegate from the UK to 
accompany the occupation and to keep the English speaking solidarity groups 
informed of events. This led to my own return to Cali on the 11th of January, 
2002, and to the daily eyewitness accounts that I produced from inside and outside 
the occupation until its termination (Novelli, 2002), and also to a quicker and more 
efficient system of translation into English of the `urgent actions'. The `urgent 
actions', communiques and eyewitness reports were widely circulated through a 
range of solidarity electronic networks and the `eyewitness accounts' were serialised 
in the Morning Star. This motivated wide-ranging solidarity, increased the amount of 
letters of protest being sent from different parts of the world, and strengthened the 
pickets outside the Colombian Embassy (see Appendix 10 for a sample of the 
solidarity messages). 
One further key event that consolidated the UK solidarity with the 
occupation was a further live video-link up between Sintraemcali leaders and the 
headquarters of the British TUC, Congress House on Thursday the 17th of January. 
On the UK side this was attended by Andy Gilchrist, President of the FBU, John 
Edmunds, President of the GMB, Mick Rix president of ASLEF, Alison Shepherd, 
national committee member of UNISON, Ken Cameron of Justice For Colombia 
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and Simon Steynes, International Officer TUC. The conference took place at 12.00 
midday Colombian time (6.00 pm UK time) in a highly charged atmosphere as 
friends stared at each other through a computer screen facilitating communication 
between two continents. Having secured my own entrance into the occupation the 
evening before, I was able to carry out the translation direct from the CAM Tower. 
During the course of the video-conference, UK and Colombian leaders exchanged 
their opinions on the increasingly deleterious effects of privatisation. Alexander 
explained the long struggle of Sintraemcali, which since 1994 had fought off 16 
attempts to privatise Emcali, and the price they had paid: the murders, the 
assassinations attempts and the forced exile of many workers. The demands of the 
union were simple, he said. "We are not fighting for higher wages, or better 
conditions. Quite the opposite, we are happy to work overtime for free to do what 
we can to defend the company" (Novell, 2002). In order to gain these demands, 
the union were prepared to do whatever they had to, including giving up their own 
lives. The British trade unionists one by one sent their messages of solidarity, and 
support, and the cry from Simon Steynes was "You are not alone" (see Picture 7). 
The UK union leaders agreed to support a demonstration outside the 
Colombian Embassy in London on the 25th of January, and write and issue 
statements of solidarity and support for the occupation and do what they could to 
pressure both the British government and the Colombian government to prevent a 
military solution to the occupation. Finally they agreed to raise and send money to 
Sintraemcali. These international activities would expand as the occupation 
developed. On the following day, the Manning Star ran a front page article covering 
the `historic meeting' serving to generate even more solidarity and support (Morning 
Star, 18/01/02). 
On the 25th of January, 2002, the TUC backed mass picket outside the 
Colombian embassy was well attended by prominent trade union leaders and 
activists (see Appendix 11). John Monks, general secretary of the TUC, along with 
the trade union leaders met with the Colombian ambassador Victor J Ricardo, and 
expressed their support for Sintraemcali and their concern for the safety of their 
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fellow trade unionists. After the meeting, John Monks reported back to the 
activists outside stating that the: 
Ambassador Victor Ricardo admitted that the British trade union leaders 
seemed to know more about the situation in Cali than he did, and he was 
even receiving faxes to brief him during the meeting. The ambassador had 
complained that the Prosecutor General had not informed him of what was happening on Alex's case, and promised to relay all the concerns expressed by the delegation back to Pastrana. John Monks was very firm that the TUC 
considers the situation in Cali of great concern to the trade union movement in Britain and internationally (Colombia Solidarity 2002a, p. 39). 
The fact that the Colombian ambassador appeared to know less than the 
UK trade union leaders was a clear vindication of the effectiveness of the channels 
of communication that had been set up, and the meeting in general reflected the 
high `official level' support that Sintraemcali had been able to develop during the 
course of the occupation. 
6.8 The Role of the Human Rights Team 
The final piece in the construction and consolidation of the episode of the 
CAM Tower occupation was the role of the Sintraemcali human rights team that 
provided a bridge across the different `spaces' of the occupation. Berenice Celeyta, 
head of the human rights department would play a range of coordinating roles 
negotiating both with local and national police and military, local government 
officials and international human rights organisations. She returned from Bogota 
on the evening of the 27th of December. As part of the humanitarian agreement 
signed that evening she was then able to enter the occupation. Immediately "we set 
about planning the things we had to do. First, to ensure that there wasn't a violent 
attempt at entry. Second, to strengthen the resolve of the workers inside the 
occupation and third, to ensure that the international community was kept 
informed and made statements in favour of Sintraemcali" (Interview with Berenice 
Celeyta, 2002, p. 19). 
Crucial in this process was to construct a discourse demonstrating the 
legitimacy of the direct action. From the headquarters of the Managing Director of 
Emcali, where Alexander Lopez had set up home, they began to draw up letters to 
be sent to the different state organisms (ibid) demonstrating the success of the 
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Plan PARE in addressing corrupt practices within the company, but also pointing 
out that the newly appointed Managing Director of Emcali Oscar Halim Reveiz 
was under investigation for corrupt practices in 1991 when he was employed as a 
middle ranking manager in Emcali. (El Tiemio, 26/12/01). Secondly, they raised 
the question of the legitimacy of the state to militarise the plants when making an 
administrative decision. The Commander of the local military denied that this was 
related to the change in Managing Director and stated that it was purely due to 
security concerns during the `Cali Festival' (Interview with Berenice Celeyta, 2002, 
p. 20). 
In understanding the role of the human rights strategy is its ability to work 
at a range of levels from local mediation and motivation to national and 
transnational activities. Unlike conventional understandings of human rights 
defence, the human rights department saw itself as playing a dual role. Firstly it 
worked through `official' structures of human rights defence such as the local and 
national people's defender (Defensoria del Pueblo), dealing with state organisms of 
control such as the Prosecutor General and the Controller General, mediating with 
local and national military and police, and international organisations such as the 
ILO, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. Secondly, its role was to 
strengthen `alternative mechanisms of human rights defence', which was the 
Occupation itself both internally within the CAM Tower and externally in the 
community, supporting the various protests and public meetings, and raising the 
morale of workers inside the CAM Tower and the workers and community outside 
the occupation (Interview with Berenice Celeyta, 2002, p. 20). 
In that sense, the human rights department and its activists cannot be 
understood as mere mediators, but active participants inside the conflict, that stood 
alongside workers and communities. Simultaneously, however, the `mediating' role 
with local, national and international state and non state organisms was also crucial, 
locating Sintraemcali's struggle within national and international human rights 
norms, and drawing upon the institutional power that these norms provide 
(see 
Chapter Six). Drawing on the human rights resources available can thus be seen as 
an alternative powerl source that 
functioned in a similar manner to electrifying and 
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guarding the doors - neither guaranteed security but they potentially provided 
some leverage and protection. 
6.8.1 Mediation and Monitoring 
Within the parameters of mediation and monitoring, the human rights 
department remained in permanent contact with the People's defender, with 
national police and military, and would intervene in attempting to prevent any 
violent entry into the occupation, and also to monitor the various mobilisations 
and demonstrations that developed. This would extend to contacts with Amnesty 
International, Human Rights Watch, the ILO, and the transnational advocacy and 
solidarity networks. 
Crucial in the process of mobilising the transnational human rights 
infrastructure was the role of the `urgent actions' generated from the human rights 
department from the outset of the occupation. These were written in the name of 
the National and International Human Rights Campaign Against Corruption, 
Privatisation, and the Cri finalisation of Social Protest - Forbidden to Forget 
(Campana Prohibido Olvidar) and signed by all of the affiliated organisations to 
provide discursive weight. Each UA would, after explaining the particular situation, 
have a set of demands, and a list of addresses for messages of protest to be sent via 
email or fax. The first was produced on the 24thof December in response to the 
militarization of Sintraemcali plants (Campana Prohibido Olvidar, 24/12/01). On the 
25thof December a further UA was sent out explaining the decision to occupy the 
CAM Tower (Campana Prohibido Olvidar, 25/12/01). Urgent Actions were then sent 
out documenting all of the human rights violations that took place during the 
period. 
These Urgent Actions covered situations such as attacks on workers on the 
25th December for attempting to pass food to those inside the occupation and a 
tear gas attack on workers outside the occupation on 26thDecember at 8 am where 
one worker was seriously injured (Campana Prohibido Olvidar, 25/12/01). They also 
documented the presence and threats of paramilitary organisations such as on the 
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2811, December in the Puerto Mallarin Area, where one of Emcali's plants is 
located, a paramilitary group were patrolling the outskirts of the plant late in the 
evening. Urgent Actions were also produced in response to verbal threats received 
by the trade union. For example on the 1St of January at 8.00pm the trade union 
headquarters received a call. The caller stated that 'We are calling on behalf of the 
`frente 44 de Cajibio Cauca (authors note: a paramilitary group) and we have more 
than 800 men to come and blow up the tower, the trade union, and the mayor". 
On the 12thof January 2002, at 10.00pm someone called the headquarters of the 
trade union asking for Alexander Lopez. When he was told that Alexander was not 
there he stated "tell those sons of bitches, that we are going to blow up that shitty 
trade union" (Campana Prohibido Olvidar, 16/01/02). 
Likewise, Urgent Actions were carried out in response to violent attacks 
such as that on the 10th of January, 2002 at 12.00pm when a small bomb went off 
outside the home of the Sintraemcali activist Sedilfredo Grueso, who was 
responsible for organizing the food for the workers inside the occupation. Urgent 
Actions were also produced on the detection of infiltrators in the surrounds of the 
CAM Tower such as on the 10thof January, when an armed man was apprehended 
outside the occupation wearing a Sintraemcali t-shirt, and attempting to mingle 
with the crowd. In the latter period of the occupation an `urgent action' was 
produced after a worker was shot by police outside the CAM Tower Occupation 
(Campana Prohibido Olvidar, 28/01/02), after city wide blockades were attacked by 
police (Campana Prohibido Olvidar, 24/01/02) and during the 2nd Occupation in 
Bogota (Campana Prohibido Olvidar, 28/01/02). Coupled with direct communication 
with state and international organisations the human rights department was able to 
pressure the Colombian government to moderate its behaviour and its response. 
Crucial here was the `public' nature of the CAM Tower occupation and the 
difficulties this posed for the government's ability to handle the situation in its 
favour. The local, national and transnational conduits of this information meant 
that the government's response always had to have one eye on the international 
impact of any action. 
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The role of the human rights department went beyond monitoring and 
mediating to include elements of motivating and mobilising. This stemmed from 
the human rights department's conception of direct action and mobilisation as 
being legitimate mechanisms of human rights defence. The human rights 
department discursively portrayed the worker/community alliance within the 
Urgent Actions as a movement of human rights and provided a language of 
justification that transcended the sectoral confines of trade union discourse. Indeed 
the department extended the language of human rights to the domain of broader 
struggles for social justice and the protection of the environment emerging globally 
against the effects of neo-liberal globalisation. 
The different and competing interpretations of human rights provided the 
possibility that different organisations both locally, nationally and transnationally, 
could support the CAM Tower occupation, without necessarily embracing the 
opposition to privatisation. For example the ILO, Amnesty International and 
Human Rights Watch could avoid reference to privatisation and merely focus on 
the international norms of mobilisation and protest. Likewise, the ICFTU and the 
UK TUC could frame their support in the context of what they termed opposition 
to "undemocratic privatisation" which presumably implies that `democratic 
privatisation' would be acceptable (ICFTU, 2002). This focus on human rights thus 
provided an amplification of the possibilities for solidarity allowing people the 
ability to opt in to solidarity without supporting all of the trade union's demands. 
Internally within the CAM Tower, there was a need for a more intensive 
process of motivation building. The workers had entered on Christmas day and all 
had left family and friends behind. Hence, popular education within the occupation 
became a crucial motivating factor. Workshops were arranged for those workers 
not on security duty, and a range of classes took place related to human rights and 
the struggle against neo-liberalism (Interview with Berenice Celeyta, 2002, p. 24). 
In 
this respect, the international solidarity that developed became an important 
factor 
in motivating the workers. A corridor on the wall of the 
5thfloor was adorned with 
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all of the messages of solidarity that had been received, and the international 
interest in the occupation raised the spirits of many inside. The messages also 
helped to concretise the fact that the workers were involved in a `historic' event 
that had captured the imagination of many people across the world as clearly 
demonstrated by the extensive geographical spread of messages of solidarity that 
were received (Interview with Wilson Bortes, 2002, p. 7; Interview with Asdrubal 
Gonzalo, 2002, p. 8). 
6.9 Mapping the Dynamics of the Occupation 
The range of different networks locally, nationally and transnationally, as 
highlighted above, carried within and between them a high degree of trust and 
bonds of allegiance - built up over previous years through the strategic pedagogy 
developed by the union. Furthermore, by the 28thof December, the `Space of the 
Occupation' was beginning to solidify and institutionalise itself. Routines were 
developed, both inside the CAM Tower and outside it. Outside protest music 
played, the road outside was regularly blocked by supporters. Families visited loved 
ones inside and waved at them from the barriers erected by the police, food was 
prepared, security shifts coordinated, and political speeches were made. Inside a 
similar process had emerged as the CAM Tower became both work and home. 
Each worker carried out their required shifts, and spent their leisure time on the 
computers or relaxing on the terrace roof on the third floor of the CAM Tower 
which was renamed `Panza' after a popular touristic site on the edge of the city 
where families spend their weekends. Political education meetings were held, even 
English language and computer classes (Interview with Claudia Caritas, 2002, p. 8). 
Yet nobody involved in the Sintraemcali/Community alliance wanted to 
`normalise' the situation, and many workers were anxious and worried as to the 
reason why little progress had been made in the negotiations, and the government 
continued to distance itself from any contact. For that reason I want to now turn 
to the dynamics of the occupation and the negotiations to show how these 
networks reacted with the social forces intent on pushing through the process of 
privatisation in Emcali developed during the course of the 36 days to gather a 
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momentum that eventually forced the government to back down and accept the 
trade union's core demands. 
6.10 The politics of survival 
The dynamics of the 1St stage of the occupation develops from the analysis 
above of the consolidation and construction of the occupation in a difficult 
conjunctural situation. In essence the early days were dictated by the ability of the 
national government to avoid the issue. This produced an uneasy stand off 
between workers and police that in the early days occasionally erupted into 
confrontation. On both the 25thand the 26th of December riot police had used tear 
gas on workers attempting to pass food to those inside the CAM Tower. After the 
humanitarian agreement had been signed this problem was partially resolved with 
food now allowed to enter the CAM tower three times a day. However, this new 
scenario produced its first incident when police allegedly found several bullets 
hidden within a food package at 6.00pm on the 29th of December (El Occ dente, 
31/12/01). 
The trade union immediately denied any involvement and accused the 
police of sabotage. The resulting dispute led to an agreement drawn up with the 
Mayor to create an independent commission to monitor the food going in to the 
CAM Tower. Whatever the truth of this matter, its production and dissemination 
within the media both raised the tension in the city and raised questions as to the 
activity and intentions of the trade union. The tension produced by the incident led 
to other rumours that the police and military might be planning a forced entry into 
the Tower on the 31st of December, to take advantage of the likelihood that few 
people would be present in the surrounds of the CAM Tower75 (Interview with 
Alberto Bejarano, 2002, p. 19). 
In order to prevent any attempted violent assault on the CAM Tower the 
leadership called on communities to spend their New Years Eve accompanying the 
workers outside the occupation. Preparations were quickly made for the provision 
75 Christmas Eve is traditionally spent at home with famillies in Colombia. 
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of food for the celebrations and tables were set up along the Avenida Colombia. 
Thousands of people turned up to support the occupation and joined the `table of 
dignity and peace' and the event passed off peacefully. For most of the workers 
inside the occupation this was the most difficult day, and marked a turning point in 
the occupation. For the workers inside the CAM Tower this was the first time they 
had spent New Years Eve away from their families. In many of the interviews with 
the workers involved in the occupation, this day is discussed with great emotion. 
They recall how Alexander Lopez had visited each floor of the building and wished 
every one well for the New Year and reassured them that they were doing 
something `historic', something `for the future of their children' and for the 
`country', something that one day they would be thanked for. They describe their 
emotion at seeing the amount of people that had gathered (Interview with Carlos 
Guttierez, 2002, p. 4; Interview with Claudia Caritas, 2002, p. 6). Maria del Carmen 
notes how surprised she was to return at 11.30pm to find the streets full of 
supporters "the most emotional thing was to see new faces that weren't family or 
friends of the workers inside, not political leaders or activists, just normal everyday 
people, people that had no direct connection with what was going on" (Interview 
with Maria del Carmen, 2002, p. 8). 
At midnight Alexander Lopez addressed the crowds (see 12) and made a 
powerful speech vindicating the `heroism' and `courage' of those engaged in the 
occupation both inside and outside. For Alberto Bejarano, this began the shift 
towards the union. Alexander's speech that night "brought the conflict into the 
souls of the people, the dignity of the people struggling against massive odds for a 
more just society", an event that "is part of the great moments of struggle in the 
history of the Valle de Cauca region" (Interview with Alberto Bejarano, 2002, p. 4). 
Many of those interviewed have stories to tell of that night, the conflicting and 
powerful emotions that went with the day. Several of the workers tell of special 
moments, such as when they passed a telephone out to the police to allow them to 
call their families and wish them well for the New Year {Interview with 
Wilson 
Bortes, 2002, p. 6, also reported in El Occidente, 02/01/02). 
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All of these events have important strategic and pedagogic implications, 
perhaps most importantly in understanding how a potentially dangerous and 
violent threat was turned into an evening of solidarity and optimism, the 
transformation of a threat into an opportunity to strengthen the processes of 
resistance already there. More broadly, the events of New Year's Eve can be seen 
as an example of the wider cultural battle taking place over the privatisation of 
public services in the city. The trade union through this `war of position' were 
winning the hearts and minds of many citizens. Despite the consolidation of the 
occupation both physically and in the battle of ideas, virtually no progress had been 
made in the negotiations in that first week of the occupation. As the New Year 
began, the momentum would start to run in the trade union/ community alliances 
favour and the second phase of the occupation would begin which would provide 
the impetus for negotiations. 
" The CAM Tower Occupation: Phase 2 
6.11 2nd January to 30t" January - mobilizing for negotiation 
In the second phase of the occupation, a shift in focus occurred from the 
defensive consolidation of the occupation to its expansion across the city and 
beyond. But the process was not without its setbacks and tensions, both within the 
Sintraemcali/Community alliance, between that alliance and the Mayor, and most 
obviously between these forces and the Colombian state that was reluctant to 
concede to local demands, and even more reluctant to have contact with 
Sintraemcali. These problems were compounded by the deteriorating political 
situation in the country. On several occasions, the internal civil war would intrude 
and effect the movement of opposition to privatisation in Cali and blur the borders 
between the social and the political conflict, actively assisted by local elites and 
military leaders who were only too happy to have all opposition in Colombia 
labelled as insurgents and `suitably' dealt with. 
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Despite continued government reluctance to engage with the demands of 
the workers, the union pressed on. On the 2nd of January the first mass rally was 
held outside the CAM Tower, organized by the Municipal Strike Command which 
attracted over 3,000 people. Inside, several local councillors and Members of the 
Colombian Congress met over 2 days and signed a declaration acknowledging the 
success of the Emcali administration over the previous 8 months and calling on the 
Colombian government to pay its 80% share for the PTAR water treatment plant 
(El Occidente, 03/01/02). 
The Colombian government, however, continued to refuse to negotiate 
with Sintraemcali and instead opted to begin negotiations with the Mayor. He 
travelled to Bogota on the 2nd of January, but returned with little more than the 
announcement that a meeting would be held in Cali between the trade union, the 
local government and the national government on the 8th of January (El Pais, 
03/01/02). On the 4th of January a `Forum on Public Services' was held in the 
environs of the CAM Tower, attended by several thousand members of the 
community. Juan Manuel Pulido, the sacked Managing Director of Emcali spoke 
in defence of the financial viability of Emcali and pledged support to the trade 
union (see Picture 8). Despite being invited, no government representative 
attended the forum. Those present agreed on a one-day civic strike in defence of 
public services provisionally scheduled for the end of January (El Pais, 05/01/02). 
On the same day a major breakthrough in the traditional press occurred with the 
publication of a full-page article written by one of the participants inside the 
occupation (El Occidente, 04/01/02). This was followed by another full-page article 
that appeared in El Pais (06/01/02- see Appendix 9). Both articles provided 
justification for the occupation and presented the `human' side of the story76. 
The first clear sign of a breakthrough occurred on the 5th of January with 
the newly appointed Managing Director of Emcali offering 
his resignation (El 
76 in the El Occidente article the occupation is compared to the Paris Commune, while 
in the second 
article the events of New Years 
Eve are firmly located within notions of patriotism and the defence of 
public goods. 
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Occidente, 05/01/02)". While there was a long way to go, we can clearly see in these 
early days in January a notable shift in the dynamics of the events. On the 6th of 
January the Controller General Carlos Ossa Escobar, stepped into the debate and 
made a public statement recognizing that the financial situation in Emcali had been 
greatly improved during the previous seven months (El Pais, 07/01/02) and 
followed this up on the 8thof January by publicly criticizing the Superintendent of 
Public Services handling of the Emcali situation (El Occzdente, 09/01/02). Divisions 
within the Colombian state were appearing. 
6.11.2 Negotiations Begin 
This changing scenario meant that the first real negotiations between the 
trade union, the local Mayor and the Colombian government took place in an 
environment where the trade union appeared to be gaining political momentum. 
On the 8thJanuary, negotiations coincided with a march and mass assembly outside 
the CAM Tower organised by the Municipal Strike Command (see Picture 9). A 
live video link-up was also made between workers inside the CAM Tower and the 
British TUC during the event which served to raise the profile of the occupation. 
Simultaneously, negotiations were being held in the Hotel Pacifico between the 
trade union, local government and national government representatives78. During 
the mass assembly, some community leaders called for a demonstration outside of 
the Hotel Pacifico. In response nearly a hundred people travelled to the south of 
the city. The demonstration outside the hotel caused the Manager to ask the 
negotiators to leave the premises. Negotiations resumed in the `Fez' (Cali Cultural 
Centre) in the centre of the city and within an hour the demonstrators had 
regrouped outside. During these negotiations the Sintraemcali negotiating team 
demanded that two members of the local community were included in the 
negotiations. Patricia Molino and Diego Padilla, the Municipal 
Strike Command 
community representatives were later allowed to enter the negotiations. 
The 
77 This emerged the day after the Superintendent of Public Services 
had stated that he may be willing to 
review his appointment of Reveiz 
(El Pais, 04/01102). 
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negotiations however broke up after 17 hours without agreement. The government 
delegates returned to Bogota. In an interview with El Pais newspaper (El Pais, 
10/01/02) the Superintendent of Public Services stated that Sintraemcali wants an 
agreement on the PTAR but that he was unable to give that suggesting "the 
President will fire me". Alexander Lopez (EI Occzdente, 10/01 /02) argued that there 
was a possibility for more negotiations but that the PTAR water treatment plant 
remained the key obstacle to progress. 
6.11.3 Negotiating Positions and Alliances 
The process of negotiation from January onwards can be understood within 
the context of two broad competing blocks: the national government and the local 
council/trade union/community alliance. Within the Cali alliance, while all three 
representative sections agreed on the importance of maintaining Emcali as a public 
service company there were strong disagreements over other key demands and 
tactics. This division was particularly evident between the `community' 
representatives and the Mayor. The Mayor of Cali criticized the presence of the 
`community' delegates as he saw himself as a representative of the community 
(Interview with Marta Losada, 2002, p. 19; Interview with Arial Diaz, 2002, p. 16). 
The Colombian government was in agreement with this, but extended the 
argument to challenging the legitimacy of the presence of Sintraemcali as well. 
Hence, when the talks broke down on the 8th of December, the government 
invited the Mayor to negotiations in Bogota on the 14th of January, 2002, but not 
the trade union or the community representatives (E/ Occidente, 14/01/02). One 
can clearly note a shift in the relationship between the Sintraemcali/community 
alliance on the one side and the local mayor on the other from that point on". The 
Mayor returned from Bogota on the 14th of January with an agreement ready to 
sign to resolve the situation. The Mayor announced that subject to the successful 
78 Alexander Lopez, Luis Hernandez and Harold Biafra (Leaders of Sintraemcali) received permission to 
leave and re-enter the CAM Tower on the 7th of January to prepare for the negotiations the 
following 
day. 
79 Here the role of Jon Maro Rodriguez, can be understood in the context of the classic Latin America 
populist leader, who vacillates between opposing 
forces, attempting to please everyone but ultimately 
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renegotiation of the company debt with creditors, the Colombian government had 
agreed to hand back control of Emcali to the Cali Municipal Authorities (El 
Occidente, 15/01/02). However, the union/community alliance rejected the 
agreement because it failed to force a clear commitment on the government to pay 
its 80% share of the PTAR, which they saw as crucial to the company's survival (El 
Occidente, 17/01/02). 
6.7 7.4 Mobilising for negotiating space 
From the 8th onwards, the tension between the Mayor and the 
Sintraemcali/Community alliance erupted into open conflict. The planned march 
for the 11thof January called by the Municipal Strike Command was declared illegal 
by the Mayor. His rationale for banning the march was the precarious situation of 
the Peace Process, but many local leaders suspected other intentions and a shift in 
the position of the Mayor (Interview with Alexander Lopez, 2002, p21). In visible 
defiance the march went ahead and was attended by over 10,000 people chanting 
"with permission, without permission, the march has taken place" (El Tiempo, 
12/01/02; El Occidente, 12/01/02). 
The emergence of a rift between the mayor and the 
Sintraemcali/community alliance was made more serious due to escalating tension 
within the city. On the 10th of January the bomb outside the home of Sigilifred 
Grueso and the increasing amount of paramilitary threats received by Sintraemcali 
led to fears of an outbreak of violence. This was exasperated when a paid 
advertisement was placed in the Cali newspaper by the major local 
business 
federations calling for the workers in the CAM Tower occupation to 
be forcibly 
removed. Sintraemcali issued a statement rejecting the violent intentions of the 
Cali 
business community and called for a peaceful negotiated solution to the conflict 
(El Ocddente, 15/01/02a; El Pais, 17/01/02). 
Despite increased tension, there were also further encouraging 
breakthroughs within the media and its mode of reporting. On the 17thof January, 
losing trust on both sides. Some interviewees suggested that the Mayor 
became afraid of the 
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El Pais, (17/01 /02a) published an article presenting evidence that the government 
signed an agreement in July 1995 promising to pay 80% of the cost of the PTAR. 
On the following day a further article was published in El Tiempo (18/01/02), 
providing evidence that President Pastrana pledged on two occasions during his 
election campaign to pay the 80% share of the PTAR. Both of these articles served 
to weaken the moral legitimacy of the Colombian government and vindicate the 
trade union/community alliance. 
6.11.5 Back to Broader Negotiations 
On the 19th of January, negotiations began again in Cali between the 
Colombian government, the local government, Sintraemcali and community 
delegates (see Picture 10). These negotiations, however, took place in the shadow 
of the potential break down of the Peace Process between the FARC and the 
Colombian government. While the collapse of the `peace process' had been present 
in the background from the beginning of the occupation, by the 10th of January 
onwards, it had begun to influence it more intensely. From that date Colombian 
military troops had begun to head towards the `zone of distension' in the Southern 
area of Caguän and widespread tension over future of Colombia dominated the 
media (El Occidente, 10/01 /02). In response to threats of increased military conflict 
new security measures had been introduced in the major cities, giving increasing 
power to the military (El Occzdente, 11/01/02). While a final collapse of the peace 
process had been avoided already on two occasions (El Occzdente, 15/01/02) the 
negotiations in Cali took place 24 hours ahead of a further deadline that threatened 
to send the country into an escalation of the civil war. 
Negotiations ended on 20th of January with some progress on the PTAR 
issue. The Sintraemcali/Community alliance, however, required concrete 
guarantees on this and that the company would not be privatised and that there 
would be no price increases. The trade union, as a major concession, had agreed to 
give back all the working hours lost during the occupation (El Occidente, 21/01/02). 
The government had become deeply frustrated by the events of the previous four 
consequences of standing up to the 
Colombian government and/or appearing too close tyo Sintraemcali. 
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weeks and appeared to be seeking a way out. According to the Mayor, the 
government had agreed unofficially to provide 80% of the funding for the PTAR, 
which would facilitate most of the union's demands, but refused to put this in 
writing. Politically they could not afford a public defeat. The union/ community 
alliance however refused to accept any verbal agreements and demanded written 
conformation of all commitments (ibid). 
The follow-up meeting scheduled for the 21st was however postponed 
once again due to the collapse of the peace process (El Pais, 22/01/02). On the 
same day the Mayor increased the pressure on Sintraemcali to leave the CAM 
Tower, arguing that the occupation was impeding the resolution of the Emcali 
conflict (El Pais, 22/01 /02a) Meanwhile in Cali a local march of artists and theatre 
groups in defence of public services is held in the city and attended by over 5,000 
people (El Occidente, 23/01/02). Despite renewed optimism the situation remained 
tense. 
6.11.6 Raising the cost of delays 
The increasingly strained relationship between the Mayor and the trade 
union/ community alliance, would in the final 10 days of the occupation, be 
stretched to the limit. The Mayor was clearly under pressure from local elites, both 
to resolve the crisis in Emcali and distance himself from the trade union. Several 
attacks on the Mayor appeared in the press (El Tiempo, 23/01/02). 
Meanwhile, 
momentum was gathering to raise the temperature within the city and push 
forward the negotiations with blockades planned for the 24th and a civic strike 
for 
the 28th. On the 24thof January the Municipal strike command and the trade union 
supported a 6-hour blockade of all the major entrances and exits to 
the city, 
paralysing Cali. For the first time during the occupation, the 
financial life of the city 
had been seriously disrupted (El Occidente, 25/01/02). 
The response the following morning was very hostile to the perceived 
`abuse of power' of the union. A range of prominent 
business people were 
interviewed in an El Tiempo article (25/01/02) denouncing the trade union. 
On the 
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same day the Mayor of Cali announced that the FARC had called for an armed 
strike in the South West of the country that `coincided' with the planned `civic 
strike' by Sintraemcali and the Municipal Strike Command. In response he 
announced a series of security measures from 6.00pm on Sunday evening until 
6.00am on Tuesday morning. These included a ban on all alcohol sales, meetings, 
marches and demonstrations, the deployment of troops at all public buildings, the 
restriction of movement of vehicles, and a ban on the carrying of firearms. Two 
extra military Battalions would be brought in to the city. 
The effect of these announcements was to start to build a discursive link 
between the armed insurgency of the FARC and the Sintraemcali/community 
alliance in Cali. Sintraemcali and the Municipal Strike Command immediately 
postponed the civic strike and made public statements refuting any link between 
the trade union/community alliance and the armed insurgency. Despite these 
statements, the major newspapers in Cali ran stories the following day, which 
implied that the `armed strike' called by the FARC, and the `civic strike' were 
related. In the daily El Pais newspaper it stated that: 
A terrorist plan to destabilise the city through road blocks, the occupation of 
churches, public Buildings and other buildings as part of a civic strike 
endorsed by the Emcali workers union was discovered yesterday by the 
authorities (E! Pais, 26/01/02). 




trade union organisations and armed groups at the margin of the 
law are behind the calling of the civic strike... "(ibid). 
These kinds of comments appeared in many newspapers (c. £ El Tiempo, 
26/01/02) and on the radio and television and despite attempts to counter the 
claims (El Occidente, 27/01/02), the accusations had succeeded in raising the fear of 
those inside and outside the CAM Tower as to what would happen on Monday 
when negotiations were scheduled to begin in Bogota and Cali would be under 
conditions of virtual martial law. The events in Cali, and the general atmosphere 
brought about by the collapsing Peace Process meant that the situation over the 
weekend of the 26th and 27th of January had become increasingly tense. 
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The negotiating commission from Cali including Alexander Lopez, Luis 
Hernandez, Carlos Gonzalez and Martha Losada left for Bogota early in the 
morning of the 28th of January. Before they had arrived they had already received 
a message saying that the Superintendent of Public Services was to cancel the 
meeting. But the Superintendent of Public Services was to have his own shock and 
disappointment that morning when over a hundred workers that had travelled up 
to Cali several days before took over his headquarters, and the 
Sintraemcali/Community alliance played its last strategic card. 
The workers took over the building at 9.00 am (see Appendix 13 for 
background to the organisation of this second occupation). They entered in 
groups, their faces covered, asking the workers to leave the building and disarming 
the security guards (Interview with Maria Durana, 2002, p. 6). Luis Imbache, one of 
the leaders of Sintraemcali, went immediately to the office of the Superintendent, 
who, according to one eyewitness, appeared both shocked and relieved. Shocked 
that his headquarters had been taken over, but relieved when the masks revealed 
trade unionists and not members of the major guerrilla organisations the FARC 
and the ELN. The superintendent remained with three of his secretaries, as 
everyone else was quickly escorted from the building (Interview with Liliana 
Merce, 2002, p. 9). 
Once the workers had left the group began to organise themselves. 
Communication was maintained via two-way radios. They also quickly found the 
security room which controlled all the security cameras/monitors in the building. 
Within fifteen minutes they had taken control of a government building in the 
heart of the capital, the headquarters of the Superintendent of Public Services or as 
the occupiers would call it "the headquarters of privatisation and corruption in the 
country" (Interview with Luis Hernandez, 2002, p. 23). Outside, trade unionists 
from the electricity union of Bogota. (ETB) and water workers from Aqueductos 
de Bogota had encircled the building to provide a cordon of protection for those 
inside. Berenice Celeyta began immediately communication with the Human Right 
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agencies and state organisms. Very soon, armoured tanks and elite forces arrived, 
positioning snipers on adjacent buildings, and treating the situation as an armed 
hostage crisis. They were followed by the media and two journalists, one from 
RCN and the other from Caracol television networks were allowed into the 
occupation by the Sintraemcali/Community leaders on condition that they 
remained until the conclusion of the dispute, however long that might take 
(Interview with Berenice Celeyta, 2002, p. 26). 
Those early moments for Liliana were the most terrifying; the sight of the 
snipers, the tanks and the amount of police everywhere was almost too much to 
cope with. For Liliana this was very different from the occupations in Cali. There 
they knew their terrain, and had at least some faith in the agreements drawn up to 
ensure against a violent ending to the occupation. In Bogota there were no such 
guarantees, and the environment was unfamiliar, they just had to keep their faith in 
the leadership and in the correctness of what they were doing (Interview with 
Liliana Merce, 2002, p. 11). 
Alexander Lopez was allowed entry to the building at a little after 12pm and 
negotiations began with the Superintendent of Public Services in an environment 
of mutual hostility (Interview with Alexander Lopez, 2002, p. 23). By around seven 
in the evening a deal had been made between the trade union and the 
Superintendent to allow him to leave on condition that the military/police did not 
attempt a forced entry. As he left, Liliana described the torrent of abuse that he 
was subjected to as "the most vulgar words you can imagine" by the workers inside 
the occupation. Before he left, his briefcase was searched, and several documents 
were taken from him (these documents would become crucial bargaining chips in 
the final negotiations). Once he had left the atmosphere outside changed. Suddenly 
more police arrived, and there were snipers everywhere with their infra-red sights 
activated (interview with Berenice Celeyta, 2002, p. 25). 
Suddenly, a tank began heading towards the building and attempted to enter 
through the basement. Meanwhile, tear gas was fired into the building. As the 
teargas burned the workers eyes they ran around sharing cloths with vinegar to 
protect them. In the basement the men pushed cars from the car park up the steep 
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hilly exit to block the tank (ibid, p. 11). Throughout the building, there was 
complete chaos, "all of us armed with whatever we could get our hands on, and 
ready to fight it out. ... 
The soldiers were ready for combat, and so were we, and we 
said that we are here and we are going to move forward. The tank attempted three 
times to break down the gate to the basement, but then withdrew" (Interview with 
Liliana Merce, 2002, p. 11). 
At the same time, Berenice Celeyta was contacting the human rights organs 
of the Colombian state and had managed to halt the assault. A little later on, 
Alexander Lopez emerged from upstairs and told everyone that final negotiations 
would take place the following day and they were now going to leave the building. 
The buses later entered into the building and workers, with the curtains closed, and 
masks still on, emerged from the basement, singing defiantly as they filed past the 
riot police who had come so close to entering the building. The following day the 
workers left for Cali as the negotiations began in earnest between the Colombian 
government and the Sintraemcali/Community alliance. 
6.11.8 The Final Negotiations 
The following morning negotiations took place between the trade union, 
the Mayor and the Colombian government. Carlos Gonzalez of the 
Sintraemcali/Community alliance negotiating team recounts how surprised he was 
that prior to the commencement of the meeting, one of the Ministers asked the 
Sintraemcali leaders to call their friends in England and tell them to leave Victor G 
Ricardo (UK Ambassador to Colombia) alone, because President Pastrana "had his 
head full of all this" and wanted an end to the hostility coming from England 
(Interview with Carlos Gonzalez, 2002, p. 12). This had a big impact on Carlos: 
We knew that the comrades from the Colombia Solidarity Campaign were 
carrying out some intense work, but we never expected it to come to fruition at 
that moment... ) Carlos Gonzalez am a witness to that ... that 
lead me to be 
very clear that effectively this was a good reason to work towards 
strengthening further the international solidarity work (ibid, p 12). 
80 
80 Carlos Gonzalez has since visited the UK on several occasions and Sintraunicol is now involved in 
developing a major campaign for the defence of human rights in the university sector in Colombia: See 
Colombia Solidarity Campaign website for further details: www. colombiasolidarily. org. uk. 
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But the international pressure was but a small part in the whole strategy that 
had come to fruition during the 36 days and had been complimented by no small 
amount of luck. The documents taken from the Superintendent of Public Services 
the day before proved to be highly useful. The contents of these documents 
extended to several things, including corruption at the highest level of government 
and evidence that dealt with agreements with several MNCs on the privatisation of 
Emcali. There was also a letter proving that it was the Superintendent of Public 
Services that had ordered the Colombian military on the 24th of December to 
militarise all the Emcali work-plants-breaking legal and constitutional mechanisms 
that necessitated this pass through the Mayoral office. 
The documents meant that the Superintendent of Public Services, normally 
a belligerent and aggressive character, was transformed. According to Carlos 
Gonzalez, " He was a man defeated, broken... he had his head down and accepted 
all the conditions that the trade union demanded" (Interview with Carlos 
Gonzalez, 2002, p. 16). Within two hours an agreement had been signed which 
satisfied the main demands of the trade union/ community alliance. 
The key points of the agreement were laid out in a powerful communique 
release by the trade union the following day entitled: 'We Covered Our Faces So 
That We Could Be Seen" (see Appendix 1): 
1. No liquidation or privatisation of Emcali and maintaining its character as an 
Industrial and Commercial State Corporation. 
2. No increase in charges for public services above those already set in 
Emcali's budget for 2002. 
3. An optimum solution to guarantee the continuity, operation and functioning 
of PTAR [waste water project] with the national government seeking to 
minimise its impact on the finances of Emcali E. I. C. E E. S. P. and the user 
community. 
4. No administrative, disciplinary, criminal or financial measure to be taken 
against a worker, and payment of wages for the time of the permanent 
assembly [occupation]. 
5. Commitment to convene a public hearing to inform the citizens of Cali about 
the corporation's situation and future. " 
At 6. OOpm the hundreds of workers inside the occupation left the building, 
their faces covered by the balaclavas that had become the defining symbol of the 
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occupation. 81 The occupation was over, the transnational movement in defence of 
public services in Cali had won (see Picture 11). 
6.12 Conclusion 
The CAM Tower Occupation, as described above, was an intense 
laboratory of social struggle and contestation. Its conclusion was also to set off a 
new chain of events that culminated several months later in the election of the then 
President of Sintraemcali, Alexander Lopez, to the Colombian Congress as a 
member of the Social and Political Front. Two things stand out in the analysis of 
the CAM Tower occupation, the first is the personal risk and sacrifice that so many 
people were prepared to undertake in the defence of public services. This I believe 
is clearly rooted in the cultural transformation of the union, and its ability to 
motivate a collective sense of responsibility for defending the `public'. 
Understanding and explaining this commitment needs to be located not only in the 
new ethical morality that the trade union developed, and its transformation of the 
work force from workers to defenders of Emcali, but also in an understanding of 
the role that the politics of state terror plays in producing its mirror image `a 
dignity in resistance'. It is hard for many people to understand, or believe, that 
these workers were ready to lay down their lives if necessary in the defence of 
public services. However, as an unpredicted consequence of the terrible repression 
and brutality of state and para-state forces, a beautiful dignity and resolve emerged 
and was present inside and outside the CAM Tower. That trust and solidarity 
transcended national borders and resulted in remarkable acts of sacrifice and 
energy of working class people united in their refusal to accept the decision of 
national government. 
The second thing that is immediately apparent through the entire episode of 
the CAM Tower occupation is the range of scales upon which the strategy for the 
defence of Emcali was built on, from the local poor communities, to the local 
81 The night before, a message had been sent out by the union to call for all of the supporters to come to 
the CAM Tower wearing jeans and white or yellow T-Shirts. As the occupiers merged with the awaiting 
crowd, they removed their balaclavas and 
disappeared into the vast swathes of people that had gathered 
around them. 
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council, to the national and transnational domains. The tactics tested and tried the 
patience of the Colombian government utilising a range of alternative power 
sources to push its demands through. This ultimately became too much for the 
Colombian government and they retreated. In the next chapter I will explore in 
greater detail how Sintraemcali had developed such a comprehensive multi-scalar 
and committed strategy through an exploration of the strategic pedagogy that had 
guided its development. 
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How can we make sense of Sintraemcali's transformation? And what we 
can we draw out of it to contribute both to Sintraemcali's further development and 
towards the refinement of a pedagogy of resistance embedded within a broader 
sociology of rebellion? In this chapter I want to address these questions and 
highlight how Sintraemcali managed to develop a counter-hegemonic strategy that 
works on and between the contradictions and effects of neo-liberal globalisation as 
it manifests itself in Colombia. This counter-hegemonic project, explored in the 
last two chapters, produced a network of solidarity links that transcended 
local/global boundaries, linked up a range of sites of resistance containing 
differential capacities and resources that the union could access and alternative 
ways of knowing, learning and acting that could be deployed. Drawing on Kevin 
Cox's conceptualisation of `Spaces of Dependence' and `Spaces of Engagement' 
(1998) I will highlight a way of theorising the interrelationship between the 
different scales of Sintraemcali's activity and the strategic way that Sintraemcali was 
able to operate. 
7.2 Networks and Scale 
In Cox's (1998) paper on `Spaces of Dependence and Spaces of 
Engagement' he discusses the politics of scale by making an analytical distinction 
between `spaces of dependence'-spaces that are to be defended and strengthened, 
and `spaces of engagement'-which are sites which 
different social actors draw 
upon to defend a `space of 
dependence': 
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Spaces of dependence are defined by those more-or-less localized social 
relations upon which we depend for the realization of essential interests and for which there are no substitutes elsewhere; they define place-specific 
conditions for our material well being and our sense of significance. These 
spaces are inserted in broader sets of relationships of a more global character 
and these constantly threaten to undermine or dissolve them. People, firms, 
state agencies, etc., organize in order to secure the conditions for the 
continued existence of their spaces of dependence but in so doing they have 
to engage with other centers of social power, local government, the national 
press, perhaps the international press, for example. In so doing they construct 
a different form of space which I call here a space of engagement: the space 
in which the politics of securing a space of dependence unfolds. This may be 
at a more global scale than the space of dependence, as per the idea of 
jumping scales' but it may not be (Cox, 1998, p. 2). 
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In the case of Sintraemcali's struggle for the defence of public services we 
can locate a series of `spaces of engagement' upon which the defence of the local 
was conducted. These different spaces of engagement, at a range of scales from the 
local to the global, can be understood as forming a network strategically developed 
to defend the local `space of dependence' - Emcali as a state owned public utilities 
provider. While in this chapter I analyse these `spaces of engagement' separately, in 
reality they interacted with each other producing more than the sum of their parts 
- an emergent power - in the terms of the critical realist understanding outlined in 
Chapter One (Section 1.5). In each of these `spaces of engagement' new allies and 
new knowledge and skills were required that were facilitated by the twin trajectories 
of Sintraemcali's strategic pedagogy. 
In the last two chapters I have emphasised the centrality of four strategic 
directions: the Plan PARE, the Trade Union/Community Alliance, the radical 
mobilisation strategy and finally a human rights strategy. Each of these strategies 
depended on the cultivation of certain `spaces of engagement'. In this chapter I 
want to focus in on four key `spaces of engagement' that were constructed 
by the 
trade union and which served important functions in the 
defence of the local. In 
each of these `spaces of engagement' we can isolate the strategic pedagogy of 
Sintraemcali operating through the twin trajectories of transborderisation and 
horizontalisation. The first-transborderisation - represented a pedagogy of 
developing and transmitting new skills and strategies adequate to operating within 
each particular space of engagement. 
The second-horizontalisation- represented a 
`politics of translation' (Section 2.2) whereby 
different population groups worked 
out their differences, 
built up trust and solidified alliances. These twin processes as 
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we will see operated dialectically in each of `the spaces of engagement' and between 
them, producing a dynamic momentum which in line with Hay's model of strategic 
learning (Section 2.6.4) can be understood as the process through which 
Sintraemcali transformed itself through the decade. 
7.3 Sintraemcali's Spaces of Engagement 
The first `space of engagement' was that of the poorest sectors of the Cali 
community - this was a physical space located in some of the poorest 
neighbourhoods in the city but also a discursive space constructed to give voice to 
all those that had lost out under neo-liberal restructuring. The second was the site 
of a clear section of the Sintraemcali workers that formed the `Comite de base', 
again this can be understood as a physical space located within the most militant 
sections of the membership, but it also extended to several committed `outsiders' 
who saw within that space a political home. The third site, rather than a 
population group was the `management space' -a knowledge space - that required 
an intense process of research and education in order to understand the workings 
of Emcali and to plan out its alternative management. Because of the nature of the 
ownership, debts and management structure of Emcali this `space' transcended 
local boundaries and linked up Emcali with the local municipality, national 
government, the World Bank and other IFIs, and a range of investment banks and 
creditors that were embroiled to different degrees in the financial fate of the 
company. Finally and equally transnational was the human rights `space', which was 
both a discursive space and a legal and political space upon which competing 
conceptualisations of human rights were fought over and contested. These four 
spaces represented key nodes within a network of resistance to privatisation in the 
city, and each space was actively constructed and fought over by the union82. 
In 
that sense, they represent spaces of contestation there to be 
fought over, and won 
or lost in the battle over the space of dependence - Emcali and public utilities 
within Cali. For that reason I want to understand these spaces of engagement as 
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pedagogical spaces actively constructed through a range of strategic interventions. 
In the rest of the chapter I will explore how each `space of engagement' operated 
and then finally make some comments on the interrelationship between the 
different spaces of engagement and the dynamic that they produced. 
7.3.1 Constructing Worker/ Community Alliances 
We have talked about unity for a long time, it's not the unity, it's the 
mechanism of how you get to that unity, how the workers managed to connect 
with community (Interview with Otoniel Ramirez, 2002, p. 10). 
In the mid 1990's Sintraemcali faced the difficult task of beginning the 
process of constructing a broad based movement in order to oppose the 
privatisation of public services. It recognized both the difficulty of negotiating with 
the Colombian state, and of transforming the union into an organisation able to 
challenge the emerging alliance intent on privatisation. The need to build bridges 
both between workers and the local community and between other trade unions 
with in the city was clear (Interview with Alexander Lopez, 2002, p. 2). The ability 
of social movements to build alliances has been recognised as a key factor in 
increasing their influence (Della Porta & Diani 1999; Laumann & Knoke, 1987) 
and the literature on social movement unionism highlights the efficacy of trade 
union/community alliances in strengthening trade union claim making (Moody, 
1997; Munck, 2002). The task of constructing alliances with those workers located 
in the informal sector and/or unemployed has also been recognised as a key 
priority for trade union strategy under conditions of neo-liberal globalisation 
(Galten, 2001). As we saw in Chapter Four the increased `casualisation and 
informalisation' of labour has become a key structural feature of the neo-liberal 
process in Colombia with the `informal sector' now representing more than 60.3% 
(ENS, 2002) of the economically active workforce. In stark contrast the organised 
trade union working class has seen a steady downward drift due to the 
restructuring process itself, and no doubt as an effect of the dirty war. New neo- 
liberal legislation facilitating the informalisation of labour enacted in the early 
82 This is not to suggest that these were the only spaces. These spaces have been selected on the basis of 
the observation during the periods of field-work and the extensive interviews with participants in the 
Cam Tower occupation. 
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1990's (Law 50 and 60 particularly) led unionisation rates to fall from 15% to 9% 
between 1990 and 1992 (Chernick and Jimenez, 1993, p. 72). This downward 
pattern has continued, leading many trade unions to build alliances with non- 
unionised sections of the working class (Interview with Hector Castro, 2002). This 
section will explore the practicalities and mechanisms through which these 
alliances were forged by Sintraemcali. 
In the construction of the trade union/community alliance the particular 
nature of public service restructuring provided important strategic advantages for 
Sintraemcali. The first objective advantage that Sintraemcali had is related to the 
particular nature of public service workers and their relationship with the `public'. 
The process of privatisation of water, telecommunications and electricity would 
not only effect workers' employment and conditions, but also the entire Cali 
community who are recipients of these services. The difference between public 
sector and private sector unions has been explored by Johnston: 
In contrast to private sector unionism, public worker movements can be 
expected to identify their interests with some interpretation of public needs. To 
be sure, whatever notion of public needs they embrace is certain to be shaped 
by their private interests: not the surrender of private interests to some 
external public good, but rather the constant compulsion to bring these 
together. Not only a political struggle, for example, by health care or education 
workers for more jobs (or fewer layoffs) but also a struggle for health care and 
for education. Each bloc of workers, in other words, can be expected to 
identify with and participate in a larger political bloc organised on some terms 
around, by and for the production (and depending upon the political 
conjuncture - the reform of production) of the particular public need which 
defines their vocation and sustains their organisation. In this sense, despite 
possible reform agendas and demands to institutionalise worker and 
organisational rights, the public worker movement accordingly aims to 
integrate itself to the state (Johnston, 1988, p. 57). 
These twin phenomena of, on the one hand, the drive of public service 
unions to express the interests of the `general public' as well as their specific 
'workplace' demands, and the intrinsic interest that the general public has as 
consumers of public services, provides at least the possibility to engage with an 
interested public. A private sector union may have far more difficulty mobilising 
public interest and support in their struggles unless they can articulate their 
demands to motivate public intervention. Obviously, community interest in the 
future of public services does not inevitably translate into support for the trade 
union. Government arguments 
for the privatisation of public services are generally 
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based on the future provision of better, more economic and efficient services in 
the long term. This necessitates the trade union being able to provide a convincing 
justification for the defence of the status quo, or the projection of an alternative to 
privatisation that can match the aspirations of the community. Johnston argues 
that to a large degree public service unions have failed to break away from the 
culture of private sector unionism and recognise their relationship to public needs: 
... 
the public worker movement suffers from an undeveloped collective identity, 
and / suggest that recognition of a structurally induced and always problematic 
identification with public needs can help serve this purpose. The often 
demoralising outcome of the public worker movement since the 1970s which 
relied upon identities inherited from an earlier era in the private sector have 
disorganized these movements, promoted the current withdrawal by members 
into bureaucratic privatism, and left union officials ministering to empty 
organisations and groping for corporatist alliances with management. The 
outcome may be different, however, if the next wave of public worker 
movements is oriented by reflection on itself (Johnston, 1988, p. 67). 
What is evident in the case of Sintraemcali, as demonstrated in the last two 
chapters, is that the organisation had engaged in a process of transforming its 
relationship with the `public' and with the `state'. Carlos Gonzalez (Interview, 2002, 
p8), noted the shift in the direction of Sintraemcali. He had for many years been 
trying to work with Sintraemcali on common public issues but had found few 
ideological and political meeting points. He noted how the trade union began to 
portray itself as the defender of the public, of the company, and of the natural 
resources that the public should own. Conceptualised as the defence of national 
sovereignty, Sintraemcali tapped into the long tradition throughout Latin America 
of popular national liberation. The union portrayed itself as the defender of the 
state against both the imperial interests of powerful states and MNCs, and also the 
decadent nature of the national elite, which was prepared to cede national 
sovereignty for bribes and corruption, and shares in the new privatised companies 
(ibid, pp. 8-9). This was a strategy fraught with contradictions in the sense that 
Sintraemcali was in a process of both struggle for the state (to 
keep public services 
public) and against the state (that had abused its powers through corrupt practices). 
This dynamic of both defending the state in general while struggling against 
its present `particular' contingent representatives necessitated the projection of an 
alternative future and an alternative state that will one 
day `defend' the `national' 
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and the people's interests. Thus the defence of public services in Cali was also a 
battle of the `nation'. This was evident during the 36 day CAM Tower Occupation 
not only on the part of the union and its activists who draped themselves in the 
Colombian flag and played the national anthem on a daily basis during the CAM 
Tower occupation, but also on the part of the state. During the CAM Tower 
occupation Alexander Lopez was charged with `defaming patriotic symbols' 
through the use of the Colombian flag (in a clear attempt to break the link between 
nation and union that was so evident). The use of the Colombian flag by 
Sintraemcali sought to emphasise their defence of the nation and by implication 
served to accuse the state of treachery encapsulated in the Colombian insult `wende 
patria' (a person who sells `vende' the nation `patria'). State strategies were clearly 
focused on the one hand on attacking the union for fighting for its `particular' 
interests which ran contrary to the public good, and on the other of insinuating a 
relationship between the trade union and the armed insurgency alleging that 
SINTRAMCALI was a `puppet of the guerrilla' to delegitimise the organisation 
and break its symbolic relationship to popular nationalism. Sintraemcali's ability to 
combine both the defence of place - conceived as the city of Cali (and the nation 
more generally) with that of class - understood more broadly as the worker/poor 
community alliance (obrero-popular or el pueblo - the people) appears crucial to 
explaining its popularity. 
The second clear advantage assisting in the construction of a trade 
union/community alliance, particularly in the last three years, has been both the 
growing revelations of corruption linked to processes of privatisation, and the 
demonstrable increases in prices for consumers in those areas where privatisation 
had already taken place. In many parts of Colombia, including the neighbouring 
municipalities of both Palmira and Buenaventura, privatisation of public utilities 
had increased prices and reduced the quality of the service (PSI, 2002; Hall & de la 
Motte, 2004). Furthermore, in the run up to the CAM Tower Occupation, the 
crisis in Argentina would serve as a further example of the social chaos that the 
neo-liberal model has wrought. The trade union was able to tap 
into this 
groundswell of information of the 
deleterious effect that neo-liberal globalisation 
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has had on Latin America in general, and for the poor in particular (c. f Green, 
2003). 
However, while there were a range of strategic possibilities for building the 
trade union/community alliance there were also a range of obstacles, and this can 
be understood in relation to the tensions between trade unionists, who in Cox's 
categorisation could be understood as `precarious' population groups, and the 
`community' which could be understood as an `excluded' population group (see 
Section 2.4.2). In this analysis it is necessary to define, through the self- 
understanding of the Colombian trade union movement, what is meant by the 
trade union/community alliance within Cali. Otoniel Ramirez, President of the 
CUT-Valle (Interview, 2002, p. 10) states that it composes of two broad sectors. 
The first is the organised trade union movement, grouped under the auspices of 
the regional CUT- Valle de Cauca subsection. In this grouping, local and national 
trade union organisations and their affiliates would be seen as the target audience. 
The second, is the most marginalised sections of the Cali community, those that 
would live in stratas 1-3 in the scale of housing, " normally ranging from extremely 
poor to lower middle class. Within this concept of `community', students, 
sympathetic intellectuals and progressive politicians would also be included and 
welcomed. In that sense the `community' is largely defined as those sectors of the 
population `excluded' from formal employment. While at an abstract level of 
analysis commonalities between `precarious' and `excluded' may be clear, there may 
also be a range of tensions between those workers engaged in formal employment 
and those without work or engaged in highly insecure work with little social 
protection. 
One prominent Community leader and activist, Patricia Molina, sheds light 
on the differences between workers and communities in Cali and some of the 
obstacles that coalition building faces. 
83 In Colombia electricity, water and telephone bills are charged at differential rates according to 
estimated social stratification 
in the place where you live. Strata 1 is the poorest neighborhoods, while 
state 5 is the most elite. 
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At the community level there is a lot of resentment towards the trade unions 
and this has a range of reasons. Some of the reasons stem from them (the 
community) being manipulated by the oligarchy, a form of managing the 
consciousness of the people and creating resentment between those who have work and those that don't, arguing that they (the trade unions) are just fighting for their money, for what they want, their economic stability and that 
they don't care about anything else ... so this creates resentment between the `clase popular' (popular class) and the working class (Interview with Patricia 
Molina, 2002, p. 9). 
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This tension was fully utilised by local and national elites as they attempted 
to discredit the trade union and argue that Sintraemcali's politics was a selfish 
politics aimed at defending their own privileges. While recognising the `divide and 
rule' tactics of the `oligarchy' Patricia Molina also argues that there are real 
problems and differences between these two groups: 
We in the communities have to live every day with our neighbours dying 
outside the hospital because they are refused entry, of the child who could 
have been saved but received no medical attention, we see these things 
every day, every day we feel the community suffering, that we don't have 
fundamental rights.... This is my point of view of the open abyss between trade 
unionists and the community, because historically the struggles that they have 
carried out here from the trade union sector have remained in the `gremial' 
(authors note: within the corporation, possible simile: corporatist), they have 
remained in the search for their labour rights and economic rights and the 
people know this (Interview with Patrica Molina, 2002, p. 9). 
She goes on to say that obviously there are exceptions of trade unions that 
have worked on community issues, but most of the people don't know about 
those. In that sense the trade union movement is perceived in terms of 
representing a relatively privileged sector of society holding on to its members' 
particular interests: 
The trade union movement has been absent when people are dying every day 
without medical attention, and they have to beg in order to get admitted into 
the hospital, or knock door to door pleading for money so that they can buy 
medicine. This is terrible and the trade union movement is absent from this 
reality (Interview with Patricia Molina, 2002, p. 10) 
The question that was posed to Sintraemcali was how to break down these 
barriers in order to demonstrate to the poorest sections of the community that 
they were fighting not for themselves but for all those sections of the 
Cali 
community suffering from the effects of neo-liberalism. 
In this process educational 
activity became crucial, but it was an educational activity embedded within practical 
activity aimed at improving the material conditions of the 
`excluded' community 
members. For that reason 
Sintraemcali did not only run popular education courses 
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and hold mass meetings, but also built and managed a school - the Sintraemcali 
Institute, created in 1994 to provide basic education for students from the poorest 
sections of Cali, and set up the Minga Comunitarios to carry out socially 
productive work within these neighbourhoods. The unity between workers and 
community also began earlier on the educational front in 1999 with the setting up 
of the `Eduardo Umana Mendoza Popular Workers School' which runs popular 
education and human rights courses. These courses, rooted firmly in the Freirean 
tradition, bring together community, trade union and social leaders in the region, 
providing a `space' for discussion, the acquisition and exchange of knowledge, 
networking and social bonding, and a rich arena for the exchange of recent 
experiences and practices. Both of these projects brought Emcali workers, trade 
unionists and local communities together, increasing levels of trust, and 
communication between trade union and community - clear processes of 
horizontalisation. ' 
Alexander Lopez talks of the obstacles that the trade union initially faced in 
these pedagogical processes, the objectives of the pedagogical interventions and 
the attitudinal transformation that later prevailed: 
In the beginning we had resistance from the community, because the 
community sees the workers as the problem, and we have explained to the 
community who are the real problem, and where the neo-liberal politics comes 
from, what is the World Bank, what is the International Monetary Fund, for the 
people don't know this. It has been a very didactic strategy, very long, but also 
very beautiful and fruitful because... the community takes time to make a 
decision, but when it makes it, it makes it forever, I believe that the people, 
yes, they have this logic, they don't recognise a lot of things, but they feel it 
when you speak, when you explain, and these type of lovers are not 
temporary loves but lovers that last forever (Interview with Alexander Lopez, 
2002, p. 14). 
The initial objective of the union in the mid 1990's was overwhelmingly 
educational, aimed at raising the `political consciousness' of the 
local marginalised 
communities and addressing the real material needs of the community utilising 
the 
resources available. One important innovation in this educational process was 
the 
setting up of a weekly one- hour TV programme 
"Despertar Popular" (Popular 
Wake Up Call), a Sintraemcali run local news programme, which was 
broadcast on 
84 The Human rights diplomas operated under exactly the same principle ensuring a 
balance between 
trade union, social and community activists. 
Spaces where interpersonal relationships and trust could be 
Chapter Seven 
233 
community channels. The programme provides a forum for debate on alternative 
proposals for development in the city, and addresses issues relating to the social, 
economic, and political crisis. In many of the poorest neighbourhoods of the city 
free access is available for these local community channels. The programme thus 
became a key medium through which Sintraemcali could get an alternative message 
out to the local poor community. 
Raising consciousness and awareness was central to the trade union's 
strategies. Coupled with this is the recurrent theme running through Sintraemcali 
which is that actions speak louder than words. Their public speeches have always 
been complemented with concrete community projects such as the Sintraemcali 
Institute and the Minga Comunitarios. They also support local community 
demonstrations and protests on other issues and promote struggle and collective 
organisation as the necessary way forward: 
For us, and it is worth repeating, in the organisational processes of struggle 
we cannot remain only at the level of rhetoric, at the level of giving talks, but 
instead to act, to practice. This means we don't just call on the people to fight 
for an objective, but we seek to raise the education and understanding of the 
Cali community and the Colombian people. You have to educate them from 
the point of view that they can understand their rights, when the people know 
their rights they organize and they struggle. This is the objective of our 
organisation, to educate the people, to generate education 'obrero popular' 
(worker-popular). That means that both the workers and the community need 
to learn their rights, their constitution, to develop their sense of belonging, of 
class consciousness, and to move closer to what it means to defend the 
public', to become part of the process of struggling for sovereignty (Interview 
with Luis Hernandez, 2002, p. 12). 
This visible presence of the trade union movement in the neighbourhood 
built up a great deal of trust between the community and the union, and could be 
seen as serving a purpose of `conscientisation' in Freirean terms (Freire, 2000), 
where a `dialogical' process begins to emerge between organised labour and 
communities. As Alexander Lopez notes (Interview, 2002, p. 14), apart from 
attending to the real material needs of local communities, and raising political 
consciousness, these were aimed at providing a `space' for challenging the attitudes 
of the communities and the workers towards each other. For Emcali workers it 
served to promote a spirit of solidarity with local communities and pride in their 
built up. 
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company; for the communities it allowed for a better understanding of the 
objectives or activities of the union and how these relate to their own struggles. 
As Luis Hernandez recognizes, there are limitations to how much practical 
activity Sintraemcali can engage in with the communities, but more importantly it is 
an ideational and cognitive shift towards recognising the commonality of interests 
between workers and the community that breaks away from the more narrow and 
traditional `corporatist' focus of trade unions: 
We have our limitations, both in terms of finance and time, but we have tried 
since 1995 to be with the community, in their struggles, in their organisational 
processes. To show that they are not alone, and in turn, when we have called 
for solidarity and support, the community has responded (Interview with Luis 
Hernandez, 2002, p. 16). 
This dialectical relationship between support for the communities and 
solidarity for the union has inevitably built up tensions within the process. One 
student involved in solidarity in the CAM Tower occupation lamented the fact that 
the trade union overused references to the trade union in its discourse which 
sometimes alienated potential supporters: 
If you call people to a demonstration and all the time you are chanting 
`Sintraemcali, Sintraemcali' then you feel excluded. If you are really thinking 
for the city, in the general community and not in an organisation, then referring 
only to one organisation constantly is a form of exclusion. Those that aren't 
members start to think What am I doing here? ( Interview with Cristian 
Ortega, 2002, p. 6). 
Likewise Sintraemcali on occasions has been accused of only having contact 
with the `community' when they needed support, seeing the community as a tool, 
rather than as an ally (Interview with Patricia Molina, 2002, p. 17). In overcoming 
these obstacles the more permanent actions of the Minga Comunitarios and the 
Sintraemcali Institute have been important. But there remains a need for the 
community representatives to have a greater voice in the decision-making and 
organisational processes of the defence of public services (ibid). For that task the 
mechanism of the Municipal Strike Command has been essential. 
The appointment 
of two community representatives to the final negotiations 
during the CAM Tower 
Occupation was seen as a positive step forward, and a recognition of the strength, 
importance and independence of the municipal strike command (Interviews with 
Arial Diaz, 2002; Alberto Bejarano, 2002 and Patricia Molina, 2002). 
Chapter Seven 
235 
Returning to the more concrete outcomes of this `space of engagement' we 
can see that in the process of the development of the trade union/community 
alliance that the community brought with it a range of material and ideational 
resources that assisted the Sintraemcali struggle. This network of organisations and 
individuals to differing degrees would show solidarity to the union's struggle, 
engage in marches, public demonstrations, provide material and political support 
to the union, apply pressure on local political representatives, and disseminate 
further an alternative reading of particular disputes. On many occasions they have 
blocked roads, joined marches, attended public meetings and shown solidarity with 
the union in a range of ways, nor least in defending the perimeter of the series of 
occupations, and particularly the 1998 and 2001 occupations. While this strategy 
has brought success to the union it remains a process in construction. Alberto 
Bejarano argues that the sustainability of the Sintraemcali project is not yet assured. 
While Alexander Lopez was fully committed to the project of constructing 
community/worker alliances, he is not convinced that all Sintraemcali leaders are: 
Alexander Lopez is a man capable of constructing with workers and with 
communities, in constructing a unitary and democratic discourse. A discourse 
that is participatory, a level of politics that is interesting, but not all leaders of 
Sintraemcali have this conception and not all the workers have this 
conception. The truth is that today there is a strong dispute between Emcali 
workers, communities and the unemployed. Many feel, lets say, that the 
relationship is not too harmonious. There remain corporatist attitudes, 
exclusionary attitudes of the workers towards the rest, that reflects a political 
backwardness. Moreover, we could say that even in the leadership of 
Sintraemcali there are still contradictory practices taking place, it's a process 
(Interview with Alberto Bejarano, 2002, p. 7). 
In that sense the future of the worker/community alliance and its powerl 
depends on the internal struggles within the union and the ability of both the trade 
union and community activists to sustain this. Returning to Santos's `politics of 
translation' (see Section 2.2) the critical pedagogy of horizontalisation can be seen 
as addressing the difficult and complex task of uniting these different sets of social 
forces and providing spaces where differences could be debated and worked out 
and common actions developed. The second `space of engagement' 
located 
around the development of a material critique of the management of 
Emcali and 
the development of the Plan PARE was an equally contested and complex 
location. 
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7.3.2 The space of production and consumption 
While a great deal of the strategic energy of the union was devoted to 
building the worker/ community alliance, it is also important to understand the 
willingness of the union to engage at all levels of the Colombian polity in its 
attempts to advocate an alternative to privatisation and its `transborderisation' into 
the space of management which required an intense process of education, research 
and investigation. The development of the Plan PARE was a major break from its 
previous role and once the knowledge and alternatives had been developed its 
representatives engaged in a wide range of forums to promote their alternatives: 
From 1998 our vision changed, we were not only viewing things from the 
perspective of trade unionists, but in terms of the strategic management of the 
company. This took us to a range of spaces: the Chambers of Commerce, the 
Municipal Council, the Departmental Assembly. We also presented a policy 
plan for public services in the table of negotiations with the FARC, to the 
National Government, the Congress of the Republic - where on more than ten 
occasions we participated and presented our Salvation Plan for Emcali and 
intervened in the debates on public services (Interview with Alexander Lopez 
2002, p. 18). 
Addressing the issue of the management of public services through the 
critique of corruption and the pro-active Plan PARE allowed the union to enter 
into a whole series of new `spaces of engagement'. As highlighted in the last two 
chapters in many ways this was structurally driven by the new neo-liberal 
environment, but it was also a highly strategic response that recognised that while 
the previous patterns of trade union/management relations were being broken 
down new spaces of engagement could potentially be opened up. In this new space 
the question of 'who manages, who controls' was once again placed on the 
negotiating table (ibid, p. 22). Sintraemcali began to reconceptualise its role away 
from one of mediation to one of worker control of production. Here, drawing on 
Munck (1988, Chapter 8) I understand `workers control' as being located 
somewhere between `workers participation' - where workers win or are given some 
control of production, and `workers councils'- where workers exercise 
full control 
over production. This shift from mediation to control, while remaining partial, was 
a highly emancipatory shift as it began to throw up questions not only of workers 
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rights and benefits, but also of workers control of production and the challenging 
of the labour/capital relation. 
The development of the Plan PARE (outlined in Section 5.3) represented 
an intense laboratory whereby workers developed the new skills and knowledge 
necessary to manage the company and develop alternatives. Crucial to this process 
was the culture of learning that emerged within Sintraemcali, and particularly the 
developing interest of workers in learning every intricate detail about the 
functioning of the company. During the CAM Tower Occupation, while political 
education took place took place inside the tower, there were also computer classes 
and English classes. Both of these were seen as important new skills for workers to 
acquire if they were to manage the company efficiently (Interview with Claudia 
Caritas, 2002). There were also classes where workers from one area or workplant 
could learn about how a different part of the company was operating85. The Plan 
PARE action research project meant that the union had developed by 2001 an 
enormous knowledge of the day to day running of the company and its financial 
difficulties and was able to take its well-researched alternatives to a wide range of 
fora and debate alternatives. 
During these interventions, networking and contacts would be developed 
through which joint political projects could be discussed and strengthened with 
independent political forces. Several sympathetic representatives of Congress and 
the Senate would take up support of the case against privatisation such as Wilson 
Borja, member of the Colombian Congress. Furthermore, at the Municipal level 
support was given by the union to the Mayoral campaign of Jon Maro Rodriquez, 
who in 2000 was elected as Mayor of Cali and began to implement the Plan 
PARE. 
These actors would be involved to different degrees in the Sintraemcali project, 
though not necessarily the militant tactics of the union. The mayor was able to 
do 
this because what Sintraemcali provided and was able to deliver was a constructive 
alternative development plan for the management of the company and a work 
force that was committed to the company and its salvation, and were prepared to 
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make a great deal of sacrifices in order for the plan to be successful. This `space of 
engagement' worked on one of the contradictions within the neo-liberal 
globalisation project in Colombia, this being decentralisation. On the one hand it 
brought greater local democracy and control for local political structures, but on 
the other, driven as it was by needs to reduce the central budget, it produced 
tensions between the centre and the state over resource allocation. Sintraemcali 
was able to use this conflict to further its defence of public services. This conflict 
would emerge most clearly over questions of the PTAR water treatment plant, and 
the central government's responsibility in contributing resources to a project 
whose benefits would not be confined to the city of Cali alone. Hence, the space of 
local government become an increasingly important terrain upon which the 
struggle against privatisation was waged. Yet, Sintraemcali was only able to fully 
capitalise on this possibility by strategically taking the decision to research and learn 
about how the company operated and develop an alternative plan - this was a 
product of the critical pedagogy of transborderisation and Sintraemcali's ability to 
recognise the new skills, knowledge necessary to operate successfully in this 
management space. 
7.3.3 The Rank and File: The Space of Militancy 
As outlined in Chapter 5 (Section 5.6.1), the internal transformation of the 
union was driven and sustained by a group of between four to five hundred 
workers. These workers emerged in and around the `Comite de Base' (rank and file 
committee) and were at the centre of the union's direct actions. These members 
would be at considerable personal risk, have a strong ideological commitment to 
the union's objectives, and to broader process of political change within the city 
and country. This group would be largely affiliates of Sintraemcali but also include 
several local trade unionists, community leaders, leftist activists, more radical 
human rights activists etc. who had decided to make a strong commitment to the 
trade union. From this group are many of the assassinated members, the 
forcibly 
85 I was initally surpised by this, for at that early stage of my research 
I was unable to fully comprehend 
the importance of Plan PARE and the educational action research project that 
had developed to create an 
alternative management plan 
for Emcali. 
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displaced, receivers of death threats etc, those that have been personally affected 
by the policies of state and para-state repression. Many were actively involved in 
the construction of the Plan PARE, and would have been involved in many of the 
militant actions such as the occupations, blockades, strikes etc that have developed 
since 1994. They would have developed great experience in organising an 
occupation, their responsibilities, duties, the psychological discipline necessary etc. 
The level of commitment amongst this group is reflected in the phrase 
"Hasta la vida misma86", which has become their organising slogan. This level of 
commitment is perhaps the most difficult to theorise and explain. Amongst these 
workers there are a range of reasons as to why they have been so committed to the 
union and prepared to risk their lives for the defence of the company87, but one can 
note a combination of commitment to the company for having made a real 
material contribution to their own lives and also a sense of justice and the 
enjoyment of struggling for a cause. One worker felt that because his father was an 
employee in the company and that later he had also entered, he could see the direct 
contribution that Emcali had made to their lives, allowing them to go to school 
and survive in difficult economic times (Interview with Carlos Guttierez 2002, p. 2). 
In that sense he felt an obligation, but this was also clarified by saying that "but 
also because I like the struggle, to be here struggling for this company. " (ibid) 
Another prominent female activist stated that "I like all of this, I have it in my 
blood, I like justice, and also because I know that this company has given me a lot" 
(Interview with Libiana Hernan, 2002, p. 2). In a broader discussion on this issue 
with a group of 45 workers that were actively involved in the 2001 CAM Tower 
occupation, many stated that after watching the video of the occupation that they 
felt sure that "this struggle is worth dying for" (Authors field notes on 
focus 
group). One worker recounting the story of her involvement in the occupation of 
the headquarters of the Superintendent of Public Services in Bogota tells 
how she 
86 This literally means `until death itself and implis that the workers were prepared to 
die for the 
struggle against privatisation. 
87 The basis for the information in this section is developed from a series of interviews both individual 
and a focus group. As these workers are not 
in the public eye Where I have named people this is a 
psuedonym. These workers, unlike the 
leadership do not carry weapons for self defence and do not have 
bodyguards and are therefore the most vulnerable to assassination 
by state and para-state forces. 
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was approached by one ex-leader of Sintraemcali prior to the occupation. He 
asked her whether she was `berraca'. 88 She sought clarification and he asked her 
whether she was able, if asked, to go to a place, follow orders, and sit down. She 
knew immediately that this was to be another occupation and agreed immediately, 
and promised to keep it a secret (Interview with Liliana Merce, 2002, p. 5). This 
implicit faith in the union leadership, being prepared to go to an unknown place 
and follow orders, and knowing that this involves risking her life, is perhaps the 
most remarkable example of the trust that the union had developed over the years. 
When asked as to why this group were prepared to risk their lives for the 
defense of public services and thus for the union, Luis Hernandez, President of 
Sintraemcali responded that: 
I believe that you cannot buy this kind of loyalty, but you must construct it, and 
you construct it through a strong and responsible class leadership. I believe 
that those of us who have been leading this organisation have demonstrated 
this and have built up a consciousness amongst the workers. This is a long 
process, but effective, very effective. Those workers that have accompanied 
us in the different direct actions have felt the strength of our organisation 
which is expressed in the beautiful phrase `hasta la vida misma' We have 
been prepared to do this for a collective objective, as is the defence of public 
property, and defending the interests of the people (Interview with Luis 
Hernandez, 2002, p. 8). 
He highlights the role of the range of educational processes that many of 
these activists underwent: 
This loyalty has been developed from the training that our followers have 
received, and will continue to receive, because the good leader is in a 
evolutionary process, we are all in an evolutionary process and we are all 
learning, and developing and we will never have the final truth revealed, every 
day we need to learn more. That is why we are convinced that we need to 
generate more training and education. So that tomorrow it is not 500 workers 
but we can double that number or triple it, in the sense that we can keep 
generating more consciousness to struggle amongst the workers (ibid, p. 9). 
In this process we can see how loyalty was constructed by the union 
through its leadership, and also through its successes. Those engaged in the direct 
actions and occupations did so because they had become part of a process much 
bigger than themselves and were able to conceptualise this `collective' responsibility 
and recognise their role within that. But they also 
had a strong belief that they 
88 `Berraca' is a Cali colloquial term which means in this context `very tough' or `brave'. In 
different 
contexts it can also mean `brilliant', and also can refer to a situation which appears very 
difficult to 
resolve. 
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would win, which stemmed from earlier successes (Authors field notes on focus 
group). Luis Hernandez notes that there have been limitations to the educational 
processes aimed at developing this group of workers and expanding their numbers, 
both within the union and in the community: 
1 think in this sense our trade union has not done enough. But the root of this lies in the exact same situation of struggle that we have been forced to live. 
We have had to engage in a constant state of struggle, in organised 
processes of struggle rather than in training. Despite this, we have generated 
a range of training programmes, but now we are determined to make this 
more intense, more ideological training, both for the workers and for the 
community and social leaders and activists with the aim of producing more 
people who in one way or another can put their grain of sand towards 
generating social change in Cali, in the Valle, and in the country" (ibid, p. 10). 
Here if we reconceptualise the processes of struggle as processes of 
education (see Section 2.6) we can then see the importance of this in the formation 
of the identities of these workers. Many had had friends assassinated since 1997, 
and had forged strong bonds with those comrades that they had engaged in direct 
actions and occupations with. During these occupations, intense solidarities and 
bonds of trust were forged. As one worker noted "in the occupations we shared 
everything, if we had an empanada (small pie) we would divide it in 6 or seven 
pieces, we shared our thoughts, our fears and our lives" (Interview with Asdrubal 
Gonzalo, 2002, p. 9). This sense of collectivity and commitment provided the 
unpredictable element for the Colombian state for these people had lost their fear. 
As noted in a remarkable set of recent ethnographic studies on the issue of state 
terror (Sluka, 2000), loss of fear represents the key challenge to the effectiveness of 
state terror: 
Once you've seen two year olds in diapers running up to Israeli soldiers and 
flashing them the V for victory sign, you know that state terror has some 
inherent weaknesses. Death and torture may NOT be the worst of 
alternatives for all people in a society. Maybe some of us would rather 
struggle for the truth, for justice, for an end to oppression without worrying so 
much about what might happen to us, rather, worrying more about what will 
keep happening to us, collectively, if we do nothing" (Sluka, 2000, p. 36). 
The Comite de Base represented those limits, how else can one explain why 
so many men and women - ordinary workers - would on December 
25th, 2001 put 
masks on their faces and take over a building knowing full well that the 
repercussions in a country such as Colombia could be 
death? For our 
understanding of the critical pedagogy of 
Sintraemcali it was this bonding and 
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Central to an understanding of Sintraemcali's success in crossing national 
borders is the growing recognition of the deteriorating human rights situation in 
general in Colombia and in particular the situation of trade unionists, outlined in 
Chapter Four (Section 4.2). For the international trade union movement, and 
particularly the UK, US, and Canadian Unions, Colombia has become the 
international trade union movement's `pariah state'. Sintraemcali's attempts to 
construct transnational networks of solidarity has benefited from this increase in 
profile of the Colombian trade union movement, but Sintraemcali has also 
contributed to this raised profile through its series of delegations, international 
exchanges, interventions in a range of international forums, and the production 
and dissemination of materials ranging from `urgent actions' to video 
documentaries narrating the struggles of the union in its defence of workers. There 
is also an element, noted in relation to Santos's `politics of translation', of the way 
that neo-liberal globalisation is producing commonalities and empathy between 
different groups. As privatisation has globalised so has opposition to it, particularly 
amongst poor and marginalized communities throughout the world. In that sense 
Sintraemcali was able to tap into two key narratives - human rights and anti- 
privatisation - which both carried a great deal of legitimacy. 
The catalyst of this was the unintended outcome of the Colombian 
government's use of state terror89. Strong links were forged when Alexander Lopez 
came to the UK for a brief period of voluntary exile in London between 
October 
to December 2000. He had survived an assassination attempt in Colombian and 
been informed by the Colombian government that his `irresponsible attitude' 
meant that the Colombian government could no longer guarantee 
he protection of 
his human rights (Interview with Alexander Lopez, 2002, p. 14). 
Alexander, 
reflecting on the early solidarity work records 
his limited knowledge of the 
possibilities of international solidarity. 
89 Again a further illustration of the critical realist relational theory of power. 
The Colombian 
government's use of violence 
led to a range of connections that eventually would serve to 
transnationalise Sintraemcali's struggle. 
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In the union, obviously we knew that Europe existed, that North America 
existed.... but due to an attempt to assassinate me, the executive council of the union took the decision to get me out of the country for a while (Interview 
with Alexander Lopez, 2002, p. 14). 
During that initial period contact was made with the Colombian exile 
community in London, and through them a relationship was initiated between 
Andy Higginbottom, a seasoned internationalist and rank and file activist, who 
would later become one of the founding members of the Colombia Solidarity 
Campaign. During this period a range of meetings were held, and a strong 
relationship with UNISON, the UK public service union was established 
(Interview with Andy Higginbottom, 2002, p. 6). 
Upon his return to Colombia, Alexander Lopez maintained contact, 
particularly with Andy Higginbottom and the UNISON International Department. 
When the Colombia Solidarity Campaign was founded and held its first conference 
in April 2001, Alexander returned and since that point there have been delegations, 
exchanges, and many invitations for Sintraemcali representatives to talk at British 
trade union conferences, and several delegations have been sent to Colombia. The 
Colombia Solidarity Campaign have also sent volunteers to work in the human 
rights department for extended periods to facilitate particularly the translation of 
documents. 90 
Since 2000 there has been a regular process of communication and 
delegations, which have forged strong bonds between Colombian and British trade 
union leaders and activists and this has expanded to different parts of the world 
(see Section 5.6). Berenice Celeyta, head of the union's human rights department 
and one of the architects of the international strategy charts the development of 
contacts: 
90 My own work in Sintraemcali is part of this process. 
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Initially and as a product of the serious threats, information was sent to sister 
organisations such as trade unions and NGOs in England and Spain, later 
these links were strengthened with the presence of Sintraemcali comrades, 
the Human rights department and NOMADESC that went on delegations, and 
through these we gained support at two levels. The accompaniment here in 
Cali of an English comrade who during several months worked in the Human 
Rights Department during which time we managed to overcome one of the 
biggest obstacles that we have for the international work, the language, we 
could then rely on translation of analytical documents and urgent actions. 
Through this we widened the circulation of these documents to different 
English speaking countries. Later with the link with comrades from the 
Colombia Solidarity Campaign in the UK we received political support via 
meetings they organised with the Colombian Embassy in London. Equally, the 
series of delegations that have come to our region have a political effect at the 
government level (Celeyta, 2003, p. 4). 
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Here, the concept of translation takes its more traditional linguistic 
meaning, and the process of solidarity work brought the struggle of Sintraemcali 
into `visibility' within the UK trade union movement through the English language. 
This assistance with translation allowed for the production of a steady flow of 
information for distribution: 
We began to produce and translate videos and documents in Spanish and 
English and we were able to raise awareness amongst the international 
community, particularly the trade union movement and several human rights 
organisations, and deliver conferences, meetings at universities, with trade 
unions, with social sectors of the international community. We explained the 
struggle against corruption, explained the impunity, the violations of human 
rights but above all the struggle that we had built against globalisation, against 
privatisation. This work has been beautiful, and has been well received by the 
international community, and I believe that we have been able to sustain it by 
organising delegations once or twice a year which have given oxygen to the 
relations that we have built up with the international community where we 
have open exchanges" (Interview with Alexander Lopez, 2002, p. 15). 
But the process of translation also revolved around the cultural sphere as 
activists from different parts of the world came into contact with Colombia, both 
through visiting and also from receiving and meeting Colombian delegations in 
their home countries. Crucial here has been the interpersonal relationships 
developed in different pats of Europe, the USA and Canada through which 
networks of activity were established. While transnational communication 
is 
facilitated by developments in communication, face-to-face communication and 
interaction has been crucial in developing sustainable solidarity links. Likewise, the 
institutional resources of the various trade union organisations outside of 
Colombia have facilitated this process and suggest a strategy of engagement with 
both `official' trade union structures and more horizontal activist based networks. 
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Likewise, each broad network has different resources to contribute to advocacy 
and solidarity campaigns. The more horizontal contacts, particularly in the UK led 
to mobilizations outside of the Colombian embassy, while cultivating institutional 
structures such as the TUC facilitated engagement with representatives of the 
Colombian state. Neither of these practices is mutually exclusive and in Lambert & 
Webster's (2003) conceptualisation of `new' and `old' internationalism we can see 
the potential for a combination of activities operating in a complementary way. 
However, there are tensions between different organisations - both within 
Colombia and the UK, between Sintraemcali and CUT and between the Colombia 
Solidarity Campaign and the TUC, which led to the emergence of an alternative 
solidarity organisation `Justice for Colombia' which operates a more strict union to 
union form of solidarity with Colombia and operates in a more hierarchical 
manner. However, this may not necessarily be a negative development in that there 
is a great deal of room for further solidarity actions in Colombia and this may serve 
to open up more spaces of engagement. It does however highlight the tensions 
inherent within the construction of transnational solidarity processes. 
Within the development of solidarity with SINTRAECALI we can see the 
range of solidarity actions operating in both the more traditional forms and models 
of international trade union activity and the `new' labour internationalism, anti- 
capitalist and human rights domains: 
In the last three years we have had ten international delegations: Amnesty 
International, American Watch, who carried out important work in verifying 
denouncements of human rights violations, 3 UK delegations of trade union 
leaders, where organisations such as UNISON, the FBU, ASLEF, Colombia 
Solidarity Campaign and War on Want have participated. Two delegations 
from the Spanish, Red de Hermanidad (Brotherhood Network); one Canadian 
delegation, another Spanish one and one mission from Public Services 
International which included 12 delegates from different countries, and most 
recently a delegation from Austria. We have seen the strengthening of this 
accompaniment, beginning initially with trade unions from England and later 
on from a range of European countries, the United States and Canada. We 
have received humanitarian support, and emergency funds in those moments 
of serious crisis from UNISON, the FBU, the TUC and War on Want. We have 
also been present at the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre and at the 
European Social Forum in Firenze (Interview with Berenice Celeyta, 2003, 
p. 6). 
The human rights department has provided a permanent point of contact 
for the international work. This involves coordinating activities with international 
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organisations, producing and disseminating videos, reports, and urgent actions. 
The vast array of contacts and the experience that Berenice Celeyta, the prominent 
Colombian Human rights activist, has brought with her has ensured that the union 
capitalised on the potential interest of the international community in the situation 
of Colombia. As Lambert & Webster (2003) have noted, in their own study of 
labour renewal, one crucial ingredient has been the entry into the labour movement 
of activists engaged in different domains - human rights, community organizing 
etc. These experiences can serve to breathe new life into trade union practices by 
reorientating the focus. However, in order for this to take root there needs to be a 
level of openness within the culture of the trade union to allow for new directions 
and experimentation. Sintraemcali's openness has greatly facilitated this process 
and the day to day repression suffered by union activists meant that human rights 
discourse and praxis found fertile terrain within which to grow. 
The human rights department provided the technical skills and abilities to 
develop the ability of Sintraemcali to challenge the Colombian state at a range of 
levels from local legal processes to the Inter-American Human Rights Court (see 
Section 5.6). Crucially, the department continues to provide training for local trade 
union and community activists transferring these vital skills. These graduates of 
human rights courses and diplomas are able to act as intermediaries with state 
forces, government representatives and international bodies in specific conflicts 
and aware of the functioning of this global infrastructure. Cases 
have been won at 
the Inter-American Human Rights Court and the case of Sintraemcali has 
been 
well-documented in a range of annual reports of the major 
international human 
rights monitoring organisations including the UNCHR, 
Amnesty International and 
Human Rights Watch. 
Here notions of `visibility' and `invisibility' are crucial 
in understanding 
Sintraemcali's strategy. Many of the worst human rights violations 
in Colombia 
take place away from the eyes of the cameras, 
in rural areas where `events' can be 
`managed'. By raising the international profile the local protest events 
become 
highly visible, and `urgent actions' sent to 
Colombian embassies specifically make 
reference to the government's responsibility 
if violence were to happen to workers 
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and their supporters. The twin process of making protests `visible' and 
`pinpointing' the Colombian government's `responsibility' have made it difficult for 
the government to attempt an overt violent solution to the Sintraemcali conflict 
and its direct action. 
More generally the effectiveness of both the international solidarity work 
and the human rights work (which clearly overlap) is the sensitivity of the 
Colombian government and its need to maintain international respectability. How 
this functions has not been fully theorised but is intimately related to the need of 
nation states to be legitimated both `domestically' and `internationally'. Finnemore, 
& Sikkink (1998, p. 652) note that: 
... International legitimation 
is important insofar as it reacts back on a 
government's domestic basis of legitimation and consent and thus ultimately 
on its ability to stay in power. This dynamic was part of the explanation for 
regime transitions in South Africa, Latin America, and Southern Europe. 
Central to the strategic pedagogy of Sintraemcali was the need to create the 
necessary skills, knowledge and materials able to operate effectively in these new 
solidarity and human rights spaces. The human rights diplomas provided the skills 
for trade union and community activists, the production of video's, the detailed 
collection of human rights testimonies and the support for delegations both to and 
from Colombia all reflected the trade union's commitment to educating both their 
own members in human rights and the international community of trade union 
and political activists about what was taking place in Cali and in Colombia more 
generally. This was a highly strategic and active process that, as we saw 
during the 
CAM Tower Occupation produced important results. 
7.4 The CAM Tower Occupation: An emergent power 
Returning to the CAM Tower Occupation what we can see is how these 
different spaces of engagement: the trade union/community alliance, the militancy 
of the rank and file, the management space of the 
Plan PARE and the 
transnational solidarity space of human rights and 
labour rights operated together 
to produce more than the sum of their 
individual parts. Simultaneously, we had the 
CAM Tower Occupation controlled and defended, discursively the 
knowledge 
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developed on the workings of Emcali meant that the trade union was able to 
challenge local, national and international assertions that Emcali was not viable, the 
trade union/community alliance mobilised and organised in a myriad of different 
ways, and the barrage of international solidarity and support ate away at the 
Colombian government's legitimacy. The combination of these different powerl 
resources when activated against the range of powerl resources of the Colombian 
state served to produce unexpected and unintended outcomes. The state was 
constrained in its action, despite its overwhelming military capacity. The trade 
union's clear command of the facts and figures of the company meant the 
government struggled to maintain its coherency in the press. The strike command 
and the range of local solidarity networks developed meant that there was an 
alternative story of Emcali emerging across the city and this produced a range of 
highly effective demonstrations and the shift of site to the occupation in Bogota 
had the government reeling from the multiple attacks - all of which were watched 
and monitored by constant communication via transnational solidarity networks 
producing solidarity actions and letters. The dynamics of the particular 
conjunctural event eventually proved too much and the government retreated, to 
await its next chance. 
7.5 Conclusion 
Central to the success of this episode of contestation lay the long and hard 
strategic work put into developing all of these alternative power resources. 
The 
twin trajectories of horizontalisation and transborderisation become under the 
dynamic leadership of the trade union organization the twin pillars of a new 
pedagogy of rebellion and resistance that emerged within the union. 
Operating in 
parallel the first reflects Santos's politics of translation and essentially refers to ways 
in which different population groups come together and address and work out 
their differences. This has two aspects. The first is the creation of an 
inter-personal 
space, such those new spaces created 
between trade unionists and community in 
the Minga's, the Municipal Strike Command, the Plan 
PARE Groups, the Human 
Rights Diplomas, the international delegations, the rank and file meetings. 
All were 
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crucial in developing trust and building understanding between groups that often 
had little or no contact, and particularly contact that focused directly on these 
particular issues of privatisation and the defence of national resources. The second 
aspect is a shift in the culture and attitude of the trade union towards the 
importance of new spaces/constituencies. Reflected in the collective terms for `la 
comunidad' (the community) or `lo internacional' (the international), but also `la 
empresa' (the company) each represented a new space of engagement which 
required a shift in the culture of the trade union away from its prior quite narrow 
concerns for workers salaries and conditions. This cognitive shift towards these 
new `spaces' would then lead to the necessity of new knowledges which is the 
input of transborderisation. 
Transborderisation represented the conquest of new spatial terrains that 
were either selected - as new spaces of engagement - or perhaps were already 
there or thrust upon the trade union. These spaces were actually new scales of 
contestation and in order to compete against those opposing the trade union's 
plans there was often a need to learn new skills. The pedagogy of 
transborderisation thus became the educational process of acquiring the necessary 
skills to operate successfully in a particular space of engagement. One can clearly 
delineate here the crucial spaces of human rights - requiring a new language and 
understanding of the mechanisms of how the international human rights regime 
operates and how it can serve as a mechanism that can strengthen the movement's 
objectives. The space of management - that emerged around the Plan PARE 
required the clear need for a detailed study of how the company operates, who is 
trying to take it over etc, all requiring new knowledge. The space of the occupation 
- that required the workers to develop new skills and knowledge as to 
how to 
manage and defend the occupation, control security, organise food, and also to 
develop the skills to deal with the the politics surrounding the occupation such as 
that of handling the management of the media. 
As Foley (1999) notes these educational processes took place in a range of 
ways: formally in the human rights diplomas and the weekend Plan PARE 
workshops, but also informally in the day to work, in the anti-corruption teams 
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and the Plan PARE Teams. It took place incidentally during demonstrations and 
occupations where workers would learn new skills (responding to tear gas attacks , 
learning about self-defence). There were a whole range of educational processes 
taking place that fitted the needs of the spaces of engagement. Crucially, there is 
also a need to clarify the distinction between Sintraemcali and the movement for 
the defence of public services in Cali. These educational processes went way 
beyond the membership and beyond the control of Sintraemcali. They extended to 
poor communities in Cali who went to meetings organized in their 
neighbourhoods and to the local community and trade union activists' who 
participated in the Municipal Strike Command. The international trade union and 
human rights activists who attended meetings in their own countries or those who 
came on international delegations were also involved in these processes of 
education which both raised consciousness - inspiring them to try to assist the 
union - and providing them with knowledge as to how best to direct their efforts 
to find the weak points in the armoury of the Colombian state. While Sintraemcali 
often articulates this in fixed scalar levels: the local, national and international, 
Cox's spaces of engagement allows us a way of pinpointing agency in these scales 
by focusing in on the particular groups. It was not all the international community, 
national or local, but particular sets of people that carried out certain things, and 
their actions were linked in a myriad of different ways. 
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SECTION THREE: 




LEARNING FROM THE SOUTH: 
LISTENING TO SINTRAEMCALI 
! believe that the leaders of labour organisations are responsible for not acting in relation to globalisation and the neo-liberal model. Look at my country 
where being a trade unionist is synonymous with being dead.... / don't 
understand why in other countries where there is not war and corruption, why they haven't made decisions like we made. Not because we are more or less brave, nor because we are more or less intelligent, the problem is that the 
neo-liberal problem can be confronted, the neo-liberal model has no justification, no logic, wherever you look it goes against the collective interest. 
The problem is that the leaders know the problem and prefer to not confront it (Interview with Alexander Lopez, 2002, p. 22). 
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In this research I set out to understand how a small trade union had 
successfully managed to fight off a series of attempts by the Colombian 
government and its transnational allies to privatise public utilities in Cali. In 
exploring this, I sought to analyse the strategic development of the union and the 
pedagogical processes that were involved in this transformation. More broadly, I 
sought to contribute, albeit in a small way, to the development of a sociology that 
focuses on the dialectical relationship between `order and control' and `rebellion 
and solidarity' under the conditions of contemporary processes of globalisation 
(Section 2.2). Through a sociology of absences (Santos, 2003a) I excavated the 
hidden story of Sintraemcali and its struggle against privatisation. Central to this 
task was recognition of the importance of listening to and learning from `the 
South', as the place where the sharpest contradictions of the contemporary world 
order take place and where new knowledges, insights and possibilities can be 
derived. 
By way of conclusion to the thesis, I will assess to what extent the research 
itself has provided insights that might inform a sociology of rebellion and solidarity 
adequate to the task of exploring, understanding and theorising contemporary 
movements seeking to challenge hegemonic forms of globalisation, and more 
specifically neo-liberalism. Secondly, I will turn to the task of sketching tentative 
answers to the central research questions while simultaneously attempting to draw 
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out the broader insights that the case study can offer for trade unions and 
oppositional social movements. 
Researching Radical Social Movements 
I began this research with the objective of simultaneously engaging with and 
writing about the popular movement in Colombia and contemporary struggles 
against privatisation. These dual tasks, as highlighted in Chapter Three, seek to 
combine the commitment of the activist with the intellectual rigour of the social 
scientist. The objective of this work was to move in and out of two worlds by 
inhabiting a `third space' that exists somewhere in between (Routledge, 1996). By 
avoiding `spectator knowledge' over the course of the last three years I have gained 
privileged access to the inner workings of a sophisticated social movement that has 
engaged not only in `opposition' but also developed wide-ranging `propositions' for 
the efficient and more equitable management of natural resources in Cali. The 
openness of the interviewees and the leadership of the organisation to all my 
requests for information derived from the trust developed simultaneously 
throughout that period as I worked alongside them and for the trade union both in 
Colombia and here in the UK. That level of trust, in a country where state terror 
heightens suspicion within social movements, is no small matter. While any 
research relationship is riddled with power differentials and problems, I firmly 
believe that my research approach was able to bridge many of these boundaries 
and borders and begin to build mutually beneficial relationships that produced new 
insights and knowledges. Neither the relationships developed, not the knowledge 
produced, will end with the completion of this thesis and both will continue to 
develop and grow. 
While an ethics of commitment was central, there was also a clear 
theoretical commitment attached to the importance of studying, listening and 
learning from the `South'. This is based on a belief that it is where the 
contradictions of contemporary capitalism are at their sharpest that new 
insights 
and new counter-hegemonic knowledges can 
be produced and developed. 
Furthermore, it is also a belief that it is those activists operating under these 
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conditions that have the experience and knowledge to produce these insights. This 
leads back to the question of why do we might benefit from a sociology of 
rebellion and solidarity? As I argued in Chapter One and Two there is an 
imbalance in critical research based on an overwhelming focus on `order' and 
`control' at the expense of `rebellion' and `solidarity'. The case study of Sintraemcali 
provides a rare opportunity to explore the inner workings of a successful 
oppositional movement and shows that behind the `apparent' spontaneity there 
was organisation, planning, and strategy development. This will be explored more 
deeply in the next section. Secondly, the focus on `rebellion' and `solidarity' rather 
than merely on `resistance' is based on a belief that often `resistance' becomes too 
limiting conceptually, implying the presence of a dominating `other'. A sociology of 
rebellion and resistance provides the possibility for being less reactive and 
exploring practices that are not merely struggling against, but also struggling for 
something else: a different future, an alternative way of knowing, seeing and living. 
In exploring the strategic development of Sintraemcali we can clearly see that 
process in action. It is located in the Plan Pare, in the `minga comunitarios' and in 
the bonds of solidarity and friendship among those engaged in the CAM Tower 
Occupation. Each `space' points beyond the present and towards Panitch and 
Gindin's (2000) `concrete utopia' (see Chapter Two). 
More broadly, Burawoy's `extended case method' (Chapter Three) provided 
the means by which a `politics of commitment' could be combined with a 
`sociology of rebellion and solidarity' which went some way towards addressing the 
perennial problem of the relationship between theory and practice. Throughout 
the research I felt this tension as I moved from periods of intense day-to-day 
`practice' in Colombia to university life and `theory' in Bristol. 
Inevitably, there are limitations to my research, both in terms of its 
execution and its scope. If time had permitted the research would have 
benefited 
from more engagement with local activists from poor communities engaged in the 
Municipal Strike Command and an exploration of issues related to gender and 
ethnicity. Likewise, research on the history of trade union and social movement 
resistance in the Valle de Cauca region 
before 1990 would have been beneficial for 
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exploring commonalities and differences between modes of struggle during distinct 
historical periods. Each of these areas provides fruitful new directions for further 
research. Despite these limitations, the central research questions have, I believe, 
been adequately addressed and it is to the tentative answers to these questions and 
their broader relevance to trade union and oppositional social movements that I 
now turn. 
Lessons We Can Learn: Major Findings 
In essence, the central questions that I set about discovering in this thesis 
related to how Sintraemcali had developed a powerful movement of opposition to 
privatisation in Cali, and what the pedagogical aspects of that development were. 
In answering the first question I begin with what I believe represents this research's 
central theoretical contribution; namely, that the activities of individuals and 
groups can be linked up to the big global historical shifts and transformations 
taking place without either losing their agency on the one hand or their location 
within bigger historical structures on the other hand (Section 1.4.2). When 
Alexander Lopez spoke out in the worker's meeting in the Sewerage Plant back in 
the early 1990's he began a process of transformation in Sintraemcali that 
continues today. This is a movement that has transcended the geographical 
confines of Cali and continues to have repercussions in both Colombia and 
beyond. While Alexander Lopez is now a member of the Colombian Congress for 
the Social and Political Front, he also continues to work for the trade union and 
the principles that led him into the Colombian popular movement. 
If evidence were needed of the effectiveness of his work, then the discovery 
of a high level plot to assassinate him in August 2004 may provide such proof (see 
Appendix 14 and El Tiempo, 27/08/04). Berenice Celeyta and Luis Hernandez were 
also on that assassins list. State complicity in this was confirmed when the Attorney 
General's Office raided a flat in Cali on the 26th of August, 2004 using evidence 
that Alexander Lopez had obtained and arrested a high ranking army officer who 
was carrying out surveillance on prominent leftist leaders in the region under an 
operation codenamed `Operation Dragon'. The serving military officer stated that 
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he was working for GIL (Consultoria Integral Latinoamericana) a private security 
firm carrying out studies on the socio-economic and political environment of 
several planned privatisation projects, including Emcali. 
Classified documents were found in his possession from Military 
Intelligence that named a range of political leaders, including Angelino Garzon, 
Governor of the Valle de Cauca Department; Lucho Garzon, the Mayor of 
Bogota; Wilson Borja, member of the Colombian Congress and Alexander Lopez 
(among others), as all being "supportive of the objectives of the insurgency". 
Detailed plans of Alexander Lopez's Cali office were also found amongst the 
documents. In his press statement Lopez notes that "the documents found in the 
raid corroborate that in effect there are parallel organisations contracted by the 
government to eliminate the political and social opposition in Colombia" 
(Appendix 14, see also Section 4.2.1). 
The people on the confidential military intelligence list are all 
representatives of the emerging popular opposition to neo-liberal globalisation in 
Colombia, and Sintraemcali's struggle represents an important moment in the 
development and historical memory of that opposition91. Sintraemcali's struggle 
was always much bigger than Emcali, and its leadership recognised that the 
movement against privatisation and neo-liberalism was always embedded within a 
broader one for national independence, peace and social justice in Colombia 
(Interview with Berenice Celeyta, 2002, p18). Just as in the case with the Congress 
of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) in South Africa and the CUT in Brazil, 
two previous exemplars of `social movement unionism', Sintraemcali's struggle 
went beyond mediating between capital and labour to raising questions of the 
organisation of democracy, control of production, sovereignty and human rights. 
That the transformation of this trade union began through the determination of a 
small group of people in the Sewerage Plant as they challenged the conservatism 
91 All of the above mentioned leaders of the opposition were involved in the Cam Tower Occupation to 
different degrees. Angelino Garzon, was the Minister of Labour in the Pastrana government of the time 
and was brought in to try to bridge the gap between the Superintendent of Public Services and 
Sintraemcali. Lucho Garzon, who at the time was running as a Presidential Candidate for the Social and 
Political Front cam to Cali during the Occupation to pledge his support. Wilson Borja, has a long record 
of opposition to privatisation and has spoken out on several occasions in support of Sintraemcali. 
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and complacency of the union's leadership and transformed it from within, should 
give hope to all those rank and file activists trying to build confidence amongst 
their colleagues and their leadership that effective and strong workers movements 
can be built and remain a potentially powerful force for social change. Centrally, 
the research has shown that the CAM Tower occupation, far from being a 
spontaneous uprising, represented the outcome of many years of strategic 
development and learning, and countless hours of organising and activity by many 
trade unionists and activists mainly in Cali but also in different parts of the world. 
These processes, while less spectacular, provide the foundations upon which major 
protest events were able to develop (Chapter Seven). 
Moving from the `how' of human agency to the `how' of power we can 
explore the mechanisms and resources deployed by the Sintraemcali/Community 
alliance during the development of their movement. The case study of 
Sintraemcali offers us a glimpse of the contemporary potentiality (powerl) of trade 
unions and collective working class action and the resources that it can bring to the 
struggle for social change. Sintraemcali was able to draw on the resources derived 
from its structural location within Emcali to challenge the power of the Colombian 
state and it was able to use the resources - both human and infrastructural - of 
Emcali to (i) improve the conditions of the poor communities in Cali (the Minga 
Comunitarios, the Sintraemcali Institute) (ii) maintain the subsidies for the poorest 
neighbourhoods, and (iii) improve the efficiency of Emcali as a public service 
provider (through the Plan PARE). It was this powerl, located in the `means of 
production, ' that gave strength to the movement against privatisation. As I have 
shown in this thesis, this potential power was always relational and dependent on 
the tactics and strategies of the state and those of the union and its ability to build 
alliances locally, nationally and transnationally. 
The long process of developing community projects and links, the grass 
roots human rights training courses, the meetings of the 
Municipal Strike 
Command, the effort put into the `Despertar Popular' weekly TV programme and 
the more general media work, all built legitimacy 
for the trade union - serving as a 
crucial bridge to link up the power of organised 
labour with those `excluded' from 
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the benefits of neo-liberalism in Colombia hidden from view in repressively 
policed poverty zones or in the shanty towns that have developed on the edges of 
Colombia's major cities. But, as we saw during the CAM Tower Occupation, when 
the `excluded' make the decision to take to the streets they also represent a 
powerful transformatory force which could halt the city's economy, as they did on 
January 24th of January 2002, when all the major exits and entrances to the city 
were blocked off. In coordination with organised labour, the potential power of 
this movement is enormous. 
Likewise, the trade unionists, human rights and political activists outside of 
Colombia also played an important role in ensuring that the Colombian 
government and its `parallel state' was aware that the world was watching. The 
effect of this on the final outcome is evidenced in the fact that one of the 
Colombian Minister's thought it important enough to personally ask Sintraemcali, 
before the final negotiations began on January 28th, 2002, to call their friends in 
the UK because President Pastrana was annoyed by the amount of traffic 
emanating from the Colombian embassy in London. 
As elaborated in this thesis, the case of Sintraemcali more generally 
highlights the effectiveness of a range of interventions at the international level 
both through the legal transnational infrastructure of human rights and the 
international organisations that monitor this (Amnesty International, Human 
Rights Watch). It also shows the complementary role that can be played between 
the `official' channels of the international trade union movement and their ability to 
knock at the doors of high ranking politicians and officials and the `unofficial' role 
of grassroots activists and organisations who bring these issues to the fore in the 
first place, keep them going when people are engaged elsewhere, and refuse to 
keep quiet - even when it causes discomfort to their national 
labour movement 
and the political party that represents it. 
The combination of the energy of the activists and supporters from the 
Colombia Solidarity Campaign and their ability to mobilise and raise awareness 
about the situation of Sintraemcali and the institutional power and influence of 
organisations such as UNISON, the TUC, PSI and the ICFTU, proved to 
be a 
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powerful combination which played its part in the CAM Tower Occupation. 
Furthermore, these factors also enabled Sintraemcali to avoid the often slow and 
bureaucratic working of the international trade union movement by bypassing the 
Colombian CUT and with the assistance of the Colombia Solidarity Campaign to 
undertake the direct lobbying of trade unionists (both leaders and activists) and 
politicians in the UK. The decline in the cost of international transport and 
improvements in communication technology both facilitated the ease with which 
these twin aspects of transnational solidarity could operate for Sintraemcali, 
highlighting how some of the technological aspects of processes of globalisation 
can be turned to the service of the poor and working class in new and innovative 
ways. While there has been some interesting research on aspects of this (c. f. Lee, 
1997, Keck & Sikkink, 1998), there is a great deal more research to be done. For 
social movements in Colombia and beyond there is a need for research on `best 
practice' in human rights defence and protection in relation to this. Accessible case 
studies are needed on how, for example, `urgent action' networks operate, how to 
measure the impact of these interventions and how to develop and sustain 
transnational contacts. 
More generally, the international solidarity pressure on Colombia works by 
exploiting the gaps and contradictions that exist both within Colombia and within 
the broader neo-liberal world order. For Colombia, `the oldest democracy in Latin 
America' and the world's worst violator of the human rights of trade unionists, this 
contradiction is becoming particularly acute and difficult to manage as more and 
more cases of direct state involvement in human rights abuses are 
being revealed92. 
Yet the Colombian government continues to insist on its innocence and 
lack of 
involvement in human rights violations as it needs both local and international 
legitimacy that comes from the appearance of respecting 
human rights. This 
contradiction, while particularly acute in Colombia, remains a major problem 
for 
the stability of the neo-liberal world order and 
lies at the heart of the Polanyi 
problem (Section 1.3). 
92 The most recent case was the direct execution of 
3 prominent trade union leaders in Arauca. Initially, 
the government declared that they were members of 
the ELN and were killed in combat. After 
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As our world becomes increasingly polarised, and the scramble for control 
of the world's resources intensifies, leaders of the G7 and their transnational allies 
continue to invoke freedom and human rights as their justification for actions 
rather than naked personal and national self-interest. The upper echelons of the 
management of the neo-liberal order need legitimacy just as much as force, yet are 
finding it increasingly difficult to obtain/maintain. While in the `Post September 
11th world' the 'War on Terror' was able to command some legitimacy for 
increased repression, this remains contested even in the US heartland where mass 
demonstrations and thousands of arrests outside the Republican Party Convention 
in New York in September, 2004 reflect a deeply divided and troubled society with 
many of its citizens uncomfortable with its increasingly repressive and expansionist 
role in the world. The imbalance between what the propagators of neo-liberalism 
say and the empirical evidence emerging of what the effects are, may become 
impossible to reconcile. But, if things are to change, then we also need agents of 
change with plans and alternative ideas. This leads me to the second related 
research question on the role of pedagogy in the strategic transformation of 
Sintraemcali. 
The strategic pedagogy that emerged within Sintraemcali and the nature of 
its operation through the twin trajectories of horizontalisation and 
transborderisation was able to build from the grass roots upwards a movement that 
consciously recognised its location within bigger structures, recognising that 
"groups may move with the pressures or resist and oppose them but they cannot 
ignore them" (Cox 1996, p98). As Sintraemcali developed during the 1990's it 
actively sought to both understand and undermine those pressures. Through the 
action research process of the Plan PARE the union was able to map out, not only 
the transnational patterns of corruption that had taken place in Emcali, but also the 
broader patterns of de- and re-territorialisation of power taking place across the 
region. As the union engaged in this process of `strategic learning' it moved into 
new territories and new spaces where contests were fought and alliances were built. 
The construction and entrance into these new `spaces of engagement' and the 
international pressure and a fact finding tour the Attorney General has now issued a warrant for the arrest 
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politics of building alliances with different groups represented the key pedagogical 
trajectories of the union and produced its dynamics. 
This process lies at the centre of debates over labour renewal and the 
possibilities for constructing serious challenges to the neo-liberal global order. For 
this reason it merits a deeper inquiry. This case study highlights Sintraemcali's 
development of a critical pedagogy that operated along two key dimensions. The 
first, horizontalisation, operated as the practice of transforming the culture and 
ethos of the trade union and its members, so that it could interact and develop 
alliances with a range of population groups that could assist in its objective of 
constructing a counter-hegemonic movement able to defend its local `space of 
dependence'. In practice this meant Sintraemcali had to make sure that its 
members and activists were engaging with different constituencies, particularly 
those from the poorest sections of the community. They achieved this through 
promoting voluntary work, through involvement in the strike command, and 
through the Sintraemcali Institute. Central to this was a politics of respect for the 
local communities as consumers and as owners of Emcali. But, horizontalisation 
was not just about engaging with local poor communities. It was also about making 
the trade union itself more internally democratic and more responsive to its rank 
and file. It moved from being a bureaucratic top-down institution to a social 
movement that relied on active participation in all of the union's activities. 
Horizontalisation, thus, was a process that led members and activists into a range 
of new `spaces of engagement' where they had to deal with unfamiliar situations 
which required a `politics of translation' to build alliances. Workers learnt to deal 
with each other, with consumers, with different social movements, with 
management, with technical advisers and with the international delegations that 
came and went. 
In much of the literature on social movement unionism it is the 
worker/community alliance which defines the concept. While in the case of 
Sintraemcali, this community/worker alliance was crucial, it was not the only one 
built up. The trade union constructed a highly sophisticated network of alliances 
in 
of the soldiers for murder (New 
York Times, 08/09/04). 
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local government, among sympathetic managers, and human rights organisations 
among others. In understanding this network, the Gramscian conception of 
hegemony outlined in Chapter One is crucial in helping us to understand these 
social relationships. When Gramsci developed the concept, he used it to describe 
how the ruling class made some compromises with `subordinate' classes in order to 
rule with a minimum of force. However, the ruling classes core interests were not 
open to negotiation. Similarly, Sintr aemcali's construction of a counter-hegemonic 
movement was based on a certain set of core principles rooted in the material 
interests of the working class and poor. Sintraemcali refused compromise in its 
opposition to privatisation, price increases for the poor, and opposition to selling 
off national resources to private interests. Thus, the pedagogy of horizontalisation 
was a `politics of translation' with the interest of the working classes and the 
oppressed at its core - not unity for unity's sake. 
The second dimension under which Sintraemcali's pedagogy operated was 
that of transborderisation. This included the task of seeking out the requisite 
knowledge and tools to operate in the new spaces that were either opening up or 
being forced upon the trade union as it developed its movement. From the Plan 
PARE management space to the human rights space, the transnational solidarity 
space, and to the space created by decentralisation of local government, 
Sintraemcali and its members required new skills and knowledge to best operate in 
these new spaces. Here we can return to Harvey's (1989) notion that at particular 
scales and spaces some social forces have advantages over others. Sintraemcali, 
recognizing the relational nature of power, sought to strengthen its ability to 
operate at different scales through new skills, knowledge and alliances (Section 
2.4.1). Through this effort, it was able to successfully operate on a range of 
different scales. 
The concept of transborderisation represents a refinement of the literature 
on `new labour internationalism' and the increasing importance of the global scale. 
The case of Sintraemcali highlights the importance of operating at a range of 
scales, from the local to the global, and the new skills and alliances that needed to 
be built in order to operate effectively on these different scales. Sintraemcali, while 
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operating successfully at the `global' scale through human rights and advocacy 
networks, has also been able to operate effectively with the local state, exploiting 
the contradictions produced by processes of decentralisation. Likewise, the trade 
union/ community alliance represented a powerful mobilising mechanism. In this 
sense, the research supports the argument of Herod (2001) that processes of 
globalisation have a range of implications for workers in different industries in 
different parts of the world and are not done justice by the simplistic call to `go 
global'. As we see in the process of neo-liberal globalisation in Colombia there are 
a complex set of processes of shifting power to the locality (decentralisation), 
increased power and influence of the World Bank and the IMF (particularly since 
the IMF agreements in 2000), a new and central role for MNCs, and the increasing 
disciplinary power of the financial markets. Likewise, while all these factors may 
present limitations, they also provide new possibilities for extending and 
developing oppositional movements. Sintraemcali and its activists and community 
supporters developed new skills in understanding how the transnational human 
rights regulatory framework operated and were able to develop highly sophisticated 
techniques to utilise these. Likewise, the solidarity work with trade unionists from 
different parts of the world, and the new alliances and friendships that were 
formed, also represented new possibilities and terrains for challenging the unequal 
status quo. 
Sintraemcali now has the capacity to call for a picket of the Colombian 
embassy in London (and carry it out) almost as simply as it would call for one 
outside the local council in Cali. Both the human rights terrain and the 
international trade union solidarity work have provided new possibilities for 
struggle upon which to defend the local. What lessons we can draw from this is 
that while the process of neo-liberal globalisation is complex and multi-scalar, the 
counter-hegemonic practices of oppositional groups may be equally complex and 
multi-scalar. Neither do they have to mirror the scales and terrains of the neo- 
liberal order but may shift scale and space to counteract them. For example, while 
the transnational plan for the privatisation of Emcali operated through a network 
of links between the Colombian state, 
MNCs, Emcali management and local elites 
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and politicians, we can see an alternative and transformatory architecture of power 
constructed by Sintraemcali that relied on a local community/trade union alliance, 
a strategic alliance with local government, and a transnational network of human 
rights and solidarity activists that targeted human rights as the key issue and 
weakness of the Colombian state - rather than targeting the particular MNCs 
involved directly. 
Having explored both how Sintraemcali developed its movement and the 
twin pedagogical processes of tranborderisation and horizontalisation, I now want 
to conclude by returning to the theme that underpins the entire thesis - the 
question of power, and specifically to Sayer's critical realist relational understanding 
of it (Section 1.5). In the case of Sintraemcali we can see a dynamic interaction 
between different power sources and resources, between the agents aiming to 
privatise Sintraemcali and those opposed to it. The Sintraemcali case highlights 
how the relational nature of powerl means that conditions can change, while new 
agents can learn new skills and develop new mechanisms which undermine other 
power sources that appear invincible at certain scales. Likewise, each powerl 
resource always has a weakness. While the Colombian state militarily had the 
overwhelming capability to take over the CAM Tower, that powerl also had its 
vulnerability. What would the Colombian government look like as it asked for 
further humanitarian aid from the international community after it had directly 
assassinated several hundred workers? Likewise, the utilisation of certain types of 
power has unintended consequences. State terror and the selective assassination of 
trade union leaders, while potentially effective at creating instability and fear within 
social movements, also runs the danger of provoking widespread resistance and 
acts of incredible courage in response (Section 7.3.3). 
Those involved in the CAM Tower Occupation represent the spirit of that 
resistance as they appeared prepared to sacrifice everything in the defence of 
Emcali. However, while this dynamic process of struggle produced amazing feats 
of heroism and dedication, Sintraemcali's powerl is neither constant nor stable and 
needs attention and effort to maintain it. People drop out of movements just as 
often as they drop in, and the constant energy needed to mobilise 
in defence of 
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Emcali together with the relentless pressure placed on Sintraemcali and its 
members from both state and para-state forces inevitably takes its toll, emotionally, 
politically, and financially. Despite its success, Sintraemcali is a movement of a few 
thousand and needs other organisations and movements to take up the mantle of 
struggle against neo-liberalism for it to survive and flourish. 
The election of Alvaro Uribe Velez as President of Colombia in 2002 and 
the changed international environment that has emerged in the wake of September 
11th, 2001 has meant that the conditions under which Sintraemcali are now 
operating are becoming even more difficult and dangerous (see Epilogue). 
Likewise, despite the search for legitimacy and the need to appear respectful of 
human rights, recent world events have sent a green light to the world's torturers, 
human rights abusers, and opposers of international law. The illegal war in Iraq, 
Abu Gharib, Guantanamo Bay, the Patriot Act are all rewriting the rules of 
engagement between social movements and states at a range of scales from the 
local to the global. While Polanyi's double movement and a pendulum swing 
towards bringing markets and capital under societal control is becoming ever more 
necessary, the birth of a new more equitable global order may be a painful one. If 
so, then the lessons of Sintraemcali are even more relevant to contemporary labour 
and social movements around the globe as they confront the neo-liberal world 
`disorder'. 
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rights and benefits, but also of workers control of production and the challenging 
of the labour/capital relation. 
The development of the Plan PARE (outlined in Section 5.3) represented 
an intense laboratory whereby workers developed the new skills and knowledge 
necessary to manage the company and develop alternatives. Crucial to this process 
was the culture of learning that emerged within Sintraemcali, and particularly the 
developing interest of workers in learning every intricate detail about the 
functioning of the company. During the CAM Tower Occupation, while political 
education took place took place inside the tower, there were also computer classes 
and English classes. Both of these were seen as important new skills for workers to 
acquire if they were to manage the company efficiently (Interview with Claudia 
Caritas, 2002). There were also classes where workers from one area or workplant 
could learn about how a different part of the company was operating85. The Plan 
PARE action research project meant that the union had developed by 2001 an 
enormous knowledge of the day to day running of the company and its financial 
difficulties and was able to take its well-researched alternatives to a wide range of 
fora and debate alternatives. 
During these interventions, networking and contacts would be developed 
through which joint political projects could be discussed and strengthened with 
independent political forces. Several sympathetic representatives of Congress and 
the Senate would take up support of the case against privatisation such as 
Wilson 
Borja, member of the Colombian Congress. Furthermore, at the 
Municipal level 
support was given by the union to the Mayoral campaign of 
Jon Maro Rodriquez, 
who in 2000 was elected as Mayor of Cali and 
began to implement the Plan PARE. 
These actors would be involved to different 
degrees in the Sintraemcali project, 
though not necessarily the militant tactics of the union. 
The mayor was able to do 
this because what Sintraemcali provided and was able to 
deliver was a constructive 
alternative development plan 
for the management of the company and a work 
force that was committed to the company and 
its salvation, and were prepared to 
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make a great deal of sacrifices in order for the plan to be successful. This `space of 
engagement' worked on one of the contradictions within the neo-liberal 
globalisation project in Colombia, this being decentralisation. On the one hand it 
brought greater local democracy and control for local political structures, but on 
the other, driven as it was by needs to reduce the central budget, it produced 
tensions between the centre and the state over resource allocation. Sintraemcali 
was able to use this conflict to further its defence of public services. This conflict 
would emerge most clearly over questions of the PTAR water treatment plant, and 
the central government's responsibility in contributing resources to a project 
whose benefits would not be confined to the city of Cali alone. Hence, the space of 
local government become an increasingly important terrain upon which the 
struggle against privatisation was waged. Yet, Sintraemcali was only able to fully 
capitalise on this possibility by strategically taking the decision to research and learn 
about how the company operated and develop an alternative plan - this was a 
product of the critical pedagogy of transborderisation and Sintraemcali's ability to 
recognise the new skills, knowledge necessary to operate successfully in this 
management space. 
7.3.3 The Rank and File: The Space of Militancy 
As outlined in Chapter 5 (Section 5.6.1), the internal transformation of the 
union was driven and sustained by a group of between four to five hundred 
workers. These workers emerged in and around the `Comite de Base' (rank and file 
committee) and were at the centre of the union's direct actions. These members 
would be at considerable personal risk, have a strong ideological commitment to 
the union's objectives, and to broader process of political change within the city 
and country. This group would be largely affiliates of Sintraemcali but also include 
several local trade unionists, community leaders, leftist activists, more radical 
human rights activists etc. who had decided to make a strong commitment to the 
trade union. From this group are many of the assassinated members, the forcibly 
85 I was initally surpised by this, for at that early stage of my research I was unable to fully comprehend 
the importance of Plan PARE and the educational action research project that had developed to create an 
alternative management plan for Emcali. 
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displaced, receivers of death threats etc, those that have been personally affected 
by the policies of state and para-state repression. Many were actively involved in 
the construction of the Plan PARE, and would have been involved in many of the 
militant actions such as the occupations, blockades, strikes etc that have developed 
since 1994. They would have developed great experience in organising an 
occupation, their responsibilities, duties, the psychological discipline necessary etc. 
The level of commitment amongst this group is reflected in the phrase 
"Hasta la vida misma86", which has become their organising slogan. This level of 
commitment is perhaps the most difficult to theorise and explain. Amongst these 
workers there are a range of reasons as to why they have been so committed to the 
union and prepared to risk their lives for the defence of the company", but one can 
note a combination of commitment to the company for having made a real 
material contribution to their own lives and also a sense of justice and the 
enjoyment of struggling for a cause. One worker felt that because his father was an 
employee in the company and that later he had also entered, he could see the direct 
contribution that Emcali had made to their lives, allowing them to go to school 
and survive in difficult economic times (Interview with Carlos Guttierez 2002, p. 2). 
In that sense he felt an obligation, but this was also clarified by saying that "but 
also because I like the struggle, to be here struggling for this company. " (ibid) 
Another prominent female activist stated that "I like all of this, I have it in my 
blood, I like justice, and also because I know that this company has given me a lot" 
(Interview with Libiana Hernan, 2002, p. 2). In a broader discussion on this issue 
with a group of 45 workers that were actively involved in the 2001 CAM Tower 
occupation, many stated that after watching the video of the occupation that they 
felt sure that "this struggle is worth dying for" (Authors field notes on 
focus 
group). One worker recounting the story of her involvement in the occupation of 
the headquarters of the Superintendent of Public Services in Bogota tells how she 
86 This literally means `until death itself and implis that the workers were prepared to 
die for the 
struggle against privatisation. 
87 The basis for the information in this section is developed from a series of interviews both individual 
and a focus group. As these workers are not 
in the public eye Where I have named people this is a 
psuedonym. These workers, unlike the 
leadership do not carry weapons for self defence and do not have 
bodyguards and are therefore the most vulnerable to assassination by state and para-state 
forces. 
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was approached by one ex-leader of Sintraemcali prior to the occupation. He 
asked her whether she was `berraca'. 8$ She sought clarification and he asked her 
whether she was able, if asked, to go to a place, follow orders, and sit down. She 
knew immediately that this was to be another occupation and agreed immediately, 
and promised to keep it a secret (Interview with Liliana Merce, 2002, p. 5). This 
implicit faith in the union leadership, being prepared to go to an unknown place 
and follow orders, and knowing that this involves risking her life, is perhaps the 
most remarkable example of the trust that the union had developed over the years. 
When asked as to why this group were prepared to risk their lives for the 
defense of public services and thus for the union, Luis Hernandez, President of 
Sintraemcali responded that: 
I believe that you cannot buy this kind of loyalty, but you must construct it, and 
you construct it through a strong and responsible class leadership. I believe 
that those of us who have been leading this organisation have demonstrated 
this and have built up a consciousness amongst the workers. This is a long 
process, but effective, very effective. Those workers that have accompanied 
us in the different direct actions have felt the strength of our organisation 
which is expressed in the beautiful phrase `basta la vida misma' We have 
been prepared to do this for a collective objective, as is the defence of public 
property, and defending the interests of the people (Interview with Luis 
Hernandez, 2002, p. 8). 
He highlights the role of the range of educational processes that many of 
these activists underwent: 
This loyalty has been developed from the training that our followers have 
received, and will continue to receive, because the good leader is in a 
evolutionary process, we are all in an evolutionary process and we are all 
learning, and developing and we will never have the final truth revealed, every 
day we need to learn more. That is why we are convinced that we need to 
generate more training and education. So that tomorrow it is not 500 workers 
but we can double that number or triple it, in the sense that we can keep 
generating more consciousness to struggle amongst the workers (ibid, p. 9). 
In this process we can see how loyalty was constructed by the union 
through its leadership, and also through its successes. Those engaged in the direct 
actions and occupations did so because they had become part of a process much 
bigger than themselves and were able to conceptualise this `collective' responsibility 
and recognise their role within that. But they also 
had a strong belief that they 
88 `Berraca' is a Cali colloquial term which means in this context `very tough' or `brave'. 
In different 
contexts it can also mean `brilliant', and also can refer 
to a situation which appears very difficult to 
resolve. 
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would win, which stemmed from earlier successes (Authors field notes on focus 
group). Luis Hernandez notes that there have been limitations to the educational 
processes aimed at developing this group of workers and expanding their numbers, 
both within the union and in the community: 
I think in this sense our trade union has not done enough. But the root of this 
lies in the exact same situation of struggle that we have been forced to live. 
We have had to engage in a constant state of struggle, in organised 
processes of struggle rather than in training. Despite this, we have generated 
a range of training programmes, but now we are determined to make this 
more intense, more ideological training, both for the workers and for the 
community and social leaders and activists with the aim of producing more 
people who in one way or another can put their grain of sand towards 
generating social change in Cali, in the Valle, and in the country" (ibid, p. 10). 
Here if we reconceptualise the processes of struggle as processes of 
education (see Section 2.6) we can then see the importance of this in the formation 
of the identities of these workers. Many had had friends assassinated since 1997, 
and had forged strong bonds with those comrades that they had engaged in direct 
actions and occupations with. During these occupations, intense solidarities and 
bonds of trust were forged. As one worker noted "in the occupations we shared 
everything, if we had an empanada (small pie) we would divide it in 6 or seven 
pieces, we shared our thoughts, our fears and our lives" (Interview with Asdrubal 
Gonzalo, 2002, p. 9). This sense of collectivity and commitment provided the 
unpredictable element for the Colombian state for these people had lost their feat. 
As noted in a remarkable set of recent ethnographic studies on the issue of state 
terror (Sluka, 2000), loss of fear represents the key challenge to the effectiveness of 
state terror: 
Once you've seen two year olds in diapers running up to Israeli soldiers and 
flashing them the V for victory sign, you know that state terror has some 
inherent weaknesses. Death and torture may NOT be the worst of 
alternatives for all people in a society. Maybe some of us would rather 
struggle for the truth, for justice, for an end to oppression without worrying so 
much about what might happen to us, rather, worrying more about what will 
keep happening to us, collectively, if we do nothing" (Sluka, 2000, p. 36). 
The Comite de Base represented those limits, how else can one explain why 
so many men and women - ordinary workers - would on 
December 25th, 2001 put 
masks on their faces and take over a 
building knowing full well that the 
repercussions in a country such as 
Colombia could be death? For our 
understanding of the critical pedagogy of 
Sintraemcali it was this bonding and 
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commitment along with the new knowledge that developed during occupations 
that gave Sintraemcah that vital edge in controlling those new spaces of protest. 
7.3.4 Human rights and Workers rights: The Space of Transnational Solidarity 
We have learnt that in this struggle we are not alone, and that men and 
women in different parts of the world share our basic principles concerning 
justice and human dignity, and reaffirm the idea that a different world is 
possible and that in the face of globalised world that alternative is to globalise 
resistance (Celeyta, 2003). 
While the spaces of engagement highlighted above were initiated from the 
outset of the transformatory process within Sintraemcali, the construction of a 
broad transnational network of solidarity emerged several years later, and really 
took off from 1999 onwards. Since then the union has dramatically raised its 
international profile, and accessed a range of transnational mechanisms through 
which pressure has been placed on the Colombian government. 
In Chapter Two (2.4.3) 1 explored some of the potential obstacles to 
transnational solidarity and the economic and political imbalances between `North' 
and `South'. Beyond those serious political cleavages, there is a also a sense of 
scepticism amongst many trade unionist towards the efficacy of international 
solidarity, with those involved in international delegations accused of `having a 
holiday' by the membership (Interview with Alexander Lopez, 2002). 
Communication has been a further obstacle, both through cost and language. 
Internet technology has drastically reduced the cost of communication, but as yet 
failed to resolve the linguistic differences (Lee, 1997). For a relatively small union 
such as Sintraemcali, a further barrier has been the traditional hierarchy of the 
international trade union movement, where much the same as in the military there 
is a chain of command from local, regional, national to international federations. 
Here again, developments both in international transport and telecommunications 
have facilitated new `spaces of engagement' that have sought to bypass the 
traditional hierarchical organisation of international solidarity and facilitated a range 
of important horizontal ties that have served as a catalyst to solidarity actions. 
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Central to an understanding of Sintraemcali's success in crossing national 
borders is the growing recognition of the deteriorating human rights situation in 
general in Colombia and in particular the situation of trade unionists, outlined in 
Chapter Four (Section 4.2). For the international trade union movement, and 
particularly the UK, US, and Canadian Unions, Colombia has become the 
international trade union movement's `pariah state'. Sintraemcali's attempts to 
construct transnational networks of solidarity has benefited from this increase in 
profile of the Colombian trade union movement, but Sintraemcali has also 
contributed to this raised profile through its series of delegations, international 
exchanges, interventions in a range of international forums, and the production 
and dissemination of materials ranging from `urgent actions' to video 
documentaries narrating the struggles of the union in its defence of workers. There 
is also an element, noted in relation to Santos's `politics of translation', of the way 
that neo-liberal globalisation is producing commonalities and empathy between 
different groups. As privatisation has globalised so has opposition to it, particularly 
amongst poor and marginalized communities throughout the world. In that sense 
Sintraemcali was able to tap into two key narratives - human rights and anti- 
privatisation - which both carried a great 
deal of legitimacy. 
The catalyst of this was the unintended outcome of the Colombian 
government's use of state terror89. Strong links were forged when Alexander Lopez 
came to the UK for a brief period of voluntary exile in London 
between October 
to December 2000. He had survived an assassination attempt in Colombian and 
been informed by the Colombian government that his `irresponsible attitude' 
meant that the Colombian government could no longer guarantee 
he protection of 
his human rights (Interview with Alexander Lopez, 2002, p. 14). 
Alexander, 
reflecting on the early solidarity work records 
his limited knowledge of the 
possibilities of international solidarity. 
89 Again a further illustration of the critical realist relational 
theory of power. The Colombian 
government's use of violence 
led to a range of connections that eventually would serve to 
transnationalise Sintraemcali's struggle. 
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In the union, obviously we knew that Europe existed, that North America 
existed.... but due to an attempt to assassinate me, the executive council of 
the union took the decision to get me out of the country for a while (Interview 
with Alexander Lopez, 2002, p. 14). 
During that initial period contact was made with the Colombian exile 
community in London, and through them a relationship was initiated between 
Andy Higginbottom, a seasoned internationalist and rank and file activist, who 
would later become one of the founding members of the Colombia Solidarity 
Campaign. During this period a range of meetings were held, and a strong 
relationship with UNISON, the UK public service union was established 
(Interview with Andy Higginbottom, 2002, p. 6). 
Upon his return to Colombia, Alexander Lopez maintained contact, 
particularly with Andy Higginbottom and the UNISON International Department. 
When the Colombia Solidarity Campaign was founded and held its first conference 
in April 2001, Alexander returned and since that point there have been delegations, 
exchanges, and many invitations for Sintraemcali representatives to talk at British 
trade union conferences, and several delegations have been sent to Colombia. The 
Colombia Solidarity Campaign have also sent volunteers to work in the human 
rights department for extended periods to facilitate particularly the translation of 
documents. 90 
Since 2000 there has been a regular process of communication and 
delegations, which have forged strong bonds between Colombian and British trade 
union leaders and activists and this has expanded to different parts of the world 
(see Section 5.6). Berenice Celeyta, head of the union's human rights department 
and one of the architects of the international strategy charts the development of 
contacts: 
90 My own work in Sintraemcali is part of this process. 
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Initially and as a product of the serious threats, information was sent to sister 
organisations such as trade unions and NGOs in England and Spain, later 
these links were strengthened with the presence of Sintraemcali comrades, 
the Human rights department and NOMADESC that went on delegations, and 
through these we gained support at two levels. The accompaniment here in 
Cali of an English comrade who during several months worked in the Human 
Rights Department during which time we managed to overcome one of the 
biggest obstacles that we have for the international work, the language, we 
could then rely on translation of analytical documents and urgent actions. 
Through this we widened the circulation of these documents to different 
English speaking countries. Later with the link with comrades from the 
Colombia Solidarity Campaign in the UK we received political support via 
meetings they organised with the Colombian Embassy in London. Equally, the 
series of delegations that have come to our region have a political effect at the 
government level (Celeyta, 2003, p. 4). 
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Here, the concept of translation takes its more traditional linguistic 
meaning, and the process of solidarity work brought the struggle of Sintraemcali 
into `visibility' within the UK trade union movement through the English language. 
This assistance with translation allowed for the production of a steady flow of 
information for distribution: 
We began to produce and translate videos and documents in Spanish and 
English and we were able to raise awareness amongst the international 
community, particularly the trade union movement and several human rights 
organisations, and deliver conferences, meetings at universities, with trade 
unions, with social sectors of the international community. We explained the 
struggle against corruption, explained the impunity, the violations of human 
rights but above all the struggle that we had built against globalisation, against 
privatisation. This work has been beautiful, and has been well received by the 
international community, and I believe that we have been able to sustain it by 
organising delegations once or twice a year which have given oxygen to the 
relations that we have built up with the international community where we 
have open exchanges" (Interview with Alexander Lopez, 2002, p. 15). 
But the process of translation also revolved around the cultural sphere as 
activists from different parts of the world came into contact with Colombia, both 
through visiting and also from receiving and meeting Colombian delegations in 
their home countries. Crucial here has been the interpersonal relationships 
developed in different pats of Europe, the USA and Canada through which 
networks of activity were established. While transnational communication 
is 
facilitated by developments in communication, face-to-face communication and 
interaction has been crucial in developing sustainable solidarity links. Likewise, the 
institutional resources of the various trade union organisations outside of 
Colombia have facilitated this process and suggest a strategy of engagement with 
both `official' trade union structures and more horizontal activist based networks. 
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Likewise, each broad network has different resources to contribute to advocacy 
and solidarity campaigns. The more horizontal contacts, particularly in the UK led 
to mobilizations outside of the Colombian embassy, while cultivating institutional 
structures such as the TUC facilitated engagement with representatives of the 
Colombian state. Neither of these practices is mutually exclusive and in Lambert & 
Webster's (2003) conceptualisation of `new' and `old' internationalism we can see 
the potential for a combination of activities operating in a complementary way. 
However, there are tensions between different organisations - both within 
Colombia and the UK, between Sintraemcali and CUT and between the Colombia 
Solidarity Campaign and the TUC, which led to the emergence of an alternative 
solidarity organisation `Justice for Colombia' which operates a more strict union to 
union form of solidarity with Colombia and operates in a more hierarchical 
manner. However, this may not necessarily be a negative development in that there 
is a great deal of room for further solidarity actions in Colombia and this may serve 
to open up more spaces of engagement. It does however highlight the tensions 
inherent within the construction of transnational solidarity processes. 
Within the development of solidarity with SINTRAECALI we can see the 
range of solidarity actions operating in both the more traditional forms and models 
of international trade union activity and the `new' labour internationalism, anti- 
capitalist and human rights domains: 
In the last three years we have had ten international delegations: Amnesty 
International, American Watch, who carried out important work in verifying 
denouncements of human rights violations, 3 UK delegations of trade union 
leaders, where organisations such as UNISON, the FBU, ASLEF, Colombia 
Solidarity Campaign and War on Want have participated. Two delegations 
from the Spanish, Red de Hermanidad (Brotherhood Network); one Canadian 
delegation, another Spanish one and one mission from Public Services 
International which included 12 delegates from different countries, and most 
recently a delegation from Austria. We have seen the strengthening of 
this 
accompaniment, beginning initially with trade unions from England and 
later 
on from a range of European countries, the United States and 
Canada. We 
have received humanitarian support, and emergency funds in those moments 
of serious crisis from UNISON, the FBU, the TUC and War on 
Want. We have 
also been present at the World Social Forum in Porto 
Alegre and at the 
European Social Forum in Firenze (Interview with Berenice Celeyta, 2003, 
p. 6). 
The human rights department has provided a permanent point of contact 
for the international work. This involves coordinating activities with 
international 
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organisations, producing and disseminating videos, reports, and urgent actions. 
The vast array of contacts and the experience that Berenice Celeyta, the prominent 
Colombian Human rights activist, has brought with her has ensured that the union 
capitalised on the potential interest of the international community in the situation 
of Colombia. As Lambert & Webster (2003) have noted, in their own study of 
labour renewal, one crucial ingredient has been the entry into the labour movement 
of activists engaged in different domains - human rights, community organizing 
etc. These experiences can serve to breathe new life into trade union practices by 
reorientating the focus. However, in order for this to take root there needs to be a 
level of openness within the culture of the trade union to allow for new directions 
and experimentation. Sintraemcali's openness has greatly facilitated this process 
and the day to day repression suffered by union activists meant that human rights 
discourse and praxis found fertile terrain within which to grow. 
The human rights department provided the technical skills and abilities to 
develop the ability of Sintraemcali to challenge the Colombian state at a range of 
levels from local legal processes to the Inter-American Human Rights Court (see 
Section 5.6). Crucially, the department continues to provide training for local trade 
union and community activists transferring these vital skills. These graduates of 
human tights courses and diplomas are able to act as intermediaries with state 
forces, government representatives and international bodies in specific conflicts 
and aware of the functioning of this global infrastructure. Cases have been won at 
the Inter-American Human Rights Court and the case of Sintraemcali has been 
well-documented in a range of annual reports of the major international human 
tights monitoring organisations including the UNCHR, Amnesty International and 
Human Rights Watch. 
Here notions of `visibility' and `invisibility' are crucial in understanding 
Sintraemcali's strategy. Many of the worst human rights violations in Colombia 
take place away from the eyes of the cameras, in rural areas where `events' can 
be 
`managed'. By raising the international profile the local protest events become 
highly visible, and `urgent actions' sent to Colombian embassies specifically make 
reference to the government's responsibility 
if violence were to happen to workers 
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and their supporters. The twin process of making protests `visible' and 
`pinpointing' the Colombian government's `responsibility' have made it difficult for 
the government to attempt an overt violent solution to the Sintraemcali conflict 
and its direct action. 
More generally the effectiveness of both the international solidarity work 
and the human rights work (which clearly overlap) is the sensitivity of the 
Colombian government and its need to maintain international respectability. How 
this functions has not been fully theorised but is intimately related to the need of 
nation states to be legitimated both `domestically' and `internationally'. Finnemore, 
& Sikkink (1998, p. 652) note that: 
... 
International legitimation is important insofar as it reacts back on a 
government's domestic basis of legitimation and consent and thus ultimately 
on its ability to stay in power. This dynamic was part of the explanation for 
regime transitions in South Africa, Latin America, and Southern Europe. 
Central to the strategic pedagogy of Sintraemcali was the need to create the 
necessary skills, knowledge and materials able to operate effectively in these new 
solidarity and human rights spaces. The human rights diplomas provided the skills 
for trade union and community activists, the production of video's, the detailed 
collection of human rights testimonies and the support for delegations both to and 
from Colombia all reflected the trade union's commitment to educating both their 
own members in human rights and the international community of trade union 
and political activists about what was taking place in Cali and in 
Colombia more 
generally. This was a highly strategic and active process that, as we saw 
during the 
CAM Tower Occupation produced important results. 
7.4 The CAM Tower Occupation: An emergent power 
Returning to the CAM Tower Occupation what we can see is 
how these 
different spaces of engagement: the trade union/community alliance, the militancy 
of the rank and file, the management space of the 
Plan PARE and the 
transnational solidarity space of human rights and 
labour rights operated together 
to produce more than the sum of their 
individual parts. Simultaneously, we had the 
CAM Tower Occupation controlled and defended, discursively the 
knowledge 
Chapter Seven 249 
developed on the workings of Emcali meant that the trade union was able to 
challenge local, national and international assertions that Emcali was not viable, the 
trade union/community alliance mobilised and organised in a myriad of different 
ways, and the barrage of international solidarity and support ate away at the 
Colombian government's legitimacy. The combination of these different powerl 
resources when activated against the range of power) resources of the Colombian 
state served to produce unexpected and unintended outcomes. The state was 
constrained in its action, despite its overwhelming military capacity. The trade 
union's clear command of the facts and figures of the company meant the 
government struggled to maintain its coherency in the press. The strike command 
and the range of local solidarity networks developed meant that there was an 
alternative story of Emcali emerging across the city and this produced a range of 
highly effective demonstrations and the shift of site to the occupation in Bogota 
had the government reeling from the multiple attacks - all of which were watched 
and monitored by constant communication via transnational solidarity networks 
producing solidarity actions and letters. The dynamics of the particular 
conjunctural event eventually proved too much and the government retreated, to 
await its next chance. 
7.5 Conclusion 
Central to the success of this episode of contestation lay the long and hard 
strategic work put into developing all of these alternative power resources. The 
twin trajectories of horizontalisation and transborderisation become under the 
dynamic leadership of the trade union organization the twin pillars of a new 
pedagogy of rebellion and resistance that emerged within the union. Operating in 
parallel the first reflects Santos's politics of translation and essentially refers to ways 
in which different population groups come together and address and work out 
their differences. This has two aspects. The first is the creation of an inter-personal 
space, such those new spaces created between trade unionists and community 
in 
the Minga's, the Municipal Strike Command, the Plan PARE 
Groups, the Human 
Rights Diplomas, the international delegations, the rank and file meetings. All were 
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crucial in developing trust and building understanding between groups that often 
had little or no contact, and particularly contact that focused directly on these 
particular issues of privatisation and the defence of national resources. The second 
aspect is a shift in the culture and attitude of the trade union towards the 
importance of new spaces/constituencies. Reflected in the collective terms for `la 
comunidad' (the community) or `lo internacional' (the international), but also `la 
empresa' (the company) each represented a new space of engagement which 
required a shift in the culture of the trade union away from its prior quite narrow 
concerns for workers salaries and conditions. This cognitive shift towards these 
new `spaces' would then lead to the necessity of new knowledges which is the 
input of transborderisation. 
Transborderisation represented the conquest of new spatial terrains that 
were either selected - as new spaces of engagement - or perhaps were already 
there or thrust upon the trade union. These spaces were actually new scales of 
contestation and in order to compete against those opposing the trade union's 
plans there was often a need to learn new skills. The pedagogy of 
transborderisation thus became the educational process of acquiring the necessary 
skills to operate successfully in a particular space of engagement. One can clearly 
delineate here the crucial spaces of human rights - requiring a new language and 
understanding of the mechanisms of how the international human rights regime 
operates and how it can serve as a mechanism that can strengthen the movement's 
objectives. The space of management - that emerged around the Plan PARE 
required the clear need for a detailed study of how the company operates, who is 
trying to take it over etc, all requiring new knowledge. The space of the occupation 
- that required the workers to 
develop new skills and knowledge as to how to 
manage and defend the occupation, control security, organise 
food, and also to 
develop the skills to deal with the the politics surrounding the occupation such as 
that of handling the management of the media. 
As Foley (1999) notes these educational processes took place in a range of 
ways: formally in the human rights 
diplomas and the weekend Plan PARE 
workshops, but also 
informally in the day to work, in the anti-corruption teams 
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and the Plan PARE Teams. It took place incidentally during demonstrations and 
occupations where workers would learn new skills (responding to tear gas attacks , 
learning about self-defence). There were a whole range of educational processes 
taking place that fitted the needs of the spaces of engagement. Crucially, there is 
also a need to clarify the distinction between Sintraemcali and the movement for 
the defence of public services in Cali. These educational processes went way 
beyond the membership and beyond the control of Sintraemcali. They extended to 
poor communities in Cali who went to meetings organized in their 
neighbourhoods and to the local community and trade union activists' who 
participated in the Municipal Strike Command. The international trade union and 
human rights activists who attended meetings in their own countries or those who 
came on international delegations were also involved in these processes of 
education which both raised consciousness - inspiring them to try to assist the 
union - and providing them with knowledge as to 
how best to direct their efforts 
to find the weak points in the armoury of the Colombian state. While Sintraemcali 
often articulates this in fixed scalar levels: the local, national and international, 
Cox's spaces of engagement allows us a way of pinpointing agency in these scales 
by focusing in on the particular groups. It was not all the international community, 
national or local, but particular sets of people that carried out certain things, and 
their actions were linked in a myriad of different ways. 
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LEARNING FROM THE SOUTH: 
LISTENING TO SINTRAEMCALI 
believe that the leaders of labour organisations are responsible for not acting 
in relation to globalisation and the neo-liberal model. Look at my country 
where being a trade unionist is synonymous with being dead....! don't 
understand why in other countries where there is not war and corruption, why 
they haven't made decisions like we made. Not because we are more or less 
brave, nor because we are more or less intelligent, the problem is that the 
neo-liberal problem can be confronted, the neo-liberal model has no 
justification, no logic, wherever you look it goes against the collective interest. 
The problem is that the leaders know the problem and prefer to not confront it 
(Interview with Alexander Lopez, 2002, p. 22). 
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In this research I set out to understand how a small trade union had 
successfully managed to fight off a series of attempts by the Colombian 
government and its transnational allies to privatise public utilities in Cali. In 
exploring this, I sought to analyse the strategic development of the union and the 
pedagogical processes that were involved in this transformation. More broadly, I 
sought to contribute, albeit in a small way, to the development of a sociology that 
focuses on the dialectical relationship between `order and control' and `rebellion 
and solidarity' under the conditions of contemporary processes of globalisation 
(Section 2.2). Through a sociology of absences (Santos, 2003a) I excavated the 
hidden story of Sintraemcali and its struggle against privatisation. Central to this 
task was recognition of the importance of listening to and learning from `the 
South', as the place where the sharpest contradictions of the contemporary world 
order take place and where new knowledges, insights and possibilities can 
be 
derived. 
By way of conclusion to the thesis, I will assess to what extent the research 
itself has provided insights that might inform a sociology of rebellion and solidarity 
adequate to the task of exploring, understanding and theorising contemporary 
movements seeking to challenge hegemonic forms of globalisation, and more 
specifically neo-liberalism. Secondly, I will turn to the task of sketching tentative 
answers to the central research questions while simultaneously attempting to 
draw 
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out the broader insights that the case study can offer for trade unions and 
oppositional social movements. 
Researching Radical Social Movements 
I began this research with the objective of simultaneously engaging with and 
writing about the popular movement in Colombia and contemporary struggles 
against privatisation. These dual tasks, as highlighted in Chapter Three, seek to 
combine the commitment of the activist with the intellectual rigour of the social 
scientist. The objective of this work was to move in and out of two worlds by 
inhabiting a `third space' that exists somewhere in between (Routledge, 1996). By 
avoiding `spectator knowledge' over the course of the last three years I have gained 
privileged access to the inner workings of a sophisticated social movement that has 
engaged not only in `opposition' but also developed wide-ranging `propositions' for 
the efficient and more equitable management of natural resources in Cali. The 
openness of the interviewees and the leadership of the organisation to all my 
requests for information derived from the trust developed simultaneously 
throughout that period as I worked alongside them and for the trade union both in 
Colombia and here in the UK. That level of trust, in a country where state terror 
heightens suspicion within social movements, is no small matter. While any 
research relationship is riddled with power differentials and problems, I firmly 
believe that my research approach was able to bridge many of these boundaries 
and borders and begin to build mutually beneficial relationships that produced new 
insights and knowledges. Neither the relationships developed, not the knowledge 
produced, will end with the completion of this thesis and both will continue to 
develop and grow. 
While an ethics of commitment was central, there was also a clear 
theoretical commitment attached to the importance of studying, listening and 
learning from the `South'. This is based on a belief that it is where the 
contradictions of contemporary capitalism are at their sharpest that new 
insights 
and new counter-hegemonic knowledges can 
be produced and developed. 
Furthermore, it is also a belief that it is those activists operating under these 
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conditions that have the experience and knowledge to produce these insights. This 
leads back to the question of why do we might benefit from a sociology of 
rebellion and solidarity? As I argued in Chapter One and Two there is an 
imbalance in critical research based on an overwhelming focus on `order' and 
`control' at the expense of `rebellion' and `solidarity'. The case study of Sintraemcali 
provides a rare opportunity to explore the inner workings of a successful 
oppositional movement and shows that behind the `apparent' spontaneity there 
was organisation, planning, and strategy development. This will be explored more 
deeply in the next section. Secondly, the focus on `rebellion' and `solidarity' rather 
than merely on `resistance' is based on a belief that often `resistance' becomes too 
limiting conceptually, implying the presence of a dominating `other'. A sociology of 
rebellion and resistance provides the possibility for being less reactive and 
exploring practices that are not merely struggling against, but also struggling for 
something else: a different future, an alternative way of knowing, seeing and living. 
In exploring the strategic development of Sintraemcali we can clearly see that 
process in action. It is located in the Plan Pare, in the `minga comunitarios' and in 
the bonds of solidarity and friendship among those engaged in the CAM Tower 
Occupation. Each `space' points beyond the present and towards Panitch and 
Gindin's (2000) `concrete utopia' (see Chapter Two). 
More broadly, Burawoy's `extended case method' (Chapter Three) provided 
the means by which a `politics of commitment' could be combined with a 
`sociology of rebellion and solidarity' which went some way towards addressing the 
perennial problem of the relationship between theory and practice. Throughout 
the research I felt this tension as I moved from periods of intense day-to-day 
`practice' in Colombia to university life and `theory' in Bristol. 
Inevitably, there are limitations to my research, both in terms of its 
execution and its scope. If time had permitted the research would 
have benefited 
from more engagement with local activists from poor communities engaged 
in the 
Municipal Strike Command and an exploration of issues related to gender and 
ethnicity. Likewise, research on the 
history of trade union and social movement 
resistance in the Valle 
de Cauca region before 1990 would have been beneficial for 
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exploring commonalities and differences between modes of struggle during distinct 
historical periods. Each of these areas provides fruitful new directions for further 
research. Despite these limitations, the central research questions have, I believe, 
been adequately addressed and it is to the tentative answers to these questions and 
their broader relevance to trade union and oppositional social movements that I 
now turn. 
Lessons We Can Learn: Major Findings 
In essence, the central questions that I set about discovering in this thesis 
related to how Sintraemcali had developed a powerful movement of opposition to 
privatisation in Cali, and what the pedagogical aspects of that development were. 
In answering the first question I begin with what I believe represents this research's 
central theoretical contribution; namely, that the activities of individuals and 
groups can be linked up to the big global historical shifts and transformations 
taking place without either losing their agency on the one hand or their location 
within bigger historical structures on the other hand (Section 1.4.2). When 
Alexander Lopez spoke out in the worker's meeting in the Sewerage Plant back in 
the early 1990's he began a process of transformation in Sintraemcali that 
continues today. This is a movement that has transcended the geographical 
confines of Cali and continues to have repercussions in both Colombia and 
beyond. While Alexander Lopez is now a member of the Colombian Congress for 
the Social and Political Front, he also continues to work for the trade union and 
the principles that led him into the Colombian popular movement. 
If evidence were needed of the effectiveness of his work, then the discovery 
of a high level plot to assassinate him in August 2004 may provide such proof (see 
Appendix 14 and El Tiemo, 27/08/04). Berenice Celeyta and Luis Hernandez were 
also on that assassins list. State complicity in this was confirmed when the Attorney 
General's Office raided a flat in Cali on the 26th of August, 2004 using evidence 
that Alexander Lopez had obtained and arrested a high ranking army officer who 
was carrying out surveillance on prominent leftist leaders in the region under an 
operation codenamed `Operation Dragon'. The serving military officer stated that 
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he was working for GIL (Consultoria Integral Latinoamericana) a private security 
firm carrying out studies on the socio-economic and political environment of 
several planned privatisation projects, including Emcali. 
Classified documents were found in his possession from Military 
Intelligence that named a range of political leaders, including Angelino Garzon, 
Governor of the Valle de Cauca Department; Lucho Garzon, the Mayor of 
Bogota; Wilson Borja, member of the Colombian Congress and Alexander Lopez 
(among others), as all being "supportive of the objectives of the insurgency". 
Detailed plans of Alexander Lopez's Cali office were also found amongst the 
documents. In his press statement Lopez notes that "the documents found in the 
raid corroborate that in effect there are parallel organisations contracted by the 
government to eliminate the political and social opposition in Colombia" 
(Appendix 14, see also Section 4.2.1). 
The people on the confidential military intelligence list are all 
representatives of the emerging popular opposition to neo-liberal globalisation in 
Colombia, and Sintraemcali's struggle represents an important moment in the 
development and historical memory of that opposition91. Sintraemcali's struggle 
was always much bigger than Emcali, and its leadership recognised that the 
movement against privatisation and neo-liberalism was always embedded within a 
broader one for national independence, peace and social justice in Colombia 
(Interview with Berenice Celeyta, 2002, p18). Just as in the case with the Congress 
of South. African Trade Unions (COSATU) in South Africa and the CUT in Brazil, 
two previous exemplars of `social movement unionism', Sintraemcali's struggle 
went beyond mediating between capital and labour to raising questions of the 
organisation of democracy, control of production, sovereignty and human rights. 
That the transformation of this trade union began through the determination of a 
small group of people in the Sewerage Plant as they challenged the conservatism 
91 All of the above mentioned leaders of the opposition were involved in the Cam Tower 
Occupation to 
different degrees. Angelino Garzon, was the Minister of Labour in the Pastrana government of the time 
and was brought in to try to bridge the gap between the 
Superintendent of Public Services and 
Sintraemcali. Lucho Garzon, who at the time was running as a Presidential Candidate for the Social and 
Political Front cam to Cali during the Occupation to pledge his support. Wilson Borja, has a long record 
of opposition to privatisation and has spoken out on several occasions 
in support of Sintraemcali. 
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and complacency of the union's leadership and transformed it from within, should 
give hope to all those rank and file activists trying to build confidence amongst 
their colleagues and their leadership that effective and strong workers movements 
can be built and remain a potentially powerful force for social change. Centrally, 
the research has shown that the CAM Tower occupation, far from being a 
spontaneous uprising, represented the outcome of many years of strategic 
development and learning, and countless hours of organising and activity by many 
trade unionists and activists mainly in Cali but also in different parts of the world. 
These processes, while less spectacular, provide the foundations upon which major 
protest events were able to develop (Chapter Seven). 
Moving from the `how' of human agency to the `how' of power we can 
explore the mechanisms and resources deployed by the Sintraemcali/Community 
alliance during the development of their movement. The case study of 
Sintraemcali offers us a glimpse of the contemporary potentiality (powerl) of trade 
unions and collective working class action and the resources that it can bring to the 
struggle for social change. Sintraemcali was able to draw on the resources derived 
from its structural location within Emcali to challenge the power of the Colombian 
state and it was able to use the resources - both human and infrastructural - of 
Emcali to (i) improve the conditions of the poor communities in Cali (the Minga 
Comunitarios, the Sintraemcali Institute) (ii) maintain the subsidies for the poorest 
neighbourhoods, and (iii) improve the efficiency of Emcali as a public service 
provider (through the Plan PARE). It was this powerl, located in the `means of 
production, ' that gave strength to the movement against privatisation. As I 
have 
shown in this thesis, this potential power was always relational and 
dependent on 
the tactics and strategies of the state and those of the union and its ability to 
build 
alliances locally, nationally and transnationally. 
The long process of developing community projects and links, the grass 
roots human rights training courses, the meetings of the 
Municipal Strike 
Command, the effort put into the `Despertar Popular' weekly TV programme and 
the more general media work, all built legitimacy 
for the trade union - serving as a 
crucial bridge to link up the power of organised 
labour with those `excluded' from 
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the benefits of neo-liberalism in Colombia hidden from view in repressively 
policed poverty zones or in the shanty towns that have developed on the edges of 
Colombia's major cities. But, as we saw during the CAM Tower Occupation, when 
the `excluded' make the decision to take to the streets they also represent a 
powerful transformatory force which could halt the city's economy, as they did on 
January 24th of January 2002, when all the major exits and entrances to the city 
were blocked off. In coordination with organised labour, the potential power of 
this movement is enormous. 
Likewise, the trade unionists, human rights and political activists outside of 
Colombia also played an important role in ensuring that the Colombian 
government and its `parallel state' was aware that the world was watching. The 
effect of this on the final outcome is evidenced in the fact that one of the 
Colombian Minister's thought it important enough to personally ask Sintraemcali, 
before the final negotiations began on January 28th, 2002, to call their friends in 
the UK because President Pastrana was annoyed by the amount of traffic 
emanating from the Colombian embassy in London. 
As elaborated in this thesis, the case of Sintraemcali more generally 
highlights the effectiveness of a range of interventions at the international level 
both through the legal transnational infrastructure of human rights and the 
international organisations that monitor this (Amnesty International, Human 
Rights Watch). It also shows the complementary role that can be played between 
the `official' channels of the international trade union movement and their ability to 
knock at the doors of high ranking politicians and officials and the `unofficial' role 
of grassroots activists and organisations who bring these issues to the fore in the 
first place, keep them going when people are engaged elsewhere, and refuse to 
keep quiet - even when it causes 
discomfort to their national labour movement 
and the political party that represents it. 
The combination of the energy of the activists and supporters from the 
Colombia Solidarity Campaign and their ability to mobilise and raise awareness 
about the situation of 
Sintraemcali and the institutional power and influence of 
organisations such as 
UNISON, the TUC, PSI and the ICFTU, proved to be a 
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powerful combination which played its part in the CAM Tower Occupation. 
Furthermore, these factors also enabled Sintraemcali to avoid the often slow and 
bureaucratic working of the international trade union movement by bypassing the 
Colombian CUT and with the assistance of the Colombia Solidarity Campaign to 
undertake the direct lobbying of trade unionists (both leaders and activists) and 
politicians in the UK. The decline in the cost of international transport and 
improvements in communication technology both facilitated the ease with which 
these twin aspects of transnational solidarity could operate for Sintraemcali, 
highlighting how some of the technological aspects of processes of globalisation 
can be turned to the service of the poor and working class in new and innovative 
ways. While there has been some interesting research on aspects of this (c. £ Lee, 
1997, Keck & Sikkink, 1998), there is a great deal more research to be done. For 
social movements in Colombia and beyond there is a need for research on `best 
practice' in human rights defence and protection in relation to this. Accessible case 
studies are needed on how, for example, `urgent action' networks operate, how to 
measure the impact of these interventions and how to develop and sustain 
transnational contacts. 
More generally, the international solidarity pressure on Colombia works by 
exploiting the gaps and contradictions that exist both within Colombia and within 
the broader neo-liberal world order. For Colombia, `the oldest democracy in 
Latin 
America' and the world's worst violator of the human tights of trade unionists, this 
contradiction is becoming particularly acute and difficult to manage as more and 
more cases of direct state involvement in human rights abuses are 
being revealed92. 
Yet the Colombian government continues to insist on its innocence and 
lack of 
involvement in human rights violations as it needs both local and international 
legitimacy that comes from the appearance of respecting 
human rights. This 
contradiction, while particularly acute in 
Colombia, remains a major problem for 
the stability of the neo-liberal world order and 
lies at the heart of the Polanyi 
problem (Section 1.3). 
92 The most recent case was the direct execution of 
3 prominent trade union leaders in Arauca. Initially, 
the government declared that they were members of 
the ELFT and were killed in combat. After 
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As our world becomes increasingly polarised, and the scramble for control 
of the world's resources intensifies, leaders of the G7 and their transnational allies 
continue to invoke freedom and human rights as their justification for actions 
rather than naked personal and national self-interest. The upper echelons of the 
management of the neo-liberal order need legitimacy just as much as force, yet are 
finding it increasingly difficult to obtain/maintain. While in the `Post September 
11th world' the `War on Terror' was able to command some legitimacy for 
increased repression, this remains contested even in the US heartland where mass 
demonstrations and thousands of arrests outside the Republican Party Convention 
in New York in September, 2004 reflect a deeply divided and troubled society with 
many of its citizens uncomfortable with its increasingly repressive and expansionist 
role in the world. The imbalance between what the propagators of neo-liberalism 
say and the empirical evidence emerging of what the effects are, may become 
impossible to reconcile. But, if things are to change, then we also need agents of 
change with plans and alternative ideas. This leads me to the second related 
research question on the role of pedagogy in the strategic transformation of 
Sintraemcali. 
The strategic pedagogy that emerged within Sintraemcali and the nature of 
its operation through the twin trajectories of horizontalisation and 
transborderisation was able to build from the grass roots upwards a movement that 
consciously recognised its location within bigger structures, recognising that 
"groups may move with the pressures or resist and oppose them but they cannot 
ignore them" (Cox 1996, p98). As Sintraemcali developed during the 1990's it 
actively sought to both understand and undermine those pressures. Through the 
action research process of the Plan PARE the union was able to map out, not only 
the transnational patterns of corruption that had taken place in Emcali, but also the 
broader patterns of de- and re-territorialisation of power taking place across the 
region. As the union engaged in this process of `strategic 
learning' it moved into 
new territories and new spaces where contests were 
fought and alliances were built. 
The construction and entrance into these new `spaces of engagement' and the 
international pressure and a fact fording tour the Attorney General has now issued a warrant 
for the arrest 
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politics of building alliances with different groups represented the key pedagogical 
trajectories of the union and produced its dynamics. 
This process lies at the centre of debates over labour renewal and the 
possibilities for constructing serious challenges to the neo-liberal global order. For 
this reason it merits a deeper inquiry. This case study highlights Sintraemcali's 
development of a critical pedagogy that operated along two key dimensions. The 
first, horizontalisation, operated as the practice of transforming the culture and 
ethos of the trade union and its members, so that it could interact and develop 
alliances with a range of population groups that could assist in its objective of 
constructing a counter-hegemonic movement able to defend its local `space of 
dependence'. In practice this meant Sintraemcali had to make sure that its 
members and activists were engaging with different constituencies, particularly 
those from the poorest sections of the community. They achieved this through 
promoting voluntary work, through involvement in the strike command, and 
through the Sintraemcali Institute. Central to this was a politics of respect for the 
local communities as consumers and as owners of Emcali. But, horizontalisation 
was not just about engaging with local poor communities. It was also about making 
the trade union itself more internally democratic and more responsive to its rank 
and file. It moved from being a bureaucratic top-down institution to a social 
movement that relied on active participation in all of the union's activities. 
Horizontalisation, thus, was a process that led members and activists into a range 
of new `spaces of engagement' where they had to deal with unfamiliar situations 
which required a `politics of translation' to build alliances. Workers learnt to deal 
with each other, with consumers, with different social movements, with 
management, with technical advisers and with the international delegations that 
came and went. 
In much of the literature on social movement unionism it is the 
worker/community alliance which defines the concept. While in the case of 
Sintraemcali, this community/worker alliance was crucial, it was not the only one 
built up. The trade union constructed a highly sophisticated network of alliances in 
of the soldiers for murder 
(New York Times, 08/09/04). 
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local government, among sympathetic managers, and human rights organisations 
among others. In understanding this network, the Gramscian conception of 
hegemony outlined in Chapter One is crucial in helping us to understand these 
social relationships. When Gramsci developed the concept, he used it to describe 
how the ruling class made some compromises with `subordinate' classes in order to 
rule with a minimum of force. However, the ruling classes core interests were not 
open to negotiation. Similarly, Sintraemcali's construction of a counter-hegemonic 
movement was based on a certain set of core principles rooted in the material 
interests of the working class and poor. Sintraemcali refused compromise in its 
opposition to privatisation, price increases for the poor, and opposition to selling 
off national resources to private interests. Thus, the pedagogy of horizontalisation 
was a `politics of translation' with the interest of the working classes and the 
oppressed at its core - not unity for unity's sake. 
The second dimension under which Sintraemcali's pedagogy operated was 
that of transborderisation. This included the task of seeking out the requisite 
knowledge and tools to operate in the new spaces that were either opening up or 
being forced upon the trade union as it developed its movement. From the Plan 
PARE management space to the human rights space, the transnational solidarity 
space, and to the space created by decentralisation of local government, 
Sintraemcali and its members required new skills and knowledge to best operate in 
these new spaces. Here we can return to Harvey's (1989) notion that at particular 
scales and spaces some social forces have advantages over others. Sintraemcali, 
recognizing the relational nature of power, sought to strengthen its ability to 
operate at different scales through new skills, knowledge and alliances (Section 
2.4.1). Through this effort, it was able to successfully operate on a range of 
different scales. 
The concept of transborderisation represents a refinement of the literature 
on `new labour internationalism' and the increasing importance of the global scale. 
The case of Sintraemcali highlights the importance of operating at a range of 
scales, from the local to the global, and the new skills and alliances that needed to 
be built in order to operate effectively on these different scales. Sintraemcali, while 
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operating successfully at the `global' scale through human rights and advocacy 
networks, has also been able to operate effectively with the local state, exploiting 
the contradictions produced by processes of decentralisation. Likewise, the trade 
union/community alliance represented a powerful mobilising mechanism. In this 
sense, the research supports the argument of Herod (2001) that processes of 
globalisation have a range of implications for workers in different industries in 
different parts of the world and are not done justice by the simplistic can to `go 
global'. As we see in the process of neo-liberal globalisation in Colombia there are 
a complex set of processes of shifting power to the locality (decentralisation), 
increased power and influence of the World Bank and the IMF (particularly since 
the IMF agreements in 2000), a new and central role for MNCs, and the increasing 
disciplinary power of the financial markets. Likewise, while all these factors may 
present limitations, they also provide new possibilities for extending and 
developing oppositional movements. Sintraemcali and its activists and community 
supporters developed new skills in understanding how the transnational human 
rights regulatory framework operated and were able to develop highly sophisticated 
techniques to utilise these. Likewise, the solidarity work with trade unionists from 
different parts of the world, and the new alliances and friendships that were 
formed, also represented new possibilities and terrains for challenging the unequal 
status quo. 
Sintraemcali now has the capacity to call for a picket of the Colombian 
embassy in London (and carry it out) almost as simply as it would call for one 
outside the local council in Cali. Both the human rights terrain and the 
international trade union solidarity work have provided new possibilities for 
struggle upon which to defend the local. What lessons we can 
draw from this is 
that while the process of neo-liberal globalisation is complex and multi-scalar, the 
counter-hegemonic practices of oppositional groups may 
be equally complex and 
multi-scalar. Neither do they have to mirror the scales and terrains of the neo- 
liberal order but may shift scale and space to counteract them. 
For example, while 
the transnational plan for the privatisation of Emcali operated through a network 
of links between the 
Colombian state, MNCs, Emcali management and local elites 
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and politicians, we can see an alternative and transformatory architecture of power 
constructed by Sintraemcali that relied on a local community/trade union alliance, 
a strategic alliance with local government, and a transnational network of human 
rights and solidarity activists that targeted human rights as the key issue and 
weakness of the Colombian state -- rather than targeting the particular MNCs 
involved directly. 
Having explored both how Sintraemcali developed its movement and the 
twin pedagogical processes of tranborderisation and horizontalisation, I now want 
to conclude by returning to the theme that underpins the entire thesis - the 
question of power, and specifically to Sayer's critical realist relational understanding 
of it (Section 1.5). In the case of Sintraemcali we can see a dynamic interaction 
between different power sources and resources, between the agents aiming to 
privatise Sintraemcali and those opposed to it. The Sintraemcali case highlights 
how the relational nature of powerl means that conditions can change, while new 
agents can learn new skills and develop new mechanisms which undermine other 
power sources that appear invincible at certain scales. Likewise, each powerl 
resource always has a weakness. While the Colombian state militarily had the 
overwhelming capability to take over the CAM Tower, that powerl also had its 
vulnerability. What would the Colombian government look like as it asked 
for 
further humanitarian aid from the international community after it had directly 
assassinated several hundred workers? Likewise, the utilisation of certain types of 
power has unintended consequences. State terror and the selective assassination of 
trade union leaders, while potentially effective at creating instability and 
fear within 
social movements, also runs the danger of provoking widespread resistance and 
acts of incredible courage in response (Section 7.3.3). 
Those involved in the CAM Tower Occupation represent the spirit of that 
resistance as they appeared prepared to sacrifice everything 
in the defence of 
Emcali. However, while this dynamic process of struggle produced amazing 
feats 
of heroism and dedication, Sintraemcali's powerl 
is neither constant nor stable and 
needs attention and effort to maintain 
it. People drop out of movements just as 
often as they drop 
in, and the constant energy needed to mobilise in defence of 
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Emcali together with the relentless pressure placed on Sintraemcali and its 
members from both state and para-state forces inevitably takes its toll, emotionally, 
politically, and financially. Despite its success, Sintraemcali is a movement of a few 
thousand and needs other organisations and movements to take up the mantle of 
struggle against neo-liberalism for it to survive and flourish. 
The election of Alvaro Uribe Velez as President of Colombia in 2002 and 
the changed international environment that has emerged in the wake of September 
11th, 2001 has meant that the conditions under which Sintraemcali are now 
operating are becoming even more difficult and dangerous (see Epilogue). 
Likewise, despite the search for legitimacy and the need to appear respectful of 
human rights, recent world events have sent a green light to the world's torturers, 
human rights abusers, and opposers of international law. The illegal war in Iraq, 
Abu Gharib, Guantanamo Bay, the Patriot Act are all rewriting the rules of 
engagement between social movements and states at a range of scales from the 
local to the global. While Polanyi's double movement and a pendulum swing 
towards bringing markets and capital under societal control is becoming ever more 
necessary, the birth of a new more equitable global order may be a painful one. If 
so, then the lessons of Sintraemcali are even more relevant to contemporary labour 





In the wake of the final agreement between the government and the union 
reached at the end of the CAM Tower Occupation in January 2002 there was great 
optimism on the part of the trade union/community alliance. By February 11th, less 
than two weeks after the signing of the agreement, optimism had turned to despair 
with the brutal assassination of Julio Galeano. A long time Sintraemcali activist and 
actively involved in the solidarity movement outside the occupation, Julio was 
assassinated by two armed men in front of his wife. In May, 2002, two more 
Emcali workers were assassinated, Orlando Arenas Marin and Arnulfo Cardenas. 
The repression against trade unionists continued unabated with 184 out of the 213 
trade unionists assassinated worldwide in 2002 carrying Colombian passports. 
Politically, the escalation of the civil war after the collapse of the `peace 
process' between the Colombian state and the FARC has increased societal 
polarisation. In the general elections of 2002 this was reflected in the victory of 
Alvaro Uribe Velez, a hard-line right wing leader committed to a military solution 
to the Colombian conflict. His victory was contrasted by some impressive electoral 
gains for the newly formed Social and Political Front and the electoral coalition 
`Polo Democratico' (see Section 4.4). Alexander Lopez, the architect of 
Sintraemcali's transformation was elected as a member of the Colombian Congress 
after a campaign of less than two months. 
Two days after his inauguration in August 2002, the new Colombian 
President visited Cali and announced he would press ahead with policies to 
`capitalise' Emcali. While utilising the language of `social capitalisation' rather than 
privatisation, the plan appeared to completely ignore the January agreement and 
mentioned nothing of the Colombian state's responsibility for the PTAR water 
treatment plant. Sintraemcali was once again in conflict and this continues. In 
March 2003 an agreement was signed known as Todos Ponen' whereby each party 
to the Emcali dispute was to make substantial compromises to ensure the 
financial 
future of the company. While Sintraemcali agreed to a reduction of several 
holiday 
entitlements and pension 
benefits, and local consumers were charged a new public 
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service utility tax which operated as a type of `shareholder' bond (without voting 
rights). Neither the government nor the banks appear so far to have made any 
significant contribution towards securing the financial durability of the company 
and tension remains. 
In May 2004, this tension erupted once again into open confrontation when 
the Attorney General completed an inquiry into allegations of corruption by the 
Managing Director of Emcali. The Attorney General called for the immediate 
dismissal of the Managing Director and suggested that he should be banned from 
holding any public appointments for ten years. Despite clear evidence of 
corruption, the Colombian government refused to act. In response, Sintraemcali 
once again occupied the CAM Tower on the 26thof May, 2004 and demanded that 
the Managing Director be immediately dismissed. Two days later, and under 
intense military pressure, Sintraemcali workers ended the occupation after a 
compromise agreement with the local and regional government (but not the 
national government who refused any contact). The agreement represented a 
tactical retreat for Sintraemcali after clear signals that President Uribe Velez had 
given the order for a military solution (reflecting the changing nature of the 
Colombian political situation in 2004). On the 14thJuly, 2004 Emcali management 
announced that sixty Emcah employees were to be sacked for their involvement in 
the occupation, including Luis Hernandez, President and 5 other members of the 
Executive Committee of Sintraemcali. In October 2004, the situation remains 
tense, Emcali is still in state hands and Sintraemcali is challenging the legality of the 
mass dismissals. An international solidarity fund has been set up to raise money for 
the sacked workers and their legal challenge against the dismissals. Luis Hernandez, 
addressed the British TUC annual conference in September, 2004 before travelling 
to Spain and then on to the ILO headquarters in Geneva. Sintraemcali's struggle 
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I. We Covered Our Faces So That We Could be 
Seen 
You have been fighting alongside us for thirty six days in the historic defence of EMCALI 
as a Commercial and Industrial State Corporation. You have accompanied SINTRAEMCALI, the citizens of Cali and the Colombian people in conducting one of 
the fiercest struggles in history against privatisation, globalisation and the neoliberal 
model. You witnessed how we the workers had to cover our faces so that the government 
would see us. You protected the EMCALI tower that declared itself on from 25th December a Permanent Popular Assembly. 
Eight hundred and sixty four hours of resistance to gain the victory of EMCALI E. I. C. E. 
demonstrates that the only way to achieve the most elementary human rights is through 
social protest. We went to Bogota and for 13 hours we peacefully occupied the offices of 
the Superintendent of Public Services, to make the government realise that our proposal 
to defend public services is serious, that we are not just fighting for a job, a salary or a 
social demand. What we have won today is respect for the integral rights of the 
Colombian people. 
The communities, the local and community action committees, the human rights, trade 
union and social sectors achieved the totality of these demands presented to the 
government: 
1. No liquidation or privatisation of EMCALI and maintaining its character as an 
Industrial and Commercial State Corporation. 
2. No increase in charges for public services above those already set in EMCALI's budget 
for 2002. 
3. An optimum solution to guarantee the continuity, operation and functioning of PTAR 
[waste water project] with the national government seeking to minimizes its impact on the 
finances of EMCALI E. I. C. E E. S. P. and the user community. 
4. No administrative, disciplinary, criminal or financial measure to be taken against a 
worker, and payment of wages for the time of the permanent assembly [occupation]. 
5. Commitment to convene a public hearing to inform the citizens of Cali about the 
corporation's situation and future. 
WE WILL NOT BE DIVERTED AWAY FROM THE STRUGGLE against 
privatisation, corruption, impunity and the criminalisation of social protest. 
WE WILL NOT BE MOVED is the sense of the struggle which today saw victory for 
SINTRAEMCALI, the Colombian workers and the entire world that rises up against 
injustice. 
Amidst sorrow for the 7,900 of our comrades who were murdered by political 
assassinations last year, 155 of them trade union leaders to whom we dedicate this 
triumph. We say to all: our dead are martyrs to a cause that will not submit. To the 
hundreds of workers who resisted from inside the CAM Tower for 36 days; to those who 
risked their lives to occupy the Superintendent of Public Services building in Bogota, 
confronting the attack of the state security forces who wanted to 
force them out with 
special commando units and snipers 
in place; to all those who mobilised and participated 
in the marches, meetings, assemblies, road blockades; to the international community, to 
our fraternal trade union organisations; to the organisations who came together 
in the 
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city's strike command; to each and everyone who added their grain of sand to turn this 
struggle into an unstoppable spiral of dignity and resistance for social justice; to all of you 
we say fight on, because the struggle continues. 
FOR LIFE AND DIGNITY, BETTER TO DIE FOR SOMETHING THAN LIVE 
FOR NOTHING. 
AGAINST PRIVATISATION 
SINTRAEMCALI PRESENTE, PRESENTE, PRESENTE... FOR HOW LONG? 
FOR EVER! 
National and International Human Rights Campaign Against Privatisation, 
Corruption and the Criminalisation of Social Protest. 
Santiago de Cali, 30th January 2002 
(Translated courtesy of the Colombia Solidarity Campaign) 
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To the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial, to Mrs. Robert F. Kennedy, to Senator Edward 
Kennedy, to Kerry Kennedy Cuomo, to the members of the Kennedy family, and to his 
holiness the Dalai Lama, spiritual leader who guides us on the path of defending 
humanity, I give my thanks for the recognition that you give to us today. 
In the midst of the pain caused by the human rights violations that exist today in our 
country and by the worsening of the war and the memory of the thousands of victims of 
political violence, we received the news that Colombians had been chosen to receive the 
most important human rights award in the United States. 
In the pages of our long history of violence appear the names of extraordinary people, 
hardworking campesinos, workers, indigenous people, human rights defenders, all of 
them tireless fighters who dedicated their lives to the search for justice and died because 
of it. In receiving the Award today, we must remember the more than 35,000 Colombians 
who have been killed by political violence since 1968. 
One of the cruelest forms of violence that has occurred in Colombia in the last decade is 
forced displacement. More than a million and a half Colombians have had to leave their 
homes as a result of the barbarity of paramilitary groups. Often with the complicity and 
collaboration of state agents, these displacements occur in areas that are particularly 
important economically and geopolitically - regions that have abundant natural resources 
like oil and gold. 
Forced displacement causes the rupturing of the nuclear family and social groups and 
tears the social and cultural fabric. 
Recently, two thousand campesinos and miners in the Middle Magdalena region and 
seven thousand residents of Catatumbo were forced to leave their farms and places of 
work to seek refuge in schools and parks. This came after repeated and systematic 
incursions by paramilitaries, in which the families of the displaced were victims of 
massacres and murders. These campesinos insisted to the Colombian government that the 
only thing they wanted was to live. During the months of negotiation, twenty-four of 
them were killed. 
After four months of arduous negotiation with the government of President Pastrana, on 
October 4, the campesinos of Middle Magdalena signed an agreement that committed the 
three branches of government to provide full protection for the return of these 
campesinos to their homes. 
Despite this agreement, the people who spoke as representatives of the 
displaced 
population found themselves seriously threatened. 
On October 30, three of these 
individuals were detained at a roadblock apparently installed by men who identified 
themselves as paramilitaries. Neider Jose Garcia, Martin Mejia, 
Oscar Saiz Pena, Valdiris 
Chamorro appeared the second of November in a common grave. For them and their 
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families, we can do no less than commit ourselves to establish the facts and seek truth and 
justice. Only in this way will we make possible a more humane society. For everyone 
subjected to forced displacement, exile and any other form of violence, we must 
remember the words of Gardinelli, "If they force you to forget, give them back memory. 




3. Sintraemcali Occupation: Mario Novelli's 
Eyewitness Updates 
Sintraemcali Occupation: Eyewitness Update Number One 
From outside the CAM Tower, Cali, Colombia 
14th January 2002 
Getting on a plane from Britain, and within hours finding myself face to face with heavily 
armed Colombian riot police, shoulder to shoulder with workers and students locked in a 
struggle to keep public services in the public domain is, to say the least, a little bit disorientating. 
Its hard to describe the feeling of being here with the people, in the middle of a heroic 
struggle, but I will do my best to paint a picture of the beauty of the merging of the 
individual into the collective mass of the class: flags waving, banners flying and hearts full 
of the conviction that to change our social reality we have to begin to think of others as 
ourselves, and to fight for common dreams. 
Eighteen days into the occupation of CAM, the central administration Tower of 
EMCALI, in Cali (Colombia's second city), and the surrounding areas have been 
transformed into a beehive of collective action aimed at feeding the body and the soul of 
the 800 workers inside, and presenting a message to the community at large that yes we 
have dignity, yes we can fight back, and yes we have an alternative that doesn't necessitate 
that for my plate to be full, yours has to be empty. 
Apart from the riot police surrounding the tower itself, the square surrounding CAM is in 
the hands of the people who patrol the perimeter 24 hours a day in workers teams, 
making sure that those who would seek to eliminate the dream of social justice, are at least 
for the moment, kept at a distance. On the right-hand side of the building is a huge 
make-shift kitchen feeding the hundreds of occupying workers inside with breakfast, 
lunch and dinner. A military style operation which moves from control, to production, to 
consumption, each with an importance that has been drastically changed due to the nature 
of the conflict. 
The perimeter of the kitchen is fenced off to prevent any unauthorized person from 
entering: Martha the cook has been renamed during the occupation and now is called 
Thatcher - for the steely nature in which she organizes the troops, and prepares the food. 
"If somebody slipped in and poisoned the food the occupation would be over, and then 
where would we be? " But more then the security, she works with a passionate belief in the 
struggle. "I haven't been home for 18 days, I work, live and sleep in this place. Last time 
when SINTRAEMCALI took the tower, the workers inside got fed up with beans and 
rice. I change the menu every day, and make sure it is keeping them happy". Today's 
lunch was a mixed rice with beef, sausages and ham, a salad, and a milk pudding dessert. " 
I do it all with lots of love, even if they think I am a dictator they know that this job is 
important. " 
Once the food is prepared it has to pass through a committee comprised of police, 
government authorities, and union representatives. 
The police check it all with a spoon 
making sure nothing but 
food enters, the union ensures that the police don't poison it, 
and the government authorities attempt to make sure that neither side 
breaks the rules of 
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the humanitarian agreement that was signed between the conflicting parties three days 
into the dispute and covers the entry of food and medicine into the building. As the food 
moves on in its journey into the tower, Martha and the rest of her team take a break, tell 
some jokes, and she starts thinking about 
the next meal. After about an hour she calls the President of the Union, inside the 
occupation, to check that there was enough food, and that they enjoyed it. He normally 
tells her that it was terrible, and she knows by these comments that it was good. I feel 
proud to be with her. 
Across the road from Martha's kitchen is a makeshift stage where Community leaders, 
activists, and sympathisers with the struggle, make their speeches, trying to keep up the 
spirits of those outside and inside the occupation, and explain the changing situation. On 
some days, there have been 20,000 supporters outside the tower, and every few days there 
is a big meeting with several thousand people. One was even beamed via video link to 
British trade unionists and Colombian exiles at the headquarters of the British TUC. 
"Our struggle needs to be International, because these policies of privatisation are not just 
destroying our lives, " said Arial, the regional Human Rights representative of the Central 
Workers union, the Colombian equivalent of the TUC. 
Next to the stage, and all around the square, the walls are adorned with colourful union 
and social organisation banners with slogans such as"SINTRAEMCALI is the union of 
the people, and the people will defend it", " Better to die for something then live for 
nothing", and a whole range of other messages of support and solidarity. " 
Directly in front of the building, lined up against the metal barriers put up by the police, 
families and friends gather and shout messages of support and news from home to those 
inside. I do the same, and wave to my comrades inside. The struggle is personal as well 
as political, and in a movement where fear of the death squads permeates everyday 
life, 
trust and friendship are everything. 
I look around and try to think of ways to describe all this. The whole square 
has such a 
feeling of creativity to it, and of hope: that this time the downtrodden can win. 
As I link 
my arms up with others to block the roads, and shout messages of support to those 
inside, I too become locked again into the dream that we can do it, and resign myself to 
the fact that even if we can't, that dream is worth fighting for. 
Sintraemcali Occupation: Eyewitness Update Number Two 
Cali, Colombia 
Advance but with Problems 
January 15th 2002 
As day breaks there is some movement in the negotiations, and a 
buzz of optimism can 
be felt around the occupation. Last night the 
Mayor of Cali, and the government 
negotiation team signed a deal which would ensure that 
EMCALI, and the public services 
it provides would be kept in the public 
domain, but be handed back to the regional 
authority. The union was excluded 
from the negotiations, but this is more front than 
content, as they know now that the 
Mayor will enter into direct talks with the union to try 
to clinch a deal and end the occupation. 
While a move forward it throws up just as many complications as solutions. 
While not 
exhaustive these are some of the stumbling 
blocks. Who will manage the debt? How 
much money is the government prepared 
to invest? What would be the role of the union 
in the new administration? How would a peaceful ending 
to the occupation be assured? 
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Most of these questions had been floating around before the occupation began. The 
union has argued consistently, and presented a range of cases to demonstrate, that it is not 
the case that state public services cannot be run efficiently and economically, but that the 
reason for the massive public debts that EMCALI has is due to the cancer of corruption 
which has plagued the company, and the failure of central government to provide the 
funding that it had promised. . Politically appointed managers and their cronies have 
siphoned off money from the company for years, and only recently since the union began 
co-administering the company has this problem been addressed. If the government was 
responsible for employing these corrupt managers is it right that Cali citizens pay the 
price? What inflames the situation even more is the impunity which exists for those who 
flagrantly abused their position, but continue to evade prosecution. Furthermore, in the 
case of the PTAR (water treatment plant) despite a signed agreement that it would 
provide half of the funding, the government has never invested the money. 
The second problem is that of who is to manage the company. In the last 9 months the 
union has played a key role in the management of the company, alongside the local mayor, 
and the General Manager Juan Manuel Pulido (whose dismissal lead to the occupation). 
Through prudent and honest management they had managed to begin to turn the 
company around, a fact which the government, engaged in a propaganda war to push 
through privatization, was loathe to recognise. In any negotiation the union seeks to 
ensure that the bad old days of public corruption will not return, and see themselves as 
the guardian and defender of these vital funds for the community. 
The third problem concerns the ending of the occupation and the security situation that 
will prevail afterwards. The brutal history of para-state assassinations in Colombia means 
that those in occupation will emerge in fear of their lives. Many death threats and bomb 
threats have arrived at the union in the last weeks from the paramilitary organization the 
AUC (Self Defence Forces of Colombia), and the relationship between them and the 3rd 
Brigade (the local army) is well documented, and worrying. The union needs to negotiate 
a secure exit, and also extra means of protection in the coming months, which as recent 
Colombian history demonstrates is the time when the paramilitaries take revenge for any 
worker victories. 
All of these factors are likely to keep the conflict going for some time, and thus the task 
for the union is to keep the protest going, and keep the pressure up from the community 
both national and international. Tomorrow there is a delegate's assembly in the morning, 
and a general workers assembly in the afternoon. Today there were meetings with 
campesino organisations in the union headquarters, and the regional strike command, 
comprising trade union and social organisations, is meeting again on Thursday. 
All these 
meetings aim at keeping the mobilizations going, and maintaining the unity of the 
different organisations that have taken up the gauntlet of public services as a problem 
for 
us all. And for those inside the tower morale needs to be maintained after 
21 difficult 
days without family and all the trappings of a normal life. 
In the union headquarters the Urgent Actions keep going out: 
denouncing the death 
threats, the government's lack of political will, and rejecting the calls 
for a military solution 
to the occupation being called for by the regional representatives of the 
business elite. So 
despite the tentative steps forward the hard work goes on, and as 
I finish another 
document to be sent out to the International Community explaining the situation and 
calling for solidarity and support 
I switch off the computer and make my way to the 
tower. Time to peel potatoes for dinner, wave and shout to those 
inside, and to spend 
time with my friends and comrades, who 




Eyewitness Update Number 3 
Women and Communities Mobilise 
Outside The Cam Tower Cali, Colombia 
Wednesday 16th January 
Day 22 of the workers occupation of the CAM tower, and negotiations both official and 
unofficial go on inside and outside the building between the union, the mayor, and the 
government. Meanwhile the regional Strike Command which was regrouped at the 
beginning of the occupation, and draws together representatives of trade union, social 
organizations, and community leaders, is meeting in earnest to plan actions and events of 
solidarity. In the rural areas surrounding Cali, after a meeting yesterday, a joint statement 
has been issued by the community council leaders in support of the occupation and the 
struggle to defend public services. In the poor neighborhoods community leaders are 
ready for the civic strike if and when it is called. In the University students are meeting to 
plan for a big conference tomorrow morning on "The crisis in Argentina and its effect on 
Cali. - the Occupation of CAM". In the Navaro EMCALI plant SINTRAEMCALI worker 
delegates are meeting, and at 2pm there is a general workers assembly outside the 
occupation. In the human rights department of SINTRAEMCALI we are busily 
preparing for a video conference between British trade union leaders and the occupying 
workers tomorrow, and dealing with the logistics and day to day issues that come up, and 
trying to keep all the different groups in contact with each other -a mammoth task which 
we are unable to fulfill, but are happy to die trying. 
I am waiting and hoping for the government to authorize my entry into the occupation, as 
a human rights observer. After a meeting between Alexander the union president, and 
Berenice, a human rights activist and negotiator yesterday, they thought it would be a 
good idea to try to get me government authorization to get inside the occupation to talk 
about the international solidarity work that we are involved in, and do some worker 
education sessions to raise the spirits. Popular education is in the background of 
everything that we do, and with the systematic elimination of trade union and social 
leaders, being carried out by parastate forces, the urgency of forming new leadership is 
ever present. 
Last night I spent the evening outside the occupation. Things were fairly low key, and 
there was time to chat to some of the people outside the occupation who have put their 
lives on hold since December 25th. One of the community mothers, who look after 
children in the poorest neighborhoods, was telling me about the march that was called on 
the 11th of January, and how the Mayor had denied permission due to the delicate nature 
of the peace negotiations that were taking place that day. More than 10,000 people 
marched from their neighborhoods, meeting up in the centre, and ending outside the 
occupation. The most popular slogan of the day being 
"We will march with permission or 
without it, the Cali community is present, present, present" 
(it sounds better in Spanish). 
The march seems to have moved the process forward with 
both national and local 
government recognizing that the support for 
SINTRAEMCALI and the struggle is 
building across the working class neighborhoods, the universities, and among the workers. 
This is a vindication of the strategy of the union 
for several years, which has been that it is 
in the poor communities where the foundations to social change 
have to be built. I have 
heard countless speeches from Alexander, the president, and 
Lucio, the vice president on 
trying to rebuild the social fabric of the society 
from below, not with fine words but with 
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actions. For the last 8 months they have been running 4Mingas4which in one of the local 
indigenous languages means something like 4to come together to carry out a specific 
task4. In SINTRAEMCALI, and in alliance with other unions and social organizations, 
this has meant that every few weeks workers, doctors, nurses , 
lawyers, hairdressers all 
give up their weekends and go to the poorest neighborhoods and provide their services 
for free: fixing electricity lines, telephones, giving free medical treatment, legal advice, 
haircuts and a whole range of activities. It has become a carnival of solidarity, and has 
generated a process of trust between the unions and the communities: the marches, the 
support, and hopefully the victory are products of this work, and it is a lesson that we on 
the left in Britain can learn from. 
Moving back into the workers kitchen, I am becoming increasingly aware that those who 
are feeding the occupying workers are fulfilling many more duties then that. Some have 
also become important negotiators between the police and the union, smoothing over 
disputes, and calming the situation. They have been living side by side with the police for 
22 days now, and some friendships have sprung up, with a few police becoming new allies 
to the cause. The young recruits have much in common with the workers, and they and 
their families will be equally effected if prices of services go up, with many well aware of 
the brutality of the economic policies being pushed through. These new recruits to the 
cause are now helping the union in many interesting ways - will let you know after. 
Finally, a few words on the new fashion items emerging amongst the activists; Baseball 
caps, T-Shirts, and even kitchen aprons with "2nd Occupation of the CAM tower" written 
across them, all money need I say is going to the occupation fund. This is the time to be 
proud of our class, for it is fighting back with dignity and imagination. 
Sintraemcali Occupation: Eyewitness Update 4 
The People Inside Robin Hood Tower 
The Cam Tower, Cali, Colombia 
Thursday, 17th January 
Late on Wednesday night I managed to get authorisation 
from the local mayor as a 
Human Rights Observer to enter the occupied building, a reflection of both the power of 
the union, and also the contradictory position that the mayor 
is in. On the one hand he is 
a mayor of the people, on the other he 
is locked into the government with all its 
responsibilities and limitations. This dual position 
has meant that he is now both friend 
and foe of the unions' demands, and the 
balance between the two will no doubt be 
revealed in the next few days as negotiations 
begin between the union, the Minister of 
Labour and the mayor. 
Moving through the police cordon I slowly walked through no-man's 
land and as the door 
opened I was greeted with 'what's up 
Novelli? from a voice I recognised but whose face 
was covered with a balaclava. I smiled and they 
locked the door. I was inside the 17- 
storey EMCALI tower, the central administration 
building of one of the biggest 
companies in Colombia, and it was 
in the hands of the workers. As masks were taken off 
I was greeted with hugs and handshakes, and moved on 
through the building, up the stairs 
and towards the general manager's office within which 
Alexander Lopez Maya, president 
of SINTRAEMCALI, and the 
board of directors organise the occupation 
both inside and 
outside. 
Alexander is an example to us all of what it means to 
be committed to social change. 
b 
At 
thirty three, he has already survived three assassination attempts, and 
leads the by 
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example with sacrifice, courage and honesty. You can't help but trust him, and he has 
created a sense of undying loyalty to the cause which an army general would be 
proud of. He is a charismatic figure, a true working class hero, who has decided that the 
only way to move forward in Colombia is to stop being afraid. Once you break the fear 
then the system doesn't look so strong after all, and the impossible seems to become a 
concrete goal. We chat for a while about family and friends, about Andy and Gloria and 
the members of the campaign in England, my studies, and, of course, the occupation. He looks remarkably relaxed as he converses with me, directs people around him, answers the 
phone and fiddles with his video camera. He is the exception that proves the rule, a male 
multi-tasker who operates on so many levels at the same time that he makes me tired just 
watching him. He was born to lead the struggle, and all of us that are close to him are 
prepared to do whatever we can to keep him alive. 
I meet up with some old friends, and Aydee a colleague from the Human Rights 
Department of the union suggests a guided tour of the newly named 'Robin Hood 
Tower', and we are on the move again. I am taken first to the 'barakeros' (the toughest 
ones). They have spent the last 22 days sleeping on the roof in a makeshift tent, ensuring 
that the police don't storm the building from the roof. We decide to have an impromptu 
meeting, and I ask them about how they are doing, and they ask me what is going on with 
the international solidarity work, and in the world in general. I talk a bit about the picket 
outside the Colombian Embassy, the meetings, the bulletin, and the contacts in the unions 
and social organisations in Britain. They remember the people from the delegation that 
came, and ask about them. We talk of Argentina, of the war in Afghanistan, and where the 
cracks in the system are appearing. 
I tell them how they are an example to us all, of dignity in struggle, and that for me, they 
are for the workers' movement what the Zapatistas were for the armed struggle. A new 
and exciting organisation that transcends the limits of a trade union and becomes more 
like a social movement - new social trade unionism which fights not just for higher wages 
and better conditions for themselves, but places the power of the working class institution 
at the service of the community. They smile, and I can feel their pride. 
The whole occupation has been built around the idea of the social role of the union, and 
the work in the communities is bearing the fruit of solidarity which grows day by day. 
The fact that all services have been maintained during the occupation is a further example 
of this: "our struggle is not against the people, but against this government and the 
corrupt oligarchy" is a phrase often repeated. There have been some complaints, of 
course, particularly from those nearby residents who have to listen to loudspeakers playing 
messages of support and popular protest songs to those inside, but what's a few sleepness 
nights compared with the immensity of the social problems in the city? 
I carry on on my guided tour. The building wasn't made for all these people, and it is 
remarkable that everyone seems so calm and relaxed. The whole building is run with 
precision, with workers having shifts to patrol the building, keep the place clean, man the 
phones, and deal with the running of the services. I chat with Monica, a telephone 
operator, and ask her how things are going. She tells me that she misses her 
family, but 
that she has a family here too. It hasn't been easy for any of them. The government never 
thought that Colombians, so famous for their love of family and celebrations, would 
occupy on Christmas Day. They were wrong. She tells me how 
beautiful New Year's Eve 
was when thousands descended on the tower, blocking all the roads, and at midnight 
lighting candles in solidarity with those inside. 
I spend some time with Guillermo, a 
54 year-old first mechanic who is mopping the 
floors. He tells me how he worked as a second chef for many years on a 
boat, and so this 
life is not so different for him. He 
has also been in all of the previous three occupations 
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that the union has carried out to defend the company. When he goes on to the balcony he puts a mask and a wig on, and looks completely insane. But all this in one way or 
another is madness, and the president's nickname is, after all, "El Loco" (the crazy one). It is madness because they are supposed to know their place, and not do these things. I'm 
glad that I am mad too. 
Sintraemcali Occupation: Eyewitness Update Number 5 
Cam Tower, Cali, Colombia 
From The Local, To the National and the International -A Day Of 
Solidarity 
Friday 18th January, 2002 
There are definitely some advantages to be gained from taking control of the Central 
Administration of EMCALI, and one of the main ones is communication. Yesterday was 
a day of solidarity, and the videoconference was the new tool in the hands of the workers 
movement. 
At 9.00 am in the Universidad del Valle, the local state university, a conference was held 
by SINTRAUNICOL, the university workers union, on the "Crisis in Argentina, and its 
effects on Colombia: The Taking of the EMCALI Tower". Inside the occupation we 
watched a radical economist from the National University in Colombia, as he explained 
the background to the crisis, the role of the World Bank and the IMF, and the rebirth of 
the popular movement in Argentina. Scores of us sat huddled in front of the computer, 
occasionally waving and shouting support to the students and workers that squeezed into 
the auditorium. At 11.00 am Alexander, the president, began his speech. He talked of the 
occupation, of the unity necessary between students and workers, and of the strong bonds 
between those in the University who had fought off for several years its privatization, and 
of SINTRAEMCALI. When the students occupied their central administration two years 
ago, Alexander joined them inside. 
At 12.00 am we had a conference with the T. U. C in Britain, with leaders of the GMB, 
UNISON, ASLEF, FBU, Ken Cameron, and Simon Steynes from the International 
Department of the T. U. C. Alexander explained the long struggle of SINTRAEMCALI, 
which since 1994 had fought off 16 attempts to privatize EMCALI E. I. C. E, and the price 
they had paid: the murders, the assassinations attempts and the forced exile of many 
workers. 
The demands of the union were simple, he said. " We are not fighting for higher wages, 
or better conditions. Quite the opposite, we are happy to work overtime 
for free to do 
what we can to defend the company". The demands were an stop the government policy 
of privatization, no price increases for the poorest sections of the Cali community, and an 
end to the impunity from prosecution of the corrupt officials who 
have siphoned off 
money from the company for years. In order to gain these demands they were prepared 
to do whatever they had to, including giving up their own 
lives. The British trade 
unionists one by one sent their messages of solidarity, and support, and the cry 
from 
Simon Steynes was "You are not alone". 
The meeting produced some truly positive results, which yet again 
highlights that real 
international solidarity can be built through realistic goals and 
hard work. The union 
leaders agreed to support a demonstration outside the 
Colombian Embassy in London on 
the 25th of January, that they would write and 
issue statements of solidarity and support 
and do what they could to pressure 
both the British government and the Colombian 
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government to prevent a military solution to the occupation. Finally they agreed to raise and send money to SINTRAEMCALI to help to sustain the struggle. The union has spent over fifty thousand pounds in the 23 days of occupation, and faces bankruptcy 
when it ends. All the meetings, all the food for the workers, all thevideoconferences, all the transport costs, legal fees, and related expenses have drained everything that the union has. When the meeting finished and the screen went blank we all embraced, and felt the presence of international solidarity in the room. We were not alone. 
In the afternoon from the poorest communities in the city a mass of humanity descended 
on the square outside the tower, gathering in defence of the company, shouting slogans 
and waving banners and flags. The Strike Command leaders spoke from the stage and Alexander from the roof of the tower. From there the march began, and I left the building, through the police checkpoint, and merged into the crowd. The streets again 
were in the hands of the people, and the momentum of the struggle locally, nationally and internationally is gathering pace. 
Sintraemcali Occupation: Eyewitness Update Number 6 
Negotiations Begin but Progress Is Slow 
Cali, Colombia 
Sunday, January 21st, 2002 
Day 26 of the occupation, and for the last two days formal negotiations between the 
union, the government, the mayor of Cali, and community leaders began. Several union 
leaders and their bodyguards left the occupation in the late afternoon to head for a local 
cultural centre, and there meet up with the delegated community spokespeople. As they 
emerged from the parking lot beneath the tower, workers outside blocked off the roads. 
From the windows of the tower occupying workers dropped a snowstorm of tiny pieces 
of white paper on the crowd below, as the Internationale played from loud speakers. 
With representatives of the government, the municipality, and the union all present in one 
place, security in the cultural centre was very tight. Machine guns and bullet-proofed vests 
in abundance, and every entrance and exit covered. The dirty war carried out by the 
paramilitaries means that trade union leaders are always in a permanent state of alert, but 
with the taking of the CAM Tower things have moved to a new and dangerous level. The 
question has to be raised as to how the paramilitaries have managed to grow so quickly in 
the last years to an estimated 10,000 members, a growth which has paralleled the 
implementation of the US initiated PLAN COLOMBIA, a two billion dollar largely 
military aid package supposedly aimed at the eradication of cocaine production. Curiously 
the paramilitaries have been untouched by this military war on drugs, despite admitting 
that they fund themselves largely from drug production in the areas under their control. 
The war on drugs is clearly focussed on those areas where the left wing guerrilla 
movements are located. 
Could it be that that the US is fighting not against drugs, but against resistance to the 
imposition of an economic model based on privatisation, budget cuts, and rising 
inequality? If it is, then the stakes at this negotiation table here are high, for if the Cali 
community, and SINTRAEMCALI stop the privatisation of public services, and prevent 
price increases for the poor, then they are not just preventing government plans, but the 
plans of the IMF and the World Bank, and their US masters. Plans that seek to ensure 
that Colombia fits in to the neo-liberal block being developed across the region. 
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The negotiations are complicated, and I try to follow them as best I can from the corridor 
outside the negotiating room, where periodically the delegates emerge to consult with a 
broader group of the spokespeople. We all sit on the floor, and listen to what the 
government and the mayor have put forward so far, and different sectors of the 
community give their opinions. The Cali community and the union's central demands are 
for an end to the policy of privatisation, no price increases for public services, and a high- 
level anti-corruption commission to bring to justice those who have drained the 
company's resources. 
This implies that the financial security of the company needs to be secured, government 
obligations to fund past projects need to be fulfilled, a new General Manager needs to be 
agreed, and unequivocal willingness is present on the part of the government to 
investigate corruption. These are big things, and progress is slow. Talks on the first night 
finished at 2.00am, and resumed the following afternoon. By the second day everyone in 
the SINTRAEMCALI and Community negotiating group, and their advisers, were tired. 
Hours go by moving in and out of rooms, discussing with the Mayor and the Minister of 
Labour and then returning to the bigger group to explain developments and seek advice. 
The situation is tense in our room, and tempers are frayed, it isn't easy breaking through a 
corporate mode of negotiation, and discussing decisions with the community. But this is 
the new direction that the union has taken: that to fight the politics of privatisation the 
union and the community have to stand together, and for that more voices have to be 
heard. The negotiators are well aware of the responsibilities on their shoulders, and also of 
the events going on in the country as a whole. The deadline for the end of the 
demilitarised zone agreed with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia is only a day 
away, and the security of those inside the CAM tower may drastically change if the civil 
war escalates. 
The talks break down at 1.00 a. m. with the government refusing to move on the key areas 
of funding and corruption, and the future of the negotiations are left up in the air. Those 
in the room agree to bring forward the Municipal Civic Strike, if possible to Friday, and 
head back to the CAM Tower in a convoy of cars speeding down the city's streets 
knowing full well that more pressure has to be applied. 
Sintraemcali Occupation: Eyewitness Update Number 7 
The River Of Resistance Is Rising 
From The Cam Tower In Cali, Colombia 
Sunday 20th December 
The struggle in the defence of EMCALI E. 
I. C. E. is transforming peoples lives both inside 
and outside the occupation. Collectivity and solidarity, supposedly 
dead and buried in our 
materialist world have again been reborn, and as the 
imagination of the people begins to 
be set free, questions of power move 
beyond public services and into the domain of 
democracy, equality, and freedom. 
Inside CAM tower the newly formed women's group is formulating proposals to address 
male attitudes to their female comrades. 
To raise questions as to why no woman has ever 
been a member of the Executive Board of the union, and 
to challenge the sexism that 
exists in the union and beyond. 
"We are in the frontline of the struggle to 
defend 
EMCALI, and male attitudes inside the 
Tower are changing towards us. When we 
leave 
we want to change the attitudes of those outside 
as well, " said Aydee, one of the 
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spokeswomen from the group. She had entered the occupation to join her comrades 
three days after it had begun, disguised as a nurse. 
Inside the Tower they are organising a range of initiatives: educational, political, and social 
to keep both women and men busy and united. "Tomorrow we have computer classes, 
and English classes, and we are organising a cleaning party, jointly with the men, to keep 
the tower clean. We are also circulating the words of the Internationale and the anthem of 
SINTRAEMCALI to every floor, so that everyone can learn the songs by heart. 
Tomorrow we will have a competition with a prize for the floor that sings them the best. " 
Whilst I was there they were planning the exit parade, and discussing ideas. Every detail is 
considered as they decide on the image that they wish to present to the community and 
the wider world when they eventually leave the tower, heads held high in dignity and 
solidarity. 
Outside the tower, people are gathered around the stage watching a dance group from 
Agua Blanca, the poorest district in Cali, and the crowd sways in time with the music. A 
local rap band from the same area, chant their tribute to social protest and their chorus of 
"SINTRAEMCALI, present... SINTRAEMCALI present. " On the roof of the two- 
storey building attached to the tower, occupying workers clad in Balaclavas dance together 
in this carnival of the people. Workers and communities experiencing new things, forging 
new friendships, and debating new ideas as this new popular front of diversity begins to 
solidify into a solid block of popular resistance. 
I think of what my friend Berenice, a popular leader and human rights activist, told me 
she had heard from a campesino in the South of Bolivar describing the popular 
movement. He had said that the social struggles in Colombia are like the Magdalena 
River; in the morning the level of the river is shallow, but by the evening the river can 
become uncontrollable. The river of resistance in Cali is indeed rising and tomorrow the 
Municipal Strike Command meet to raise that level even higher. 
Sintraemcali Occupation: Eyewitness Update Number 8 
Cam Tower Occupation Enters Crucial New Stage 
Cali, Colombia 
Wednesday 23rd January, 2002 
As the occupation begins its 5th week, a breakthrough 
has emerged, and a team of 
union/community representatives will tomorrow 
(Thursday 24th January) begin 
negotiations in Bogota. Despite President Pastrana's reluctance to give credibility 
to the 
union's dramatic actions, he is increasingly unable to avoid engaging 
directly with the 
situation. The negotiations have been set up 
in such a way that the Mayor negotiates with 
Andres Pastrana, while the union/community alliance negotiate with 
Government 
Ministers, all in the same building but not in the same room. 
The spatial geography of 
resistance now operates at the local, national, and 
international level, with actions being 
planned in Cali, Bogota, and outside the 
Colombian Embassy in London in the next few 
days. 
Solidarity messages have been flowing in to 
SINTRAEMCALI's human rights department 
from all around the World. Yesterday we received messages of 
support from the Central 
Workers Federation of Indonesia, from the Norwegian 
Socialist Party, and an anti- 
imperialist organisation in the Philippines. 
Whilst on a colourful youth march, with 
hundred of schoolchildren, a Folk 
Bank and 4 metre high puppets marching in 
defence of 
public services, I was approached 
by an Italian who introduced himself: 
" Claudio, Anti- 
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Capitalist Movement Genoa, Italy. " We are beginning to get the feeling that the world is 
starting to take note of what those inside the tower already know: this is an historic battle. 
With a temporary deal between the FARC and the government signed on Sunday, the 
possibility of an escalation of the civil-war has resided, and the occupation of the CAM 
tower has been moved up the political agenda. Before the negotiations begin, it might be 
worthwhile briefly discussing the different positions of the various actors involved, and 
the continued attempts by the media to distort the issues to discredit the popular 
movement and sow divisions. 
There are two major blocks: the government and the union/community alliance. The 
Mayor of Cali, in the manner of the classic populist leader, vacillates between the two 
attempting to please everyone but ending up by being distrusted by all. He has, however, 
played a crucial role by refusing to use force to dislodge the workers, and many believe 
that if a right wing mayor had been in office, the people would already be burying their 
dead comrades and friends. 
The government has become deeply frustrated by the events of the last four weeks, 
surprised by the ingenuity of the workers and the solidarity that they have gained from the 
community. They are now attempting to save face. According to the Mayor, the 
government has agreed unofficially to provide 80% of the funding for the PTAR water 
treatment plant, which would facilitate most of the union's demands, but they refuse to 
put this in writing. Politically they cannot afford a public defeat. The union/community 
alliance cannot except this for one simple reason explained by Alexander Lopez, the 
union's president: "How can we accept a verbal agreement with the government, when the 
government is notorious for reneging on agreements even when they are written on paper 
in the presence of lawyers? " Last weekends negotiations broke down due to these 
reasons, and it became clear very quickly that the Minister of Labour had little power to 
make a concrete deal. Ultimately, it is with President Pastrana where the real negotiations 
can take place. 
From the union/ community alliance position, the core elements of the three demands are 
non-negotiable: no privatisation, no tariff increases, and a high level anti-corruption 
committee to bring to justice those managers and corrupt officials who have bled the 
company dry over the last years. For the first two to become possible and sustainable, 
government agreement to funding PTAR is crucial. The union/community alliance is 
solid, but it has to be recognised that there are different degrees of responsibility and 
pressure. The union has hundreds of people inside the CAM tower, and if the police and 
military attempt to take the tower by force the consequences will be horrific. 
Nevertheless, and this needs to be made very clear, the union leadership and those inside 
the building are prepared for this possibility. 
It is probably hard for many people to understand or believe that these workers are ready 
to lay down their lives if necessary in the defence of public services. But those in the 
popular movement are well aware of the price of holding on to the 
dream of peace and 
social justice. In the last ten years 1535 trade union 
leaders and activists have been 
assassinated, and the memory of those friends and comrades 
killed in the class struggle 
creates, in the mind of those who remain, a collective class-consciousness which provides 
the energy and the enthusiasm to carry on. 
As an unpredicted consequence of the terrible 
repression and brutality of state and para-state 
forces, a beautiful dignity and resolve has 
emerged, and it is present inside and outside the 
CAM Tower. 
In the battle of hearts and minds the union/community alliance wage a 
daily battle to get 
the message across to the population that their 
demands are in the interests of the people, 
with no discussion of collective agreements or personal sectoral 
interests. But the mass 
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media, owned by the very same families of the oligarchy who would benefit from the 
privatisation of EMCALI continue to distort the facts, aided by a Mayor attempting to 
remain in control of a situation which has already gone way above his head. Yesterday in 
an interview on national radio he suggested that the community spokespeople do not 
represent anyone, and if it was just the union at the negotiating table then the deal would 
have already been signed. This is a lie, but those in power make their living from 
distorting the truth and these tactics of divide and rule are not lost on the 
union/community alliance. Counteracting these messages without access to massive funds 
is one of the biggest obstacles of the popular movement, both here and in the wider 
world. Yesterday the financial collapse of the union was temporally abated when in a 
Workers Assembly members began donating there salaries to keep the occupation going 
with all its related costs, including leaflets and posters to be printed and sent out. 
Each day the SINTRAEMCALI journalist churns out press releases, and the union and 
the Municipal Strike Command produce documents, posters and leaflets to be distributed 
across the cities poor neighbourhoods. This is strengthened by public meetings across the 
city, demonstrations, and Public Assemblies where the situation is explained and clarified. 
Reports and documents are sent out nationally and internationally to rally more support 
and solidarity, and the computers in the Human Rights Department have just crashed 
under the stress of it all. There are also a few humans on the verge of collapse here, but 
somehow everyone manages to keep going. 
The next two days will be crucial, and we all need to do what we can to keep the 
movement going, not just for the 70% of people living in poverty in Cali, not for the 60% 
living in poverty in Colombia, but for all of us who believe that a different world is 
possible. The occupation of the CAM Tower is a ray of hope, and we must do all we can 
to defend it. 
Sintraemcali Occupation: Eyewitness Update Number 9 
Temperature Rising On the Streets of Cali 
Cali, Colombia 
Thursday 24th of January, 2002 
At 6.00am this morning in the city of Santiago de Cali, the working class movement, 
shoulder to shoulder with the community, began to raise the stakes and the significance of 
the occupation of the CAM Tower in defence of public services. 
Three of the most 
important roads, which link the city to the rest of the country, were 
blocked by thousands 
of workers. The blockades were maintained until 
11.30. a. m, preventing anything and 
anyone from entering or leaving the city 
by road. For the first time in this dispute, the 
commercial life of the city has been seriously affected, a strategy which 
the union had, 
prior to today, done its best to avoid. Since the occupation 
began EMCALI's services 
have remained intact, and apart from the marches 
disrupting traffic, city life has remained 
fairly normal. 
Today things changed, and for five and a half hours road 
links to the rest of Colombia 
were cut. While serious conflict between the police and 
the worker/community alliance 
was avoided, there was tension in all three 
locations. At 11.30a. m the workers and the 
communities, accompanied by convoys of 
EMCALI trucks and jeeps, marched back in to 
the centre, reunited in a mass of 
humanity that filled the streets outside the CAM Tower. 
The city's transport system ground to a 
halt, and traffic jams could be seen in all 
directions. If the government thought that the occupation was running out of steam 
and 
losing community support, today 
it received a firm and resounding response, and things 
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are likely to escalate further with the build up for the Municipal Civic Strike which is 
planned for Monday. In the rally that followed, union leaders inside the CAM Tower 
explained that yet again the government had postponed the negotiations, this time until 
next Monday: "If this is how they want to play the game, then so be it. Today is just a 
warning. If they think that they are going to tire us out, they are wrong. We have now 
spent 30 days inside this Tower, and if we have to we can spend another thirty more to 
achieve our objectives,. " said one of the union leaders from the balcony of the tower, face 
covered with the balaclava that has become the symbol of the occupation. 
The governments waiting game is a dangerous one, and they are forcing an escalation of 
the conflict which threatens to spin out of control. Unemployment in Cali has doubled in 
the last four years from 12% to 24%and according to CEPAL (Centre for Latin American 
Statistics) a United Nations research centre, 70% of Cali's population now live below the 
official poverty line. This situation has been worsened by the influx of thousands of 
peasants who live in slums on the outskirts of the city or on the inner city streets. Most 
were forced from their land by the paramilitaries, others by the economic collapse of the 
agricultural industry. But not everyone is suffering under neo-liberalism, and this is 
reflected in the rise in inequality. In 1990 when Colombia began this economic model, 
the difference in revenue between the poorest 10% and the richest 10% was 1: 40, it is 
now 1: 80. Resentment is growing, and I witnessed this in the anger of the march when 
the crowds began shouting at the residents in the high rise luxury apartments that line the 
streets of one of the richest parts of the city. Cali is a potential powder-keg, and one 
serious incident over the coming days may just light the match. 
Sintraemcali Occupation: Eyewitness Update Number 10 
Sintraemcali Workers Complete One Month In Cam Tower Occupation 
Cali, Colombia 
January 25,2002 
Exactly one month ago on Christmas Day, the occupation of the CAM Tower began, and 
today this anniversary is being marked inside the tower with a mass-cleaning session, and a 
competition to determine which of the teams on each of the 16 floors of the 
building can 
sing the Internationale, and the SINTRAEMCALI anthem the best. 
Outside the building, 
food continues to be prepared in Thatcher's Kitchen, the streets are still patrolled 
by 
groups of workers, family and friends continue to gather to shout messages to 
loved ones 
inside, and loudspeakers continue to blast out messages of support and protest music. 
The infrastructure of resistance both inside and outside the tower remains 
intact, and in 
many ways has become normalized: a remarkable tribute to the adaptability of all 
those 
who have had their lives turned upside 
down in the last month. This is not to say that 
there are not problems, of course there are, but there still remains a solid 
determination to 
see this thing through. 
After the road blocks of yesterday morning, the strong show of support 
by local 
communities, and the continued preparations 
for further actions on Monday, there are 
signs that the government may be yielding to public pressure, and 
reconsidering its 
position on the crucial issue of funding 
for the PTAR, water treatment plant. While 
nothing can be confirmed, an article 
in EL OCCIDENTE this morning stated that 
sources inside the government suggested that 
it was now prepared to pay the 80% of 
funding promised in an earlier agreement. 
If this is true, then the government and 
union/community alliance may 
be getting closer to a peaceful negotiated settlement. 
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True to form, the majority of the mass media did their best to discredit the blockades of 
yesterday, describing them as an abuse of power by the union and focusing on the 
inconvenience that was caused to the public. El Tiempo, one of the most popular papers 
in Cali, even made reference to unproven allegations that during a prior conflict trade 
unionists had threatened the life of the then Mayor Ricardo Cobo. They neglected to 
mention that he is a known paramilitary sympathiser, and that in the same period 6 
SINTRAEMCALI leaders and activists were assassinated, two were forcibly disappeared, 
and three were put on trial for terrorism (the trial collapsed). The article also failed to 
mention the death threats received over the last weeks from the Paramilitaries who 
threatened to blow up the building, the union headquarters, and kill Alexander Lopez, the 
president. However, there was at least one good piece of news: an RCN radio poll showed 
that over 90% of those questioned said that they supported the actions of the union. 
Proof that even with the disinformation circulating in the media, people are beginning to 
make sense of the main issues involved in this conflict. 
Tomorrow afternoon there is a popular assembly to agree on plans for Monday's day of 
action, and members of the negotiating team are in a meeting inside the CAM Tower in 
preparation for the negotiations in Bogota. Meanwhile, here in SINTRAEMCALI's 
Human Rights Department, we eagerly await information on a meeting in Bogota 
between SINTRAEMCALI representatives and national trade union leaders, the picket of 
the Colombian Embassy in London, and the meeting between the Colombian ambassador 
and British trade union leaders. Hopefully, all of these things will contribute towards a 
just and peaceful resolution to the occupation. 
Sintraemcali Occupation: Eyewitness Update Number 11 
48 Hours of Uncertainty 
Cali, Colombia 
Sunday 27th, January, 2002 
The Occupation of the CAM Tower is about to enter into its most dangerous phase, and 
the possibility of military intervention to dislodge the occupying workers appears to 
be 
becoming a strong possibility. From the optimism of the Day of 
Action, where the 
working class movement and local communities united in the 
defense of public services, 
comes the brutal reality of a state that appears to have no 
limits. In order to understand 
how this changed scenario has come about, we need to go 
back to Friday evening, and 
follow the events that then prevailed up to today, and all the 
different media and means of 
communication that have been deployed by the 
Colombian government to construct a 
new reality to the people of what is going on in the 
CAM Tower occupation, and what is 
the potential solution. 
On Friday evening the Mayor announced that the 
FARC, the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia, had called for an armed strike 
in the South West of the country on 
Monday, and that this coincided with the 
Municipal Civic Strike being planned by 
SINTRAEMCALI, and the Municipal Strike Command. 
He called for a high level 
security meeting with the military and police, and 
the meeting led to a range of security 
measures being deployed from 
6pm on Sunday evening until 6. am on 
Tuesday morning. 
These measures call for a ban on all alcohol sales, meetings, marches 
and demonstrations, 
the deployment of troops at all public 
buildings, the restriction of movement of vehicles, 
and a ban on the carrying of 
firearms. Two extra military Battalions will be brought 
in to 
the city. The effect of these announcements was 
to start to build a link between the armed 
insurgency of the FARC, and the working class movement 
in Cali, particularly 
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SINTRAEMCALI. Quickly realising the trap that was being set up, SINTRAEMCALI 
and the Municipal Strike Command immediately postponed the Municipal Civic Strike, 
and made public statements refuting any link between the trade union and community 
organisations and the armed insurgency. 
Despite these statements, the major newspapers in Cali ran stories the following day, 
which implied that the Armed Strike called by the FARC, and the Municipal Civic Strike 
were related. Two examples may help to illuminate this: In the daily EL PAIS newspaper 
on Saturday (26th January 2002) it stated that: "A terrorist plan to destabilise the city 
through road blocks, the occupation of churches, public Buildings and other buildings as 
part of a civic strike endorsed by the EMCALI workers union was discovered yesterday by the authorities". In the same edition, the commander of the Third Division of the Army, General Francisco Rene Perlaza, alleged that " ... some trade union organisations 
and armed groups at the margin of the law are behind the calling of the civic strike... " These kind of comments appeared in many newspapers and on the radio and television. 
The imagery is clear, the popular movement is linked to the armed insurgency and there is 
a 'terrorist' plan. In the post September 11 th world this seems to be justification to do 
almost anything, and it is to the speculation of what may happen that I now turn. 
On Monday negotiations between the SINTRAEMCALI/Community alliance, the Mayor 
of Cali, and the national Government begin in Bogota. This will coincide with the 
militarization of the streets of Cali, with any public gatherings, demonstrations or 
meetings forbidden. For that reason those inside the CAM Tower are going to be very 
isolated, and with the increased military presence outside the building tension is likely to 
be running very high. This tension was further increased when on Saturday evening the 
Mayor stated on television that either through negotiation or through force the 
occupation will end on Monday. 
With the militarization of the streets of Cali, the increasing cri finalization of those inside, 
and the prevention of any supporters from lining the streets outside the building, if the 
negotiations do break down in Bogota then the use of force becomes a high probability. 
Inside the CAM Tower preparations are being made to defend the occupation, and 
various scenarios are being discussed calmly and in an atmosphere of dignified resistance. 
This violent ending to the CAM Tower occupation, is not however inevitable. If it is to 
be avoided, then on Monday the 28th of January we all need to do what we can to 
pressure the Colombian government not to use military force. Wherever you are reading 
this from, you can play your part, sending letters to the Colombian authorities, contacting 
any organisations that may be able to highlight to the rest of the World what is going on, 
and to pressure the Colombian government. 
I call for this in the name of all those heroic women and men that are today inside the 
CAM Tower. People whose dignity and selflessness are an example to us all. They are 
putting their lives on the line to keep basic services in the public domain, and affordable 
for all. But more than that, they are challenging an economic model that is destroying our 
planet, and condemning over two thirds of the world's population to poverty and misery. 
Please do all that you can to help them. 
Sintraemcali Occupation: Eyewitness Update Number 12 
A Day of Tension And Uncertainty In The Cam 
Tower Occupation 
From Inside the Cam Tower, Cali, Colombia 
Monday 28th January 
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Monday 28th of January, will be remembered by all those involved in the CAM Tower 
occupation, both inside and outside the building in Cali, in Bogota, and abroad, as the most potentially dangerous day yet. That it ended without anybody being seriously 
wounded (one person was shot by a policeman but received only superficial injuries), was 
a welcome surprise. 
The day began in an atmosphere of optimism. Alexander Lopez and Luis Hernandez, 
president and vice-president of SINTRAEMCALI left the CAM Tower with bodyguards 
at 5.00am to head for the airport for the short flight to Bogota. They carried with them 
the hopes and aspirations of all those inside and outside the Tower. At the airport they 
were joined by the two community spokespeople, and together they travelled to the 
capital. Upon arrival, they found out that the government was yet again backtracking on 
the negotiations, and the union leaders took the decision to escalate the non-violent direct 
action that had been taken thus far. 
A coach load of SINTRAEMCALI workers and activists who had arrived in the capital 
several days before to build solidarity for the union's cause amongst Bogota's trade union 
and social organisations, occupied the headquarters of the Superintendency of Public 
Services at just after 10.00a. m. They were backed by both water industry workers, and 
telecommunications trade unionists in Bogota. Riot Police and army quickly surrounded 
the building, with snipers positioned on the roofs of the adjacent buildings and several 
tanks on the road below. In Cali, workers lined the streets outside the CAM Tower, and 
parked their EMCALI trucks and cars on the streets. Both of these acts were in clear 
defiance of the emergency regulations imposed by the Mayor of Cali from 6pm on Sunday 
evening until 6.00 a. m. on Tuesday morning. 
In both Bogota and Cali the situation remained tense throughout the afternoon and 
evening. In Cali at around 4.00pm, two Cali Metropolitan Policeman, on a motorbike, 
began writing down the number plates of the parked cars. When challenged by EMCALI 
workers, one of them fired a shot, which wounded ARLEY GORDILLO, a water and 
sewerage worker. Fortunately, the wound was superficial, and he was later released from 
hospital. At the time it sent alarm bells both inside and outside the building, and the 
occupying workers went into a state of red alert, preparing themselves for an eventual 
attempt by the police to enter by force. 
Meanwhile, in Bogota negotiations between the Superintendent of Public Services, and 
the SINTRAEMCALI/Community alliance broke down with virtually no progress, and 
the likelihood of both the occupations ending in violence became a real possibility. 
Frantic negotiations in Bogota between human rights representatives eventually managed 
to avert the use of force. In Cali, the massive presence of workers and supportersoutside 
the CAM Tower appeared to have a similar effect. 
By about 9.00pm things began to calm down a little, and an agreement was negotiated in 
Bogota to end the occupation at the Headquarters of the Superintendent of Public 
Services. The government pledged that it would begin serious negotiations with the 
SINTRAEMCALI/ Community Alliance on Tuesday morning. At 11.00pm, a coach 
entered the basement of the building in Bogota, and the occupying workers 
left the 
building, curtains closed to protect their identities. 
Throughout the day contact was maintained with the solidarity campaign and British trade 
union representatives who were doing what they could to prevent the use of 
force by the 
Colombian authorities, with pressure being applied at the 
highest levels. Meanwhile, the 
in-box of SINTRAEMCALI4s email account 
filled up with copies of e-mails sent to the 
Colombian Government demanding a peaceful ending to the crisis. 
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In the CAM Tower it is now 1.00a. m, and very quiet. Day 34 of the occupation began 
with optimism but quickly descended into despair. It now ends with hope that 
tomorrow's negotiations will lead to an agreement. We all cling on to that idea as we try 
to get some sleep, for the alternative is too horrible even to contemplate. 
Sintraemcali Occupation: Eyewitness Update No 13 
Total Victory for Sintraemcali And The People of Cali 
Cali, Colombia 
Tuesday 29th January 
On the 29th of January, 2002, an agreement was signed by the Colombian government, 
the Mayor of Cali, and SINTRAEMCALI to bring to an end the 35 day occupation of the 
CAM Tower. The agreement completely satisfied the three demands of the Union, which 
since the 25th of December had occupied the CAM Tower and developed a range of 
activities to ensure that EMCALI EICE ESP remains a public company. 
This agreement represents a complete victory for the workers of EMCALI, guaranteeing 
that the company will not be privatised, that there will be no price increases this year, and 
that a high level anti-corruption inquiry will begin to investigate and bring to justice all of 
those people who have siphoned off public resources from the company in recent years. 
After several days of heightened tension, which threatened to end in violent confrontation 
between workers and security forces both in Cali and Bogota, a peaceful solution is a 
welcome ending for all concerned. That this solution is also a just one, is a tribute to the 
strategy of the union leaders, the courage of all those involved both inside and outside the 
CAM Tower, and the solidarity expressed by trade unionists and activists across the 
World, and particularly in Britain. 
Let this victory give courage to all those who desire a world of peace and social justice. It 
is time to challenge the dictates of the rich and powerful. If it can be done in Colombia, 
the most dangerous countryin the World for trade unionists and activists, it can be done 
anywhere. 
Sintraemcali Occupation: Eyewitness Update Number 14 
Victory Celebrations End Historic Occupation of Cam Tower 
Cali, Colombia 
Wednesday, 30th January 
Today in Cali, the neo-liberal model, based on impoverishment of the many 
for the 
benefit of the few, has again been dealt a serious blow. 
Through the courage, dedication, 
and imagination in resistance of thousands of people, the 
CAM Tower occupation came 
to an end, and EMCALI EICE ISP remains 
in state hands, will fulfill its social role by not 
increasing prices to people who can barely afford to eat, and now 
has the power to root 
out the corruption that has plagued the company 
for years. 
Last night I spent my last night in the 
CAM Tower, with people whose dignity and 
courage has changed many peoples' 
lives, including my own. Many joked and laughed, 
others cried tears of tension and 
joy. For everyone the immensity of what they had 
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achieved was understood, and people chatted about how the 'model' can be broken, and 
of how public services such as education and health could be defended. There were lots 
of hugs, and special moments, and signs that friendships forged in these situations will 
never disappear. But most of all there was talk of the 'salidä (leaving the building). 
We had been preparing for this possible day of victory for several days, with hundreds of 
Colombian flags being sewn, and the new SINTRAEMCALI flag and symbol being 
designed. The CAM Tower has become the new symbol, with the faces of workers and 
communities surrounding it. The colours of the flag represent the ideas of the movement: 
Green for hope, White for honesty, Red for the struggle, and Black for all the members 
that have been assassinated. Around the circular perimeter is written SINTRAEMCALI : 
Por la Vida: Hasta la Vida Misma, a rough translation would be 'for life, even if we have to 
give up our own lives. '. 
The 'salida' fulfilled all the expectations, with thousands of people filling the streets, the 
Internationale playing, and the workers filing out in military parade, faces covered with 
balaclavas, flags held high, and the force and power of what had been achieved present for 
all to see. Before the 'salida' began the new four metre by three metre flag of 
SINTRAEMCALI was lowered by ropes from the 17th floor. The streets filled with the 
roar of the crowd as they watched it slowly reach the ground. Everybody outside had 
been told to wear blue jeans and white or yellow t-shirts, and as the hundreds of workers 
filed past the barricades, they entered the crowd, took their balaclavas off, and merged 
with the masses. It was a special moment for all. 
After several interventions by the strike command, community leaders, representatives of 
SINTRAEMCALI the time came for Alexander Lopez, president of the union to make 
his speech, and the crowd fell silent. He thanked everyone who had built this victory from 
the local community, the workers, the people who had occupied the Headquarters of the 
Superintendent of Public Services, and of course the women and men who had been in 
the CAM Tower. He urged everyone to celebrate this victory of the people, but only for 
today. Tomorrow everyone had to carry on in the struggle, to build in the communities a 
spirit of resistance which would drive out the corrupt oligarchy that has bled the country 
dry, and give back to the people what is rightfully theirs: everything. As the sounds of 
SINTRAEMCALI PRESENTE ended the speech, we began a march around the city's 
streets, and those who had been inside the CAM Tower for 35 
hard days, slipped away, 
silently, and as planned, to protect their security and identity. 
The occupation was over, but the danger of state and para-state 
forces taking their 
revenge is not. This was a big blow to the ruling class in Colombia, and we all need to 
stay alert for when they begin to strike back through the selective assassination of 
the 
activists and leaders involved, a practice which has made them notorious. 
One battle has 
been won, but the dirty war continues. 
Mario Novelli 
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4. List of interviewees* 
Name Gender Position/Role within SINTRAEMCALI Interview 
* Bortes Wilson Male Activist SINTRAEMCALI - inside CAM Tower July 2002 
Occupation 
* Caritas, Claudia Female Activist SINTRAEMCALI - inside CAM Tower July 2002 
Occupation 
* Casira, Helena Female Activist SINTRAEMCALI - inside CAM Tower July 2002 
Occupation 
* Castro, Ana Maria, Female Activist SINTRAEMCALI - inside CAM Tower July 2002 
Occupation 
* Durana, Maria Female Activist - Inside occupation of Superintendent of July 2002 
Public Services Headquarters, Bogota 
* Gonzalo, Astrubal Male Activist SINTRAEMCALI - inside CAM Tower July 2002 
Occupation 
*Castro, Hector Male Trade Union and Community Leader. Chief June 2002 
Education Officer for the CUT - Sub-Directive Valle 
de Cauca 
* Guttierez, Carlos Male Activist SINTRAEMCALI - inside CAM Tower July 2002 
Occupation 
*Hernan, Libiana Female Activist SINTRAEMCALI - inside CAM Tower June 2002 
Occupation 
Marta *Losada Female Local Activist involved in Strike Command July 2002 
, 
*Merce, Lillian Female SINTRAEMCALI activist - Inside occupation of July 2002 
Superintendent of Public Services Headquarters, 
Bogota 
Juan *Mercedes Male Activist SINTRAEMCALI - inside CAM Tower July 2002 , 
Diego Occupation 
* Cristian Ortega, Male Student Activist Valle University - active outside June 2002 
CAM Tower Occupation 
* Pastrana, Anita Female Activist SINTRAEMCALI - inside CAM Tower July 2002 
Occupation 
* Rosa, Marjorie Female Activist SINTRAEMCALI - inside CAM Tower June 
2002 
Occupation 
2002 l *Villegas, Herman Male Activist SINTRAEMCALI - inside CAM Tower Ju y 
Occupation 
Bejarano, Alberto Male Social and Political Front Activist and 
June 2002 
SINTRAEMCALI during CAM Tower Occupation 
Caicedo, Carlos Male Financial Officer - SINTREMCALI 
July 2002 
Celeyta, Berenice Female Head of Human Rights 
Department - July 2002 
SINTRAEMCALI 
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Del Carmen, Maria Female Journalist -SINTRAEMCALI Press Department July 2002 
Diaz, Ariel Male Head of Human Rights Department of CUT-Valle de July 2002 
Cauca Sub Directive and played leading role in 
Municipal Strike Command 
*Escobar, Cristiana Female Activist SINTRAEMCALI - inside CAM Tower July 2002 
Occupation 
Gonzalez, Carlos Male Ex President of SINTRAUNICOL-Cali and July 2002 
Spokesperson for SINTRAEMCALI during CAM 
Tower Occupation 
Hernandez, Luis Male President of SINTRAEMCALI (Vice - President July 2002 
during the CAM Tower Occupation 
Lopez Maya, Male Ex- President of SINTRAEMCALI, now member of July 2002 
Alexander the Colombian Congress for the Social and Political 
Front 
Molina, Patricia Female Community Activist and Spokesperson for July 2002 
Municipal Strike Command during negotiations 
Ramirez, Otoniel Male President of CUT-Valle de Cauca Sub Directive June 2002 
Sanchez, Nelson Male Financial Adviser to SINTRAEMCALI and head f July 2002 
Plan Pare Team 
Those marked with an asterisk * are pseudonyms to protect the identity of activists that 
were not high profile participants during the occupation 
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5. Main Themes for Interview Questions 
" Background to the Interviewees involvement with Emcali/Sintraemcali/the 
Colombian popular movement 
" Background to the movement against privatisation in Cali 
" Background to the CAM Tower Occupation 
" Interviewees role in the CAM Tower Occupation 
" Main strategies of the CAM Tower Occupation and the educational aspects of 
those strategies 
" Key events during the CAM Tower Occupation 
0 Major Obstacles during the CAM Tower Occupation 
0 Moments of hope and despair 
" Lessons that we can learn from the CAM Tower Occupation 
" Future direction of the movement against privatisation in Cali 
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6. CIP memorandum: Alvaro Uribe's government 




To: Interested Colleagues 
From: Ingrid Vaicius, Associate, Center for International Policy 
Re: Colombia: Alvaro Uribe's government and Colombian human rights defenders 
On April 30, President Alvaro Uribe of Colombia will arrive in Washington for his 
second visit since assuming office last August. Elected for his promises to intensify 
the Colombian government's decades-old fight against guerrilla and paramilitary 
groups, Mr. Uribe has implemented a series of hard-line security policies in the 
first nine months of his administration. 
Such measures as citizen informant networks and an easing of searches, wiretaps 
and "'preventive arrests" have so far brought few gains on the battlefield. Many 
Colombian human rights defenders, however, fear that these measures 
may instead end up targeting the country's peaceful opposition, which is a 
necessary element of any healthy democracy. In the past, Colombian 
governments' attempts to crack down on guerrillas have had little effect on armed 
groups, but have brought surveillance, imprisonment, threats, exile and even 
death to human rights and peace activists, labor organizers, opposition politicians, 
academics, and journalists. 
Though the Uribe government insists that its policies fall within a framework of 
"democratic security, " public comments from officials and individuals close to the 
president raise fears that this ugly pattern could repeat itself. On several 
occasions, we have been alarmed by Uribe government officials' 
unfounded accusations that peaceful advocates of reform are somehow 
tied to, or indistinguishable from, guerrilla groups. Though such comments 
raise tensions and close political space for civil society, they are rarely retracted 
or countered by President Uribe. 
Several examples follow. 
" "Brigadier General Jose Arturo Camelo, head of the Military Penal Justice 
division, while participating in a conference in Washington hosted by the 
U. S. Army on April 10 of this year, accused Human Rights NGOs of carrying 
out a 'judicial war' against the military. He also denounced that these 
organizations are 'friends of the subversives' and part of a strategy 
coordinated by the guerrillas. " - from an April 21 Human Rights Watch 
letter to President Uribe_[ fl 
" "I wouldn't say this because I have no evidence, but there's a coincidence 
of what the FARC (guerrillas) say and what these guys [the human rights 
groups] say. I'm not accusing anyone, but there's a nice coincidence. 
" - 
Gen. Carlos Ospina, commander of the Colombian Army, Washington, 
January 28,2003. [21 
" "Intelligence also has to be carried out on NGOs, 
because they are the 
ones that have damaged this country. ... 
[S]ubversive groups also work 
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with masks, they work sheltered in those organizations. " - Pedro Juan Moreno, security and intelligence advisor to President Uribe (and Uribe's 
former private secretary when governor of Antioquia) 3 
" "The friends of Mono Jojoy [the FARC guerrillas' number-two leader] and among them particularly the NGOs that receive the communion of liberation theology or those judicial wanna-be guerrillas ... the clergy of CINEP, Father Javier Giraldo, Mr. Gallon and the Jose Alvear Restrepo 
Lawyers' Collective. " - Plinio Apuleyo Mendoza, Colombia's ambassador to Portugal [4]. 
" "Colombia is the victim of an international conspiracy in which 
environmentalists and communists participate.... [T]his diabolical 
conspiracy is also carried out when members of the armed forces are brought to court without any proof or evidence.... [P]olitical scientists tell 
us that communism is dead, but the communists are not and they continue 
to have their views and their will to fracture contemporary society. 
Frequently they dress in green, so they are the Green parties, they are no 
longer the red parties because they do not attract [people], and it doesn't 
mean much, instead they are green and they are the environmentalists 
and they all come together to figure out where they are going to hit and 
they painfully hit the prestige and the livelihood of Colombians. " - Fernando Londono, the Uribe government's "super-minister" of interior and 
justice, July 10,2002, upon the release of the book Shearing the Wolf 
(Esquilando a/ Lobo), a book alleging NGO links to guerrillas published by 
Colombia's "Body of Retired Generals and Admirals"[5], 
" ""We are going to get ahead and take an offensive position regarding 
information about human rights. ... [W]e are going to stop the highhandedness and injustice of many NGOs. It is unreasonable that in the 
last year the embassy in Canada has received five thousand complaints of 
alleged human rights violations and only 20 are against the guerrillas.... 
[W]e are tired of having to follow in NGOs' footsteps, of having to dance to 
their tune. " - Fanny Kertzmann, Colombia's ambassador to Canada [6]. 
. 
11 Human Rights Watch, Letter to President Alvaro Uribe Velez (Washington: 
Human Rights Watch, April 21,2003) 
<http: //www. hrw. org/spanish/cartas/2003/uribe_defensores. html>. 
L2] Pamela Hess, "New Colombian soldiers to join fight, " UPI, (Washington: 
January 28,2003). 
"Se Destapa Pedro Juan Moreno, " Revista Cromos 4,442 (Bogota, Colombia: 
March 30,2003) <http: //www. cromos. com. co/anteriores. asp? edicion=4442>. 
[4) Plinio Apuleyo Mendoza, "Despedida, "' El Espectador (Bogota, Colombia: 
November 24,2002) 
<http: //www. elespectador. com/2002/20021124/opinion/nota7. htm>. The 
organizations and individuals named are prominent Colombian human rights 
activists. 
j5]"Ministro del Interior acusa a ecologistas de'complot mundial', " EcoNoticias 
(July 16,2002) 
<http: //www. iepe. org/econoticias/072002/16072002latin_colombia. 
htm>. 
f 6_ "Colombia encara la guerra, " El Tiempo (Bogota, Colombia: August 18,2002). 
CIP (2003) Memorandum; Alvaro Uribe'sgovernment and Colombian human rights defenders, 
April 
23'd, The Center for International Policy's Colombia Program. Available online at 
http: //www. ciponline. org/colombia/03042301. htm 
(last accessed 29/09/04) 
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7. PILOT PROJECT 1 DIPLOMA CALI 
THEMATIC CONTENT 
The Diploma will have five Modules: 
" The History and Concept of Human Rights 
" Human rights Organisations and Instruments 
" Generations of Human Rights 
" International Humanitarian Law and the Armed Conflict in Colombia. 
" Practical Tools for Human Rights Activity 
FIRST MODULE: HISTORY AND CONCEPTS 
" History of Human Rights 
" The State, Democracy, the Constitution and Human Rights. 
" Plan Colombia and Human Rights. 
SECOND MODULE: ORGANIZATIONS AND INSTRUMENTS. 
" Human rights and the international Community: the United Nations, The 
Organisation of American States, other International arenas. 
" Governmental institutions and human rights: possibilities for action, defence, and 
promotion. The Defensor del Pueblo (peoples Defender), Government Peace Office, 
Municipal Prosecutor, Red Cross, Ministry of interior Protection Programme. 
" International Labour Laws: The ILO. 
THIRD MODULE: GENERATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
" 1" Generation , the right to 
liberty, civil and political rights. 
" 2nd Generation, the right to equality, economic, social and cultural rights. 
" 3rd Generation, Solidarity Rights, Rights to Bio-diversity, development and peace. 
FOURTH MODULE: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND 
THE ARMED CONFLICT IN COLOMBIA 
The armed conflict in Colombia: Ethics and the peace Process. 
" International Humanitarian Norms and Rights 
" International Law. 
" The rights of people, the rights of communities, the struggle against impunity, 
international public opinion tribunals, the NUNCA MAS project. 
FIFTH MODULE: PRACTICAL TOOLS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVITY 
" Human Rights and revindication of social organisations, human rights and labour 




8. PETITION FOR THE DEFENCE OF EMCALI 
The removal of Juan Manuel Pulido from the management of the Municipal Company of EMCALI (EMCAIJ) by the Superintendent of Public Services, Diego Humberto 
Caicedo, and his replacement with Oscar Halim Reveiz by the government of Andres Pastrana is an act in the interests of multinational companies. Imperialist demands, as has been the case in Argentina, have necessitated the use of the State's repressive apparatus, 
which in the case of EMCALI meant that the decision coincided with the installation of 
riot police in all of EMCALI's plants. In response to this serious attack on the citizens of Cali and the imminent threat to national resources, SINTRAEMCALI has occupied the 
EMCALI tower. SINTREMCALI has the following demands: 
TO SUSPEND THE POLICY OF PRIVATISATION AND END THE 
CORRUPTION which is putting at serious risk the most important company in the city. 
This corruption exists at a range of levels and functions through a process of political 
clientelism which has devastated the company's financial liquidity which then works in 
favour of the multinationals. The management of Juan Manuel Pulido, with the support 
and agreement of SINTRAEMCALI, has virtually eliminated these chentelist practices. 
The appointment of Oscar Halim Reveiz by the Superintendent of Public Services works 
completely against the spirit of these attempts as Reveiz is himself a political appointee 
filling the quota of the Vice Minister for Planning, Federico Rengifo. Corruption is part 
and parcel of neo-liberal politics, and this government which acts as an agent for these 
policies, practices it widely. Preventing the privatisation of EMCALI is a legitimate tight 
of citizens and workers. For this reason, in response to the aggression of the 
Superintendent, we call for social protest in all its diverse forms, beginning with the Board 
of Directors of the trade union and extending to workers and citizens from 'popular' 
sections of the city. The fundamental objective is to defend EMCALI, its natural 
resources and its social capital, which for forty years has allowed the city to develop and 
has provided satisfactory public services. The sale or privatisation of the company would 
have terrible consequences for the citizens of Cali and it is well known that the only 
interests of those who advocate privatisation is to increase the profits for a few owners of 
capital at the expense of the majority, through the increase in the tariffs of public services. 
TO CREATE AN ACCEPTABLE POLICY OF TARIFFS. The removal of subsidies 
for public services, a policy which is being pursued by the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), has terrible economic consequences for poorer 
sectors of society. The implementation of such a policy benefits the owners of public 
services, particularly national and foreign banks, to the detriment of productive national 
enterprises and the social role of the state which uses subsidies to redistribute 
income. 
Furthermore it is a policy which prepares the ground for privatisation and disguises the 
real beneficiaries, the national and international investors. We oppose this 
backward policy 
and believe that through good administration, the cancer of corruption can 
be eliminated 
and it is possible to maintain low prices and provide good public services. 
TO RESPECT JUSTIFIABLE SOCIAL PROTEST AND THE DIGNITY OF 
WORKERS STRUGGLES AGAINST THE USE OF THE STATE'S REPRESSIVE 
APPARATUS TO PUSH THROUGH PRIVATISATION. This specific protest which 
we are involved in is a legitimate constitutional right. 
In the second article of the Magna 
Carta it states that "citizens have a right to full participation 
in all decisions that affect 
them in the economic, political and administrative obligations of the nation", and this 
has 
been negated by the arbitrary actions of the government. 
For this reason we are using 
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peaceful social protest through a range of means such as public assemblies, 
demonstrations, community meetings etc and we demand that the forces of law and order 
do not use judicial mechanisms to criminalise our legitimate social protest. Above all, we 
demand that we are not treated as common delinquents and that social protest is not met 
with violence. This violence in Colombia and Latin America has extended to the 
assassination of protestors. We believe that through participation of all parties we can 
find a path for the salvation of EMCALI for the benefit of the city. 
Finally, we call for a Negotiation Commission made up of the Minister of the Interior, the 
Director of National Planning, the Minister of Labour, various local authorities and 
organisations and SINTRAEMCALI. This Commission can then pave the way for a 
peaceful political solution and can put an end to the impasse brought about by the 
arbitrary actions of the national government and the Superintendent of Public Services. 
Facilitating Commission SINTRAEMCALI 
(Translated courtesy of the Colombia Solidarity Campaign) 
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9. From the press: This is how they took the 
EMCALI tower 
This remarkable article appeared in the 6th January 2002 edition of El Pais. Foryears this newspaper 
has assumed a hostile attitude to SINURAEMCALI and the interests of the workers in saving the 
corporation. 
The occupation of the Municipal Corporation building had been carefully prepared three 
months in advance. Not one detail was left to chance-Right in the middle of the day on 
25th December members of the Executive Committee of SINTRAEMCALI, the 
EMCALI Workers Union drove into all the internal parking spaces of the CAM tower. 
Although it was a strange thing to do, it did not seem that out of the ordinary. Under the 
terms of the collective agreement all the trade union leaders have free access to all 
workplaces in the corporation, at any time of day or night. That's why the security guards 
responsible for guarding the building let them enter without great difficulties, even though 
it was Christmas Day. Almost immediately hundreds of workers from the Navarro, Rio 
Cali, Rio Cauca, Ptar, Diesel I and II, Colon, San Fernando and Versalles plants started 
beating on the entrance doors. The guards were practically relieved of their posts and the 
workers assumed control of the building. That is how the occupation started of EMCALI 
administrative building, which is now completed thirteen days. 
The trade unions had been preparing to take over several of the corporation's most 
important work places. However, it was learnt on 24th December that the Army had 
reinforced its guard over the main plants, so then the administrative centre became the 
only target. 
The arrival early on Christmas Eve of the first lorry full of soldiers at the Puerto Mallarino 
water processing plant indicated to the workers on shift that something was afoot. The 
contingency plan worked out three months previously by the union to respond to 
whatever government decision on the future of the corporation was immediately enacted. 
Every one of the members had full knowledge of what they had to do 
in this type of 
situation: assume control of entry points, activate the internal communications system and 
guarantee a permanent presence in the places and sectors of greatest vulnerability at each 
one of the plants. But the Army moved quickly to control all the access points to the 
plants. 
Union President Alexander Lopez's mobile phone didn't stop ringing in the morning of 
24th December. Within 20 minutes he had received a situation report from all of the 
plants. The only area there was no report from was 
EMCALI's administrative centre, the 
CAM tower. Curiously, there was no military presence there, 
despite the concerns of the 
Municipal Administration and that it was known that something was going on. 
A senior 
official in the city council was overheard saying, 
"It's not our problem. If the Government 
wants to militarise the CAM tower, then they 
have to do it, at the end of the day 
EMCALI is in their hands". 
So the union quickly changed tack. 
"We'll be fucked if we don't act quickly", Alexander 
Lopez said to the other nine members of 
SINTRAEMCALI's executive. At that moment, 
1.00pm on 24th December, the union and the 
Municipal Administration were notified of 
the appointment of Oscar 
Halim Reveiz, replacing Juan Manuel Pulido as emergency 
Managing Director of the corporation. 
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The tasks were agreed and the responsibilities distributed under great secrecy. Each one of the union leaders was commissioned to contact the stoppage committees and put the plan into action. The occupation was to go ahead. 
At the moment of taking the building, Juan Manuel Pulido was arriving from Popayän 
where he had spent Christmas night. The mayor, Jhon Mato Rodriguez, who the Superintendent was to accuse of initiating the occupation, was elsewhere getting ready to launch the horse parade that opens the Cali Festival. 
At the two places, the EMCALI building and the Corporation Centre, from where the horsemen start the procession, there was general tension. Meanwhile inside the EMCALI 
tower the trade unionists were assuming positions, in readiness to prevent any attempt by 
the Security Forces to dislodge them. In the far north of the city the riders were readying 
their horses for the parade. 
Once in possession of the building, the trade unionists spread out to each of the 17 floors, 
but in such a way as to keep the greatest number of people at the access points. They were far away from what was happening in the rest of the city, the opening of the year's biggest 
festival. 
As soon as he was notified of the incursion Heliodoro Alfonso Roa, Commander of the 
Metropolitan Police, ordered the few men he had at his disposal - the great majority were 
out policing the horse parade - to go to the CAM tower occupation. He immediately 
communicated the news to the Mayor. 
Already harangues against the National Government could be heard emerging from inside 
the headquarters of the Municipal Corporation. The propaganda committee hung pendant 
banners down the face of the building, with posters and placards denouncing the 
privatisation of the corporation. 
The first police to arrive at the scene did not understand what was going on. Who would 
think of occupying a public building on the opening day of the Cali Festival? Nonetheless 
they mounted a security cordon and isolated the zone. Even more so when other groups 
of workers began to gather on Second Avenue North, in front of the CAM tower. In the 
north of the city the Mayor was still attending the launch of the horse parade, as were 
hundreds of other calenos. 
By now the slogans that were being chanted out from windows on the upper floors were 
receiving responses from the street. This increased the bewilderment amongst passing 
caleflos, just what was going on here, and on Christmas Day? Some, remembering the 
scenes of protest from Argentina that they had seen on television, supposed that it was a 
protest against unemployment. 
A few yards away, in Correo Square, some hundreds of citizens were contending with 
each other to get the best place to watch the horse parade pass by. And only a very few 
were aware that something odd was going on in front of the CAM tower, where some 
skirmishes were taking place between the building's occupants and the police. The 
commander of the Metropolitan Police, meanwhile, was awaiting instructions from the 
Mayor as to how to proceed with protesters occupying the administrative headquarters of 
the most important public service corporation in the south west of the country. 
Towards 6.00pm the Mayor arrived at the scene and asked to meet with the union's 
leaders. Lopez, Hernandez and other co-ordinators of the occupation authorised the entry 
of the Mayor and a group of journalists. 
For the first time in many months Jhon Maro 
Rodriguez walked without bodyguards. After a 20 minute meeting 
in the Managing 
Director's room, now occupied by the workers, the mayor abandoned the 
building 
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without letting out a word. The occupation of the building was not going to be 
withdrawn. 
Inside the EMCALI tower fear and uncertainty were growing because of a possible 
eviction by the Police. There was speculation that the Military Police would intervene, a 
unit specialising in this type of public order situation. 
That night, the first of twelve that have passed up to now, the guards were doubled at the doors giving access to the building, and in the basements and the CAM terrace. Other 
teams were dispatched to the twelfth, thirteenth and fifteenth floors where there are 
communication passages connected to the Mayor's building. 
Meanwhile a delegation designated by the Mayor, consisting of the Secretary of Government Jorge Ivan Ospina, the ombudsman Fernando Montoya, the People's 
Defender Hernando Toro, and the Regional Prosecutor Gloria Edith Ramirez tried to 
persuade the trade unionists to leave the building. They only reached an agreement that 
the Security Forces would not be allowed to enter. Almost nobody slept that first night, 
which for many was their first experience of being in an occupation. Others had already 
participated in the one that was carried out in 1999 to demand the reunification of the 
corporation. 
On 26th December the zone was threatened by strong control of the authorities. Public 
access to the Municipal Adminstration offices was totally restricted. In front of the CAM 
tower some officials from EMCALI and the Municipality started to gather. The slogans 
returned. Only now they were mixed with the music of Carlos Prueba and Mercedes Sosa, 
and being relayed through sound equipment. 
At 6.00am the toilet and health committee started its rounds of each of the 17 stories, 
checking on the condition of their comrades in struggle. On the second day a worker had 
to be evacuated by Red Cross because he had difficulty in breathing. By 9.00am everyone 
must be washed and ready to take part in the day's activities. For this the showers that 
exist in the bathrooms of some offices were used. For the men's bathing, the water 
workers set up a system to shower groups at a time. 
Five workers were commissioned to prepare food that at 7.30am, 12.30pm and 6.00pm is 
brought into the building, with oversight from the Police and checked by the 
ombudsman's staff. On 29th December six cartridges for a 38 revolver were discovered 
hidden in the bread. 
A great big stove - "the eating house of EMCALI" - was set up next to the energy plant 
on one of the sides of the CAM building. This is where the team of five prepare the food. 
A pig that was slaughtered in the Navarro plant made up part of the menu. 
On the last night of the year the occupants of the EMCALI building gathered around the 
windows to look out onto Second Avenue North, to join in the act of solidarity organised 
by their friends and families to back the occupation. That was how they celebrated the 
New Year. As far as that day was concerned, 31 st December, the vent was well attended: 
more than two thousand people met in front of the CAM. 
The final speech, one of the 
most emotional, was given by ex-managing Director Juan 
Manuel Pulido. 
At 12.00pm the National Anthem and SINTRAEMCALI's song were played, managing 
to move even the security police. And as though all were 
in agreement, there was an 
immense and prolonged silence. "Happy New Year! 
Viva SINTRAEMCALI! " called the 
announcer over the sound system. 
Only a few responded, for all the others had a lump in 
their throat and were silently wiping away the tears that, 
in the emotion of the moment, 
they could not hold back. 
The arrival of 2002 saw the occupation moving 
forward. Even though all the bustle of the 
year end had not allowed much advance 
in the search for solutions in the new conjuncture 
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confronting the corporation. Inside the occupation everything went on as normal. Those 
responsible for security and guarding the building's doors kept taking their shifts every 
two hours. During the day, in every one of the floors, there were courses on trade 
unionism, motivation and even systems with the aim of keeping the personnel occupied. 
In each storey clean floors in some offices and desks are available for sleeping on, which 
the men and women do separately. 
At 10.00pm the health commission does the same round as in the morning, this time to 
make sure that everyone is sleeping. 
With this daily life, and some negotiations in which neither of the parties back down, is 
how the occupation has already passed thirteen days inside the Cali Municipal 
Corporation EMCALI building. 
(Translated courtesy of the Colombia Solidarity Campaign) 
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10. Sample Email Messages of Solidarity 
Received by Sintraemcali 
I am writing to express my 
admiration for your courageous stand in 
opposition to the efforts to undermine 
democracy still further by transferring 
public assets to unaccountable private 
hands, and thus shrinking the space for 
democratic participation and control - 
and also, rather typically, enriching some 
corrupt politicians and foreign investors. I 
understand very well the hazards faced in 
Colombia by working people and others 
who try to defend human rights, including 
elementary civil rights. And would like to 
express my strong support for you in 
these critically important endeavours, and 
hope for your success, very soon. 
Long live international solidarity!!! 
For the Indonesian Federation of 
Trade Unions, GSBI 2000 
I remain, 
S. Santoso 






Brother and Sister!!!!!!! 
Strong support from grassroots 
NGO's in Papua New Guinea (PNG). 
You are an inspiration to all in your self 
less stand for justice. We are keeping a 
close eye on your courageous struggle. 
We are with you in spirit. Hang in there 
with the good fight 
Bismarck/Ramu Group (BRG) 
Madang, PNG 
29/01/02 
Warmest greeting from 
Indonesian workers!!!!!!!!!! 
It is encouraging and inspiring 
what you all have been doing in Cali. 
Workers and students work hand in hand 
to defend their lives from privatization, a 
ruthless practice of neo liberalism. Your 
actions and the aftermath of it at the 
local, national and international, prove 
that we have really nothing to lose but 
our chains..!!! 
These actions are necessary, 
otherwise more misery is in 
front. 
It is really encouraging and 
The National Democratic Front of 
the Phillipines (NDFP) expresses its firm 
support for the just demands and legal mass 
action of SINTRAEMCALI and conveys its 
earnest desire that the negotiations between 
the SINTRAEMCALI/Community Alliance, 
the Mayor of Cali and your government 
which will begin in Bogota tomorrow, 
Monday 28th January 2002, will be fruitful for 
the good of the SINTRAEMCALI/Community 
Alliance, their families and supporters and 
for the people of Colombia in general. 
The NDFP joins many other 
people's organizations and movements in 
different parts of the world in supporting the 
legitimate and peaceful action of 
SINTRAEMCALI. We vigorously oppose any 
plan to use violence against 
SINTRAEMCALI and their supporters. Any 
such use of military violence against 
SINTRAEMCALI will surely be met with 




*Author's note: all emails were sent to 
the Campana Prohibido Olvidar email. 
inspiring since we have the same cause. 
U 
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Colombian Embassy Faced TUC Delegation and Combined Picket 
The TUC delegation and joint mass picket of the 
Colombian Embassy on Friday 25th January were very 
successful. The delegation was led by John Monks, 
General Secretary of the TUC and Lord Brett of the ILO 
and consisted of senior representatives from seven 
trade unions: Ken Cameron (Fire Brigades Union and 
Justice for Colombia), Mick Rix (ASLEF traindrivers), 
Judy McKnight (NAPO probation officers), Anita Halpin 
(NUJ journalists), Billy Hayes (CWU 
communication/postal workers), Alison Shepherd 
(UNISON public sector), Steve Sinnott (NUT teachers) 





The delegation expressed its general concern at the 
high numbers of assassinations of Colombian trade 
Lord Brett pointed out to the Colombian ambassador that putting arrest warrants on Alexander was 
declaring him a target for the paramilitaries, and insisted that the charges be dropped. The TUC is very 
by newspaper reports that Cali's mayor is threatening to use force to break into the occupation next 
In the meantime the picket was building up to 100 strong. There 
were representatives of other unions, a contingent of hospital 
workers from UNISON and a group of students from Sussex 
University. Two friends had traveled from Liverpool to join the 
picket line. Gloria )aramillo taught the waiting British trade 
unionists some of the slogans used in the Colombian 
movements. "Companeros de SINTRAEMCALI no estan solos, 
estamos con Ustedes! " SINTRAEMCALI - Presente! ". Andy 
Higginbottom passed on greetings from Alexander Lopez and pý 
called for further mobilisations to stop the privatisation. "After 
ýýýý 
ý` '1 
one month in occupation this dispute has reached its critica l 
point, the outcome hangs in the balance. We are on the verge of 
an historic victory, a popular mobilisation to block privatisation. EM(A We have a rare opportunity to make a real difference in the 
struggle against the multinationals". Richard Solly drew attention ýý 
to the house arrest of lawyer Armando Perez, for daring to stand 
up to the US multinational Exxon running the El Cerejon 
coalmine. Dan Gladesbrook president of Sussex students, UNISON members, and Latin America specialist David Raby 
stepped forward to pledge their solidarity with the SINTRAEMCALI occupation. 
John Monks reported back to the picket on behalf of the delegation. Ambassador Victor Ricardo admitted that the 
British trade union leaders seemed to know more about the situation in Cali than he did, and he was even receiving 
faxes to brief him during the meeting. The ambassador had complained that the Prosecutor General had not informed 
him of what was happening on Alex's case, and promised to relay all the concerns expressed by the delegation 
back to 
Pastrana. John Monks was very firm that the TUC considers the situation in Cali of great concern to the trade union 
movement in Britain and internationally. 
Colombia Solidarity Campaign, available at 
http" / /www colombiasolidarityora uk/Solidarity%205 /picket. html 
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12. Only Triumph will make Social Justice 
and Dignity Possible in the New Year 
New Year's message to the workers of SINTRAEMCALI and the people of Cali From the Centro Adrninistrativo Municipal - EMCALI - CAM Tower 
Comrades, friends, families, fathers, mothers, sons, daughters, brothers, to all of 
you, and in a very special way to the workers who are heroically resisting here in the 
name of the people of Cali, of the Cauca Valley and of Colombia, today is 31st 
December 2001. Right at this moment in many places in the world hundreds of 
children are dying of hunger, peasants are being forced off their land, and 
thousands of workers are far from their homelands and their families. 
Today, like yesterday, while some enjoy the exploitation of others, people like 
ourselves rise up with banners high resisting a return to the days of slavery. 
From inside and outside the EMCALI tower, we must give birth to a better future 
for our families, by defending our rights and those of the people of Cali. The 
historic example that today we give to the world will be written in the pages 
recording the dignity of peoples. 
Justice and perseverance are the fundamental conditions of this struggle. What good 
would it do us if today we were at home, fulminating in defeat, with EMCALI 
liquidated and in the hands of those few who want to appropriate it by force? What 
would we be celebrating if we were not here defending our corporation, which is 
for all the people of Cali, as we are today? Would we be celebrating the prospect of 
being out of work, having handed over what we have built with our sweat and 
efforts over so many years? 
We have a clear objective, and we are perfectly determined and conscious that life is 
at stake. We are not going to yield, neither today, nor in 2002, nor in the years to 
come. We will not allow neoliberal policy and privatisation to tear away out rights 
and include us in the long list of unemployed in our country. 
This peaceful occupation is a new push to save EMCALI. We have already 
demonstrated through the Stop programme, through Work Brigades, Work without 
Bonus and the strategic plan, that it is possible to administer a State Corporation 
honestly and transparently. The dimensions of this struggle are incalculable, for it is 
the continuity of historical efforts. We should not forget that EMCALI, the 
Municipal Corporation of Cali, is the result of the glorious struggles of the workers 
in Cali in the 1930s, under the leadership of the workers leaders Ignacio Torres 
Giraldo and Julio Rincön. They led workers' mobilisations that created EMCALI, 
foiling the North American companies who were trying to get the business of 
supplying water, sewerage and the then new born telephone system to the city. 
We 
are indebted to this is proletarian inheritance, and we too must 
live up to the legacy 
of our class. 
Today we ask, Who are really responsible for the current 
bankruptcy of EMCALI, 
expressed in an external and internal public 
debt of more than 900,000 million 
pesos [ (265 million ]? When will there 
be real judgement of the politicians 
responsible for the terrible management of the corporation 
in previous 
administrations under bi-partisan Liberal and 
Conservative political rule? 
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EMCALI was a case study of all forms of corruption and administrative shambles, 
these have been denounced by the trade union. But more than 1,000,000,000 pesos 
was lost, and that is what today compromises the economic viability of invaluable 
public assets. 
EMCALI has an average cash flow of a million US dollars a day, it provides 
domestic services to over 1.5 million users in the metropolitan area. 83% of our 
users receive subsidies from the social fund by virtue of the fact that EMCALI has 
formal status as an Industrial and Commercial State Corporation. 
The principal point to take into account is that if the corporation is not kept as a 
state supplier, it is forecast that users will be transferred to financially aggressive 
companies, and they will demand continuing increases in their charges for services. 
The likely result, according to SINTRAEMCALI and our representative's 
calculations, besides the Superintendent of Public Services own projections, is a rise 
in 2002 in charges for water supply, sewerage and telephone services of 30% for the 
highest strata of the population, and increases of up to 100% for the badly off 
sectors in strata 1,2 and 3. 
Take into account also that due to government policy the monthly minimum wage 
in Colombia will not be increased by more than 8% in year 2002 [barely keeping 
pace with inflation], and that is without the thousands of sackings predicted in the 
coming year. Besides which, in speaking of Cali we are speaking of a population that 
is currently suffering one of the sharpest economic and social crises in our history, 
as is indicated by the following facts: 
70% of Cali's population (estimated as two million inhabitants according to the last 
national census) does not receive income of more than two minimum salaries. 
[Note: the minimum salary is only [90 a month. Progressive commentators 
estimate that four minimum salaries are needed to allow a family to live with any 
dignity]. According to the figures of the Education Secretary for Cali Council 
200,000 children do not have access to the education system. 
As far as health is concerned, we can see how the clinics and hospitals have become 
battle zones, where by the minute human lives are lost that could be saved were 
they to receive the required attention. Life expectancy in Cali has fallen since 1985, 
in the popular sectors of the city have seen the reappearance of epidemic illnesses 
such as tuberculosis which had been controlled in previous times. 51% of the 
population is not covered by the health system. In the city of Cali there is a housing 
deficit of more than 100,000 units. The proportion of the urban population living 
under the poverty line has increased from 30% to 40% in the last decade. The 
proportion population of the provincial capital's population in destitution 
has 
reached 10%. That is to say one in ten calenos is destitute and in absolute poverty. 
[Note: The official test for this is set extremely low, able to obtain one meal a 
day. ] 
From 1997 unemployment rates have a three year average of 21%. 
This is how 
things are, more than a fifth of the economically active population are unemployed. 
Finally, according to figures from the National Plan and the 
Bank of the Republic, 
3,700 productive corporations were closed or liquidated 
in the Cauca Valley 
through the course of the 1990s. 
This social and economic panorama cannot resist the 
impact of excessive increases 
in charges for public services as are being predicted through the 
liquidation of 
EMCALI and the privatisation of its services, which 
is what the National 
Government is trying to do. All of this is orchestrated from the capital, with the 
cowardly complicity of the political class 
in this region, who are responsible not 
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only for the crisis in the corporation but also for the high degree of social and 
economic decomposition of the population in the Cauca Valley. 
The Superintendent of Public Services is a den of neoliberal corruption, as can be 
seen by the previous superintendent, Dr. Enrique Yanez who is now in prison for 
corruption. And the current superintendent, Dr. Diego Humberto Caicedo, has 
been denounced by the Trade Union for activities in the past linking him to false 
declarations, swindling and irregular management of State moneys. Out 
denouncement has not been taken up by the communication media in Colombia, 
that opted not to report the news. This fits into the framework of impunity that 
characteristic the anti-social and corrupt regime to which the President of the 
Republic is himself committed. 
Why not struggle? Why not fight? 
Why should we resign ourselves to suffering the dictatorship and oppression of the 
national government and the bi-partisan political class? We will make all the 
sacrifices that may be necessary in this struggle, but never will we suffer injustice 
and defamation without doing anything. 
It is said that we are disobedient for being here in the tower. Well we say long live 
civil disobedience fighting for the people, for our sovereignty, for our country! And 
it is said that we are rebels. Well we say long live rebellion! What can never be said is 
that we have lain down in the face of tyranny. 
With this new protest action we are giving rebirth to building the workers story, in 
the real search for peace with social justice for which so yearned for by the people 
of the Cauca Valley and the Colombian people. 
We are convinced that this is a small contribution to the hope for a secure future 
for the coming generations of young people, of boys and girls who are growing up 
in a city which is today hostile, unjust, and mortgaged to the market of capitalist 
misery and ignominy. 
The calendars say that today is 31st December, however for the workers of 
EMCALI it is another day and night of struggle and tireless resistance. A final 
greeting to the neighborhoods, to the common people, to the city's nomadic 
inhabitants, who we love and defend so much, and to the families who have broken 
their plans to celebrate the New Year alongside us the workers. Be sure that this 
action will not lose its way and that this land will 
be reborn in democracy and 
dignity. 
For us nothing... for all, Everything 
We are from you and for you. 
SINTRAEMCALI - Presente. 
Alexander Lopez 
Presidente Junta Directiva 
Sindicato de Trabajadores de las Empresas Municipales de Cali 
SINTRAEMCALI - READY TO STRUGGLE 
FOR THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF THE COLOMBIAN PEOPLE 
(Translated courtesy of the Colombia Solidarity 
Campaign) 
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13. Background to the Occupation in 
Bogota 
On the Wednesday before (23/01/04) the Bogota Occupation a group of over 100 
Sintraemcali, local trade union and community activists had travelled to Bogota on a 
mission which few knew the focus of (Interview with Liliana Merce, 2002, pp6). 
That night three busloads full of people were bid farewell by Robinson Masso, 
Angel Tovar and Oscar Figueroa - all of them leaders of the union, who had left 
the occupation as part of the `negotiating' team. They wished them luck and sent 
them on their way. Few of those on the bus had any idea of what they had 
committed themselves to. They were all told to say that, if stopped, they were 
going on holiday (there were 3 buses, with around 100 people). The people on 
those buses were not just Sintraemcali activists. There were also members 
Sintradepartamento de Cali (Cali Civil Servants Union), students from the local state 
University - Universidad del Valle, local community activists and members of 
SINTRAUNICOL, the University workers union. Interestingly, the members of 
SINTRAUNICOL that joined the action, were all participants on a trade union 
training course, which they decided to suspend when the occupation began so that 
they could get involved. The crucial role of SINTRAUNICOL in the whole 
occupation at various levels is important to note. (Interview with Berenice Celeyta, 
2002, pp26) 
The following morning they arrived in Bogota, the capital of Colombia. They were 
provided with a roof over their head from the trade union of the ETB (Electricity 
Workers union of Bogota) and rumours amongst the group spread as to what the 
objective would be. Most guessed that it would be a further occupation, but many 
thought it would be the headquarters of the ILO in Colombia or perhaps the 
United Nations to raise the profile of the human rights situation. But they had 
arrived in Bogota at a very difficult time for carrying out a direct action. On the 
Friday a bomb had gone off in the centre of Bogota leaving five people dead and 
the streets were highly militarised (El Occidente, 2002, Bomba en Bogota: cinco 
muertos, 26/01/02). Over the following three days they weren't allowed to move 
about much, and rumours abounded as to what the potential target might 
be. 
All those who had made the trip to Bogota would not ultimately 
be joining the 
occupation (Interview with Arial Diaz, 2002, p23). It was an 
individual decision, and 
about thirty decided not to stay and returned back to 
Cali on one of the buses. But 
most stayed on, received their orders, and were split 
into `squadrons' that would 
carry out and control different areas of the 8 
floor building that they were about to 
take over. 
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Terrorist Plan to assassinate opponents of the current 
administration discovered 
Press Bulletin by Congress Representative ALEXANDER LOPEZ 
Bogota, 27th August 2004 
Two raids carried out by officers from the Technical Research Unit [CTI - Cuerpo Tecnico de Investigaciones] of the Attorney General's office [Fiscalia General de la Naciön] in Cali and Medellin have led to the discovery that the Colombian Army supplied classified information to an international corporate 
consultancy expert in security investigations. 
The connection was made through Lieutenant Colonel Julian Villate, 
military identity number 7217167. The purpose was to obtain precise details on the 
political positions, habits, activities and above all the vulnerability in the daily 
movements of opposition leaders who have death threats against them, including 
political, trade union and social movement leaders as well as human rights 
defenders. It seems that the Fiscalia found what amounts to a parallel intelligence 
network that operates not only with the collaboration of the Army's 3rd Brigade, 
but also involves the Superintendent of Public Services, the management of Cali 
Municipal Corporation, EMCALI; the Intelligence Service of the National Police, 
SIPOL; the National Electrical Finance body, FEN; the Ministry of the Interior; the 
Administrative Security Department, DAS and the Cali Metropolitan Police. 
These state bodies knew about, collaborated with, endorsed, and above all 
gave full support to the intelligence gathering operations of CONSULTORIA 
INTEGRAL LATINOAMERICANA, CIL and an associated company by the 
name of SERASYS with which they exchanged special information on the 
processes to liquidate several public corporations. The corporations include the 
Barranquilla Telephone Company; Tolima Electric and the public service 
corporation EMCALI all of which are in the process of liquidation and 
privatisation. The army officer tried to justify his presence in the place where the 
raid took place and his possession of various confidential documents - now 
included in the case - arguing that he had been part of CIL, to which he referred as 
"our company". This circumstance is causing concern for the Fiscalia. By this 
statement the officer recognised his double role: on the one hand as a member of 
the National Army and on the other as a private investigator paid by CIL. 
Villate maintained that CIL was contracted by EMCALI and the 
Superintendent of Public Services to carry out an analysis of the economic, financial 
and political- social reality of the corporation, that would try and suggest actions in 
strategic terms to guarantee its viability. In the raid on apartment 301, Castle 
Buildings Number 8N-37 on 4th Avenue North in Cali, the investigators found a 
folder marked "SECRET" with 21 files inside. The manuscript had been forwarded 
on 24th May 2003 from Santiago de Cali by the MILITARY INTELIGENCE 
OF 
ARMY REGIONAL INTELLIGENCE No 3 to the colonel Central Director of 
Intelligence in Bogota. The document was numbered internally under the reference: 
093 CIME-RIME3-INT4-252. Several mobile telephones were found as were hand 
written notes alluding to "Operation Dragon". Besides, the Fiscalia 
found a black 
leather notebook that included 38 pages recording such information as the names, 
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telephone numbers and addresses of individuals. There was a specific note on the 
campaign headquarters of Congressman ALEXANDER LOPEZ, which had a detailed description of the property. 
The Fiscalia raided this residence because it was explicitly mentioned in a 
secret report received by Congressmen that affirmed, amongst other things, the 
existence of a plan to assassinate the Congress Representative that would be carried 
out that same week and that a large sum of money had been paid to those due to 
execute the operation. 
In all the documents found in the Cali raid - including those of the Army - 
curiously, emphasis is made on the political activities of members of the Polo 
Democrätico [Democratic Pole], the Frente Social y Politico [Social and Political 
Front], the Alternativa Democrätica [Democratic Alternative], the MOIR 
[Revolutionary and Independent Workers Movement] and Congress 
Representatives WILSON BORJA, GUSTAVO PETRO, MARIA ISABEL 
URRUTIA, CARLOS GAVIRIA, JORGE ENRIQUE ROBLEDO, LUIS 
CARLOS AVELLANEDA, the Governor of Valle department ANGELINO 
GARZON, Mayor of Bogota, LUIS EDUARDO GAZON marked out in these 
reports as supporting the objectives of the insurgency and creating spaces to 
advance humanitarian interchange [a reference to exchange of prisoners held by the 
FARC and the state authorities. 
Days before Congress Representative ALEXANDER LOPEZ had been 
advised of a definite plan to assassinate first himself, then followed on the list by 
BERENICE CELEYTA the President of NOMADESC [Association for Research 
and Social Action], and LUIS HERNANDEZ the president of SINTRAEMCALI. 
This triggered Lopez's denouncement to the Fiscalia of the threatened assassination 
attempt. 
Most serious of all is that the person who provided the said information was 
categoric about the direct relation between active and retired military personnel. 
This source highlights in particular the action of Colonel GERMAN HUERTAS 
CABRERA, chief of security at EMCALI who has launched a strong polemic in the 
interests of President ALVARO URIBE VELEZ concerning the privatisation of 
the public services corporation. 
The documents found in the raid corroborate that in effect there are parallel 
organisations contracted by the government to eliminate the political and social 
opposition in Colombia. 
(English version Translated by Colombia Solidarity Campaign) 
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Picture 1. One of the women workers inside the CAM 
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picture 2: The CAM 
Tower' The central 
administration 
building of EMC ALL 




Picture 3. Occupying Workers on the 
adjacent roof to the CAM Tower. 
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Picture 4 Picket organised by the Colombia Solidarity 
Campaign outside the US Embassy in London, UK in 
opposition to Plan Colombia, July 2001. Luis Hernandez 
(Vice President of SINTRAEMCALI) is in the centre of 
the picture (light blue shirt). 
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Picture 5: Occupying Workers 
Take Control Of the Managing Director's Office. 
.. _s UEbr rb f 4P 
__,.,.. ý,. ý_. T- _. ý_,,, T ti. __ 
Irr- 
nib 
Picture 6. The Stage of Dignity and 
Resistance opposite the CAM Tower. 
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Picture 7. Live Video link up with the 
TUC from inside the CAM Tower 
Occupation. At the table from right to 













Picture 8. Juan Manuel Pulido, the sacked Managing 
Director of EMCALI speaking at the Form on Public 
th Services, January 8,2002. 
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Picture 9. Local communities mobilising 
for the January 8`' demonstration in 
defence of public services in Cali. 
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Picture 10. Alexander Lopez and several other leaders of 
SINTRAEMCALI leave the CAM Tower on January 17th to 





Picture It. Alexander Lopez (President of 
SINTRAEMCALI) and Luis Hernandez 
(Vice President of SINTRAEMCALI) on 
January 30th 2002. In the background is the 
new SINTRAEMCALI flag with the CAM 
Tower at the centre and the community 
surrounding it. 
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